THE five working groups were set up by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government at the Centre. The aim was to involve stakeholders from various regions, ethnic groups and social organisations in J&K in the entire gamut of the issues facing the people, including ways to bring peace in the region affected by terrorism. The following were the high five:

• Confidence building measures across segments of society in the state: Headed by now Vice President Dr Hamid Ansari.
• Strengthening Centre-state relations: Headed by Justice (retired) Sagheer Ahmad (now dead).
• Ensuring good governance: Under former bureaucrat and diplomat Naresh Chandra Saxena.
• Strengthening relations across LoC & economic reforms: Helmed by M. Rasgotra and C. Rangarajan, former Governor of Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
• Matters relating to the special status, strengthening democracy, rule of law, secularism and devolution of powers: Late Justice Sagir Ahmad submitted its report directly to then CM Omar Abdullah in December 2009, but it had failed to recommend anything as there were serious differences among members.

The four working groups gave their reports in April 2007 to PM Manmohan Singh during the third roundtable in Delhi. A high-level committee was formed in February 2008 headed by then union home secretary to oversee implementation of the recommendations of the four groups. Following were the objectives and results: Group I headed Hamid Ansari: Improve the condition of people affected by militancy, rehabilitation of orphans and widows, issues relating to the relaxation of conditions for persons who have foresworn militancy; effective rehabilitation policy, including employment, for Kashmiri Pandit migrants, an approach to return of Kashmiri youth from areas controlled by Pakistan, steps to protect and preserve the unique cultural and religious heritage.Ground Reality: Some centrally sponsored schemes implemented for militancy victims particularly orphans and widows, two key recommendation of the WG-I.No much headway on return of Kashmiri youth from Pakistan and rehabilitation of displaced Kashmiri Pandits. Nothing on AFSPA and Disturbed Areas Act because of continued Pak support to cross-border terrorism. A job package for Pandits was implemented in 2010, no further steps for their return and rehab following opposition from separatists. Centre slow in allowing Kashmiri youth from Pakistan to settle back in Kashmir. Group II: Strengthening ties across LoC: (chairman M. Rasgotra): To recommend steps to simplify procedures to facilitate travel across LoC, increase goods traffic, expand people-to-people contact, open up new routes such as Kargil-Skardu Ground Reality: Trade and visits started in 2006, but no headway to increase people-to-people contact. Opening of Kargil-Skardu is unlikely in near future as Pak shows little interest. Group III: Economic development (chairman: Dr C Rangrajan): Ensure balanced economic development and employment generation, a balanced regional and sub-regional development.Ground Reality: No headway in transferring 390mw Dulhasti and 1020mw Bursar project. Despite government expressing its commitment to balanced development, unemployment, development disparity, regional divide and rising grievances about corruption are key challenges. Group IV: Good governance (chairman: NC Saxena): Increase responsiveness, accountability and transparency of the administration, strengthen local self-government, monitor development programmes, promote zero tolerance for rights violations.Ground Reality: No serious attempt to strengthen accountability commission and bring transparency. Panchayat system and urban local bodies remain without much power. Majority of the developmental projects run behind schedule. Rights situation has improved but continued provocation by separatists and militants has led to death of several youths in protests.Group V: Strengthening ties between state and Centre (late Justice Sageer Ahmed). Matters relating to the special status within the Union; effective devolution of powers. Ground reality: The recommendations on some sort of autonomy in the Justice Sagheer Ahmed working group report caused discord between NC and Congress when they were in coalition (2009-2014). A cabinet sub-committee formed to give its opinion on the matter failed to reach any consensus. ‘Recommendations redundant, irrelevant’ Former BJP ideologue Prof Hari Om, who had presented the party in working groups, says their recommendations have become redundant and irrelevant. Prof Hari Om, who had attended deliberations in the working groups and round table conference as vice president of the BJP, argued that recommendations were by and large Kashmir-centric. The wishes and aspirations of the people of Jammu and Ladakh were “deliberately ignored,” he said. “There is no mention of such issues as problems faced by West Pakistani refugees, rehabilitation of displaced Kashmiri Hindus and issues concerning refugees from Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK)”, he said.  Prof Hari Om had signed a dissent note in the recommendations. Panun Kashmir (PK) chairman Ajay Chrangoo was also a member of Working Group on Centre-State ties. “The report was submitted without taking most members into confidence”, Chrangoo says. The entire process was a futile attempt to negate the aspirations of national population in the state that believes in Constitution of India, he said. 

— Dinesh Manhotrain Jammu

A decade of ups & downs

• May 24, 2006: PM Manmohan Singh arrives in Srinagar for a 2-day round-table.
• May 25: Manmohan says 5 working groups to be set up. 4 tourists die in a grenade blast on Srinagar outskirts.
• May 31: Grenade attacks on two tourist busses in Srinagar, 36 tourists injured.
• July 11: 8 persons, including 5 tourists, killed in a series of grenade blasts. Over 200 die in multiple train blasts in Mumbai.
• March 2007: Pak lawyers’ stir against suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary weakens Pervez Musharaf’s hold.
• July: Lal Masjid siege and military operation in Pakistan; sets off a new wave of radical militancy in Pak.
• Nov 28: Musharraf steps down as Chief of Army Staff.
• Dec 27: Benazir Bhutto assassinated.
• June-August 2008: Communal divide visible as protests sweep for several months in Kashmir and Jammu regions over land transfer to a Hindu shrine board.
• Aug 18: Musharaf steps down as the president, a month later Zardari takes charge.
• Nov 26: 10 militants attack Mumbai city, fighting continues for three days as nearly 200 killed. Indo-Pak talks halted.
• May-June 2009: Alleged incident of rape of two women in Shopian triggers protests.
• May 22: Manmohan Singh sworn in PM for second term.
• June-October 2010: Killing of a student triggers widespread protest, leading to bloodshed in Kashmir as 120 protesters and civilians killed.
• Feb 10, 2011: India agrees to resume talks with Pak suspended after 2008 Mumbai attacks.
• November 2011: Zardari vows to grant most favoured nation status to India.
• April 13, 2012: India decides to allow FDI from Pak as the two decide to open a trading post on the Wagah border.
• Feb 9, 2013: Parliament attack convict Mohammad Afzal Guru hanged; Kashmir locked down.
• March: Suicide attackers return after years of lull in Kashmir, CRPF personnel attacked.
• June 5: Nawaz Sharif elected Pak PM.
• May 26, 2014: Narendra Modi elected Prime Minister.
• Jul 10, 2015: India, Pak PMs meet on the sidelines of a Summit in Ufa.
• August 2015: National security advisors of India and Pak call call off meet after India objects to a meeting between Pakistani NSA and Kashmiri separatists.
• Dec 25: Modi in Pakistan on his first visit surprises all.
• Jan 2 2016: Armed militants attack Pathankot Air Force Station.

— Compiled by Azhar Qadri

A great sense of unease combined with a fear of eruption of streets is palpable in Kashmir.  The separatists and the deemed mainstream have come together and the ruling Peoples Democratic Party has swayed towards them in a bid to show that it can stand up to its right-wing ally, BJP, on issues perceived to be hurting Kashmir. These games and postures have created an atmosphere of unrest. Mishaps take place in Kashmir in a matter of minutes when a lethal mix of distorted facts and fiction comes to rule the psyche. A fear of an assumed assault on the religious and ethnic identities of Kashmiri Muslims is being instigated. That is prompting them to fight back to retain the special status of the state and avert an “imminent threat” to the Muslim majority character of the Valley. In this frame of thinking any and every issue — be it residential enclaves for migrant Kashmiri Pandits, state subject ex-servicemen, new industrial policy or NEET — becomes an occasion for deepening alienation. Separatists see in the opening of new medical colleges ways of bringing non-locals to undermine the ethnic and religious majority of the place. To make it look like a real assault — and the need to resist it — the hitherto divided separatist leaders have “united.”  Common Kashmiris feel something is definitely wrong.  Streets are vulnerable to protests.  Since there is no counter-narrative, “my way or the highway” attitude is rolling on. That a design is at work gains credence when a host of issues appear all of a sudden and the ruling class joins the chorus of sharing the separatists’ concern on protecting the special status of the state. The backdrop is ominous. Three policemen were gunned down in Srinagar on Monday. There is ready acceptance of any call to shutdown and protests from the separatists despite the high tourist season. The PDP-BJP alliance sans the requisite development and sense of empowerment is helping the forces wanting to make this summer really hot.

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Group Captain HS Gadhok. A Tribune photograph

Chandigarh, May 16

Group Captain HS Gadhok has taken over the command of 1 TETTRA School at Air Force High Grounds here today. Prior to this, he was serving at Directorate of Maintenance Inspection at Air Headquarters. A ceremonial parade marked the change of command.Commissioned in the Aeronautical Engineering (Mechanical) Branch in September 1988, Gp Capt Gadhok has been involved in maintenance activities on MIG-29 fighter aircraft for the past 27 years. He has held important appointments associated with the MiG-29 fleet starting from engineering officer of a squadron, senior production engineer of overhaul division and chief of quality assurance at 11 Base repair Depot. He has also done tenures as instructor at the Air Force Academy and Quality Assurance at Ordnance Factory, Bhandara. — TNS

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, May 15

An Army officer was injured by agitated jawans of his battalion following the death of their colleague in the sensitive north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh this morning. Admitting that a scuffle had taken place, the Army authorities here said it was not a “mutiny”. The incident occurred in an area located in the far-eastern corner of the state close to McMohan Line, the de facto boundary between India and China. “Six jawans of an infantry unit got agitated after one of their colleagues died during routine training. He had  complained of chest pain prior to a route march. He was examined by the unit’s medical officer and declared ‘fit’. However, the jawan collapsed during the march and was brought to a field ambulance, where he died,” the authorities said.As the Adjutant approached the jawans to console them, a scuffle ensued and the officer was injured, though not seriously. “The incident is being probed as is the practice in all cases of death during training,” the Army authorities added.

Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam’s book India’s Wars: A Military History, 1947-1971, which will be released in New Delhi on Monday, May 16, is an eye-opener.

India’s Wars gives the reader deep insights into little known aspects of combat, the sharp military minds that shaped battlefield tactics and the precision with which they were executed.

Deeply researched and passionately written, Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam — a fighter pilot who has commanded an MiG-21 squadron and a large IAF base — offers a fresh and extremely readable perspective on modern Indian military history.

Rediff.com brings you an exclusive excerpt from India’s Wars about leadership in the 1971 war, India’s greatest military triumph, published with the author’s kind and gracious permission.

What then were the major operational takeaways from the 1971 war from an Indian perspective?

While much of the current discourse on the 1971 war concentrates excessively on the meticulous military planning and orchestration at the highest level, particularly at Eastern Army Command Headquarters, it is the conversion of that plan into more than just successful operational outcomes that takes pole position.

This was only possible because of the initiative and innovation by field commanders like Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, Captain Swaraj Prakash, Group Captain Wollen and Group Captain Chandan Singh.

Had Sagat Singh not bypassed Akhaura, Bhairab Bazar and Sylhet; had Chandan Singh not responded as he did when it came to urging the Mi-4 helicopter crews to press on regardless as they transported men, logistics, ammunition and artillery guns across the River Meghna; had Wollen not asked his MiG-21 pilots to experiment with steep-dive attacks on Tezgaon airfield; and had Swaraj Prakash and Major General Uban not kept almost half a division tied down in the Chittagong sector, Dacca may not have fallen when it did.

For the first time after Independence, India made serious attempts at shaping the battlefield in the sector of its choice, the eastern sector, before engaging in full-scale operations.

Whether it was covert operations by small teams of R&AW-trained Mukti Bahini operatives initially, or large battalion-sized incursions from November onwards, the psychological impact of the Mukti Bahini can hardly be disputed.

Lieutenant General Shammi Mehta puts the overall contribution of the Mukti Bahini in the right perspective by praising them effusively:

One of the greatest contributions of the Mukti Bahini was in providing intelligence for manoeuvre. If I had to manoeuvre in a vacuum in Bangladesh, I would have ended up waging attrition warfare like in the western sector. During the initial stages of the war, we almost exactly knew where the enemy was thanks to the Mukti Bahini and later on, even if we did not, we could predict their moves thanks to the inputs given by the Mukti Bahini.

In the western theatre, though, the Indian Army entered the war with a rather defensive mindset much to the chagrin of Lieutenant General Candeth, the commander of the Western Army Command.

The concept of ‘Offensive defence’, which gained traction from Army HQ, had its merits as the war on the western front unfolded. It called for exploiting fleeting opportunities while retaining a defensive balance; dynamic generals like Pinto exploited this flexibility and tasted success in Shakargarh and Basantar with a refreshingly aggressive approach at every stage.

Up north, an aggressive corps commander like Sartaj Singh managed to stabilise Chhamb and score victory after victory in northern Kashmir, Kargil and Turtok sectors. However, despite making good progress, an inspirational leader like Major General Zorawar Chand Bakshi was held back in a defensive role after making spectacular progress in the Chicken’s Neck area. Holding the west was imperative for the success of India’s two-front strategy.

General Shammi Mehta highlighted that in all of India’s earlier wars, attrition warfare ruled the roost without much success whenever two forces bashed against each other head-on without much success, inspired by what he calls the ‘hierarchical inheritance of Montgomery, the grand-dad of attrition warfare’.

He points out that wherever the Indian Army tasted success in 1971, it was because of prosecuting manoeuvre warfare.

Dispelling the widespread notion that only armoured corps officers possessed the mind set of a manoeuvrer, General Pinto, a hardcore infantryman, looked at manoeuvre as a state of the mind and not merely a movement of forces on the ground. He went on further to highlight that proactive and reactive strategies of warfare were merely an extension of manoeuvre and attrition warfare.

Pakistan, he added, were purely reactive in 1971. When asked whether he was surprised that Pakistan did not use their idle armoured division (6 Armoured Division) against his 54 Division, he chuckled and said, ‘Had they done so, I would probably not be here talking to you.’

He was equally critical that India’s idle and sole armoured division (1 Armoured Division) was not rushed to his sector once he had made inroads. Closing the discussion on the battle of Basantar, he laughed his still infectious laugh and said, ‘The offensive-defensive concept still baffles me.’

In the overall context, however, it was a balanced mix of manoeuvre, aggression and offensive defence that resulted in a comprehensive military victory for India.

The next major operational takeaway from a joint perspective was that training, logistics and infrastructure requirements had been well anticipated by India in the six months prior to the war.

Across the border, the Pakistan armed forces had got lethargic and used to the trappings of political power. Their army was mainly engaged in ‘mass-killing operations’ in East Pakistan, and was not really prepared for war.

When asked how his division trained for war, the ninety-two-year-old General Pinto said, ‘We were much better prepared than the formations had been in 1965. As the divisional commander, I spent a lot of time in conceptual thinking and then testing these concepts during sand-model discussions.

‘Though the peacetime location of my division was in Secunderabad, we made regular visits to the I Corps HQ at Mathura and onwards to our operational locations. We knew exactly what we had to do when the balloon went up. Intellectual sharpness is essential in modern warfare; the air chief, P C Lal, was one of those with a sharp and incisive mind,’ he chuckled.

While the IAF went about building airfields, stringing across air defence networks and developing innovative tactics, the PAF had slackened its usually stringent operational training. It failed to build on the operational successes during the 1965 war despite best attempts by Air Marshal Nur Khan, the PAF chief during the interim years, to keep pace with the IAF.

The IAF gained complete air superiority over East Pakistan in a few days and flew over 2,300 sorties of fighters, helicopters and transport aircraft.

With near parity in the western sector between the IAF and PAF, the IAF flew more than twice the number of sorties in 1971 compared to 1965.

Furthermore, though it was not able to achieve complete air superiority, it was able to keep down the PAF and prevent it from operating to its full potential.

The PAF suffered greater attrition in the 1971 war as compared to 1965 and had to reckon with a resurgent IAF as the war progressed. Interdiction of follow-on forces and operational support requirements by the IAF proved to be quite decisive when it came to denying the Pakistan army of reinforcements when they were needed the most.

The innovative bombing of a Pak artillery brigade in Haji Pir and the largest ammunition dump in the Changa Manga Forest by An-12 transport aircraft led by the brilliant Wing Commander Vashisht contributed immensely to the IAF’s deep interdiction campaign. He too was awarded the Mahavir Chakra for his exploits in battle.

Though (Air Chief Marshal P C) Lal had articulated a departure from old aerial strategies, the temptation of creating an impact by Strategic Interdiction was too great and the IAF did carry out some effective strikes on the Kiamari oil refineries at Karachi harbour, Sui gas plant in Sind, Mangala dam and the Attock oil refinery near Rawalpindi.

Even though some Indian military historians have questioned the impact of such strikes on a short war such as the one fought in 1971, their offensive flavour certainly had an impact on the Pakistani mindset and demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep in order to hurt an adversary’s economic potential.

AVM -Arjun Subramaniam <arjun31@gmail.com>

The state has offered land to the Army at Bajpathri in Budgam.

Majid Jahangir

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, May 13

The non-availability of suitable firing ranges has compelled the Army to train its men outside the state, “adversely” impacting the working of the force in Kashmir. This has been disclosed by the Army in an affidavit to the National Green Tribunal (NGT), New Delhi, in response to the notices issued by the tribunal over the proposal for allowing the Army to set up an artillery firing range in a forest area of Bajpathri in central Kashmir’s Budgam district. The NGT had also issued a notice to the J&K Government.“The Government of Jammu and Kashmir offered the area of Bajpathri for notifying as an alternative field range. The detailed study and reconnaissance was carried out by the Army along with the Air Force followed by a joint study with the state government authorities to study the requirement of land, impact on the environment and the 

effect on tourism.

“The final decision to notify the ranges will be that of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir,” read the affidavit filed by the Ministry of Defence through its respondent Col Vinod S, officiating Brigadier, General Staff (Training) Headquarters, Northern Command, last week.The petition against the proposal for the firing range in Bajpathri was moved in the tribunal by social activist Raja Muzaffar Bhat in February. The petitioner stated that “if field firing and artillery practice is allowed in Bajpathri, it will  endanger the lives of people living in scores of villages adjoining the area with a disastrous impact on the environment and the wildlife habitat.” The proposal for setting up the firing range in Bajpathri in the meadows of the picturesque Yousmarg tourist destination had evoked strong resentment.In 2014, the Army had vacated the Tosa Maidan firing range spread over 11,200.477 hectares in Budgam district and since then it has been asking the J&K Government to allot an alternative place for the field firing range.The Army said there was a requirement of a field firing range in the Kashmir region. “As on date, a large number of restrictions have been imposed on the Indian Army with respect to the availability of ranges in J&K. Whereas our adversary on the western border is not constrained by any such restrictions and has a number of ranges available to it. Similarly, our adversary on the eastern front has unfettered access to firing ranges. This is likely to have an adverse impact on the preparedness of our armed forces vis-a-vis our adversaries,” its affidavit read.The Army said the non-availability of a range in the Kashmir region has now compelled it to move the heavy equipment to far-off ranges at Babina in Madhya Pradesh and Mahajan in Rajasthan.“The non-availability of suitable ranges in the Kashmir theatre of operations had an adverse impact and serious implications on the internal and external security,” the Army stated, adding that  it was facing major problems in the absence of the firing ranges.“Apart from the expenditure on fuel, oil and lubricants, the movement to alternative ranges results in depletion in manning levels of the counter-infiltration, counter-terrorism grid deployment affecting the internal security.”The Army said the levels of retaliation to ceasefire violations had reduced due to the non-availability of essential weapons and war-like stores for a prolonged duration. It would also affect the military response to the threat posed by our adversaries due to the time required for transporting the equipment. The affidavit stated that Rs 43 crore had to be expended on the movement of the troops for training outside J&K.

What Army told the Central tribunal

• Our adversary on the western border has a number of ranges available to it. Similarly, our adversary on the eastern front has unfettered access to firing ranges. This (lack of firing ranges) is likely to have an adverse impact on the preparedness of our armed forces vis-a-vis our adversaries
• The non-availability of a range in the Kashmir region has compelled the Army to move the heavy equipment tofar-off ranges in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.
• Rs 43 crore has to be expended on the movement of the troops for training outside J&K. The final decision tonotify the ranges will be made by the J&K Government

Jammu, May 10

After training the fair gender in arms to take on militants, the Army has another task at hand to make them physically robust and psychologically empowered.The Army has initiated a four-week martial arts cadre for girl students in remote areas of Rajouri district.“A total of 40 girl students from six schools of Nowshera tehsil in Rajouri district are participating in the cadre, aimed at developing self-confidence and making them physically robust and psychologically empowered,” said defence spokesperson Col SD Goswami.The four-week cadre under Operation Sadbhavana is being conducted at Government High School, Seri. It focuses on physical training and mechanics of self-defence.“The training is being conducted by an Army soldier, a black belt in judo. During the cadre, the students will master the art of hand-to-hand combat, besides various martial arts techniques,” said Colonel Goswami. — TNS

Army holds vocational training

Rajouri, May 10

The Army conducted a vocational training course in “Electrician and welding” works in conjunction with the civil administration at Kalal. At least 17 youths from Kalal, Deeing and Bareri villages attended the camp which was conducted with an aim to providing avenues for setting up small scale projects.