By Air Marshal RGK Kapoor PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)
The lessons from Operation Sindoor need to be assimilated by the military establishment and the national leadership and applied to bolster national security. One significant issue being pursued by the nation is enhancing jointness among the services through a transition to theatre commands. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has long argued that India is one theatre as far as the Air Force is concerned. Op Sindoor, the author of the article below, a retired Air Marshal and someone who has been Commander-in-Chief of an IAF Command argues against such a requirement. There will be many different views on his argument which we welcome. Read on.
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Operation Sindoor was successfully executed by the Indian armed forces. It is an example of synergy and jointness in planning and executing operations across the entire length of the western borders, from Kutch in the south to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in the north. The operation is ongoing; however, the current pause provides an opportunity to review what we did well, replenish the war machine, undertake an honest evaluation and tighten the loose ends.
Operation Sindoor was planned, executed, and reviewed at the highest level, as it involved a subtle transition from a sub-conventional response to conventional military operations involving the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF), with robust support from the Indian Navy (IN). It was predominantly a classic air campaign in which air power provided the winning punch.
Genesis of Theatre Commands
The genesis of theatre commands traces its roots back to the analysis of the Kargil War in 1999. In August 2023, the Indian Parliament passed a landmark bill advocating the establishment of theatre commands for the Indian Armed Forces. Traditionally, the Indian military has fought wars individually based on unifying their operational plans rather than jointly formulating operational plans. The result is a lack of efficiency and duplicity of efforts. The importance of synergy and jointness in any future network-centric and joint all-domain conflict cannot be overstated. While the bill’s passage signifies a crucial initial step, a lot of effort would be needed to iron out issues to operationalise theaterisation.
Presently, the Indian Armed Forces have 17 Individual service commands. Of these, the IA has seven commands, the IAF has seven and three belong to the IN. IA has six, IAF has five, and IN has two operational commands.
Creation of theatre commands commenced with the appointment of the first CDS, Gen Bipin Rawat, in January 2020. While many deliberations have taken place and progress has been made, the theatre commands have yet to materialise. It highlights the complexity of the process and the numerous variables and imponderables that need to be resolved before it bears fruit.
The duties and functions of CDS, as enunciated in the GoI document dated 3 February 2020, include “To bring about jointness in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc. of the three Services.” And “Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through the establishment of joint/theatre commands.
The higher directions advocate jointness as the ultimate goal, and theatre commands as a means of achieving it. They do not necessarily direct the formation of theatre commands, should a better solution be found. The information available in the open domain indicates provision for three theatre commands, one each for the Western Front, Northern Front, and Peninsular Front, extending into the Indian Ocean region.
Broadly, the structure envisions theatre commanders leading operations within their Area of Responsibility (AoR). The Service Chiefs are envisioned to play only the role of Raise, Train, and Sustain, with no operational role in warfighting, a role they have been performing since independence.
Threats and Likely Future Operations
India faces multiple threats across the entire spectrum in all domains, ranging from sub-conventional, hybrid, and asymmetric threats to grey zone operations, minor incursions, and limited wars, as well as full-scale conflict. Both neighbours have repeatedly created situations necessitating the mobilisation of resources, ending in either a stand-off or limited kinetic action—the latest being Operation Sindoor. Current indications do not inspire confidence, and demand continued vigilance to address evolving situations.
Operation Sindoor, which is ongoing, has once again confirmed collusion between Pakistan and China and, to an extent, overt support from Türkiye. 81% of Pakistani military equipment is now from China, up 7% from 2019. Indications are that China extended both material support and provided services to Pakistan for the conduct of operations. Pakistan is now collaborating with both China and Türkiye on the development of fifth-generation fighter aircraft, modern drones, and weapons. China is likely to also assist in the Cyber and Space domains. The elevation of Gen Asim Munir to the rank of Field Marshal is a clear indication of continued Pakistani support of terrorism and their desire to avenge the punishment meted out by India.
Both China and Pakistan will closely study the outcomes of Operation Sindoor in formulating their future strategies. Operation Sindoor revealed close coordination and cooperation between Pakistan and China, indicating that both nations should be treated as a single entity. The regional dynamics suggest that any future conflict with either will likely involve the other, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, strategies, capabilities, and plans should cater to a two-front conflict, which more or less makes India a single theatre.
Any future conflict would involve Joint All Domain Operations, which are a step above multi-domain operations (JADO). JADO necessitates that all services operate in a synchronised manner, involving networks and employing resources from across the nation. This concept enables the effective utilisation of the strengths of every service rather than assigning service-specific responsibilities. A simple example is conventional IRBMs, which, when decided for induction, may reside deep inside the AoR of another theatre for centralised employment. Similarly, future fifth-generation fighters will have adequate range and weapons to address targets in a different theatre, strategic force multipliers like air refuelers and AEW&C also fall into the same category. JADO identifies the best solution from among the available solutions, thus enhancing efficiency and effectiveness. Splitting resources under such conditions may not be the most efficient way to deal with the evolving character of war. Executing JADO requires Joint All Domain Command and Control. Service Chiefs could provide it through their respective chains of command.
The rapid transition of conflict from sub-conventional to full-scale war would involve close interaction, coordination, and decision-making at the apex level. Operation Sindoor highlighted a whole-of-nation approach. It means that the war would be directed from Delhi rather than from Theatre Command HQs. Future conflicts would be fast, intense, and rapidly evolving, necessitating innovation and extensive iterations regarding scaling the operational tempo up or down, as well as decisions from the political leadership. It can be best executed from Delhi with all agencies and COSC in the loop.
Operation Sindoor once again underscored the existence of space for controlled conventional escalation under a nuclear hang. It allows for future conventional conflicts in a limited sense, which will be controlled by the political leadership for specific objectives so far as Pakistan continues to promote terrorism and against Chinese nibbling at territory along the LAC.
Takeaways from Operation Sindoor
Operation Sindoor was launched on 07 May 2025 to avenge the dastardly terror attack against innocent tourists involving a particular religion. This operation provided insight into the shape of future operations as it evolved from a counter-terror air and land operation into a controlled military operation involving all domains. It’s also the biggest tri-services operation after the 1971 war without formal mobilisation of all services, representing the changing character of conflict and the nation’s response to emerging threats and challenges.
The Prime Minister chaired numerous meetings in the run-up to and during the active phase of Operation Sindoor involving senior functionaries, including CDS and the three service chiefs. It indicates the close control being exercised and reviews taken during the planning and execution phase of the operation. It also demonstrates the government’s hands-on approach to calibrating military action and response across all domains. It can, therefore, be surmised that political leadership will remain intricately involved in military operations, which would necessitate the orchestration of operations from the national capital.
Operation Sindoor is a classic example of centralised planning and organising a campaign with decentralised execution in a synergised manner by the three services. The jointness was therefore achieved through coordinated planning at the service headquarters level and executed through joint operations by integrating networks and systems. Centralised command and control was the key. Additionally, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) reviewed the progress of operations and made necessary adjustments. The operation also highlighted the strength of condensed chains of command exercised by all three services and the importance of the service chiefs leading operations. All available assets were efficiently employed to achieve the desired effect due to pan-India visibility and understanding of the progress of operations. Centralised planning and organisation also reduced the cyber and electronic footprint on communication channels between executors and national leadership, thus fostering secrecy.
The jointness during the operation was achieved through centralised planning, and the much-discussed Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) resulted from integrated networks that synergised the capabilities of the three services. It was certainly not because of the three services sitting and executing operations from a single ops room.
It clearly highlighted the importance of joint operations by synergising the core competencies of each service, fostering a common understanding of the nature of conflict, setting clear military objectives, and harnessing the strengths of each service. It has also proved that once the historical baggage is shed, then working together towards a common cause is easier to accomplish.
All this was achieved without the implementation of theatre commands. The primary difference between Operation Sindoor and all previous conflicts/ wars and operations was that they were planned in service-specific stove pipes with an attempt to marry them at the tactical level, whereas this time, the planning and coordination were done at the apex level, which allowed decentralised execution at the operational and tactical levels. A simple example is the targeting of the terror infrastructure using the most suitable platforms and weapons by the IAF and IA, something that was not conceivable a few years ago.
Requirements for Future Wars
India faces collusive threats from both its adversaries. While Pakistan can be handled with force and India holds an asymmetric advantage, China poses a principal threat due to its technological and military growth. As China competes with the USA, it builds capabilities which outpace India at current levels. China is learning fast and is filling the operational voids. It will continue to support Pakistan both overtly and covertly (military hardware overtly and Cyber, Space, EW and intelligence support covertly). It necessitates readiness on both fronts with the available resources. The most intense conflict in the Indian context would likely take place in the air and on the ground, with some offensive and deterrent roles in the maritime domain. India must, therefore, be considered as a single theatre to respond to future collusive threats.
To tackle this threat, India needs to have its full complement of authorised/ sanctioned equipment, expand space and counter space capabilities, and network all available systems and weapons into a redundant network with artificial intelligence solutions in targeting (Surface-to-surface and Air-to-surface weapons and platforms) and defending (IADS), develop a common operating picture for all domain awareness and air space management. It calls for integrating networks of the three services from strategic to tactical levels. Bringing in theatre commands would only add another layer to this effort, which may not be advantageous in a fast-evolving battle.
Pakistan also adopted an A2/AD philosophy using Chinese AD and Drone/surface-to-surface missile warfare. In any future conflict, China will likely do so multiple times. Strong Integrated AD, including a strong CUAS grid, needs to be developed, including reviewing the number of SAMs and ammunition required to counter an intense drone and missile strike against diverse targets. Directed Energy Weapons could be a choice of system to counter the drone threat.
There is a need to expand surface-to-surface missile capability with longer-range weapons to strengthen our long-range non-contact strike capability along with air-launched air-to-surface long-range precision weapons.
Cyber and Space will need to be scaled up many times for a collusive threat. It could be achieved by elevating the DSA and D Cy A to the status of independent tri-services commands.
Way Forward
The threats in the Indian context are unique since the Indian military is constantly responding to threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. Grey zone and hybrid operations are ongoing on a routine basis on both borders. The theatre command template adopted by various nations may not be suitable for India. India is, like, one of the theatres for the USA, especially given the collusion between China and Pakistan, which effectively renders India a single theatre since an integrated response should be ready while addressing threats emerging from one border. The collusion observed during Operation Sindoor lends support to this argument.
Is there a need for more jointness? Yes. Do present structures address those requirements? Perhaps not. Does Op Sindoor provide an insight into the kind of operations India could undertake in the future? Yes. Does the present proposal of theatre commands serve Indian warfighting needs for a future conflict? Perhaps not.
It is, hence, opined that there is a need to revisit the theatre command concept presently envisaged after the success of Op Sindoor. Op Sindoor has highlighted the importance of the service chiefs’ role in operations, the need for joint planning and organisation at the HQ level, and centralised planning with decentralised execution through joint structures at service HQs and other agencies. Command HQs of all three services are supported by redundant networks spanning from strategic to tactical levels. The repeated meetings held between the Prime Minister (PM) and the National Security Advisor (NSA), individually or together with the service Chiefs or the Chief of the Staff Committee (COSC), provide the decision-making template in the Indian context.
It is recommended that discussions on jointness focus more on aligning the areas of responsibility of all operational commands across the three services for both fronts. Build on the successes of the integrated AD system and joint planning for offensive and defensive operations to address future drone and missile warfare. Create a joint planning HQ with three-star reps and their staff under the COSC. Operationalise networks in a timebound manner for planning, execution and real-time flow of information for prompt decision-making at the strategic and operational levels. Speed up the formation of Cyber and Space commands. Review the manpower and resources required to address a collusive threat from a technological and future threat perspective.
Conclusion
Operation Sindoor has been a paradigm shift in the conduct of military operations by India. It highlighted the unique command and control complexities in a counter-terror operation escalating into military operations. It provides an insight into the shape of things to come in the future as India deals with a collusive threat spanning the full spectrum of conflict. Thus, India effectively becomes a single theatre. It also provides a deep insight into how operations would be conducted through regular meetings between the political and military leadership, which necessitates the presence of military leadership in the national capital and highlights the importance of service chiefs leading operations.
The unique disposition faced by India and the collusion between the two neighbours necessitates centralised command and control of resources, along with decentralised execution through the shortest chains of command and an efficient span of control. A study is hence essential in the backdrop of Operation Sindoor to review the proposed theatre command construct in the context of the likely contours of future conflicts and decision-making in the Indian context.
Air Marshal Ravi Kapoor (The author retired as Commander-in-Chief, Central Air Command in 2024)
