A good beginning may be made by agreeing to establish a line of communication between important sectors and formations on the LoC to allow interaction between field commanders.

Lt-Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)THE nearest to an official and written ceasefire agreement at the LoC is only enshrined in the subtext of the Simla Agreement of July 2, 1972. However, since then, LoC soldiering has assumed a different colour. It’s not just about preserving the ‘sanctity of the LoC’ with Pakistan, an adage well known to Indian Army officers; it’s much to do with proving a couple of points.  First, which is the more macho Army and, by extension, the more macho nation? Second, which is the more professional army? Yet, more importantly, it’s all about ‘moral ascendancy’. I can’t remember a definition of the term in any Indian Army publication; perhaps the Pakistanis may be having something of their own. Nevertheless, since it is a task spelt out to every LoC commander, it does deserve an analysis of its interpretation and what affect that has on the attitude towards and manifestation of ceasefire.On the face of it, moral ascendancy is all about being professionally more competent than your adversary. However, the most important aspect is motivation and morale. There are increasing instances in which units of the two armies, which faced each other in Siachen or later days of Kargil 1999, are coming back face to face once again at the LoC. The antipathy then was much higher. All this is fine. It’s when the lead begins to fly around that problems arise. Even worse, when rogue actions from across the LoC  involve bestial acts such as beheading, they have to be responded to. Otherwise, the moral ascendancy slips and that’s not acceptable by a mile or more.It’s not as if ceasefire infringements commenced only in 1989, the year when Pakistan decided to launch its proxy war to exploit the fast-track changes the world was then undergoing. The moral ascendancy game was in play through the late seventies and eighties, but with one difference: there was no infiltration of terrorists. Immediately after 1989, the LoC got associated primarily with infiltration; terror sponsors in Pakistan found that the simplest way of forcing gaps in deployment to effect infiltration was to push Indian ambushes, deployed in the open, into their posts which had overhead protection (OHP) from fire. Even with the construction of the LoC fence, although partial OHP exists at ambush sites, it is the resultant chaos from shelling and small arms fire that assists in infiltration.On November 26, 2003, Pakistan took a decision to vigorously implement the ceasefire and abide by it. Although it appeared unilateral and India has never made it look any different, the truth is that some behind-the-scene parleys did assist in reaching that stage where Pakistan could announce its ‘offer’. There was no official document signed by the two sides, although recorded announcements to abide by it made it appear as a de facto agreement. Infiltration attempts continued as before, but at reduced levels. Why President Musharraf accepted, or as claimed, even initiated the ‘proper implementation’ of the 1972 ceasefire remains a mystery to the day. Analysis of initiatives which characterised the Vajpayee premiership is a subject by itself, but there was a Vajpayee-Musharraf moment which captured the essence of what could have been the grounding for an improved Indo-Pak relationship. The ceasefire was probably the result of that. Many a Pakistani strategic analyst I have spoken with has failed to identify the Musharraf thought process. And Pervez Musharraf today is in search of another identity; he would preferably disassociate himself with the ceasefire.The LoC remained quiet almost till 2009 when one segment in the Krishna Ghati sector erupted and has never quieted thereafter. Siachen has remained a model of the ceasefire as much as has been Kargil. This gives weight to the argument that breaches of ceasefire take place in infiltration-prone areas because there is no infiltration in the Ladakh zone. Paradoxically, larger attempts at infiltration have been made in the Machil, Keran, Tangdhar and Lipa sectors of the Valley, but very few breaches of ceasefire have occurred there. In recent years, the major LoC exchanges have all been south of the Pir Panjal and along the International Border (IB), the latter being held by the BSF. The area has little terrorist presence, but some sleeper agents continue to exist. However, the area is more vulnerable to transient terror through infiltration of suicide squads (fidayeen) due to the shorter distances and potential of single-night operations. Currently, the prime reasons for the breach of ceasefire by the Pakistani side revolve around a few factors. 1 Firstly, infiltration continues to play a role, irrespective of the explanations above. 2 Secondly, the LoC offers the easiest location for the demonstration of violence for the international community to take note that the J&K conflict continues to fester; it is Pakistan’s abiding interest to prove this despite being a signatory to the bilateral clause of the Simla Agreement. Earlier, major terror attacks sponsored by Pakistan preceded big ticket events such as high-profile international visits to South Asia or even the annual UN General Assembly session. With better Indian control over J&K, it isn’t easy to do that; the LoC becomes the next best symbol for demonstration. 3 Thirdly, the Hindu populated areas of the Jammu IB or LoC belt get targeted to cause more angst within J&K and, indeed, within India and enhance the communal temperature to Pakistani advantage. 4 Fourthly, Pakistani friendly jihadi elements such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiyaba (LeT) maintain their relevance through shallow infiltration and attempted terrorist actions against objectives closer to the LoC, as shown by the Uri and Mohra attacks in the Jhelum Valley. 5 Lastly, with increasing political ambitions of the jihadi groups of Hafiz Sayeed and Masood Azhar, spectacular acts at the LoC or deeper in the hinterland will continue so as to draw attention and attraction.In the light of the history of the ceasefire, the fact that it hardly exists today and the harder response by India without remorse, the feasibility of returning to 2003 remains remote. It could have happened with PM Modi’s initiative of December 25, 2015, or may still find life in a sudden unprovoked peace-related trigger. The advantage of keeping the LoC hot finds favour with Pakistan, but once a threshold is crossed, India will not disfavour a more robust response. Pakistan’s intent is to somehow bring the UN military observers into the scene so as to internationalise the issue and rescind the provisions of the Simla Agreement. The initiative for the ceasefire cannot come from India because the triggers come from Pakistan. It is up to Gen Qamar Bajwa to find his own moment if peace is to return to the LoC; the chances of that in 2018 appear more remote than ever. A good beginning may be made by agreeing to establish a line of communication between important sectors and formations on the LoC to allow interaction between field commanders.

In one frame: India should facilitate ASEAN ties and not be seen as a cog in the wheel.

Sandeep Dikshit

PRIME  Minister Narendra Modi had us decidedly in thrall with the India-ASEAN commemorative summit. Disbelievers will dismiss it as yet another extremely well-crafted event; that the PM got 10 times as much camera time greeting his chief guests than he would have had with one, unless a Trump or an Obama was on the Republic Day podium.Like the 2015 Africa Union summit, this wasn’t a turnout of leaders from countries only the inveterate foreign policy wallah could relate to. Situated across the Indo-China cultural fault line, each of the ASEAN countries hosts Indian diasporas and the subcontinent’s cultural footprint. These are the places an average Indian, outside his shores, feels most comfortable in.The enormous energy of the Indian state devoted to persuading 10 heads of state to simultaneously attend the Republic Day parade served well the government’s own description about its management of foreign policy. The New India definitely seems to be on the march: there were Netanyahu’s gushing words for India and Modi; Indian diplomats and military officials huddle with peers from the US, Australia and Japan as part of a Great Game in the South China Sea; the PM’s serenading of world leaders touches unexplored dimensions with equally hearty reciprocity.The chink in this grand alliance-in-the making is the extraordinary focus on maritime cooperation with near-neighbours and the strained political relationship with two neighbours with disputed land borders. This brings with it factors that seek to limit Indian influence. Pakistan is a stumbling block only in Afghanistan. Its posture of inveterate hostility to India compels only a few Arab countries to recalibrate their ties: Saudi Arabia’s security ties with Pakistan, for instance, are too intimate to entertain a military dalliance with India. The China factor does not complicate India’s calculations in dealing with West Asia as yet, though that could change. India has a default advantage in Europe because of the EU’s proscription on military trade with China on human rights considerations.But China does matter in the ASEAN. In fact, Trump’s presence at the previous ASEAN summit overshadowed its political turnaround since the US set it up as a grouping of nations under its military umbrella to check communist influence. The countries which ASEAN was supposed to counter — Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia — have joined the club.The foreign travel itinerary of top leaders from Vietnam, the ASEAN member reckoned to be most at odds with China, reveals its careful balancing: every high-level Vietnamese visit to Washington, New Delhi or Tokyo is carefully set-off against a stopover in Beijing. In deference to China, Vietnam narrowed the terms of MoU with India promising it oil wells in the South China Sea. Vietnam had promised to allot the wells during the tenure of Manmohan Singh when Indian political management of ties with China was a key South Block priority. The narrowing of Vietnam’s offer took place when Sino-Indian ties were in a prolonged trough.Despite a background of occasional military clashes with China on the South China Sea dispute, not one of the 10 ASEAN countries has shown inclination to be drawn in an adversarial alliance of extra maritime powers. The ASEAN’s feeble desire for a military option towards China grates uncomfortably against India’s enthusiastic endorsement of the Quad concept: four democracies with large navies ensuring a free Indo-Pacific. It began with the ASEAN summit that Trump attended. There was a veneer of a political alliance with no military overtones at the first Quad meeting because the conferrers were all career diplomats. But the symbolism about its military fist was not lost when naval chiefs from all the four Quad nations — Australia, India, the US and Japan — appeared together at an event generously underwritten by the Indian Foreign Office.India’s troubled security and political ties with China have a spillover effect on the economic front in ASEAN. The Chinese projects on the north-south axis are at an advanced stage of implementation. India has proposed projects mostly on an east-west axis and needs to activate consultation channels with China to ensure they are not dead in water.The Chinese advantage of being a much early entrant in ASEAN is visible in the form of the world’s biggest industrial supply chain that begins from East and South East Asia and terminates in China. India needs to integrate more of its industrial sectors into this supply chain just like its automotive industry that now provides quality employment to millions of skilled Indians.Sometime in future, India will have to pay back ASEAN for its leaders taking the trouble of travelling to India in unison to boost PM Modi’s domestic rankings. A consultative approach with China to integrate Indian business into the global supply chain may not work out after New Delhi’s security managers badly misread the Chinese signals in Doklam.The only other way India can accommodate ASEAN is by opening its traditional sectors. The Vajpayee government under NDA-I had explored a similar option with the framework Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN. Liberal imports of cash crops like rubber, black pepper, palmolein devastated rural households across South India. At a time of heightened farm distress and amidst BJP’s attempts to enlarge its presence in South India, a similar repayment for the favour by ASEAN leaders will be political suicide.India has taken a position of violation of sovereignty with regards to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), thus shutting itself out from the project. This may not turn out to be a costly error because Pakistan’s capacity to sustain the required ecosystem for CPEC is uncertain.  However, ASEAN countries are old hands in the world of free economy and the route to India’s partial redemption from unemployment and want lies through these nations.China, however, is the elephant in the room. It cannot be ignored because of its dominant position in ASEAN’s trading calculus. South Block has a lot of political ground to recover and demonstrate flexibility to get into the game in ASEAN.India’s school headmaster approach with smaller neighbours like the Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan has already encountered a blow back. The joint photo event with heads of all SAARC countries during Modi’s swearing-in ceremony is now an embarrassing memory. It later emerged that some SAARC leaders were miffed because they felt used. ASEAN, like SAARC, is too critical to be permitted to suffer a similar fate. The security wallahs need to loosen their grip on India’s foreign policy apparatus if the Indo-ASEAN summit is not to end up as another lost opportunity.

sandeep4731@gmail.com

A US think-tank, Stratfor, has released satellite images of air bases of both countries and said the images were of this month. Photo courtesy: Stratfor

Ajay Banerjee

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, January 27

Despite having announced disengagement at the Doklam Plateau,  India and China have continued with a build-up of military resources on either side.The armies of the two nations were locked in a 73-day (June 16 to August 28, 2017) stand-off at Doklam — the tri-junction of Bhutan, India and China.(Follow The Tribune on Facebook; and Twitter @thetribunechd)A US-based think tank, Stratfor, has released satellite images of airbases of both countries and said “the imagery confirms that both China and India are pursuing a wide-ranging strategic build-up that has only accelerated in the wake of the August agreement (to dis-engage)”.The report ‘Preparing for a rematch at the top of the world’ was released just hours ahead of the Republic Day parade in New Delhi.The think tank said it had analysed four critical airbases, two Chinese and two Indian, that are within range of the Doklam Plateau. It says “…greater level of activity is visible from the imagery of the Chinese airbases near Lhasa (330 km north of Doklam) and Shigatse”. Beijing has added air defence missiles and made a new runaway in December at Shigatse, 225 km north of Doklam, says the report. It also holds deployments of KJ-500 airborne early warning and command aircraft, components of the HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile system and Soar Dragon unmanned aerial vehicles. The Chinese made a number of major airfield upgrades at Shigatse after the end of the crisis. Besides the runaway, aircraft aprons measuring 41m by 70m were built along the main taxiway and eight helipads were set up in the northeast corner of the airfield. This construction, along with the deployment of new equipment in  greater numbers, highlights how China has undertaken a serious effort to improve its capabilities close to the LAC. China’s lack of airbases close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC)  forces it to concentrate more of its air power at these bases. The imagery of the two airbases shows a significant presence of fighter aircraft (which peaked in October) and a notable increase in helicopters.On the Indian side of the border, imagery of the Bagdogra airbase and the Hasimara Air Force Station has been released. “It depicts how India has moved to reinforce its air power close to the Doklam Plateau,” says Stratfor.The Indian Air Force has greatly increased the deployment of Su-30MKI warplanes to these airbases as can be seen from the imagery, says the report.The Su-30MKI is India’s premier fighter jet, and it will soon be capable of striking land targets with the advanced BrahMos cruise missile. The dispatch of these top-of-the-line Indian jets and airfield improvements at both stations highlight India’s determination to improve its force structure near the Doklam Plateau, the report said.

Seminar on issues pertaining to medicine procurement under the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme #ECHS was held at Command Hospital #WesternCommand. The seminar was attended by Lt Gen Surinder Singh #ArmyCommander #WesternComd, Veterans & other military dignitaries.

Given the enhancing security threats from varied sources and the fact that it is the duty of the Union to protect the states against internal disturbances, a National Security Policy is needed, as also the machinery to implement it.

NN Vohra.

NN Vohra

J&K Governor

IT would be relevant to note that the states have the constitutional responsibility for the maintenance of police and public prder and are vested with powers to make all required laws and to take all necessary executive decisions for ensuring internal security within their jurisdictions. Insofar as the Union is concerned, it has the much larger responsibility of protecting the states against war and external aggression and internal disturbances. While our Constitution makes reference to security and not to national security, it would be incorrect to arrive at the conclusion that the Union and the states have distinct and separate duties for safeguarding the country and providing safety and security to the people of India. 

Understanding national security

It would be useful to have a broad understanding of the term national security. In simple words, national security comprises all facets of external security, which relates to protecting the country’s territories against war and external aggression, and internal security which includes all matters relating to the maintenance of peace and public order across the length and breadth of the country. It needs being recognised that our security concerns relate to innumerable targets and activities within our country and it would no longer do to merely focus on defending our frontiers. I would go to the extent of saying that, today, there is no important institution or activity which is not insecure. It has, thus, become extremely essential to safeguard almost every arena and to particularly secure arrangements relating to food, water, energy, nuclear power, science and technology, environment, ecology, finance, business, commerce, banking, cyber space and other important quarters.

Union-state understandings required

We have neither secured the required Union-state understandings nor developed a pan-India approach which would meet the requirements of a National Security Policy. Insofar as the role of the states is concerned, the Union has not so far been able to convince them to fully accept their constitutional duty to maintain internal security within their jurisdictions. In this context, it needs being stated that, in the years past, a majority of the states have been unable to establish efficient intelligence agencies and maintain well-trained police forces in adequate strength to effectively put down any arising disturbance. Consequently, the states have been perennially relying on the Union for the deployment of Central Armed Police Forces, and even the Army, for the restoration of normalcy in the disturbed areas. Thus, in the past decades, particularly in the North-East region and Punjab, the Union’s Armed Forces have had to be deployed on an extensive scale and for prolonged periods. Among the consequences of such deployments, there have been recurring agitations against the alleged violations of human rights of the affected populations and vociferous demands for the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. It is not easy to explain the Government of India’s approach, particularly in the context of the constitutional prescription that it shall be the Union’s duty to protect the states against internal disturbances. Considering the developments which led to the demolition of Babri Masjid, questions have been repeatedly raised about what exactly is the Union’s constitutional responsibility, particularly when it is duly warned and is well aware of an arising conflagration, as was the case before the demolition of Babri Masjid. Furthermore, after the 8/11 terror attack in Mumbai, grave concerns have also been voiced about the Union’s actual capability for dealing with such challenges. There must not be any further delay in promulgating a well-considered National Security Policy which is founded in unambiguous Union-states understandings to work together for collectively safeguarding the country’s unity and territorial integrity. It is a matter for serious concern that the states have not been able to provide adequate budgetary resources for maintaining their police forces in sufficient strength. The states are also reprehensible for interfering with the day-to-day working of the police organisations and politicising their functioning, which has resulted in eroding the discipline, integrity, morale and professionalism of the constabularies. It is regrettable that, to explain their varied failures, the states have been advancing the specious argument that they suffer from paucity of resources and, in any case, it is the responsibility of the Union to provide them adequate funds for the expansion and modernisation of their police forces as under the Constitution, it is the duty of the Union to protect the states against internal disturbances. Over the years, whatever may have been the complexion of the political parties in power, it has been the Union’s general tendency to avoid any confrontation with the states, far less question them about the factors and influences which have been leading to recurring internal disturbances. Consequently, whenever approached by a state in distress, the Union has been, without fail, providing assistance by deploying Central Armed Police Forces, and even the Army, to restore normalcy in the disturbed area. Thus, the Union has concerned itself essentially with dousing fires and has rarely ever questioned the states about the root causes of the disturbances in their areas. The Union has also been hesitant in exercising its authority under Article 256 of the Constitution to issue appropriate directives to the affected states for taking the required actions to timely quell arising disturbances. On the contrary, the practice actually followed in the past decades has been for the Union Ministry of Home Affairs to merely issue “advisories” to the states concerned in regard to the management of emerging situations. Thanks to the Home Ministry’s amiable approach of only issuing cautionary notes to the states concerned, it has not been possible to pre-empt any arising disorder. 

National Security Policy needed

If we recognise the gravity of the progressively enhancing security threats which are emerging from varied sources, from our neighbourhood and beyond, and also remember that it is the duty of the Union to protect every state against internal disturbances, then no more time can be lost in the Union taking immediate initiatives for finalising a holistic National Security Policy and, thereafter, proceeding to establish the required nationwide machinery for implementing it. For securing the required Union-state understandings in the arena of national security management, it would be enormously beneficial if the draft National Security Policy and all major issues relating to its implementation are discussed and settled in meetings with the Chief Ministers under the aegis of the Inter State Council (ISC), which is chaired by the Prime Minister. Once the states have clearly accepted their responsibility to maintain internal security, there would be no reason why they should not become progressively capable of effectively dealing on their own with any arising internal disturbance. And when the States become self-reliant, the Union shall be able to progressively reduce the large-scale deployment of its Armed Forces for dealing with disturbances in the states. In the foregoing context, it needs being noted that except in Jammu and Kashmir, where we are fighting Pakistan’s proxy war, the recurring deployments of the Army elsewhere in the country, for dealing with local insurgencies and internal disturbances in the states, has the rather worrying potential of blunting the Army’s edge and, besides, generating internal problems regarding the operational efficiencies of its officers and men who are recruited, trained and equipped to fight and destroy the enemy at first sight and not to be involved in situations in which the rules of engagement demand considerable restraint. Once the Union has been able to promulgate a bipartisan National Security Policy, the next important step would be to undertake a thorough state- and Union Territory-wise critical review to identify deficiencies in the existing security administration systems. Side by side, it shall be useful to carry out a close critical assessment of the Union’s own wherewithal for discharging its constitutional responsibility to safeguard the nation.  The Union would need to review its obligations on various fronts and, inter alia, enhance allocations to enable the central intelligence agencies to significantly enlarge their capacities for providing timely intelligence to various quarters, at the Centre and in the states. And among their many responsibilities, the intelligence agencies shall need to urgently equip themselves for particularly protecting the defence and governmental establishments, the financial sector and large public and private organisations against cyber crimes.  

Strengthen NIA

Needless to stress, when Union-atates understandings are arrived at in regard to the management of national security, a very important agreement shall have to especially provide for the enactment of an anti-terror law, enforceable in the entire country, which enables the Union agency concerned to take immediate cognisance and launch investigations without having to obtain sanctions and clearances from varied state or Central authorities. As of now, we have only the NIA which was enacted in a rush after the 8/11 terror attack. This statute requires considerable strengthening to ensure immediate cognisance of offences committed anywhere in the country to be followed by prompt investigations. Also, the list of offences covered by this law need to be dynamically reviewed and enlarged and, side by side, attention given to upgrade and enhance the powers and modalities for special investigations. Further, the obtaining procedures for the establishment of Special Courts and the completion of trials within given time frames also need to be urgently reviewed and rationalised. If the NIA is to function as the nodal agency to counter terrorism, cyber crimes and other major threats, it shall need to be provided very strong and prompt support by the Central and state intelligence agencies and by the law enforcement machinery all over the country. Many years have elapsed since it was proposed to establish the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). If I recall correctly, this proposal was opposed by the states which had demanded that the law to establish NCTC should be passed by the Parliament and, further, that this organisation should be administered by the Union Home Ministry and not by the Intelligence Bureau. These arguments reflect the distrust of the states in the functioning of the security organisations managed by the Union and yet again point to the urgent need for arriving at the required Union-states understandings to lay the bedrock of an effective National Security Policy.  

Trained manpower necessary

I now come to another very critical issue which has continued to be neglected. This relates to the fundamental necessity of ensuring that all security management departments and agencies are manned by personnel who are adequately trained and equipped to perform the sensitive tasks which they are required to handle. Traditionally, appointments to posts at various levels in the Home and Defence Ministries and other security management organisations have been from among various generalist cadres. Over the years, varied problems have arisen because the large majority of those deployed in such important agencies may have had no prior experience of working in the security management arena. Serious personnel-related problems have also been surfacing in the functioning of the Central intelligence agencies, particularly in the Research and Analysis Wing. For want of a well-planned approach, deficiencies have been faced in regard to the availability of the required number of adequately trained and experienced functionaries who are required for manning the various organisations which comprise the Union’s security administration apparatus. Problems relating to the shortage of trained human resource would pose an even larger problem once the National Security Policy has been promulgated and a significantly enlarged apparatus is required to be made operational. Establish a National Security Administrative Service There have been significant shifts in the geo-political environment in our neighbourhood and beyond and there are new threats to our country’s interests and security. In this context, I would yet again stress that we can no longer afford to follow ad hoc and disparate approaches in regard to national security management and the Government of India should not lose any more time in taking the full step to establish a National Security Administrative Service whose constituents, selected on the basis of a pan-India competitive examination, should be got especially trained in the various required areas and deployed to man the Government of India’s security administration system. Thereafter, members of this service could also be progressively allocated to the states for managing their security management machinery.Set up a new dedicated ministryMy concluding observation relates to the need to establish a new ministry which is entirely dedicated to the efficient implementation of every component of the National Security Policy and to keep a close and constant watch to see that the states effectively maintain internal security in their domains. It needs being recognised that the Union Ministry of Home Affairs is faced with ever increasing day to day pressures on varied fronts and its senior echelons are required to deal with a horde of subjects, of which one relates to internal security management. With its existing responsibilities it would be impractical to expect this ministry to devote whole time attention only to security management related issues, all of which require zero delays and immediate decisions. In this context, if national security is to be effectively managed, the time has come to establish a dedicated Ministry of National Security Affairs which is led by a senior Cabinet minister and manned by handpicked and especially trained functionaries drawn from the National Security Administrative Service, which I have earlier proposed. Finally, I would yet again stress that if the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of our country is to be effectively protected then it is of the foremost importance that the Union and States act in very close concert to ensure the efficient implementation of the National Security Policy. It is equally necessary that all matters relating to National Security are viewed with utmost concern and prompt decisions are taken to ensure that not the slightest chink is left to subvert the national interest.(Excerpts from the 12th RN Kao Memorial Lecture delivered on Jan 22, 2018 in New Delhi)

Suresh Dharur

Tribune News Service

Hyderabad, January 18

In a novel initiative, a mobile app has been launched here to enable the ex-servicemen to book online appointments with doctors at all Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) polyclinics in the two Telugu states of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.The app allows veterans to book online appointment with doctors/physiotherapists and also enables them to submit their feedback as grievances or suggestions. The initiative is a first of its kind in the organisation with the app being made available on Android phones and can be accessible on www.tasaechs.in, said Colonel Anil Kumar, Director, ECHS.“The project has a vast scope for expansion in future,” Colonel Kumar said.

Our Correspondent

Ferozepur, January 16

Two persons were killed and another injured when the rickshaw they were riding on was allegedly hit by one of the military trucks in a cavalcade that was passing through the railway crossing near Government College at Mohkam Khan Wala village on the Ferozepur-Zira road today.The deceased have been identified as Barkat Singh of Mohkam Khan Wala and his nephew Aakash, while Sohan Singh has been admitted to a hospital with serious injuries.Police officials, including DSP Jaspal Singh and SHO (Ferozepur Cantt) Navin Sharma, reached the spot and took stock of the situation. The Army truck was impounded and a case was registered at the Ferozepur Cantt police station.

NEARLY 34 years after the 1984 riots, the Supreme Court’s order to reinvestigate 186 cases of violence against Sikhs following the assassination of Indira Gandhi comes with a renewed hope of justice. Over the years, powerful instigators and perpetrators of the riots getting clean chits fed the angst of the victims, who had not only lost their loved ones, but also their businesses and homes. They suffered as many of the accused continued to flourish — notably Congress leaders Jagdish Tytler and HKL Bhagat. The victims have, despite being down and under and hitting the wall time and again, steadfastly braved the rounds of courts and they did not give up their quest. The political parties’ efforts to appease the wounded community by setting up commissions to look into the cases in which over 3,000 Sikhs were slaughtered, purportedly in complicity with the administration of the day, have failed. Too few convictions, and grossly under-proportional sentences, showed such commissions to be mere vote-garnering exercises. The new SIT, entrusted with prising open the old cases, holds promise. It has been set up by the Supreme Court and the judge named for the exercise, Justice SN Dhingra, has a track record of bold judgments and scathing strictures while dealing with such cases. He will be on familiar territory. During the 1990s, as Sessions Judge in the Karkardooma Court in Delhi, he incarcerated senior Congress minister Bhagat in an anti-Sikh riot instance. Then, he castigated the Delhi Police for their chaotic manner of prosecution of hundreds of cases spread all over Delhi. As a result, 100 cases were clubbed together and the trial streamlined. Again, it was Dhingra who convicted and sentenced Kishori Lal, dubbed the “butcher of Trilokpuri”, and the other accused of a grisly massacre of 1984.This SIT has two months to present its status report to the SC. There is hope, but also the ever-present fear of politicians using the reopening of the cases for political shenanigans. Justice has been inordinately delayed; it must be delivered so that the victims’ families get a sense of closure.