The Pakistan army continues to control that country’s India policy

In the first two years of his term Prime Minister Narendra Modi has devoted time, energy and attention to the conduct of foreign policy. He has sought to enlarge India’s influence through frequent interaction with his global peers in bilateral meetings. Modi’s participation in international and multilateral conferences has conveyed the country’s position in impressive, though pragmatic, interventions. In this largely successful canvas there is a one major dark spot: utter confusion that has prevailed in the pursuit of the nation’s Pakistan policy.The stated premise of Modi’s Pakistan policy was recently reiterated by him in a written response to the Wall Street Journal. He said, inter alia, “There can be no compromise on terrorism. It can only be stopped when all support to terrorism, whether state or non-state, is completely stopped. Pakistan’s failure to take effective action in punishing the perpetrators of terrorist attacks limits the forward movement in our ties.”“In my view, our ties can truly scale great heights once Pakistan removes the self-imposed obstacle of terrorism in the path of our relationship. We are ready to take the first step, but the path of peace is a two-way street.”There can be no quarrel with this position or the principle contained in Modi’s comment. These have been the stated policy of all governments since Pakistan made the use of terror an essential ingredient of its security approach to India. The problem lies not in the enunciated principle and position but in not following them. It is also in compromising with their obvious logic in the country’s diplomacy towards Pakistan. While diplomacy has to retain, at all times, a measure of flexibility, abrupt U-turns, somersaults or verbal contortions do not constitute the stuff of flexibility. This is especially so when there are no objective reasons to indicate a change in the prevailing realities of a relationship or the regional or international context.The objective reality is that the Pakistan army continues to control that country’s India policy. The elected leadership, including the Prime Minister, has little capacity to change its thinking. If it had, Pakistan would have agreed to begin a process of cooperative interaction with India, including in the areas of trade and connectivity. None of that has taken place and yet Modi, like his predecessors, proceeded to follow a “flexible” approach. The Generals have remained unmoved and through their actions have demonstrated so. Yet Modi has ignored all that and gone “forwards and backwards”. How has that process unfolded in the past two years?Modi invited Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony in May 2014. Nawaz Sharif, ignoring the reservations of the Generals, came to Delhi. The two Prime Ministers decided that the Foreign Secretaries would meet to consider how to take the relationship forward. The Generals reacted to Nawaz Sharif’s decision to visit Delhi by sponsoring an attack on the Indian Consulate-General in Herat, Afghanistan, just before Modi assuming office. The bravery of the ITBP security detachment prevented a major disaster. This was the Generals’ signal to both Prime Ministers: they should not be ignored.Just before the then Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh was to travel to Pakistan in August 2014, the Pakistan High Commissioner in Delhi met the Hurriyat leadership despite the last-minute warning from the Indian side. Modi rightly called off the visit on the ground that, irrespective of India looking the other way in the past, it would no longer accept the projection of the Hurriyat as a party in the Jammu and Kashmir issue. A red line was correctly drawn but such an approach requires patience and perseverance.A month later at the UN Modi signalled to Pakistan that all issues had to be settled bilaterally and terrorism had to be abandoned. Again these were words in keeping with India’s basic approach. However, while the Generals showed no change, Modi sent Foreign Secretary Jaishankar to Islamabad in March 2015 to explore ways to take the relationship forward. In July 2015 Modi met Nawaz Sharif in Ufa, Russia. They decided that bilateral interaction should begin and the two National Security Advisers should meet in Delhi to discuss all aspects of terror. Jammu and Kashmir found no mention in the Ufa joint statement. This angered the Generals who insisted that discussions should not be only on terror and that Pakistan would not accept a veto on the meeting with the Hurriyat in Delhi. The visit of the Pakistani NSA was called off and strong words were exchanged. Soon afterwards Pakistan appointed a retired and well-regarded General, Nasser Janjua, as its NSA. For some inexplicable reason Indian policy-makers construed Janjua’s appointment as an indication of the army changing course and wanting to improve relations with India. There was simply no evidence of the Generals of wanting to do so.It was this assessment that led to the activity of December 2015 when the Ufa decisions were set aside and the NSAs, accompanied by the Foreign Secretaries, met in Bangkok. This was immediately followed by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj going to Islamabad to attend the Heart of Asia conference on Afghanistan. On its sidelines, India and Pakistan decided to begin a Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue Process with a meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries to work out its modalities.On the Christmas day Modi made a stop-over visit to Lahore to meet Nawaz Sharif. This was a flamboyant gesture of goodwill but that aspect escaped the Generals who brushed it aside not only as of no enduring value to bilateral ties but also one that required a reminder that they are the bosses in Pakistan. The Pathankot attack followed and despite the brave front, Modi was severely embarrassed. In Pathankot’s immediate aftermath an effort was made to save the Modi initiative by projecting that Pakistan was serious in investigating the Pathankot conspiracy. Special emphasis was given to the visit of the JIT. Even while it was in India the Generals responded by levelling charges of espionage and terrorism against retired naval officer Kulbhushan Jadhav, and worse, sought to target the Indian NSA in this concoction.Thus the Generals’ hostility towards India remains single-minded and abiding. However, Modi’s response has been vacillating like that of his predecessors. Besides, Pakistani terrorism is not considered a strategic challenge by the Indian political and strategic establishment. As long as Indian policy-makers continue with the present approach, the Generals will not change. The focus has to be on ensuring that the Generals modify their India policy. That will not be achieved either through hope or considering that the NIA’s visit — should it take place — will be the mark of a successful Pakistan policy. — The writer is a former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs

Lt-Gen (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain
“Holding the periphery” is what the Army has to do in Jammu & Kashmir, without being obstructive; it has to be a facilitator in the closing stages of conflict stabilisation. Only then will it lead to a transformation that will afford the situation to quietly slip into conflict resolution.

Incidents like the firing in Handwara are manipulated to create the flawed impression that the Army’s presence in J&K instigates. REUTERS

SMART strategic leaders always plan for contingencies so that they do not find the proverbial pull of the rug under their feet. No better place to apply this maxim than Jammu and Kashmir. Currently everyone there is focused on the sudden increase in infiltration and gun battles; the military space is truly active. The hinterland semi-urban areas have rumours to discuss about Sainik Colonies and exclusive dwelling areas for Kashmiri Pandits. It is the vintage Kashmir situation encountered almost every other year. What surprises me is the ease with which rumours go viral and young people are willing to be led and manipulated. What is even more surprising is the inability of leaders, administrators and stakeholders to directly interact with the people, or through print and particularly social media to quell the rumours. Not doing so is like playing the street’s strength and the state’s weakness. The above is in the realm of expectation but surely the Central and state governments, Intelligence agencies and the Army can’t be misled by the still comparatively low-key situation they face. Jammu and Kashmir’s sponsored proxy internal conflict has seen more than its share of dynamic “ups and downs” for the stakeholders not to be considering where the future pitfalls lie.  Apply the mind and it starts from Afghanistan; everything there makes a difference here. Reports indicate weakening of the Taliban and the unlikelihood of a full-weight summer offensive; that is a breather for Pakistan too although it has been the Taliban’s all-weather friend. Conjectures now are all pointing to Pakistan’s hand in the killing of Mullah Mansoor to get the Taliban under its control and play to the US Congress, which has the F-16 issue like a pistol to its head. Internally within Pakistan, things aren’t too bad and Raheel Sharif, if he wishes to be a gentleman, will demit office in November 2016; perhaps he may wish to go on a high; the perception of that remains his choice. Between now and November 2016 is a big gap. If Afghanistan is quiet and internally things are in control in Pakistan where does the attention of Pakistan’s Deep State travel? No prizes for guessing. On the face of it there is a range of issues on which the Deep State and separatists can play together. These could be, limiting pilgrims for the Shri Amarnath Yatra, various human rights issues, including the manipulated Handwara case and the ongoing Sainik Colonies issue. However, none of these will throw up passions in the street in a lasting way. There are perhaps two other issues which can emerge triggers and both also have tacit support of shades of opinion within the nation which makes them even more vitriolic for effect. The first is the revocation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act or AFSPA (1990) and second is the dilution and eventual withdrawal of the Army’s presence in the hinterland areas of the Valley. The AFSPA issue is a bigger ticket and will require a separate piece to address holistically. There has never been an intellectual application of mind to it by any quarter; neither by the detractors nor the supporters.The Nexus is in search of a contentious issue which could spark the streets and wreck the coalition that forms the state government.  The latter has thus far been mature in relegating contentious issues to the back-burner and is concentrating on establishing a base for the furtherance of its governance platform. It has been a brave effort thus far. However, in J&K’s bleak security landscape, “stabilisation” is a dirty word. The Nexus cannot afford to allow that to crystalise beyond a point. AFSPA offers scope to upset the applecart and will need deft handling on the part of our stakeholders to keep it from becoming a big ticket. That is what we need to prepare for, knowing that the current political constituents of the government themselves have differences about it. Avoiding this through smart legal work and finding middle ground acceptable to the political elements within Jammu and Kashmir, and actually within the nation, holds the key. The demand for dilution of the Army’s presence has often come from within mainstream media and political opinion. Some years ago, a senior editor, Shekhar Gupta, argued that a portion of the “victory dividend” be given back to the people. This triggered a discussion among veteran senior Army officers, again with shades of opinion. Mine was that firstly there is no such thing as victory against your own people. Secondly, the situation was tenuous and identifiable as being at the initial stages of conflict stabilisation. That situation has to be held if the next stage has to be achieved. There is an apparently flawed notion that the Army’s presence instigates rather than stabilises. It is incidents of the Handwara type which create this perception. Tourists returning  from the Valley often have a query for me on the need for such a large presence of the Army. These are people with short-term memories and no backdrop information about what the Valley went through. The Army’s presence, which I agree can be made less visible, affords the national footprint to be more effective, protects military assets and avoids a free hand to the Nexus. What some elements of the political leadership, at different levels, and media analysts fail to grasp is the opportunity the Army’s robust presence brings.  It affords the ability to take positive political messaging to the grassroots; engage there and deliver on the deliverables — the development issues, the daily life issues which have been on the backburner for long because of militancy. The Army itself needs to encourage this and facilitate the administration and politicians to engage the grassroot. “Holding the periphery” is what the Army has to do, without being obstructive; it has to be a facilitator in the closing stages of conflict stabilisation. The Army has rarely, if ever, viewed its own role from this angle because it is mostly placed on the defensive by the multiple fingers which are pointed at it in a situation which could be rightly called the “public order to law and order” transition. The Army could do without the unprofessional diatribe within its own ranks by people who have never applied mind to the true role of soldiers in transiting stages of militancy.  It can certainly afford to get more intellectually robust to thwart the efforts of the Nexus, which will force the situation covertly through the ranks of those within mainstream India itself. The sooner the leadership at all levels understands this, the faster will resolution of internal conflict emerge.The writer, a former GoC of 15 Corps, is with Vivekananda Foundation and the Delhi Policy Group.

Capt CS Sidhu (retd) and Baljinder Kaur (left) seek the release of prisoners of war languishing in Pakistani jails, in Amritsar on Thursday. photo: vishal kumar

GS Paul

Tribune News Service

Amritsar, May 26

Expressing solidarity with the prisoners of war (PoWs) languishing in Pakistan jails, the United Ex-servicemen Front today announced to stage a protest rally at the Attari-Wagah border in July if the Centre failed to initiate steps to get them released.Having traced three such cases of the 1971 war, the front’s in-charge, Capt CS Sidhu (retd), said they would not refrain from disrupting the operations of the Samjhauta Express and the Indo-Pak Dosti bus if the government did not act.The front said the three PoWs had been identified as Sepoy Balwinder Singh of the 10th Sikh Regiment, Sepoy Dharam Pal Singh Dhurkot of the 4th Sikh Regiment and Sepoy Bir Singh of the 15th Punjab Regiment.Baljinder Kaur, daughter of Sepoy Balwinder Singh, hailing from Chabba Kalan Havelian village in Tarn Taran, said she was born after her father’s disappearance. She said Surjit Singh, who had been released from the Kot Lakhpat jail in 2012, had claimed that her father was alive.“I have seen my father only in pictures. He has been missing since December 16, 1971. I urge the governments of India and Pakistan to reunite us with him,” she said.Arshinder Pal Singh, son of Dharam Pal Singh of Lehra Dhurkot (Bathinda), said, “Satish Kumar of Ferozepur, who was released in 1986 from a Pakistan jail, told us that my father was lodged in the Kot Lakhpat jail since 1971. When he told us about a folk song my father used to sing, we were sure about him,” he said.Captain Sidhu said he had written a letter to the Defence Minister to intervene and take up the matter with his Pakistani counterpart to facilitate the PoWs’ release.“Both India and Pakistan have war prisoners, but no side is ready to admit it. We want that Pakistani prisoners lodged in Indian jails be released and vice-versa,” he said.

Families of 1971 prisoners of war seek their release

Mukesh Ranjan

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, May 21

Besides a steep fall in the prices of crude oil in the international market, the other area where Narendra Modi government proved fortunate for the country is internal security, as no big incident took place in the last two years, which could be compared with the Mumbai terror attack in 2008 and the ambush laid by the Naxals in 2010 in which 76 CRPF personnel were killed in Chhattisgarh.Many in the security establishment believe that “nothing substantial” has moved on the security front since former Home Minister P Chidambram left. “But during his tenure structures (like National Intelligence Grid, National Ivestigation Agency) and procedures (specific standard operating procedures) were put in place in such a way, particularly after the two watershed incidents (2008 and 2010) that our security architecture so far proved robust,” a senior official in the Ministry of Home Affairs  said.”Thankfully”, the incumbent Home Minister Rajnath Singh chose “status quo” in security matters and instead opted to move faster with regard to “disaster management” and “disaster relief distribution”, the performance of the ministry in the last two years could safely be termed as “satisfactory”, said a former IPS officer. India, in the last two years, witnessed only a few scary moments, when a BSF convoy was attacked in Udhampur, A police station was made the target in Gurdaspur and the Air Force base was stormed by terrorists in Pathankot. But in all these cases the terrorists were neutralised with minimum damage. After witnessing repeated attacks in border areas of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, the Central Government has formed a committee under the chairmanship of former Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta to suggest measures to make India’s borders foolproof. However, the exercise of police modernisation and enhancing police-public ratio, which was started by Mr Chidambram, took a beating, as budgetary allocations under these heads were cut substantially.

Achievements

• The Ministry of Home Affairs has taken forward from where the previous regime left as far as infrastructure and procedures to counter terrorism are concerned
• Barring Gurdaspur and Pathankot incidents, no major terror attack in the last two years; terrorists neutralised with minimum damage
• A panel led by ex-Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta formed to suggest measures to make India’s borders foolproof

Downside

• Many in the security establishment believe nothing substantial has moved on the security front since former Home Minister P Chidambram left
• The exercise of police modernisation and enhancing the police-public ratio, started by Chidambram, has taken a beating, as budgetary allocations under these headscut substantially
• Rising cases of intolerance and insurgency in the East continue to be a major challenge

The ITBP has posted over 150 women constables to Leh this month. They will be deployed at BOPs in groups of 15-20 on rotation. file

Vijay Mohan

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, May 20

In a first, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) has started deploying women constables to guard the rugged Sino-Indian border in Ladakh.“Over 150 women constables have been posted to Leh this month. They will be based at the battalion headquarters in Leh and will be deployed at border outposts (BOPs) in groups of 15-20 on a rotation basis,” an ITBP officer said.The ITBP mans the border with China in J&K, Himachal, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, with posts being located at altitudes up to 18,000 feet in remote and snow-bound areas. Three BOPs have been indentified where these women constables will be deployed. Modalities such as having women officers and women doctors to cater to the needs of women personnel in forward areas along with requisite administrative and logistic facilities have also been factored in their deployment.“Since women constables have been recruited into the ITBP, it is prudent that they undertake the fundamental duties that the force is meant for, rather than being posted on merely administrative or clerical duties in headquarters or rear echelons,” the officer said.

Deadly fracas in JAK LI unit in Arunachal

By Our Staff Reporter

Guwahati, May 15: A soldier died, probably of a heart attack, when his unit was sent for a 10 km march, sparking a deadly outrage among the jawans who ran riot, attacking their seniors, leaving at least five  officers seriously injured.

The army admitted that an incident of jawans attacking some officers did take place, but was tight-lipped about the place where it took place. However, The Sentinel has learnt that the incident occurred at Hayalung in Arunachal Pradesh where one of the J&K Light Infantry (JAK LI) units of the army are deployed.

Sources said a scuffle broke out between a jawan and the captain of his unit, after which a 10-km march was ordered as a punishment drill.

One soldier refused to march, complaining of chest pain, but his plea was allegedly not considered.

The soldier died during the march, apparently of heart attack.

According to an official source, 10-km marches cannot be ordered at such high altitude places.

The other jawans, outraged at the death of their colleague, attacked the captain, allegedly with rods. A subedar major tried to calm down the agitated soldiers, but he too was bashed up. Sources also said that the commander of the unit was forced to flee.

Five injured officers were admitted at an army hospital. Sources said the captain sustained injuries, including the skull and other vital organs.

The army, however, tried to downplay the incident. In an official statement, the Army said: “A case of death of a jawan during routine training activity has taken place in an infantry unit in the Northeast. It is not a case of any mutiny. The jawan complained of chest pain prior to route march – was checked by unit MO (Medical Officer) and found fit. The jawan later collapsed during route march – was brought to the Field Ambulance where he succumbed. (sic)”

The army said four to five soldiers got emotional when they were being consoled by a senior and “indulged in agitated behaviour leading to minor scuffle”.

The statement was issued after reports emerged on social media of a “mutiny-like” situation in the area.

The Army Headquarters in Delhi has denied any other individual was seriously injured. The Army has also denied that reinforcement units have moved into the area when the situation was getting out of hand.

However, the army chief has ordered a high-level inquiry into the incident, it is learnt.

In 2012, in another instance of indiscipline, soldiers had attacked senior officers in Nyoma in Ladakh in an incident the Army dismissed as a “scuffle in an artillery unit during field firing”.

Subsequent reports, however, revealed that the soldiers went out of control after senior officers severely assaulted one of their colleagues and their commanding officer.