Qingdao, June 10

Amid frosty bilateral relationship, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain on Sunday exchanged pleasantries after a press conference by the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) here.The two leaders shook hands and exchanged pleasantries at the end of the media briefing, which was addressed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. China is the host and chair of the SCO.Also read: Connectivity projects should respect country’s sovereignty: ModiModi and Hussain were among the leaders who attended the media briefing after culmination of the 18th SCO summit where India and Pakistan participated as full-fledged members.The relations between India and Pakistan had strained after an attack on an army camp in Uri in Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan-based terror organisations in 2016. The ties took a severe hit post-sentencing of Indian national Kulbhushan Jadhav by a military court in April last year.India had also boycotted the 19th SAARC Summit after the Uri attack. The summit was called off after Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan also declined to participate in the Islamabad meet.The Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir has also witnessed escalation of hostilities.India has been raising the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in various multilateral forums with an aim to build pressure on Islamabad to dismantle the terror infrastructure operating from that country.Modi held nearly half a dozen bilateral meetings with leaders of other SCO countries. However, there was no bilateral meeting between Modi and Hussain.In his address at the summit, Modi, while referring to situation in Afghanistan, talked about challenge of terrorism and its effects.In his address, President Hussain exuded confidence that the upcoming general elections in his country will further bolster economic stability in Pakistan.He said the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has boosted Pakistan’s economy.India has been strongly opposing the CPEC as it goes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. PTI 

Jammu, June 5

Within hours of a flag meeting to maintain ceasefire on the international border (IB) in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan Rangers fired mortars at Indian positions on Tuesday.Police said around 1 a.m. the Pakistan Rangers fired two-to-three mortars in the Akhnoor sector of the IB.”Border Security Force (BSF) troopers did not retaliate. No casualty or damage was caused in the Pakistani shelling,” a police officer said.On Monday, a sector commanders level flag meeting was held in Suchetgarh between the BSF and Pakistan Rangers for two hours.The meeting was held on Pakistan’s request and the two sides agreed to respect the ceasefire agreement in letter and spirit

Punjab CM Capt Amarinder Singh. File photo

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, May 28

Notwithstanding a crackdown on mobile phones in jails, an inmate of Faridkot jail has uploaded a video on Facebook threatening to kill Punjab Chief Minister Capt Amarinder Singh besides senior police officers.A government spokesperson said an inquiry has established that the inmate identified as Gobind, an under-trial in several criminal cases, including murder, had uploaded the video from within the jail premises.A Samsung phone has been recovered from him.The video was uploaded yesterday but was noticed today. Another inmate, Kuldeep Singh, would also be booked.Gobind Singh, age 30/32 years, of village Bheni of Bathinda district had been living at Jaito in a rented house for the past 15 years. 

The directions came after an NGO filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Srinagar, seeking directions to the police to furnish the status report with respect to the case

SRINAGAR: A local court today directed the police to submit a status report on the investigation into the hotel fracas involving Army officer Major Leetul Gogoi.

The directions came after an NGO filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Srinagar, seeking directions to the police to furnish the status report with respect to the case.

“SHO (station house officer) Khanyar to submit report in light of the application by May 30,” the CJM directed.

The application was moved by chairman of International Forum for Justice and Human Rights (IFJHR), J-K, Mohammad Ahsan Untoo.

On Wednesday, Gogoi was briefly detained by police in Srinagar after an altercation when he and his driver were allegedly trying to enter a hotel with an 18-year-old woman, according to a police official.

The state police has initiated an inquiry into the incident involving Gogoi, who was set free after being detained briefly.

Army Chief Bipin Rawat has said exemplary punishment would be given to the Major if he was found guilty of “any offence”.

There are clear rules that govern the conduct of military officers and they are prohibited from civilian areas in sensitive zones unless on duty.

New Delhi: Major Leetul Gogoi, who was at the centre of Kashmir’s human shield row last year, was briefly detained Wednesday after an altercation at a Srinagar hotel.

The trouble started after the hotel manager refused to allow a young local woman into the room that the officer had checked into. The girl was accompanied by a man, who has been identified as Sameer Malla, an alleged confidant of Gogoi, who is posted in Budgam.

The Army Major from 53 Rashtriya Rifles made headlines in April 2017 after he tied a civilian, Farooq Ahmed Dar, to the front of his jeep to deter stone pelters from attacking his convoy.

The latest case has now led to a debate on whether the officer’s conduct warrants action and on whether he broke Army protocol.

Consent, source and Army protocol

Questions have been raised on what Gogoi did wrong by seeking to meet a woman who was willing to meet him.

A high court lawyer who is an expert in military law, however, told ThePrint: “Irrespective of whether the girl was a consenting adult or not, action can be taken. The quantum of punishment depends on senior authorities. He may be let off with a reprimand, and the punishment may not be so harsh.”

Gogoi allegedly claimed he was meeting a source but a military expert said this isn’t the norm. “Normal officers don’t meet sources in such a fashion. That is the job of specialised intelligence officers. Even if he was meeting a source, it is critical to know whether his superiors were aware of his actions,” the expert said.

Reprimand to court martial — the possible action

According to Section 41 of the Army Act, 1950, if Gogoi’s superiors were unaware of his meeting, he could be called up for ‘disobedience to a superior officer’. On conviction by court martial, this attracts a sentence of 14 years or less.

Under this section, even officers not on active duty can be sentenced to up to five years in prison or less depending on senior authorities.

“It remains to be determined whether Gogoi was on sanctioned leave or unauthorised leave. Even if an officer is on leave, he is required to submit the address to which he is travelling to his seniors,” said a military expert.

Under Section 45, an officer is “liable to be cashiered or to suffer such less punishment” if found indulging in unbecoming conduct. Gogoi’s alleged meeting with a civilian in a sensitive area falls under this section.

“If at all Gogoi is married, the case gets even more complicated since it can be considered unbecoming conduct,” the military expert told ThePrint.

Then there is Section 63.

It states: “Any person subject to this Act who is guilty of any act or omission which, though not specified in this Act, is prejudicial to good order and military discipline shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.”

Under this section, said the military expert, officers are prohibited from civilian areas in sensitive zones unless on duty.

“The important question to ask is – he is posted in Budgam, what was he doing in Dal Lake? In areas such as Kashmir, officers aren’t allowed to visit civilian zones unless specifically ordered,” the expert said.

The military law expert said that contact with a civilian in a sensitive area can draw charges under all of the above sections. He, however, cautioned: “This is all speculative. Depending upon the investigation, the situation can lead to administrative action or court martial. But it is up to the senior authorities to decide that.”

The Centre has taken the nation by surprise by accepting the Jammu and Kashmir government’s request for a ‘cessation of operations’ for the Ramzan period for 30 days beginning May 17. This is after initial reports had indicated a negative response, especially from the Army. The concept of cessation of operations is not alien to the Indian system but knowledge on it is surprisingly low at almost all levels. As the officer coordinating the non-initiation of combat operations (NICO, as it was then called), in South Kashmir through 2000-01, I was fortunate to gain tremendous experience from the initiative then taken by Prime Minister AB Vajpayee. Hence, the idea of this piece is to put into the right perspective what can be hoped from the current initiative of the state and central governments.

The 2000-01 NICO resulted in an increase in casualties of the security forces (SF) and was called off following no positive response from the terrorists or their sponsors. Those were the days when foreign terrorists (FTs) existed in large numbers. In fact, the LeT even attempted an audacious attack on the Srinagar airport during NICO itself because it had not accepted any overture from the government. At the end of NICO 2000-01, I did feel that it had been a premature effort when terrorist numbers (especially FTs) were still too large and the counter infiltration grid in the vicinity of the LoC was leaking infiltration in the absence of an effective anti-infiltration obstacle.

Many lauded the Army and other SF for the recent successful robust operations under ‘Operation All Out’. Three hundred terrorists neutralised in less than 18 months is not a mean figure in current times with lower figures of terrorist presence. At the same time, local recruitment saw an upsurge, bringing the conclusion that robust operations could continue interminably without reduction in terrorist ranks. The response of the nexus of separatists, proxy sponsors and others also witnessed an increase in street and mosque power, rabble rousing and use of social media to ratchet up the idea that the core aim of azadi was attainable for which some more sacrifice was necessary. The dilemma before the authorities in charge is that robust operations can buy temporary stabilisation but the narratives spelt out by the ‘nexus’ could take the upper hand. With local recruitment now playing a role as significant as infiltration from across the LoC, this dilemma is real and offers few alternatives for the state. The Army and other SF are justified in their perception that the current cessation of operations will give a reprieve to the terrorists and the ‘nexus’. However, in the absence of an effective system of spelling the state’s counter narrative, which in reality is non-existent, the situation appears to be at an impasse.

In light of the above, the Centre has in all probability decided to experiment and grab the high moral ground that it has given peace a chance and it is for the ‘nexus’ to respond. A positive response is unlikely because of the prevailing perception and the LeT for one has already rejected the offer. Yet, in the absence of alternatives and the fact that further neutralisation efforts by the security forces may only add fuel to fire on the streets, and in the minds of the locals in J&K, the experiment has been given a go-ahead. It will act as a kind of balancer for the absence of any major soft power initiatives such as counter narratives. Only time will tell how sensitively the authorities can deal with this and what the final response of the local nexus will be. In the absence of any identified fresh local leadership, the benefits of outreach to the people may come a cropper.

What is important is to have a better public understanding of the execution part of the Centre’s initiative. It appears that the general public perceive cessation of operations as akin to the initiation of ceasefire at the LoC where the guns fall silent from a given time. That is not so in sub-conventional operations. The only difference here from the usual operations is that the Army avoids conducting — what are called — offensive operations, which include cordon and search (CASO) and search and destroy (SADO) operations. The concept of area domination continues robustly and in fact will probably increase manifold with many more patrols and even night ambushes to prevent freedom of movement. Movement without arms is however permitted. The SF will continue to gather intelligence, secure their installations and conduct road security operations. In other words, the counter terror and counter infiltration grids remain completely intact. This is against the understanding that the Army will take a back step into its barracks and halt all operations. The underlying logic is that should the initiative fail at any stage, the Army and other SF return to proactive operations without any loss of time and initiative; the domination having remained intact.

In the same breath, it needs to be stated that while the choice of Ramzan for the initiative is symbolic the Centre could well have lengthened the period to include the Sri Amarnath Yatra, the iconic pilgrimage. It’s the messaging which is also important for acceptance of an initiative; although if successful I have no doubt that the cessation will extend to the Yatra period.

Without adequate efforts at grass-roots level outreach by the political community, at some risk, and the spelling out of counter narratives, the period of cessation of operations will be wasted. It is not going to be easy. Ideally, there should have been considerable homework and preparation for such an initiative. In the absence of that we will have to make the best of the situation, but with an understanding of what really is required to be said and projected.

The centrality of the theme for the main counter narrative must be the neutralisation of the idea that azadi can be attained at will and with only a little more sacrifice. Strongly, and yet softly, the Centre and the state have to convince the people that for India, J&K is a finality and a threat to that arrangement is an existential issue.

The author commanded the 15 Corps in Jammu and Kashmir. Views expressed are personal.

Lt. Gen. Devraj Anbu has been appointed as the new Vice Chief of Army Staff. Commissioned in Sikh Light Infantry in 1980, Lt. Gen. Anbu has commanded a Corps in the North East.

• Written By Man Aman Singh Chhina | Chandigarh |
• Lt. Gen. Devraj Anbu has been appointed as the new Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS). He is presently GOC-in-C (General Officer Commanding-in-Chief) Northern Command. He will replace Lt. Gen. Sarath Chand who retires on May 31. The orders for Lt. Gen. Anbu’s appointment were issued on Thursday morning. He will take over the new appointment on June 1. He had taken over as the Northern Army Commander in December 2016.

  Commissioned in Sikh Light Infantry in 1980, Lt. Gen. Anbu has commanded a Corps in the North East. There was widespread speculation over the delay in announcing the name of the new Vice Chief of Army Staff as the appointment was falling vacant in a week’s time.

  Lt. Gen. Anbu is expected to be replaced by Lt. Gen. Ranbir Singh as the GOC-in-C Northern Command. Lt. Gen. Ranbir Singh was the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) at the time surgical strikes.

It is said the more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war. This is a lesson India refuses to learn – sadly, most of the sweat is not out of any exertion, but frustration at the pace of modernisation and indigenisation of our armed forces. The world is moving towards third and fourth generation warfare.

Third generation warfare uses speed, stealth and surprise and involves cyber warfare, airpower and networked armed forces delivering precision strikes. Fourth generation warfare is aimed against violent non-state actors like the ISIS. Yet, here we are, still struggling, confusing military modernisation with a shopping list of weapons – which we are the world’s largest importers of – waiting patiently for the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to deliver the magic bullet.

India Today cover story, The Army is Broke, for May 14, 2018.

In China, meanwhile, President Xi Jinping has overseen dramatic changes in his country’s armed forces, and is turning it into the world’s fifth largest arms exporter. India, meanwhile, has failed to produce an effective rifle; locally made Arjun tanks cannot be used on the sensitive China or Pakistan borders because of performance issues; and after three decades spent developing our own light combat aircraft, India has now put out a tender for 110 warplanes.

The last time the Indian Army underwent any sort of transformation was after the 2001 Parliament attacks when India updated General Sundarji’s doctrine with the Cold Start strategy that would involve limited, rapid armoured thrusts, with infantry and air support, and allow offensive operations to begin within 48 hours after orders had been issued. Despite its grand public pronouncements on national security – the BJP’s 2014 manifesto promised to “modernise the armed forces, fast track defence purchases and carry out organisational reform” – the defence ministry wallows in its bureaucratic quagmire, with four defence ministers in as many years. Although India’s defence budget has been hiked by 7.8 per cent, it is just about 1.6 per cent of the projected GDP for 2018-19, the lowest such figure since the 1962 war with China. According to experts, it needs to be over 2.5 per cent to ensure the armed forces are capable of tackling the “collusive threat” from Pakistan and China.

During the Kargil war of 1999, then Army chief General VP Malik had said “we shall fight with whatever we have”. Almost 20 years later, the Army finds itself in almost the same situation with a budgetary squeeze and poor defence planning.

The government has neither drawn up a national security strategy nor appointed a chief of defence staff (CDS), a single-point military advisor to the government who can foster integration of the armed forces and also allocate budgetary resources among them. In the absence of a CDS or an integrated headquarters of the armed forces, each individual service prepares to fight wars on its own and makes separate competing claims for budgetary resources. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is an ossified structure inherited from the British. But while Britain has moved on by horizontally integrating its MoD and armed forces, India still struggles with a wasteful colonial system. Other major militaries too are reducing manpower and increasing the use of technology; only the Indian Army is adding men instead of equipment.

Executive editor Sandeep Unnithan, who wrote the cover story, has been covering the defence ministry for over a decade, which is roughly the time it takes the government to buy an item of military hardware. He says: “It usually takes a crisis for the government to wake up to the neglect of the military as it did after the 1962 war and the Kargil war.”

Ironically, there is a lot of talk of nationalism, but no serious effort to resolve the mess in the MoD. The Make in India campaign for defence, which held great promise, is a failure. DRDO and ordnance factories are a millstone around the necks of the defence establishment. We are the largest importers of defence equipment in spite of this large government-owned military-industrial complex. The procedures are so convoluted that decisions are not made or are delayed so that equipment is obsolete. The Modi government may have removed corruption in defence purchases, but the paralysis remains.

Our armed forces are a great institution with fine traditions. They need to be equipped for modern warfare with new and innovative thinking. Their courage can never be doubted; they need to be looked after.

The PMO should consider taking defence-preparedness directly under its wings, like the space and nuclear domains, to prevent a tech asymmetrical surprise in a future war.

Air Vice-Marshal Manmohan Bahadur VM (retd)
Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New DelhiTwo recent events have been discussed for their implications on the security posture of the nation. First, the establishment of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and second, the hosting of Exercise Gagan Shakti by the IAF. While the former is perched at the strategic level and will see its efforts beginning to bear fruit only a decade from now, the latter is about testing the preparation of the Air Force to fight a war in the immediate future. The DPC would be about spelling out doctrines, strategies, capability development, defence diplomacy and streamlining defence-manufacturing and acquisitions. Gagan Shakti, on the other hand, is about testing the operational and tactical capability of the IAF to prosecute war. However, lost in the media hype is an insidious reality creeping in — a fast-developing technological asymmetry between the armed forces of India and China, which if not addressed head on would be detrimental to India’s deterrence posture.Deterrence projected by a force is a function of the lethality of its equipment, training of its personnel and the stamina of its logistics chain. In turn, these are a function of their technological relevance when the balloon goes up. Thus, down the ages, the sword was overtaken by the lance, which was no match for the bow and arrow – and they all were made to look silly when the musket, rifle and mortar came on the scene. So, while the Indian Army is firmly entrenched on the mountainous northern border and the Navy expanding its blue water capabilities, it is the IAF that is the primary instrument of deterrence against China. The IAF, at present, is well placed vis-a-vis the Peoples’ Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in almost all aspects of aerial warfare. There is a string of airfields along our northern border (all at low altitudes and hence not affecting weapon carrying capability of aircraft), the air defence network has been strengthened with new radars and surface-to-air missiles and its frontline Su-30 MKI fighters are better in all aspects than any aircraft that PLAAF can throw in. The C-17, IL-76 and An-32 transport aircraft afford an airlift capability much better than PLAAF’s while Mi-17 helicopters, supported by ALH Dhruv, match its heli-lift potential. Crowning this positive equipment asymmetry is the qualitatively better combat-readiness state of IAF aircrew who are trained in modern war fighting techniques unlike PLAAF’s rigid Russian legacy training profiles. This, however, is set to change as PLAAF goes about feverishly modernising its equipment and training profiles.The J-20 stealth fighter and Y-20 very heavy transport aircraft have started entering PLAAF and so have upgraded fourth-gen fighters like J-11, J-16 and J-10C. Feverish R&D is ongoing to master aero-engine technology by the amalgamation of numerous engine R&D centres into a single entity. In the next five-odd years, Chinese engineers would have turned the corner – dependence on Russia for engines would then end. With indigenous engines, the J-20 would become a true fifth-gen fighter and the Y-20’s payload would augment from the present 50 to 66 tonnes, bringing it on a par with India’s C-17. The Y-20, besides ramping up airlift capacity, would then be used as the base for indigenous AWACS and Flight Refuelling Aircraft, which are PLAAF’s Achilles’ heel at present.A long-range strategic bomber is on the design table and would be flying in a decade as would a hypersonic glide vehicle, whose prototype is already in existence. With extensive radar development and deployment, missile forces being coalesced into a single rocket force command, space assets being deployed in increasing numbers and net centricity in place, PLAAF may nullify IAF’s present edge. This could be accentuated by the drawdown of IAF fighter squadrons as MIG-21/27 fleets retire, low replenishment due the tortoise like production rate of Tejas by HAL and the meandering acquisition programmes of additional fighter aircraft and force multipliers like AWACS, FRA and armed UAVs. Immediate steps are necessary to prevent this alarming reversal, which is true for the other two Services too; could DPC be that catalyst?The DPC can succeed in its mission only if it follows in the footsteps of the atomic energy and space programmes — two success stories in the strategic domain, mainly because the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is directly involved and orders from these platforms are implicitly implemented by all ministries. As is known, though the foreign and finance ministries would be integral to it, the DPC would report to the Defence Minister who would forward recommendations to the Cabinet Committee on Security for consideration. This does not bode well for the very laudable spirit of making the DPC an instrument to expedite matters defence. True, that decisions and actions would be faster since the DPC head would be the National Security Adviser, but the speed with which tech asymmetry is developing against the Indian armed forces would become too skewed to play catch-up. India has tried the ‘committeeisation’ route, to use Chinese terminology, for the past seven decades and failed — and the DPC is but another committee. Time, tide and technology wait for no man and the PMO should consider taking defence preparedness directly under its wings, like the space and nuclear domains, to prevent a tech asymmetrical surprise in a future war.