ACAVALRY veteran, I respect change but get distraught when, at times, our armed forces violate their understated fail-safe ‘hastening slowly’ rule in invoking radical change. The need to break free from our colonial past is incontestable but how much is irrelevant needs a sense-and sensibility-driven approach. ‘Hastening slowly’ can be re-positioned from being a smart oxymoron to a status wherein our haste to dump the past doesn’t return to haunt us. These conflicting thoughts were temporarily overwritten in my mind by the superbly choreographed spectacle of Queen Elizabeth’s earthly journey ending as her coffin was carried to St George’s Chapel for burial by her scarlet-uniformed Grenadier Guards, escorted by her resplendent, mounted Household Cavalry. Draped in her Royal Standard, her coffin shorn of its symbols of royalty and power — her bejewelled orb, sceptre and Koh-i-noor-embellished crown — a poignant, haunting, traditional lament, ‘Sleep, dearie, sleep’ was played out by Paul Burns, her Scottish Royal Bagpiper. As the lament faded away, the lone piper symbolically walked out of the chapel… Elizabeth’s story had ended. My mind did a royalty redux as I recalled the shock and awe when I, a Short Service Commission (SSC) officer, was posted to the National Defence Academy (NDA). It had received orders to accept SSC officers but rigorous ‘performance appraisal’ of those posted was imperative; an unprecedented change inviting mutual apprehension. In the hard work that followed, I saw the first of three chances to clear the prestigious, tough-as-nails Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) examination disappear: I was on ‘probation’, I was told. When the second chance came, it was announced that Queen Elizabeth II was visiting the NDA for the 65th Course Passing Out Parade. The Commandant, Rear Admiral Ravi Sawhney from NDA’s first batch — a handsome, florid man in knifeedged ceremonials, sword, aiguillette and medals — made it clear in the Queen’s English that the parade would be memorable not just for the visiting royalty but also in making a statement with a performance of ‘NDA’, not ‘Sandhurst’, standards by proud cadets of a resurgent India. I didn’t bellyache. Officers don’t. That pleasant winter day of November 21, 1983, the Queen’s gracious words of praise and endearment for the meticulously-choreographed parade and linked ceremonial/social events made us walk tall. ‘They’ve set world standards’; so the Queen implied, as did proud Air Chief Dilbagh Singh who’d reviewed the parade. The bursting-with-pride cadets marched out on Scot poet Robert Burns’ poesy/music of Auld Lang Syne…. I followed their lead, clearing the DSSC exam on the last chance. The Queen has departed. Auld Lang Syne has departed, as has ‘Abide with me’. Our colonial past, however, needs time before deciding what’s worth trashing or retaining. Hasten slowly.
(The writer is author of Himalayan Stalemate: Understanding the India China Dispute)
INDIAN historian John Lall once observed, “Perhaps nowhere else in the world has such a long frontier been unmistakably delineated by nature itself”. How then, did India and China defy topographical odds to lock into an impasse that was ultimately tested on the battlefield?
In retrospect, certain fundamental factors can be identified that framed the context of India-China interactions in the 1950s. Despite attaining a bloody independence in 1947, a truncated India viewed itself as the inheritor of the legacy of British India’s frontiers. While the Nehru regime was acutely aware of the changed geopolitical context, its perception of the northern frontiers was based on the institutional memory of a century of frontier making by British strategists.
Let’s briefly deconstruct this legacy. It is now accepted that British India’s frontier policies had failed to produce a single integrated and well-defined northern boundary separating the Indian subcontinent from Xinjiang and Tibet. The legacy, however, was more nuanced. In the eastern sector, the British had largely attained an ethnically and strategically viable alignment via the 1914 Simla conference of India, China and Tibet, even though the Chinese repudiated the agreement itself.
The underlying rationale for British policy was to carve a buffer around an autonomous ‘Outer Tibet’ not very dissimilar to the division of Mongolia in 1913 that Russia and China had agreed upon. While this policy of an attempted zonal division of Tibet never materialised, the fortuitous byproduct of this episode was the delimiting of a border alignment between India and Tibet that mirrors more or less the de facto position today. It is instructive to note that China’s principal concern back then was not the precise boundary between Tibet and India but the borders and the political relationship between Tibet and China.
In contrast, the legacy of the western sector was more blurred. This sector, the crux of the dispute, was never formally delineated nor successfully resolved by British India. The fluid British approach in this sector was shaped by the geopolitical and geoeconomic goals of its empire, and was never designed to meet the basic requirements of a sovereign nation state.
NEW POWER EQUILIBRIUM
There were almost a dozen attempts by the British to arrive at exactly where the boundaries should lie. Most, however, were exploratory surveys by frontier agents reflecting British expansion in the north-west frontiers rather than a concerted pursuit of an international border. And, they varied with the then geopolitical objectives of London, vis-à-vis the perceived Russian threat. For instance, when Russia threatened Xinjiang, some British strategists advocated an extreme northern Kashmiri border. At times, opinion favoured a relatively moderate border, with reliance even being placed on Chinese control of Xinjiang as a buffer against Russia.
The only serious, albeit futile, attempts by the British to map the border east of the Karakoram pass with China were made in 1899 and 1905. The Chinese never responded to these proposals. Interestingly, Alastair Lamb’s 1973 study argues that the 1899 line when plotted on a modern map rather than on one relying on surveys done in the nineteenth century would place the eastern portion of Aksai Chin, including the area covering the Xinjiang-Tibet road, in China.
Areas (in red) claimed by China in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh
In 1947, no definite boundary line to the east of the Karakoram Pass existed. On the official 1950 India Map, Kashmir’s boundary east of this pass was expressed as ‘Boundary Undefined’, while the 1914 McMahon Line was clearly shown as the boundary in the eastern sector. The only two points accepted by India and China was that the Karakoram Pass and Demchok, the western and eastern extremities of this sector, were in Indian territory. Opinion differed on how the line traversed between the two points. Thus, in effect, India and China were faced with a ‘no man’s land’ in eastern Ladakh, where the contentious Aksai Chin lay.
On May 18, Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artillery reconnaissance near Podgornoe in Sevastopol detected the firing position of the U.S. supplied 155mm the M777 towed howitzers firing position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). The UAV operators fired a missile at the firing position causing damage to several guns. Being a lightweight gun, the UAF gunners quickly towed the M7772A guns into a wooded area to conceal. A video released by the Russian Ministry of Defense, shot by an ariel platform, shows these concealed guns were destroyed by artillery fire, possibly a multiple rocket launcher (MRLS). The failure of the M777 gun is too early to predict. But it does show a pattern of failures of the American weapons, both operational and in doctrine.
Javelin was supposed to burn all Russian equipment
The United States has delivered about 7,000 Javelin anti-tank missile systems (ATGM) to Ukraine. According to the American Insider Magazine, the ATGM stocks in the U.S. reserves were reduced by about a third and now 20-25 thousand sets are left. At the same time, the fighting in Ukraine showed the insufficient effectiveness of this so-called man-portable weapon.
The FGM-148F Javelin anti-tank missile system was developed in 1989 to destroy armoured vehicles and low-flying low-speed targets like helicopters, drones and light aircraft. An infrared homing head (GOS) detects the target and ensures its capture at any time of the day. After firing the Javelin missile, the shooter can immediately change his position to avoid being hit by return fire.
The target is hit by a tandem HEAT warhead capable of penetrating 600-800 mm of armour. The rocket hits a tank or other armoured vehicle in the upper part, where the armour is the weakest.
Javelins did live up to a fraction of its fearsome reputation as it managed to knock off an unspecified number of tanks. However, it was the Ukrainian ATGM Skif or Stugna-P, developed by the Luch Design Bureau, that did the most damage. While it should be a surprise for most analysts, Ukrainian soldiers are well trained in Skif ATGM handling. N-LAWs from the United Kingdom were comparatively better performers as they were lighter to carry around in urban combat. Another issue was the limited space, and tall buildings interrupted the Javelin firings. One unverified issue is that the Javelins couldn’t distinguish the targets in the urban scenario. It was not a surprise for Ukrainians as one of the opposition members, just before the war, had stated that junk was being poured into the country, and Skif’s could perform better.
The problem with Javelins is both tactical and doctrinal. The Ukrainian Prisoners of War state that the U.S. help was overhyped. The Javelins were either outdated or unkempt and often misfired. The instructors ignored the misfires and gave them basic information on how to fire the missiles. The heavy Javelins were unsuitable for urban combat, as well as in rural and remote areas. In rural and remote areas, the possibility of meeting Russian armour was remote, and the operators were exposed to spying Russian UAVs and helicopters.
The Javelins, which ended up as trophies with the Russians and Donetsk Militia, were termed ‘junk’. In fact, in the initial days of the war, the Russians spoke about the U.S. establishing an office in Lviv to prevent Ukrainians from speaking out on Javelins’ issues.
Russian tankers soon developed tactics against these man-portable ATGM’s. Russians argue that Javelins are weapons for infantry and not for large tanks
After the initial hype, even the Ukrainian propaganda department, which churns out ridiculous statistics, stopped talking about Javelins.
The U.S. assumption that the Javelins alone were enough to burn the Russian armour and military vehicles many times over was busted. Soon the U.S. started dolling out M777 155mm guns as their next doctrinal experiment.
As a side note, the Switchblade 300 loitering munition supplied to Ukraine for anti-armour uses is not much talked about, and the mythical Pheonix Ghost remains a myth.
Stinger Missiles that didn’t sting
Stinger MANPADS, which received fame in Afghanistan, were of very little effectiveness in Ukraine.
Just like the T-72’s on the ground, the Russian helicopters rule the air in Ukraine. There are few videos of Stingers shooting Russian helicopters, but largely they have been ineffective. The Russian MoD released a video of a Ka-52 gunship pilot who explained how to avoid a Stinger.
M777 Howitzers are too lightweight for this war
M777 howitzer represents a new high for the Ukrainian decision-makers as they often said in the past that the 155 mm was the ticket to NATO. Ukrainians used WW II era 152 mm guns before the U.S. donated the M777s. 152mm was the Soviet standard, and 155 mm was the U.K. standard used by the U.S. and NATO. The difference is just 3 mm, and they both fire the similar weight to a similar distance with similar types of explosivesl
The United States has supplied Ukraine with 155-mm M777A2 towed howitzers. In total, 89 guns out of 90 donated were delivered. Some of the guns are already in the Donbas, and a few of them were promptly busted by the Russians today.
On May 7, the Pentagon reported that more than 200 Ukrainian troops were trained to use these howitzers. The deliveries are a part of the $800 million aid package to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The package includes 180,000 shells for the M777s, out of which 120,000 are reportedly delivered.
The videos and images from the UAF propaganda department show that the M777A2 howitzers delivered by the Americans to Ukraine are a simplified version of the gun, from which the digital fire control system (FCS), which made this howitzer a truly highly effective artillery piece with high accuracy, was removed. In the Armed Forces of Ukraine version, aiming is carried out in the old fashioned way, using optical sights and tables. The Americans removed the FCS from the howitzers, knowing that some of the guns would fall into the hands of the Russian army.
It means the M777 version delivered to Ukraine can’t fire the M982 Excalibur guided round and can’t use the M1156 guided fuze.
As per the visuals from Ukrainian positions, the gun fires M795 High Explosive projectile with M739A1 Point Detonating Fuze and M232 MACS charge, which aren’t the most modern M777 combination. M777 are regular artillery guns but with a lower weight for easy transportation.
It remains to be seen if the M777s will make a difference in the war or will be a myth buried in the Ukrainian propaganda books.
“A strong nation thrives on its history, its past, its successes and failures, its customs and its traditions. Its diversity. So does the Indian Military”
Eradicate poverty, misogyny, unemployment. Eradicate casteism, religious bigotry, corruption in the government; eradicate corrupt politicians; eradicate the non-accountability of govt officials in the corridors of power. Eradicate the sickening VIP culture– this sense of ‘entitlement’ of the elected representatives of India.
Unfortunately, the leadership at the helm is hell bent on re-writing history and destroying the very fabric which makes a successful ‘nation state’– a homogenous collection of citizens, ideas, philosophies, religions, colours, ethnicities. A shared history woven with diverse cultures and language
In a mature democracy, you have the freedom to wear what you want. To eat what you want. To drink what you want. And an absolute freedom to believe in what you must. All this, as long as established societal norms are followed. In a true democracy the citizens are guaranteed not only equality before law but also equal protection of laws.
And we are India- not some tin pot state like Iran or Pakistan or Saudi Arabia or Uganda or N Korea. Our state power is meant to look outwards not inwards. And if the major threat is from within; then we too are a failed state and our governance needs a relook. In our misguided quest to rewrite and modify history combined with a misplaced urge to ‘undo past wrongs’, we are on a national binge to change names of cities, places, roads, buildings and monuments, traditions and culture. Soon we will have it that the British never even came to India! And the ‘mughals’ were foreigners! And that past governments stood for all that was wrong in India!
A strong nation thrives on its history, its past, its successes and failures, its customs and its traditions. Its diversity. So does the Indian Military. Ever thought as to why some states are able to convert their basic resources and human strengths into credible fighting power despite limited resources. And why do some states perform poorly despite material and equipment advantages? It is because military and thereby national power, depends on the political culture, the prevalent social structures; beliefs, doctrines, traditions and cohesion of their armed forces. Culture and traditions shape the behaviour of a body of men in peace and war. Camaraderie and brotherhood in uniformed men springs from customs, traditions, shared hardships and legacy. Traditions and unit ‘individualities’ are the essence of what binds military units together, providing a cohesiveness among the individual members, which allows the unit to function effectively as a collective entity. Those units that foster a sense of tradition, belonging, teamwork and a sense of collective pride possess a unified strength, which enhance accomplishments, endure challenges and overcome hardships. Because of this, unit cohesion is a powerful mission multiplier that instills soldiers to perform to the utmost of their abilities for the benefit of each other, the unit and ultimately the country.
And now start destroying the ‘distinctiveness’ of the Indian military system. The ethos, traditions, history, glamour and the ‘binding force’ of the Indian military– convert it into another ‘CAPF’! A ‘numbered’ police or CRPF/BSF/ITBP battalion. No traditions to go by, no culture, no pride of ‘belonging’ — just a bare railway waiting room. Enter, while-away your time and leave. Neither will the unit remember you, nor will you ever visit the unit again. No, they will not climb Tiger Hill again if they belong to a number with no history and tradition.
Cut out the bands, military parades, raising days, fanfare, the aura, the pomp and show which makes the military of any nation a force to be reckoned with. Forget past glories, rich histories. Forget the customs and traditions imbibed over centuries. Forget the battles fought by Indian soldiers/units all over the world, the medals won, the citations given, the battle honours, the war cries, the lanyards. The issue is more of a ‘no body’ imposing his thoughts on a military system. One man who has come temporarily into the political system and made an offhand (uncalled for) remark about ‘sabhyata’ has caused turbulence in the entire military environment. A person who is least qualified, a person who has never donned the uniform is today telling the Indian military ‘how it should behave and modify its trappings, culture, traditions and ethos’! The problem lies here.
We forget that motivation, belief, cohesion and traditions maketh an army not just equipment alone. The US had the best equipment and war material in Vietnam and Afghanistan. It failed. Because the soldiers and the country did not have the cohesion, pride and belief in themselves- the leadership and the cause. Ukrainian soldiers have the motivation, the belief, the pride, the cohesion, but for the Russians- its just ‘another job’. Motivation comes from ethos, belief, traditions — naam, namak, nishan. Most people forget that the Indian soldier fights first for the honour and name of his unit and the collective reputation of the soldiers who make this ‘unit’– and then the country. Distinct but interlinked.
Saragarhi was not for India. It was not even in India. Rezang La too was for the Battalion and for that intangible ‘unit brotherhood’ among those soldiers who decided to give their all; last man last bullet. A brotherhood which had been nurtured as part of unit ethos, a sense of belonging, pride mixed with traditions imbibed over a period of time. For them, after this had come the thought of the hinterland, motherland and loved ones behind. Nepali Gurkhas too do not die for India. They die fighting ferociously for their unit and the Gurkha tradition.
Tinker with the military now, regret later. Change the tunes (hum honge kamyab) by all means, but do not eradicate the past (auld lang sayne). Why not let the men in uniform decide all this? Why not let the col of the regiment or the military hierarchy take a call on the lanyard or the colour of the belt or whether to retain battle honours or mess/regimental traditions or the regimentation of the Indian Army or its recruitment/service norms or its dress codes; all hugely successful till today, and since centuries. Whenever a change was required, it was done by the military machine itself. By competent uniformed men who are most qualified to carry the rank and file with them.
This is a classic case when three and four star generals of all three services can join hands and tell the establishment, ‘Lay off– this is purely our domain’. Alas, even Krishna Menon and Nehru will be turning over in their graves.
Brig D S Sarao, is a veteran army aviator who has flown extensively in J&K. He was seriously injured in Op Meghdoot during a casualty evacuation. He is a prolific writer, academic & lecturer.
(Views expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect the editorial stance of Mission Victory India)
Pralay (“Destruction”) is a cannisterised tactical, surface-to-surface, and SRBM for battlefield use From Rafale Jets to S-400 Missile Defence System, here are five pathbreaking weapons that would boost India’s firepower immensely. Take a look at the complete list here Five Pathbreaking Weapons to Boost India’s Firepower: The past few quarters have been eventful for India as it witnessed many changes in the security dynamics near its borders. This was amid the rising tensions between India and China. However, this period was also marked by improvements in defence capabilities which were necessitated due to the rise in hostility between India and China. Here is a list of five pathbreaking weapons that will be boosting India’s firepower immensely in the coming days. Rafale Fighter Jets Rafale is a next-generation combat aircraft manufactured by Dassault Aviation, France. India has received 32 of the 36 combat aircraft as a part of the deal between India and France, the rest of the 4 aircraft are going to be delivered in the coming days after making India-specific enhancements to the aircraft. Currently, there are two active squadrons of Rafale in India operating from Hashimara Air Base, West Bengal and Ambala. It is a 4.5th Generation aircraft with the ability to carry a wide range of short and long missions. It can carry out ground and sea attacks, reconnaissance, and high-accuracy strikes with relative ease. It is equipped with Meteor which is a beyond visual range air-to-air missile with a range of 100 km, SCALP cruise missile and HAMMER precision guided ammunition. The acquisition of Rafale Jets will boost air defence capabilities and help in combating threats on both sides of the borders. S-400 Missile Defence System India has obtained the S-400 Missile Defence System from Russia in the wake of increasing border tensions between India and China. China is known to have installed the same across the Line of Actual Control or LAC which prompted the deal. This deal attracted the disapproval of the USA to the extent of it threatening India to implement the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) against India, which allows it to sanction any country that purchases this missile defence system from Russia. However, the United States hasn’t implemented the same, as India maintained a fine balance between its relations with USA and Russia. The S-400 defence system is capable of taking down UAVs, hostile aircraft, and ballistic and cruise missiles that were released by the enemy. The ability to hit mobile targets like fighter planes is achieved by its ground-to-air missiles 9M96E and 9M96E2. These missiles can hit a moving target from a 120 km distance range with high precision. MQ-9 Reaper Drones The MQ-9 Reaper Drones that India has obtained from the USA is a potent surveillance drone and can also be equipped with missiles which can be used for offensive purposes. India is looking to acquire 30 MQ-9 Reaper Drones ( 10 each for Army, Navy and Air Force). The ability to strike with precision, and perform reconnaissance and covert operations, the MQ-9 predator drones are ideal for use in battlefield operations against high-value, time-sensitive and transitory targets. The most exciting feature of MQ-9 Reaper Drones is the addition of four hellfire missiles that are very precise and destructive. The most recent attack by a Hellfire missile was done to take down Al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. TEJAS Light Combat Aircraft The procurement of the homemade Tejas Light Combat Aircraft is going to boost the aerial capability of the Air Force. India has made a deal to procure 83 TEJAS Light Combat Aircraft of which 73 will be MK- 1A Aircraft and 10 will be trainer planes. There has been talks of equipping Tejas with HAMMER missiles in order to increase its firepower. The strengths of TEJAS lies in its less weight due to use of composites, low radar signals, supersonic speed, and role in offensive air support. The Tejas is going to replace the MiG-21-Bison soon. Missiles By DRDO DRDO has been instrumental in testing new missiles as the threat of attack looms large over the horizon. The first of such tests was of Agni-P or Prime which is a medium-range ballistic missile that has a range of 2000 kilometres. It has improved accuracy and provides the ability to be launched from rail or road, these missiles can be stored in canisters for an extended period of time. Among other missiles that were tested are Pralay, which is a surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missile. The missile has a range of 150km to 500km. The other missiles being tested were helicopter-launched Stand-Off Anti-Tank Missile, Long Range Supersonic assisted Torpedo and Pinaka-MK2 Extended range rockets. The most notable development in the case of ICBMs is the successful launch of Agni-5 which is an Inter Continental Ballistic Missile or ICBM capable of hitting targets at a 5,500 (capable of 8,000 km) range.
DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT NOT LACK OF TRYING ON INDIA’S PART: JAISHANKAR
India’s dependence on Russian defence equipment and the strong defence ties with Moscow is not because New Delhi did not approach the US to get those from the United States, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said Sunday. “One of the changes in our relationships has actually been the defence cooperation which has really come about in this current form maybe the last 15 years,” Jaishankar told Indian Americans here during an interactive discussion with him organized by the US India Friendship Council and Foundation for India and Indian Diaspora Studies. “From 1965 pretty much for the next 40 years, there was no US defence equipment to India. This was, in fact, a period when the India Soviet, India Russia relationship became very strong,” he said. “This was not due to a lack of trying on India’s part. I can vouch for it myself. I’ve had my relatives, my father, my grandfather, they worked with the defence ministry. So, I know first hand what great efforts were made over those years to try to make the US understand that it was in American interest to have a strong, united, independent, prosperous India,” Jaishankar said. “At that time, they did not succeed, maybe the state of the world was such,” he noted. “The change that started was really triggered by the nuclear deal that removed a very big obstacle to go forward and then to actually take the relationship to a new level requires leadership in India,” that did not had reservations. “It takes two hands to clap. It was not just that all the problems are on the American side they were visitations on the Indian side as well,” he said. “So we also have to address the institutions on our side. I think today, the relationship is on a very different footing. We have possibility of working together in many more areas, especially the security domain. Some of our major exercises are with the American military. We fly a number of American planes today, the C-17,” the minister said. Very bullish on the future of India-US relationship, he said: “I think there are really deep convergences, which will sustain it over many, many years.”
SOLAR GROUP’S ECONOMIC EXPLOSIVES LTD TO DEVELOP ‘HIMARS’ LIKE ROCKET SYSTEM
n Indian private sector defence equipment manufacturer has proposed to develop a “High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)” multiple rocket launcher system similar to the ones used by the US army. The HIMARS has come into limelight after it was deployed by the Ukrainian forces in the Russo-Ukraine war recently, which has clearly shifted the momentum and in the process turning the tide in favour of Ukraine in the fight against Russia. The Russians have nothing equivalent to the HIMARS. Manufacturer Lockheed Martin describes the M142 HIMARS as having “shoot and scoot” capability, referring to the fact it is a highly mobile weapons system that can fire and retreat at speed, reducing the chance of being targeted by the enemy. India’s Multi-Barrel Rocket Systems Currently the Indian Army has the Soviet/Russian BM-30 Smerch which is a heavy self-propelled 300 mm multiple rocket launcher. The system is intended to defeat personnel, armoured, and soft targets in concentration areas, artillery batteries, command posts and ammunition depots. The army also operates the BM-21 Grad a self-propelled 122 mm multiple rocket launcher. The complete system with the BM-21 launch vehicle and the M-21OF rocket is designated as the M-21 field-rocket system and is more commonly known as a Grad multiple rocket launcher system. Mobility Philosophy of The Indian Army Indian army has focused on the mobility philosophy and has hence developed the indigenous Pinaka MBRL which uses 214mm instead of 300mm rocket like the ones used in BM-30 and is mounted on a 8X8 BEML made truck chassis. The advanced guided version of the MBRL consists of 8 rockets in total installed on 2 pods, whereas the unguided version has 12 rockets in total. New “Shoot And Scoot” Capability Solar Group’s Economic Explosive Ltd has submitted a proposal to MoD for the developed a HIMARS kind of a rocket system, this system will carry only 1 pod. The system will have a range of 250km surface-to-surface rocket. The MBRL may use the improved version of the Prahaar solid-fuel road-mobile tactical ballistic missile which has since been designated as Pranash by DRDO. It is designed to carry a conventional high explosive warhead or clustered munition, and significantly the missile is powered by single-stage solid propellant motor. This missile can be launched within 2–3 minutes without any preparation, providing significantly better reaction time than liquid-fuelled missiles. Pranash is being developed to provide a cost-effective, quick-reaction, all-weather, all-terrain, highly accurate battlefield support tactical weapon system.
INS Sunayna has reached Seychelles, an island off the coast of East Africa, to participate in the annual training exercise “Operation Southern Readiness” of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).
“This not only reinforces Indian Navy’s commitment to maritime security in the Indian Ocean region, but also marks the maiden participation of an Indian Navy ship in the CMF exercise,” the Ministry of Defence said in a statement.
The US, Italy, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, Spain and India are among the participants.
The Seychelles People’s Defence Force, European Union Naval Force and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime are part of the exercise. Forces of multiple nations will conduct training on boarding a ship, search and seizure techniques, search and rescue operations, maritime law and information-sharing.
In a separate development, Indian Navy’s surveillance plane, P8-I, landed at Seychelles yesterday morning for undertaking a joint surveillance on the request of the Government of Seychelles.
Commissioned in 2013
INS Sunayna, the second of the NOPV (Naval Offshore Patrol Vessel) class of ship was commissioned at Kochi on October 15 in 2013 by Vice Admiral Satish Soni, Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Southern Naval Command
DISCONTINUATION OF ANNUAL RENEWAL OF CSD SMART CARDS
DISCONTINUATIONOF ANNUAL RENEWAL OF CSD SMART CARDS
Annual Renewal of Canteen Smart Cards was instituted vide Para 8 (c) of instructions on CIMS issued in 2006, Para 7 of policy letter No 95286/SG/Q/DDGCS dated 26 Sep 2012 & later amplified vide letter of even No dated 08 Mar 2021.
Vide letter under ref, cards of ESM, Veer Naris and Civil Defence Employees ceased functioning and were reqd to be renewed annually by physically vis the URC & submitting PPO / Pension Slip.
It is felt that the policy on ‘Annual Renewal of Canteen Smart Cards’ causes significant inconvenience to our veterans, Veer Naris and Civil Defence Employees (Serving & Retired). In order to assuage inconvenience to beneficiaries, it has been decided that the policy on ‘Annual Renewal of Canteen Smart Cards’ be discontinued wef 01 Jan 2023.A mechanism is being established to deactivate the cards of deceased ESM / beneficiaries in coord with PCDA & SPARSH.
However, URCs will continue to ensure that only valid CSD Smart Card holders are permitted entry to the Canteens to purchase CSD items. Necessary measures to this effect be implemented by the URC Mgt at fmn & unit levels.
The following procedure will be adopted by URCs:-
On intimation of the demise-of an ESM / beneficiary, the Widow / NoK shall be advised to apply for a ‘Widow I NoK of ESM’ CSD Smart Card. ·
The URC shall assist in prep of the Card on priority.
The Widow / NoK shall continue to avail CSD facilities with cards of the deceased husband/ beneficiary till the new cards are received.
Once the new cards are received and activated the old cards of the deceased husband / beneficiary will auto get deactivated.
