Sanjha Morcha

शहीद कैप्टन गुरुबचन सिंह सलारिया को उनके बलिदान दिवस पर किये गए श्रदासुमन अर्पित

Capt Gurbachan Singh Salaria, PVC was born in a Rajput family of Sialkot and migrated to Village Jangal of Dist Pathankot.He was commissioned in Gurka Rifles.He was KIA in 1951 in Congo during UN mission while fighting terrorists.His team was surrounded by en and fought like Tigers killing 40 terrorists in single action

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MILITARY LITERATURE FESTIVAL

Political uncertainty in Pakistan

Political uncertainty in Pakistan

Outgoing Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa hands over the baton of command over to the newly appointed Army Chief General Asim Munir (L), during a ceremony at the army headquarters in Rawalpindi, on November 29, 2022. ISPR/Handout via Reuters

Dr. Shalini Chawla

In recent months, Pakistan has been witnessing significant political instability, an alarming economic crisis, and efforts from the political leadership to revive its slanted relationship with the West. This periodic political instability is not new in Pakistan, and historical evidence suggests the consistent inability of the democratic leaders in Pakistan to sustain power strings for their designated tenure. The political cycle as suggested by the historical evidence is that a democratic leader receives complete support from the military establishment and comes into power promising betterment of the Pakistani awaam, but the civil-military bonhomie typically fails to last beyond 2-3 years. After coming into power, the political leadership starts asserting itself in the domains that have remained sacrosanct to the establishment, challenging the authority of the military, leading to strains in the relationship and eventually the exit of the elected leader, who invariably faces corruption charges and lands behind bars, before the military starts to back another leader of their choice. Imran Khan’s victory in the 2018 general elections and his subsequent departure in the no-confidence vote were no deviation from the past trends.

Even though the political instability has been cyclic in Pakistan, what has been different in Khan’s case is that he managed to build a support lobby for himself within the critical institutions in Pakistan, which have backed his actions and narratives against the establishment. Post his ouster, Imran Khan has been on a rallying spree and has gathered support on primarily three narratives: the anti-corruption narrative, where he has pointed fingers at the opposition party leaders for their corrupt records, the anti-US narrative, where he held the US responsible for conspiring his exit; and the anti-military narrative, where he has accused the establishment (few senior army officers) of being ‘traitor’ and corrupt. His mass following and support, which reflected in his victory in the recent by-elections, indicate that his narratives have apparently been in sync with the popular sentiments.

Khan’s support within the country has been a challenge for the Shehbaz Sharif government and the military establishment. The military’s image has suffered a serious blow in a military-run state as a result of the blatant accusations by Imran Khan, which he started to levy after realizing that the establishment is no longer willing to back him. In fact, the last time the nation saw a decline in the military’s respect and image (to this extent) was after the killing of Osama bin Laden, almost next door to Pakistan’s Kakul Military Academy, in 2011 during General Kayani’s tenure.

The newly appointed Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, has some daunting tasks ahead of him. For sure, he needs to revive the army’s position and respect within society. This has been a critical factor in the functioning of the state, where the national objectives, domestic policies, ideological affiliations, and, very importantly, alliances with major powers, have been dominated by the military’s thinking and choices. The appointment of the army chief has been probably one of the most significant issues on Imran Khan’s agenda, and his efforts starting April this year have been to pressurise the regime, with the consistent display of his street power, to hold early elections. Also, Khan recently announced that his party will ‘not remain part of the current political system’. While the coming weeks and months will unfold some interesting political dynamics in Pakistan, Imran Khan cannot afford to antagonise the establishment anymore. Khan’s past ‘unpleasant record’ with Gen Munir has been a major contributor to Sharif’s calculated selection of the chief. The new chief will be focused on restoring the public’s perception of the establishment, working towards political stability (without getting overtly engaged), focusing on economic management, and continuing the momentum of the revival of Pakistan’s foreign relations.

The writer is a distinguished fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi

#Pakistan


Why no official remembrance of 1962

Why no official remembrance of 1962

In the past 60 years, there has been no official function by the MoD to commemorate the soldiers who laid down their lives in the India-China war in 1962. Photo courtesy: MoD
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Ajay Banerjee

IN the past 10 days, the Indian Army commemorated separate battles of the 1962 India-China war. However, like in the past 60 years, this year, too, there was no official function by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the national capital to mark remembrance or commemoration for the soldiers who laid down their lives during the war.

Several retired soldiers are in favour of an official function steered by the MoD, and not just Army commemorations at several locations in the Himalayas. With the National War Memorial having come up in the national capital, an official remembrance, it is felt, would be appropriate for those who died in the war that began on October 20, 1962, and lasted till November 21. The memorial has a tablet in the name of every Indian soldier who died for the country.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh inaugurating a memorial at Rezang La in November 2021 to commemorate the fallen soldiers. Photo courtesy: MoD

It could be a solemn wreath-laying ceremony each year to honour the 3,250 soldiers who laid down their lives in 1962, the veterans opine.

Right through the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, Indian troops were out-numbered four to one, were ill-prepared and ill-equipped. As per records, the supply lines for ammunition had snapped, forcing commanders to order retreat. Despite that, some of them stood up and fought against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China to the ‘last man last bullet’.

Multiple personal accounts written by military officers of those times, researchers and also the History of the Conflict with China, 1962 — produced by the MoD and released for ‘restricted’ circulation in 1993 — have a common thread. All accept that the India-China war in 1962 ended as an example of bad military planning. However, two battles — the one at Walong in Arunachal Pradesh and the other at Rezang La in eastern Ladakh — are most talked about. These have been mentioned in glowing terms in all references of the war. There were glimpses of military brilliance elsewhere too.

Honouring the heroes

India celebrates the victory of the 1971 war with Pakistan as ‘Vijay Diwas’ on December 16 and also the victory in the India-Pakistan ‘Kargil conflict’ on July 26. On both occasions, ceremonies are conducted centrally. The Navy Day celebrated each year on December 4 is to mark the attack launched by Indian warships to target Karachi harbour the same day during the 1971 war.

Can a ceremony be conducted for the war dead of 1962? Lt Gen Shokin Chauhan (retd), who was Director General of Assam Rifles, says, “I strongly suggest that soldiers who died in the 1962 war should be remembered, let’s have a ‘remembrance day’.”https://31ca2e27acc20500ff2446bb0220da6a.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-40/html/container.html

Citing the example of ‘remembrance day’ in the United Kingdom, Lt Gen Chauhan, who had commanded the premier 1 Strike Corps at Mathura, adds, “We can have one like that.”

A former Defence Secretary, who did not wish to be named, said, “It will be a political call on what sort of function can be done to honour the dead of the 1962 war.” Since the war did not end in a win, the country never remembered it by expressing it through an official function and that is the only possible explanation for the lack of a formal ceremony, the former Defence Secretary added.

Under the present system, even the Chief of Defence Staff, who heads the Department of Military Affairs, can suggest what sort of homage can be paid to the dead of the 1962 war

Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur (retd), former Additional Director of the IAF-backed think tank Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), says, “Our jawans fought to the Army’s credo, ‘last man last round’. It was India’s war and not the Army’s or any political party’s war.”

Growing up in the 1960s, he recalls, “one saw the trauma and shock of defeat during the war, along with tales of unprecedented valour. And to see that not even a wreath was laid at the National War Memorial on behalf of the Services is painful”.

It’s never too late to start such a remembrance ceremony, argues Lt Gen Chauhan, who also headed the ceremonial and welfare wing tasked with conducting such functions.

“The lack of a ceremony means the tablets with the names of the dead at the war memorial are just pieces of concrete, the soul is missing,” AVM Bahadur says.

Walong battle

Despite being numerically inferior, the Indian troops held back the Chinese at Walong in Arunachal for days. History of the Conflict with China, 1962 describes the battle: “A defensive battle against heavy odds, the troops fought bravely, but being out-numbered and out-weaponed in automatics and ammunition, suffered heavily.”

The Indian Army had 2,500 troops, the Chinese were five times that number, aided by artillery and automatic weapons. The Chinese launched the first attack on October 21 1962, but lost 60 soldiers. Regardless, they pressed forward and made two unsuccessful attempts to capture Walong. Each time they were repelled by 4 Sikh and a company of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles (GR).

The Sikhs attacked the Chinese on October 26. Sepoy Kewal Singh of 4 Sikh was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC).

A 10-day lull followed. The 4 Sikh Regiment and 6 Kumaon had been tasked to the area on September 21, while the 3/3 GR replaced two companies of 2/8 GR in the first week of November. The 4 Dogra fetched up on November 9. The Intelligence Bureau headed by BN Mullick assessed that “six Chinese battalions (some 4,800-5,000 men) were positioned across Lohit river”.

On November 6, the first Indian attack was launched by a company led by Capt RK Mathur of 6 Kumaon. “15 Chinese died,” read the post-war Vir Chakra citation of Capt Mathur.

The Kumaonis launched another attack on yellow pimple (a hill feature) and charged up in the face of a shower of bullets. The attack reached about 20 metres short of the top. Of the 200 Indian troops who assaulted yellow pimple, only 90 returned.

A few miles away at ‘Patrol base’ —located behind green pimple and yellow pimple — the ‘A’ company of 4 Sikh came under fire but beat back the enemy. With ammunition running out, the Sikhs were asked to withdraw. Across the Lohit, the ‘D’company of the Sikhs was attacked. It was a bitter fight. It halted only when the company commander, Lt Yog Plata, was killed. He was awarded a Vir Chakra.

On the west ridge overlooking Walong, Lt Bikram Singh of 6 Kumaon held on for hours. Only 17 of his troops survived; the rest, including Lt Singh himself, died fighting to the last bullet.

“Indian troops offered stiff resistance, but they had to vacate their positions,” says the MoD’s book.

Rezang La

The Indian Army held back an assault by the PLA at Rezang La in eastern Ladakh, located at an altitude of 18,000 feet and smack at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.

Rezang La sits astride the routes to Chushul to its west and Dungti to its south-east. From Chushul garrison, the road link is to Leh. The occupation of this feature would have enabled the Chinese to cut off the single road to Leh, isolating the garrison and its vital airstrip.

The battle at Rezang La waged for some 18 hours. Starting from 4 am on November 18, 1962, till about 10 pm that night, the ‘C’ company of 13th battalion of the Kumaon Regiment held on against the enemy strength of some 1,000. The commander of the ‘C’ company, Major Shaitan Singh, was conferred the Param Vir Chakra. Eight more received the Vir Chakra while four others the Sena Medal. The 13 Kumaon received the battle honour ‘Rezang La’.

A History of the Conflict with China, 1962, says: “The fight at Rezang La was hard and bitter… It was littered with the dead Chinese… The Indian soldier was defeated but not disgraced in Ladakh.”

“The company (of 13 Kumaon) had 112 men of all ranks and only 14 survived.”

The Chinese casualties are officially estimated at 500. In 1963, when the Red Cross teams went to recover the bodies, they saw the place littered with field dressings and blood marks, indicating heavy casualties suffered by the enemy.

The PLA had sent in 400 men in the first attack which was repulsed and then added more to have some 900 men surround Rezang La from three sides. The battle is seen as one of the reasons that the Chushul garrison was not overrun.

Maj Shaitan Singh had three choices — hold on to his position and fight on, break out towards the rest of the battalion but that would be at the risk of additional casualties, or lastly, surrender and save the lives of his remaining men. He stayed on and the rest is history.

Last year, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh inaugurated a new memorial at Rezang La.


MILITARY LITERATURE FESTIVAL

China and the emerging world order

China and the emerging world order

Lt Gen (Dr) JS Bajwa (Retired)

“A riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”, was a comment by Churchill on Russia. However, in today’s world this would more aptly apply to China. Enigma it is. It revels in remaining mysterious. It shrouds itself in secrecy.

The collapse of the USSR came as a shock to Chinese leadership. One of Xi’s guiding principles is: “A strong country must have a strong army.” Xi’s efforts is to revive the “Red Army spirit” in the PLA amid global geopolitical shifts, on the philosophy of “the Party controls the gun”. This stems from Mao’s idea that “political power flows from the barrel of a gun”.

In one of the lessons learnt by China from the Soviet collapse was “a top-down and unified command system is a military must. The Soviet Communist Party’s decision to abolish political education is one of the key factors that led to its collapse”. Xi has stated in no uncertain terms that loyalty to the Party is paramount. He also feels that the Soviets had converted their army into a national army from being an army of the Communist Party, which led to its inevitable collapse. As a consequence, he has clearly enunciated that the PLA is the Communist Party of China’s army, first and last. To ensure this he has reinforced the political commissar system. Xi has removed a number of senior military officers in purging the military of corruption.

As Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi has the power to command all China’s armed forces, decide their strategy and courses of action and manage their development, personnel, equipment, funding, and assets. In his report to the 20th National Congress on October 16, 2022, Xi said: “The use of military power needs to be normalised and used in diverse ways…..we need to be able to stage military operations readily, create a secure environment, deter and control risks and conflicts and win regional wars.”

Based on this thought it can be assessed that the Galwan clash has its origins in the Doklam stand-off. Post Doklam, in January 2018, the CMC issued its first Training Mobilisation Order (TMO) signed by Xi and released in an elaborate ceremony, wherein forces of all theatre commands were moblised for training. Large number of troops and equipment were inducted into Tibet for this so called training purposes in the summer of that year. Training in high altitude areas, assaults in deep snow and live fire exercises with tanks, artillery, armed helicopters and air support were carried out. These were prominently highlighted in the state-controlled media. Again in 2019 a TMO was issued in the first week of January and similar exercises were carried out in summer. A pattern was set. Therefore, when a similar TMO was issued in January 2020 it was probably taken as routine. The enhanced scope with additional forces and equipment was not known or not taken cognizance of, if known. It resulted in the aggressive proactive Chinese action in Eastern Ladakh which India had least expected.

Whenever the India-China boundary issue is put on the back-burner, China has used that opportunity to extensively develop infrastructure in Tibet. It has built a rail link from Lhasa to Nyingchi in the east opposite Arunachal Pradesh, Shigatse in the center north of the Chumbi valley, and now proposes to extend it opposite Nepal. It is also building a rail link from Chendgu to Lhasa. The obstacles and difficulties imposed by terrain and geography do not seem to hinder their projects.

Today’s geopolitical headwinds have a muscular China not just competing with the US but challenging it as well as the rest of the world. But it seems that even after 70 years China is still not secure with its presence in Tibet. Some scholars in the west had said that China poses an “existential threat” to India!! They had under estimated India political resolve and will of India.

— The writer is a former Chief of Staff, Eastern Command


MILITARY LITERATURE FESTIVAL

Role of establishment in troubled Pakistan

Role of establishment in troubled Pakistan

RK Kaushik

Pakistan became the first islamic state to be born after decolonisation started in the post Second World War period.

In the 75 years long history of Pakistan there have been only two periods when the Establishment played second fiddle to civilian leadership .The first time was from August 14, 1947 to October 21, 1951, the day prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated .The second spell came on December 20, 1971, when Zuffiqar Ali Bhutto took over and lasted till July 5, 1977, when he was overthrown in a millitary takeover.

During the rest of its journey as a nation state, Pakistan has had the conspicuous and humongous presence of the all powerful establishment controlling foreign affairs, defence, internal security and nuclear affairs, and not allowing political leaders to interface in these matters.

The reason why democracy became so fragile and the Establishment became so strong is not far to seek. The structural dynamics of the Muslim League at the time of Independence answer that. It is pertinent to mention that even in 1937 there was only one member of the Muslim League in the 175-member, pre-partition Punjab Assembly in Lahore. Muslim League had no presence in Balochistan and no member in NWFP Assembly. It had only one member in Sindh Assembly. It was only in 1945 and 1946 that Muslim League started having leaders and workers from the Unionist Party and other groups as its members in Punjab and from other Parties in NWFP and Sindh

After Independence the Establishment never allowed independent-minded leaders to grow and the moment a leader tried to encroach upon it’s domain, he was made a horrible example for others to see. The Establishment brought rich landlords, wadheras, businessmen, etc. into politics so that they would be obsequious partners in power game.

Also in Pakistan, there exists a structural and insitutional divide between elements that want to have power. This is manifest in every aspect notably in society, economy and most specifically in politics. The tension between theses forces maintains the status quo in the country and any fractures in this precarious balance always result in social clashes and brutallities that hark back to its repressive history. It is generally overlooked that institutional weaknesses have adverse impacts on the economy, national policies and social development of society.

It is a fact that exceptional personal moral standards ought to be a perequisite for holding high public office, but in a third world country like Pakistan most of the leaders have thin morality, nay intergrity, with smudged financial hygiene. Sooner or later many such unscrupulous leaders find themselves in the quagmire of corruption charges with frugal arguments to defend them, leading to instability and precariousness in the system.

The Establishment is not going to wither away and seemingly there is no leader likely to come in the near future who can take up cudgels with it. So, the world and especially India, has to face the unpleasant reality that a nuclear-armed Pakistani Establishment with an everest of animosity against India would rule by proxy in years to come. The takeover of the new Army Chief, General Asim Munir, will not change this settled paradigm.

When weak civilan leaders lead a nation state as in Paskistan, then administration becomes non performing and as Italian philosopher Giorgio Agam Ben said, “Politics melts into the management of a permanent disorder.” Then politicians and bureaucracy just pass time without making seminal changes or in any way showing sagacity in decisions and ameliorating the nagging and obnoxious problems faced by the populace at large for survival leading to instability in the country.

The post Zia-ul-Haq phase clearly shows the working of weak political leaders, be it Benazir, Nawaz, Zardari, Imran or now Shahbaz. So with the retirement of General Bajwa and taking over of General Asim Munir, no major changes are expected. The Establishment (Army and ISI) is going to rule Pakistan with puny political leaders becoming a facade of Democracy. The instability would countine for times to come.


MILITARY LITERATURE FESTIVAL

Along with powerful military & strong economy, ‘will to power’ is a must

Along with powerful military & strong economy, 'will to power' is a must

Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM

History tells us about nations of the past that have become powerful, and it also tells us about empires and civilisations that failed or ceased to exist. A third category is nations that have prevailed despite great odds faced by them against powerful nations or empires.

They have done so for a variety of reasons, but the more important ones are leadership of the highest order, cohesiveness among the polity, respect for all, self-sacrifice, character built on moral values, and most importantly a powerful military to defend themselves.

Examples of enduring against great odds are at both tactical and strategic levels, but eventually what matters is the totality of prevailing over one or more powerful countries.

Examples of enduring against great odds are at both tactical and strategic levels, but eventually what matters is the totality of prevailing over one or more powerful countries.

For over three centuries, practically the whole of India was ruled by the Mughal Empire. It existed and endured on account of its conquests, its powerful military and economic clout. Despite its size, power and wealth, there were some small countries that not only checked its increasing size but either stopped its expansion or tried to revert it.

Three important small powers who did so were the Rajput states of north and west India, the Marathas under Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj and after his death the Peshwa Confederacy from the south, and the Ahom Kingdom of Assam. Much later, when the Mughal Empire was declining, Maharaja Ranjit Singh kept it confined while he brought the various Sikh Misls together and expanded his small kingdom into the powerful Sikh Empire in the Northwest.

Compared to the massive and powerful Mughal Empire, these four protagonists were indeed small, but they had the ‘will’ within them, inculcated by great leaders of their respective regions that strengthened them to take on this huge empire and succeed in different measures to do so. Their successes reconfirm that there is nothing impossible provided one has the will and appetite for risks and brave and capable leaders.

The three brave leaders and heroes of the Rajputs that stand out are Prithviraj Chauhan, Rana Sangha and Rana Pratap. Although, the Rajputs were defeated in battle against the invaders from the north and the Mughal Empire, they made it very difficult for the powerful Mughals to take them for granted, resulting in the Mughals befriending them and amalgamating them as part of their empire.https://38e4e68cd73f67afcf46bbac2ba1d17a.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-40/html/container.html

The Marathas under Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj employed military force, guile and diplomacy against the Mughals and succeeded in their aims of laying out an empire that was finally equal to or even bigger than the Mughal Empire. The Marathas were also masters in guerrilla warfare and used it successfully against the ponderous Mughal armies. Shivaji himself was a man of many parts. Besides being an excellent warrior, he was a great administrator who brought in many reforms, especially for the peasants and women. His soldiers worshipped him and were always ready for any sacrifices asked for by their king. After Shivaji’s death, his mantle fell on the Peshwa Confederacy, which became the biggest and most powerful empire of India for many years.

The Ahoms of Assam ruled for 600 years and expanded their kingdom by both military prowess and diplomacy. Despite many invasions and efforts by the Mughals, they could not make any headway against this kingdom. The most famous warrior of the Ahoms was Lachit Borphukan, who defeated the much bigger and stronger Mughal army in the battle of Saraighat in 1671.

Having discussed examples of how countries have endured with honour and glory, my parting message is that India must inculcate ‘will to power’, along with a powerful military and a strong economy to endure as a powerful nation of this world

(The writer is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff, who had also commanded the Western Command and the Army Training Command earlier)


MILITARY LITERATURE FESTIVAL

Spreading Bhagat Singh’s ideas

Spreading Bhagat Singh’s ideas

Chaman Lal

It was a bit perplexing for me when I got a call from Sports University, Patiala, Vice Chancellor, Lieutenant General JS Cheema (Retd), inviting me to be part of a discussion panel in a session on Bhagat Singh in Military Literary Festival, as I could not see any connection, since the festival concentrates more on defence related books and matters, national and international. Among other panellists, he named Mahavir Chakra awardee, Maj Gen Sheonan Singh (Retd), who is a nephew of Bhagat Singh, but who never let this relationship be known during his military service, as he thought it will be construed as seeking favour or privilege! Only after retirement, he let it be known in an interview in a national daily. Among all close relations of Bhagat Singh, he is one of most well read about Bhagat Singh and his ideas, as Ranbir Singh, his father and younger brother of Bhagat Singh, had penned a biography of the great martyr in Urdu!

The best experiences in my mission to spread Bhagat Singh’s ideas are with Gopal Roy, minister in the Delhi Government, who inaugurated Bhagat Singh Archives and Resource Centre in Delhi which contains my gifted collection on the freedom struggle of India. While being the miniter in charge of the freedom fighters cell in Delhi, he organised functions on every 23rd March and 28th September -martyrdom and birth anniversaries of the three martyrs, and distributed free books by or on Bhagat Singh. to the audience which included children as well as old people in thousands. Writing, collecting and distributing books is the best way of spreading Bhagat Singh’s ideas of free India to enlighten the youth. I hope the Punjab Government also follows this example of their colleague in Delhi.

The writer is a retired Professor from JNU and honorary advisor to Bhagat Singh Archives and Resource Centre, New Delhi


MILITARY LITERATURE FESTIVAL

Need to evolve new civil-military maxim

Need to evolve new civil-military maxim

Ramesh Inder Singh

Punjab’s geo-political advantage as the gateway to Hindustan, turned Punjabis martial. In defending the motherland, they have rightfully earned the accolade of ‘the sword arm’ of the nation.

It is not surprising, therefore that our tricity – Chandigarh, Mohali and Panchkula – is home to many distinguished soldiers and legendary national heros. Two former chiefs of Army, a former Navy chief and a former Air Force chief, with nearly 255 retired generals, including about 90 lieutenant generals, the second highest rank in the Army, live here. The tricity has approximately 35,000 ex-servicemen, including about 5,500 retired defence service officers, out of which about 150 are gallantry awardees. One single regiment with its recruitment base in this region – the Sikh Light Infantry – has given three chiefs to the Indian Army!

In public perception, valour, heroism and sacrifice is viewed as the only attributes of war-victories, and the memory of the brave is recalled only on war commemoration days. However, soldiering today is not simple valour, but encephalon too – the brain power, that has transformed modern armies into ‘thinking soldiers’, planners, strategists, analysts, and war-gamers. Wars are won as much on the battlefield as in the sand model rooms and on the drawing boards.

This naturally results in production of a lot of military literature, war-books, research papers and the like, but these cerebral military issues were usually considered taboo for public debate, particularly in formal citizen’s forums, till Punjab Government and Western Command joined hands to organise the first Military Literature Festival in 2017 at Chandigarh with cooperation of the UT Administration

This precedent was followed by few other Literary Festivals, such as KSLF at Kasauli and VoW at Dehradun, who devoted a few sessions to military and strategic affairs. Lucknow, however, became the second city in the country to hold an exclusive military literary festival in 2021, followed by INS Valsura at Jamnagar in June 2022.

The lead taken by Chandigarh is commendable and its 6th Military Lit Fest being organised on 3rd and 4th December promises brainstorming on topical military and strategic challenges such as Russia-Ukraine conflict, China’s emergence as a super-power, aircraft carriers’ power, soldiering etc, apart from discussion on a few recently published books.

My book, Turmoil in Punjab, Before and After Bluestar, which will come up for discussion in the festival, is an eyewitness account of what happened in Punjab during the two decades of militancy. It details the role played by the various arms of the state, including the Army, in bringing peace to Punjab.

The Army is, almost always, a fall back of the last resort, when other wings of the state fail or lack capacity to deal with a situation. Armed Forces have performed commendably and enjoy citizen’s confidence. However, no institution is infallible and neo-nationalism should not inhibit reasoned debate, more so because the strategy and tactics that the armed forces adopt in wars, and also in aid to civil authority, has far reaching national outcomes. Illustratively, the consequences of the decision to use tanks in Golden Temple in 1984 are too well known to be recalled.

Our Army, to its credit, has remained professional and apolitical. However, today it is often deployed over long periods in disturbed areas, like it was in Punjab, northeastern states or is in J&K. My experience, as described in my book, is that there is need to evolve a new civil-military maxim, establish institutional structures with well-defined procedures, and civilian oversight, rather than merely rely upon the present joint command concept, which often ends up as ‘meet and greet’ conferences.

The Military Literary Festivals will provide the opportunity to examine many such complex issues and facilitate a reasoned debate.


MILITARY LITERATURE FESTIVAL

Experts warn against ignoring history

Experts warn against ignoring history

Ajay Banerjee

In June last year, the Ministry of Defence announced a new policy on archiving, declassification, compilation and publication of histories of wars and operations carried out by the Indian armed forces.

Almost 18 months later, no decision has been taken to de-classify any of the already published histories of the 1962, 1965 and the 1971 wars, published by the ministry’s History Division in the 1990s.

Official histories not released

  • October-November 1962 India-China War
  • September 1965 Indo-Pak war
  • December 1971 Indo-Pak war Released
  • Official War History of the 1947-48 Kashmir war with Pakistan (in 1989)
  • The Kargil Review Committee Report on the May-July 1999 Kargil War (in 2000)

The Difficult ones to tackle

  • Operation Pawan (IPKF in Sri Lanka, 1987-1990)
  • Operation Cactus in Maldives (1988)
  • Operation Bluestar (Golden Temple, 1984)
  • Operation Meghdoot (Siachen, 1984)

Tragically, these are not owned up as ‘official histories.’ Each of the books on the 1971 and the 1965 wars with Pakistan carry a caveat by the History Division’s Director, Dr SN Prasad: “I don’t consider this as an account of proper history.” In case of the publication of the account of the 1962 war with China, Dr Prasad has a caveat: “I accept responsibility for the facts and stated opinions expressed, which do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and do not commit it ( Govt) in any way.”

All three publications are for “restricted circulation” and are available only at select libraries of the armed forces.

New policy does not change much

Only the published account of the India-Pak war in 1948 have been made public so far. Accounts of other full-blown wars and operations. Despite the policy, declassification of records or histories of older wars like the 1962 war with China will not be automatic and will be taken up on a case-to-case basis by a committee with members from the three services, Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Home Affairs.

This means that access to records of Operation Meghdoot (Siachen), Operation Pawan (Sri Lanka), Operation Cactus (Maldives) and Operation Falcon (Arunachal Pradesh) in the mid-1980s will not be made public immediately. The same applies to Operation Bluestar – it could have a political fallout.

How does the policy function

It mandates the History Division to publish an official account of operations within five years after completion after seeking due approval. Operational records are required to be vetted for declassification by organisations concerned.https://feb77eaf21be62df9b5d7b6fbffb7855.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-40/html/container.html

Each organisation under the MoD such as the Services, Integrated Defence Staff, Assam Rifles and Indian Coast Guard, will transfer records, including war diaries, operational proceedings, etc. to the History Division for compiling and archiving.

The need of having war histories written with clear cut policy on de-classification was recommended by the Kargil Review Committee headed by K Subrahmanyam.

In January 2001 a special committee headed by former Defence Secretary, NN Vohra, and comprising Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (retd), a former Deputy Chief of the Army and Dr SN Prasad, recommended the release of the three war ( 1962, 1965 and 1971) histories in their original form

Post-Kargil, Group of Ministers’ recommendations on national security also mentioned the desirability of authoritative war history to accurate account of the events for academic research and to counter the unfounded rumours.

What the west has done

The UK and US have a strong tradition of commissioning studies and histories. The British, in 2010, got an official history written of the M-I6, their external intelligence agency. In India, former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, B Raman’s book, The Kaoboys of R&AW’, is the most authoritative account of some events of the 1970’s and 1980’s. The UK ordered a public inquiry into Britain’s role in the Iraq war of 2003. The report was made public for debate and discussion.

The US had a Vietnam Study Task Force which produced a history of the US’ involvement and is now referred to as Pentagon Papers. In 2017, the Central Intelligence Agency of US declassified files of the 1960’s and 1970’s and told how the US was looking for evidence that Indian troops had invaded East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in early December 1971.


Maritime security environment in Indo-Pacific region complex

Maritime security environment in Indo-Pacific region complex
Union Minister for Defence, Rajnath Singh at the maiden India-ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, in Siem Reap, Cambodia in November.

Vice Admiral Girish Luthra (Retd)

Historically, the growth, prosperity and security of humankind has depended on the oceans, high seas and coastal waters. The maritime domain has many unique features. Seventyeight percent of the earth is covered by seas, 85 percent of nation states have a coastline, 70 percent of the world’s population lives near the coast and 80 percent of capital cities are located close to the sea. Over 90 percent of the world trade by volume and 70 percent of transportation of goods is in the maritime sector. The maritime environment also has a strong socio-political, civilizational and cultural context.

The growth of the Indian Navy and its capabilities will serve the larger national goals and objectives

The Indo-Pacific region, covering the geographic areas of the Indian and the Pacific oceans, has gained salience and prominence in the last five to six years. The region has also become central to geopolitical and geoeconomic cooperation, competition and rivalry. It is the new centre of gravity for economic growth and contributes over 60 percent of global GDP and global growth. The rise and assertiveness of China, the ongoing US-China strategic competition, and the rapid growth of the Chinese PLA Navy and other military capabilities have been part of key drivers for speedy transitions in the region. Several new partnerships and frameworks, like the Quadrilateral comprising Australia, Indian, Japan and the US, the AUKUS comprising Australia, the UK and the US,the China-Russia partnership, have been formed. In addition, trilateral and bilateral arrangements have been forged, in different sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific. There has also been an increase in naval deployments and exercises, as well as setting up of new military bases and access facilities.

The maritime security environment in the Indo-Pacific region is complex and challenging. The traditional security threats include armed conflict over sovereignty and sovereign rights related disputes, ideological and ethnic disputes, trade disruption, attacks on shipping, offshore and coastal infrastructure, maritime terrorism and sabotage. Non-traditional threats include piracy, armed robbery, maritime militia and grey zone operations, organized crime and illicit trafficking, illegal fishing, environment, climate and biodiversity.

India’s maritime interests and challenges have grown significantly, in recent times. It has accorded priority to maritime security and cooperation. In 2015, India outlined the concept of SAGAR – an acronym for Security and Growth for All in the Region. It launched the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative or IPOI in 2019. In addition to focusing on its own defence and security from the threats posed by its adversaries, India has a key role to play to strengthen stability, security and safety in the Indo-Pacific. Through various frameworks, it has sought to promote development-linked cooperative security in the region. It is opposed to any coercive approaches or behaviour, which undermine strategic stability. Its balanced approach for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific, without being part of any military alliance, has been appreciated by many countries.

The Indian economy is expected to sustain its current growth trajectory, with corresponding increase in its trade which is mostly by sea. With new initiatives, investments and financial arrangements, the overall engagement in the region has gone up manifold and is set to rise further. In consonance, the Indian Navy’s areas of operations for a variety of maritime roles have also expanded. These deployments are in addition to its own peacetime preparations and exercises for combat and operational readiness. It is evident that with increasing role of India at the regional and global levels, the new importance and relevanceof the maritime domain, and existing as well as emerging threats and challenges, the growth of the Indian Navy and its capabilities will serve the larger national goals and objectives.

The writer is a former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command