The story runs between ‘arms dynamic’, state, contractors and taxpayers.

Front-line fourth-generation modern fighter Rafale, manufactured by the French major Dassault Aviation, was chosen as the winner in the global tender for 126 MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft) for the Indian Air Force (IAF) before the Narendra Modi government took over in 2014. The deal was shelved and subsequently replaced by announcement of a new contract for direct purchase of 36 Rafale at a cost of about Rs 60,000 crore—the process for which has already been under way since 2015 and the contract signed in September 2016. As time flies, the opposition parties, led by the Congress, have voiced serious concerns about the Rafale deal at a time when India is slated to go for national elections in less than a year from now. It appears that Rafale is going to dominate electoral discourse in the time to come. One is reminded of a national uproar during the late 1980s over the purchase of Bofors, which eventually cost the then government dearly, although a similar consequence appears highly unlikely this time.

The Rafale deal typifies a classic case of ‘arms dynamic’—a term propounded and explained by Barry Buzan and Eric Herring in the classic book ‘The Arms Dynamic in World Politics’ (Lynne Rienner, 1998)—which explains that arms transactions can be a complex affair involving elements of the state, bureaucracy and armed forces from the recipient side, and manufacturers and the state from the supplier side. Such is the ubiquity in the process as well as larger understanding between the supplier and recipient that it most often leads to inconclusive consequences, if questions are raised about its intent or process. All the more reason such cases become more complicated when the suppliers and recipients are relatively self-sufficient and deficient, respectively, in their industrial capacities. The absence of clearly-defined processes, although claimed otherwise, as well as hazy national security considerations leave little scope for probity and accountability, although large public resources are appropriated by the state.

The contract for 36 Rafale fighter aircraft typifies a case of state relations in global politics. Consider this: India needs 350-plus fighters of different types for its fast depleting belly portion of its fighter fleet, leaving aside front line as well as tail, if its sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons is to be maintained. This itself is a huge market for foreign aerospace predators. If previous tender experiences are of any indication, the Americans, Russians, French, Europeans (consortium-led), Swedish are all geared up for a slice in the $300-billion Indian military aerospace market alone. It is not for nothing that Presidents and heads of governments of these countries visited simultaneously on some pretext or the other within a span of six months during 2010 when the technical trials of 126 MMRCA were under way. In the new Rafale deal, the same situation did not happen as it was a one-off decision by the Modi government.

The 36 Rafale deal can be argued either way—on one hand, it arouses suspicion because of lack of sufficient data available in public domain, and on the other it does not appear to have flouted basic procurement rules. Consider this: the way the deal was announced during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to France raised eyebrows. Such suspicion did not get reflected adequately in the mainstream media at that time (it is only in the last few months that the opposition parties have raised the issue). However, it can be argued that the deal did not flout any rule of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) as there are provisions under the same DPP that empower a particular government to negotiate and sign one-off deals based on strategic considerations through inter-government agreements. Sections 104 and 105 (Inter-Government Agreement) and 106 (Procurement on Strategic Considerations) of DPP-2016 (pp 29-30) not only provide sufficient power to the state to negotiate and sign arms contracts of high-value systems based on strategic considerations, but also such contracts may not necessarily follow standard rules and procedures as mandated under the DPP. Accusations on flouting of rules can thus be countered by the state.

The 36 Rafale deal has three core aspects: price, technical details and process. In all three, the state can justify its stand (price does not matter under sections 104 and 105 of the DPP; technical details for obvious reasons cannot be disclosed; while process can take the usual route). However, broader aspects of such deals are subject to interpretations, which can unsettle the state if it fails to adequately address such issues. Here, three questions arise:
(1) Is Rafale a worthy product to be considered under ‘strategic considerations’?
(2) Is it going to enhance strategic strike capabilities of the IAF?
(3) Is the Indian industry (for example, Reliance Defence) going to benefit from offsets, and if so, how?
If the government fails to adequately answer the above issues, the deal could end up in favour of the supplier and the recipient state at the cost of domestic contractors and Indian taxpayers.

-The author is Director, Indike Analytics (OPC) Pvt Ltd, New Delhi

The debate on the recent no-confidence motion in the Lok Sabha will long be remembered for two notables. One, reprehensible hug-and-wink antics of an immature leader. Two, serious allegations were levelled against the government as regards the probity of the Rafale deal. The first aspect concerns the dignity and decorum of the house; and the posterity will remember it with due repugnance. It is the second aspect that is of much graver concern. For, the Rafale deal, if embroiled in political slugfest, has the potential of harming India’s security and derailing the modernisation programme.

Broadly, the government has been accused of (i) declining to reveal details of the deal under the allegedly sham clause of secrecy; (ii) negotiating a costlier deal; and (iii) ignoring the public sector to favour a private Indian company. All are serious charges and merit scrutiny. To recall, on the urgent demand of IAF, tenders were issued for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) in August 2007. While 18 aircraft were to be purchased in fully built up condition, the balance quantity was to be manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under transfer of technology. After extensive trials, two platforms (Dassault’s Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon)  were found technically acceptable. Finally, Rafale emerged winner due to its lower life-cycle cost. The announcement was made on 31 January 2012 and contract negotiations commenced thereafter. By 2014, negotiations had reached a total impasse with no signs of possible breakthrough. In addition to overly escalating cost (from USD 10-12 billion to USD 25-30 billion), two other critical issues proved highly cantankerous. One, Dassault declined to stand guarantee for the 108 fighters to be built by HAL as it had found HAL to be totally incapable of producing ultra-modern fighters. Two, differences emerged regarding the interpretation of scope and depth of technology transfer. Reportedly, Dassault was ready to part with limited technology for licence manufacture only and not the design technology. With no solution in sight, the then Defence Minister Antony had decided to let the proposal die by default. Secrecy Clause It is an accepted fact that major defence deals between the two countries are an instrument of a nation’s foreign policy objectives. They do not take place in isolation and are invariably a part of a larger package agreed to between the two nations. Hence, it is incorrect to view them as standalone commercial contract. Needless to say, many commitments made as quid pro quo carry serious security implications and are never made public. India is buying Rafale as a complete fighting system and not just the platform. The real punch lies in the weaponry, avionics, electronics and radars that it carries. Operational capability of a strategic system depends on its configuration and it has to be closely guarded secret. No country reveals such details as the surprise element gets negated and the prospective enemies can initiate counter-measures in advance. It is strange that some knowledgeable experts are wanting the government to release an item-wise comparative cost table. Demand for transparency cannot be carried to such ridiculous limits. As regards the seller, France has already confirmed that it does not want to reveal the commercial terms of the deal as it has to market the product to other nations as well. Commercial confidentiality is inherent in all government to government deals. There is no MRP for the defence systems. Comparative Cost of the Negotiated Deal It is being alleged that the deal negotiated by Modi is at a much higher cost than the one under the UPA regime. It is quite a childish prank. How can one compare a non-deal with a deal. As stated earlier, the earlier negotiations never fructified due to fundamental disagreements. A non-starter aborted arrangement cannot be used as a datum for price comparison? In addition, the earlier quote was for the platform as such and the negotiations for the add-ons never reached conclusiveness. The current deal includes large number of India specific capabilities which no other aircraft possesses. To quote an example, the base model of a sedan may cost only 11 lacs while the price of the fully loaded top-end model with all features could well exceed 16 lacs. Can the two costs be compared? Favouring the Private Sector Company The government has been accused of favouring Anil Ambani’s Reliance group by ousting HAL. This is by far the most ridiculous allegation. One does not know whether it is sheer ignorance on the part of the critics or a deliberate plan with malicious motives. The current Rafale deal does not entail manufacture/assembly of the fighters in India. All 36 aircraft will be manufactured in France and delivered to India fully configured. Hence, the question of having an Indian production partner does not arise. Reliance is not going to manufacture any aircraft. Dassault has selected a number of Indian Offset Partners (IOP) to fulfil its offset obligations and Reliance is one of them, albeit a major one. Fulfilment of offset obligations entails compensating the buyer country for the outflow of its resources through designated offset programmes. India’s offset policy has been spelt out at Appendix D to Chapter II of the defence procurement procedure. Provisions related to the current discussion are as follows:- Quantum of Offsets. As per Para 2.2, all ‘Buy Global’ cases of estimated value of more than Rs 2,000 crores have to carry offset obligations equal to 30 percent of the contract value. Interestingly, India has managed to obtain offsets equal to 50 percent of the contract value, despite stiff opposition by the French. It is a huge gain as Dassault has to incur considerable additional expenditure to fulfil extra offset obligations. Selection of IOP. Para 4.3 unambiguously states that the foreign vendor is free to select IOP and the government has no role to play at all. Responsibility for Fulfilling Offsets. Para 5.1 categorically states that the foreign vendor will be responsible for the fulfilment of offset obligations. Failure invites huge penalty (five percent of the unfulfilled offset obligation with a cap of twenty percent) and even debarment from future contracts. It is a huge punishment by all accounts. Avenues for Discharge of Offset Obligations (Para 3). The policy specifies six avenues for the discharge of offset obligations and the foreign vendor is free to choose any one or a combination of them. The avenues include direct purchase of eligible products and services; FDI in joint ventures; and investment in kind/technology. Eligible products/services cover the complete range of defence, inland/coastal security and civil aerospace products. It is a vast choice. The above provisions make eminent sense. If the vendor is responsible for offsets, he must have independence to select IOP in whom he has faith. The government cannot dictate IOP and yet hold the vendor responsible for timely completion. Dassault has chosen Reliance as a major IOP. No one can question it. It needs to be recalled here that India signed a contract for 22 Apache attack helicopters and 15 Chinook heavy-lift choppers from the US with offset obligations. Boeing chose Tata Advanced Systems, Dynamatic Technologies, Rossel Techsys and many others as IOP. Hence, accusing the government of favouring Reliance in the Rafale deal defies logic. Finally In the case of large value deals, government to government route is by far the most cost effective with sovereign guarantees. In addition, the seller government provides logistic, training and exploitation support. Most importantly, there are no middlemen and no slush money. The Rafale deal is no exception. However, every attempt at acquiring game-changing defence capability is deliberately embroiled in controversies by disparate inimical forces. As has been seen in the past, controversies are deliberately generated by the losing competitors by planting negative stories through paid sources to coerce the decision makers into aborting the deal. In the case of Rafale deal, media reports suggest that the government is considering procurement of additional Rafale fighters, especially the naval version. Apparently, efforts are being made to deter the government from going ahead. The current storm being kicked may well be a manifestation of the same. It is also alleged that some corporate entities are purposely targeted by the politicians to extort election funds. Every move to induct private sector in defence production is opposed tooth and nail by the public sector. Past performance of HAL has been dismal. With a view to develop alternate facilities for aerospace manufacture in the private sector, the UPA government had initiated a proposal for the manufacture of transport aircraft by a private sector entity in collaboration with a foreign vendor. Tata-Airbus combine was finally selected. Threatened by the entry of the private sector into its monopolistic domain, HAL cleverly converted the above proposal into a private sector versus public sector war. The proposal has since been lying mired in bureaucratic quandary and no further progress has been made. Every effort to integrate the private sector is thwarted by the patrons of the public sector. In the same vein, in the Rafale case, one has seen some conniving media personnel deceitfully claiming that HAL has been replaced by Reliance. To criticise and fault the government is fully justified provided the facts support allegations. It is grossly unfair to invent wild allegations, in the hope that some accusations may stick. False accusations to score brownie points vitiate the environment and India’s defence modernisation suffers. Even the boldest and the most conscientious leaders and officers fear subsequent enquiries. The media must certainly highlight acts of corruption and misdemeanours but it is not necessary to fault every defence deal. Anti-government posturing should not degenerate into anti-national rhetoric.

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD, commanded an Engineer Regiment on the Siachen Glacier, the most hostile battlefield in the world. A highly qualified officer (B Tech, MA (Public Administration), MSc (Defence Studies) and a Doctorate in Public Administration) he was also the Task Force Commander at Pokhran and was responsible for designing and sinking shafts for the nuclear tests of May 1998.

Read more at: http://www.sify.com/news/rafale-and-the-reliance-conundrum-news-columns-sh5i7Ihaffbac.html
Read more at: http://www.sify.com/news/rafale-and-the-reliance-conundrum-news-columns-sh5i7Ihaffbac.html

Amit Khajuria

Tribune News Service

Jammu, July 27

Despite having the required infrastructure, the Jammu airport is still waiting for the permission from the Indian Air Force (IAF) to operate during night.The Srinagar airport, however, recently got the IAF nod for night flights.The Jammu airport, which had been ranked as the 27th busiest airports of the country, is having a hard time managing heavy rush during peak hours. The airport caters to more than 4,000 passengers on a daily basis in 40 (arrival and departure) flights.The airport starts its operations after 9.30 am and the last flight takes off before 4.30 pm. No commercial flights are allowed to operate beyond the allotted time.The local IAF station controls the air traffic of the airport and it does not allow the authorities to operate during night.“We have the required infrastructure to operate flights during night,” said DK Goutam, director, Jammu airport. “To seek permission from the IAF, we need flight schedules of the airline companies which are willing to operate during night hours,” he said.Goutam said in the last meeting of the airport advisory committee held in February this year, it was decided that various airlines would be requested to the send their schedules for night flights. However, no airlines have come forward with their schedules even after six months, he added.

Time and again, successive governments have given assurances of implementing a proper one rank and one pension system as per the veterans demands but they have not got OROP which they asked for. When you will read their story, you will feel ashamed to call yourself Indian. We bring a detailed analysis of what OROP is and why it has not be implemented and still the lies have been spread that OROP has been given after 40 years. In the words of Rajnath Singh when he was giving the speech during the no confidence motion event, he said OROP was granted by the government and it was followed by a clap. May be Hon PM and RM are in the impression that they have provided OROP for the jawans but let us learn from a Retd Major(who has been fighting for veterans cause now from a long time) what exactly is OROP and that was not being given to the ex service man, many of them fought for us in wars of 62, 65 and 71. If it cannot be done now then when?

Major AK Dhanapalan (Rtd) writes the pain of an ex service man. They have been totally blacked by the media now(in order to make us believe that OROP has been granted) and they still are protesting at Jantar Mantar.

OROP – A Himalayan Blunder

( OROP to Veterans and Widows of the Indian Armed Forces and related issues )

Propaganda is being made in the media to create an impression that OROP has been given and all ESMs are happy with it. If so, it need to be explained:-

a) As to Why there are too many Court Cases?. And why from Sepoys to General Officers are to knock the doors of the Judiciary, if the Govt machinery as well as the Ex-servicemen organizations are functioning properly. ?

b) And why the Govt loose all the cases giving a direct indication that their approach is NOT correct . ?

c) But why the judgments are NOT being implemented?

d) And why, to save the face of certain crooked officials, the Govt is forced to appeal against these ex-servicemen in Supreme Court spending huge public money only to loose the cases again ? Is it NOT a conspiracy in the MOD officials to harass the poor jawans and claim huge amount towards TA/DA, engaging private advocates and other misc expenses apart from wasting office time of such officials . ? All at the cost of Ex-servicemen Welfare..!

e) Is it NOT demoralizing the Armed Forces Personnel as a whole apart from financial and social aspect being faced by them ?

An attempt is also being made to equate the Armed Forces with that of civilian central Govt employees. On One hand the Armed Forces Personnel are being equated with that of Civilian employees, but on the other hand certain privileges availed by the civilian employees are denied to the Armed Forces Personnel. For example, NFU being granted to Gp A Civilians are not extended to the Armed Forces in spite of Directions of the Courts. Cadre review (Promotions), Deputations, age for retirement, right to have unions etc are some of the examples.

If the Armed Forces personnel are to be treated at par with that of civilian employees on the basis of basic pay (allowances, status etc) other terms and conditions applicable to Civilian Employees should be equally applied to the AF Personnel.

Equation of pension calculation with that of civilian employees i.e. 50% of Pay last drawn suits only to those ESMs who retire on completion of 58/60 years of age.

This injustice has been done when the jawans are to retire at an early age when his basic pay is very very less compared to Civilian Employees who have number of years service ahead for more promotions and more Pay Commission benefits and reach a very higher pay and get higher pension. This amount is the basis for all considerations after retirement of a person whether it is DA, pay commission benefits etc., ESM community is in a very disadvantage state. If at all this 50% is to be applied, justice demand that their pay(with promotion, pay commission benefits etc) also to be notionally stepped up to make at par with the civilians who retire at the age of 60 yrs. OR ESM who are to be retire at a very early age should treated at par with the VRS OR to be treated as retrenched personnel eligible to get immediate available appointment in the Govt service without coming through PSC/Employment Exchanges OR there should be a separate package of pay . One reason being pushed is that weightage was given. This is absolutely do not carry any merit. Reason being

(a) No change in the calculation i.e. 50% of last pay drawn is given

(b) it is to compensate 33 years requirement which is not correct. 33 years was stipulated to civ employees whose retirement age is 58/60 years. Since the jawans are to retire at the age of 35-40 this requirement of 33 years cannot be stipulated. Hence the weightage was an eye-wash. The present retires only get 50% of the last pay drawn. They do not get compensation for the early retirement. No one seems to realize the tress and mental agony caused by such an early retirement and befooling them in the pension calculations.

In all fairness ex-servicemen deserve a fair deal and should have been given a “MEANINGFUL RESETTLEMENT PACKAGE” in addition to the pension for the sacrifices they made for the safety and integrity of the Country.

The One Rank One Pension (OROP) sanctioned by the Govt of India , Min of Def, Dept of EX-Servicemen Welfare Vide No.12(1)/2014/D/(Pen/Pol)-Part II dtd 7th Nov 2015, says which I quote “OROP implies that uniform pension be paid to the Defence Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with same length of service, regardless of their date of retirement , which implies, bridging the gap between the rates of pension of current and past pensioners at periodic intervals.” Unquote. This is precisely what has been done by the 7th CPC in the case of Civilian Employees, where in only the method adopted is stepping up the pay notionally to bring them at par with those of 2016 employees and revise the pension, here also the intention is to bridge the gap between the current and past pensioners. In other words, both are one at the same. Although this order for Armed Forces has been named as OROP, but this has nothing to do with the OROP, and mischievously used to confuse the issue.

However the difference is that;-

the financial implication for implementing the OROP for Jawans after a great deal of discussion and committees for years, has come to a conclusion that it would be around Rs.8 to 10 thousand Crs .

This amount is said to be a great burden to the Govt and after a long debate decided to pay the arrears in 4 (four) installments.

Apart from that , anomalies in the order which was too many, to be referred to a committee which was required to submit its report within 6 months has not seen the light even today, after 2 years.

The anomalies are still existing and the payments as per 7th CPC could not be made to the ESMs in full so far.

All these actions were to create an impression that much more than what is deserving have been given to the Ex-servicemen .

On top of it, the statement made in public functions that “OROP has been granted at the cost of poor farmers”, is an insult to the Armed Forces Personnel.

On the contrary, in the case of civilian pensioners, the similar decision to bridge the gap between the current and past retires have been fully implemented , financial implication for this is estimated to be nearly Rs. One Lakh Cr and approved with just only 15 mts discussion. The Arrears were paid in full and NOT installments.

Not only such insult and down gradation has been made, but also an attempt is being made to project the OROP as the one meant to compensate for the early retirement. There is reason to believe that the H’ble Prime Minister and the RM are being misinformed to the extent that the OROP is the one which is intended to compensate for the early retirement and is as per the demand of the -Ex-servicemen since last 40 years and most of the ex-servicemen fraternity are happy with the present OROP. This may be the reason why every time the leaders proudly say that OROP which was pending for the past 40 years have now been given to our jawans. This is factually NOT correct and misleading. This is similar to the cheating of“ Rank Pay” case gtd in 1986, created by the MOD officials. In fact, not only the OROP has not been given but also The ex-servicemen as well as the General public are being fooled using wrong propaganda.

In this connection I must mention here the findings of the 142nd Report of the Rajya Sabha committee on petitions dt 19/11/2011, extract of which is given below:(Page 2)

Islamabad, July 22

Pakistan’s top court on Sunday said it had begun reviewing statements made by a judge alleging the country’s spy agencies were influencing judicial proceedings, as the powerful military called for an investigation.Pakistan’s July 25 General Election has been hit by accusations of pre-poll rigging with ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) accusing the military of influencing the judiciary to deny it a second term.Islamabad High Court judge Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui accused the country’s premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of interfering in legal cases.“The ISI is fully involved in trying to manipulate the judicial proceedings,” Siddiqui said in a speech to lawyers, adding the agency had told the court not to release Sharif and his daughter Maryam until after the elections.“In order to safeguard the sanctity and credibility of the state institutions, the Supreme Court has been requested to initiate appropriate process to ascertain the veracity of the allegations and take actions accordingly,” the army said. Disqualification of candidates is one of the challenges the former ruling PML-N has faced ahead of the elections. — ReutersCandidate Radesh Singh Tony, the braveRadesh Singh Tony (centre) is the first independent candidate from Pakistan’s Sikh minority to run in conservative, northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The odds are already heavily stacked against Tony in a constituency populated with around 130,000 mostly Muslim registered voters, compared to just 160 Sikhs.His two opponents come from parties backed by hardline religious organisations with links to militant groups. The contest comes just months after local community leader Charanjeet Singh was shot dead. If elected, Tony has vowed to serve all communities, but is still wary of simmering threats. “We are vulnerable targets,” Tony says. “We are campaigning in an atmosphere of fear.” AFP

Pak military denies interference

Army, Navy & Air Force have to climb out of their respective silos, cease empire building, and create a joint plan to address military angst

Military officers have asked for parity with IAS and IPS officers, complaining time and again that they don’t climb ranks fast enough. The anger at the civil services, however, doesn’t justify the solutions the armed forces seem to be identifying for their ailments.

The latest attempt to find a solution has resulted in a proposal to do away with the rank of the Army brigadier. A study was commissioned by chief Bipin Rawat last month to help with the cadre restructuring. It also sought to address the three main issues plaguing the armed forces for more than 30 years: degradation of ranks, lower pay scales, and warrant of precedence.

The angst due to these issues has been most apparent ever since the deployment of the armed forces, especially the Army, increased exponentially. In military law, this is called ‘aid to civil authority’ or the deployment of armed forces for the aid of the government and the community. This ‘aid’ has become well-nigh permanent in India, as have ranks, precedence, and pay scales.

The Army seems to be copying the Joneses by proposing to prune the number of ranks so as to bring a semblance of equality with the civil services. Not a good starting point at all. Especially since the Indian military is an age-old institution which has barely been tinkered with in terms of structure, deployment and functioning.

It remains largely the expeditionary force it was created as in the pre-World War I era. Therefore, even today, the armed forces remain expeditionary in structure, command, and control. But the Indian state, which governs the military, is now largely insular, and that is where the civil-military complications become acuter.

In the largely internal deployment of the armed forces, motivated and bright officers meet their civilian counterparts who head districts, as collectors or as police chiefs. The comparison begins there: A young captain, who wears the rank of a second-in-command in the Army, and the superintendent of police, who is a three-star officer, after the same number of years in service.

As both IAS and IPS officers go up in the ranks of service, the gap in seniority gets wider and at a faster pace.

This resentment gives rise to the anger and frustration in the armed forces. More fire-fighting attempts are made to gain parity and rejoin the race. But each attempt completely misses the crucial point– there need not be a race at all.

By no stretch of imagination can the armed forces be equated with the UPSC-selected civil or police service. Their roles are completely different, and those who have joined the various services have done so voluntarily, knowing what the qualifications needed are.

When the basic requirement of soldiering are at complete variance with civil administration, why should the armed forces be seeking parity in the first place? And if they are seeking parity, it means that there has been a degradation for which the society and the leadership of the armed forces are responsible.

These dilutions and diminishing of ranks haven’t happened overnight, but are the result of political oversight, civilian manipulation, and a lot of military ignorance in governance. The solution then cannot come from within the military alone but also has to come from the government.

Cadre reviews of the past ultimately became sops for a few ranks, looked good for some years, and then horrendously unwieldy as time went by. The current cadre review and the tentative proposals in it appear to be headed in the same direction. In lay terms, it is simply denting work, rather than anything substantive.

For anything substantial to happen, the armed forces will first have to set up a joint committee to oversee any cadre review. Only the Navy, Air Force, or the Army doing it alone, as in this case, simply perpetuates the problem. After all, the three services have to work closer together than with any other government bodies. Which means they need to be on the same page and seniority in order to arrive at a solution. The Army jettisoning one rank complicates the problem further since their equivalent ranks will continue to exist in the Navy and Air Force, with military protocol and precedence under greater stress.

The three services should climb out of their respective silos, cease empire building, and formulate a joint plan. Since silos and empires are not easy to destroy, the three services can first prepare for a separate armed forces pay commission. The success of which will pave the way for greater cooperation, integration and hopefully, modernisation of the military structure.

Precedence and parity will be a hole-in-one after that.

Manvendra Singh is editor-in-chief of Defence & Security Alert. He is presently a BJP MLA in the Rajasthan assembly and former member of the Parliament Standing Committee on Defence.

The IAF in Delhi has invited applications for the post of Lower Division Clerk. Candidates who are interested to apply for the post and send their fill up applications to Air Officer Commanding, Air Force Central Medical Establishment, New Delhi on or before July 30, 2018.

IAF Delhi Recruitment 2018: Online applications for the post of Lower Division Clerk has been invited by the Indian Air force at Air Central Medical Establishment, New Delhi. Candidates who are interested to apply can submit their filled up applications before the last date scheduled on July  30, 2018.

The IAF had released The of Delhi Clerk recruitment notification on June 1, 2018 through Employment News. candidates who have passed the HS final year examination can are eligible to apply for the post. Those who are in between the age of 18 to 25 years will be considered for the post.

ALSO READ: DSSSB Recruitment 2018: Applications invited for various posts, last date August 13, 2018

Candidates need to submit their application in the prescribed format the IAF and Air Officer Commanding, Air Force Central Medical Establishment, Subroto Park, New Delhi, PIN – 110010 by July 30, 2018. To go to the official website and check the notification online, click here: http://indianairforce.nic.in/

ALSO READ: TS Police Recruitment 2018: Exam dates for Constable and Sub Inspector recruitment released @ tslprb.in

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Lt-Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)IT is not the first time that a lone Kashmiri policeman or soldier has been abducted and killed. Javed Ahmad Dar is the umpteenth policeman who while off duty has been isolated and targeted, once again in notorious Shopian. A number of Army soldiers have similarly been targeted when off duty, on leave and outside the organised support of their units; the recent case of rifleman Aurangzeb is too well known to reiterate. This includes Lt Umar Farooq of 2 Raj Rif who was killed in Kulgam last year, first among the officer cadre. All over India the public is understandably frustrated at the loss of these Kashmiri bravehearts with whose plight there is tremendous empathy. To comprehend the limitations in securing the men in uniform and whether anything is deficient in our ways it is important to get a measure of the working environment of security personnel in Kashmir. There are domains to examine — first the functional on-duty aspect and second the off duty challenges, or on leave. The Army functions as units. Thus if a Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry (JAK LI) unit consisting 50 per cent Kashmiri Muslims is deployed on either the LoC or the hinterland, the functioning is all in sub-units of at least seven men (reduced section strength); they could be deployed as just a buddy pair of two men but under constant watch and control of another superior. The hallmark of normal functioning in the Army is that no deployment can ever be in less than a buddy pair. The system of buddies ensures that even if one is resting the other is alert. Mutual support is a basic principle on which most training and execution depends. Terrorist abduction of a soldier on duty is next to impossible, although there has been one stray case in an operation near Sopore. Vulnerability to ambushes is high in the case of small parties as quick reaction teams protect officers, logistics elements or simply isolated moves such as the ambush of the Rashtriya Rifles group in 2013 near Hyderpura on the national highway, in which we lost eight bravehearts. The element of vulnerability is the highest among the Army’s Territorial Army (Home and Hearth) units in which the composition of personnel is largely local and the units stay within the Valley. The frequency of home visits by personnel is higher, making them much more vulnerable.The Army’s role and system of functioning obviously differs from the J & K Police (JKP), where the personnel are fully secure as they are deployed as armed police units. The Special Operations Group (SOG) also work in small teams but not so small as to be isolated and targeted. For the conduct of operations beyond intelligence gathering they work in close concert with Army units which give them inherent security. The vulnerability is the highest of the Station House Officers (SHOs) and their staff at police stations which is not so numerous as to afford the required overkill for ensured security. SHO Feroz Dar of Anantnag was killed a year ago in an ambush along with six of his men. The thing to remember about vulnerability of policemen is that armed police units live mostly in police lines but personnel manning police stations often live among the people and many times in their own homes. Under normal circumstances that is the best way of policing with local policemen in the know of everything in and around their abodes. However, with terror threats that makes these policemen most vulnerable.All personnel on leave have to visit their homes. In earlier periods of higher terrorist presence even notorious tehsils such as Tral had an unwritten code and security men on leave were usually not targeted even if alone or in their homes. It is with lower terrorist strength that abduction, torture, uploading of videos and eventual killing has become a norm. These personnel are the softest targets, mostly unarmed and their killing has a high impact on social media and national media. Foreign terror groups looking for reporting back to proxy masters count these as achievements. What is surprising is local groups resorting to this as it draws the ire of the public. It appears to indicate the absence of mature leadership directing the local terror operations. This is the sentiment on which the JKP has not sufficiently focused in terms of psychological exploitation painting the local terrorists as villains among their own people. Naming and shaming them in the local environment places the pressure of ethics on local terrorists (LTs), the lack of which robs a local family off its bread earner. How else can personnel travelling on leave and inevitably going home alone be better secured? The Army has an SOP of personnel reporting to the nearest posts but this affords only token security. There have been proposals to allow local security personnel to carry their service weapons while on leave. For many reasons, including that of potential desertion and snatching, this is not a doable idea. Providing additional manpower for personal security to all is out of the question, resource wise. Buddy pair system for policemen is possible up to a point and definitely not on leave. The far better way perhaps is to rouse the conscience of the people but the establishment has generally been weak at this, its so-called outreach has been undefined and unimaginative; social media can be better harnessed through professional advice. A suggestion of collective social and economic retribution against villages which cannot protect their own policemen or soldiers is never a good idea as it has many negative spin-offs. The enthusiastic response to recruitment opportunities for entry into the various security-related organisations is equally balanced by the huge turnout at funerals of terrorists. This is the paradox of Kashmir which needs greater ground-based research by some advanced research institutions because top of the head deductions will not assist in curbing the threat to those who do service for the nation. As a starter, the identity of known perpetrators of such criminal acts must be projected all over the general area from where the LTs hail. If funerals of LTs can give rise to passions among the youth to join the LT ranks, surely the sentiments on the targeted killing of local isolated security personnel can also be similarly exploited. Former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps