Monthly Archives: August 2018

Spike is an Israeli fire-and-forget anti-tank guided missile and anti-personnel missile as per a report
India has deployed the Spike missile in Ladakh amid the ongoing tension with China for the last two years. Spike is an anti-tank guided missile that can destroy any tank or armoured vehicle in the blink of an eye. This missile is so dangerous that it has to be fired just by aiming, chasing the target, it does the rest of the work itself. For this reason Spike is also called Fire and Forget missile. Its second biggest feature is also being fired from a variety of launch platforms. The Spike can also be fired from shoulder-mounted launchers, helicopters and tripods. Not only this, it can also be fitted on army tanks. This missile has recently been seen on the shoulder of a soldier during a military exercise in Ladakh. The world has seen the power of anti-tank missiles recently in the Russo-Ukraine war, where the Javelin missiles received from America created a ruckus. Spike is considered a more dangerous anti-tank missile than the Javelin.
Spike ATGM Fire And Forget Missile
Spike is an Israeli fire-and-forget anti-tank guided missile and anti-personnel missile. It is fitted with a tandem-charged High Explosive Anti-Tank Warhead (HEAT). It has been developed and designed by the Israeli company Rafael Advanced Defence Systems. It is available in man-portable, vehicle-launched and helicopter-launched variants. Its launchers once lock the target through fire and forget technology. Some variants attack their target from above, which is considered the weakest area of ​​any tank. The tanks have reactive armour plates all around, which burst during the missile attack, reducing its impact. In such a situation, by attacking from above, the Spike missile causes tremendous damage to the tank. Not only this, there is also a variant of this, which after firing its target can also be changed. The missile is equipped with an imaging infrared seeker.
Spike NLOS Most Advanced Missile
According to Rafale Advanced Defence Systems, the Israeli company that made the Spike missile, 29 countries around the world have purchased different variants of this system. The Indian Air Force is procuring Spike NLOS variants of these. Spike NLOS is the most advanced variant of the Spike family. In this, NLOS stands for ‘Non Line of Sight’, indicating its long range capability. The Spike NLOS range is about 32 km, which is almost four times that of the US AGM-114 Hellfire, which is deployed on an Apache attack helicopter. There is also news that India may make Spike NLOS indigenously under a Technology Transfer agreement.
India Preparing For Spike’s Technology Transfer
The Spike NLOS Anti-Tank Guided Missile is currently ordered in limited numbers. Later this missile can be produced on a large scale under Make in India. The air-firing Spike can automatically target enemy ground targets, their tank regiments and armoured vehicles, eliminating NLOS jamming and other standoffs. Due to this, the advance speed of enemy tanks can also be slowed down to a great extent.
Why Did India Choose Spike Over Javelin?
India has long wanted to procure air launched anti-tank missiles. In 2011, India had two options. The first of these was the US-made FGM-148 Javelin missile and the second was the Spike NLOS. Spike was chosen by India because Israel was ready for technology transfer and domestic manufacturing of missiles, which fuels the Modi government’s ‘Make in India’ initiative. Instead of outright purchase of these missiles, India negotiated with Israel for technology transfer so that the missiles could be produced in India. The Israeli company has set up a joint venture in India with Kalyani named Kalyani Rafale Advanced Systems (KRAS). In such a situation, this missile can be easily manufactured in India.

Such contracts provide ‘psychological comfort’ to MoD’s civil and military bureaucracy
by Amit Cowshish
The Indian Navy is reportedly keen on forging an inter-governmental agreement (IGA) with the US or France to procure 26 fighter jets for its indigenous aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, scheduled for imminent commissioning despite awaiting installation of its Aviation Flight Complex which is necessary for operating its combat air arm.
Boeing’s F/A-18E/F ‘Super Hornet’ and Dassault’s Rafale-M (Marine) fighters are in contention for the Navy’s requirement for 18 multi-role carrier borne fighters and eight twin-seat trainers to operate off Vikrant.
These requirements could eventually rise to a total of 57 platforms, in keeping with the Navy’s earlier projections. Both the US and French fighters had recently demonstrated their operational capabilities from the shore-based test facility at INS Hansa, the Navy’s air station in Goa. The Navy is currently evaluating their performances to determine their suitability, following which it will begin the formal tendering process to acquire the aircraft, possibly via an IGA, or some other analogous arrangement, for a variety of reasons detailed below.
What comes closest to an IGA for the US government are tenders concluded exclusively through its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which is administered by the Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the Pentagon’s overall aegis and advisement by the US State Department, as a means for furthering Washington’s diplomatic and strategic ambit worldwide.
India’s Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP2020) – and the manuals that preceded it- permits acquisition both via the IGA and the FMS on grounds of securing geo-strategic advantage or imperatives of strategic partnerships, or both. Military, technological, economic, diplomatic, and political benefits too are ‘principal factors’ for New Delhi forging such agreements for its military buys. As a matter of fact, IGAs and their variants like the FMS have been Delhi’s favoured mode of importing major military platforms and diverse weapon systems for several years.
All procurements from the former Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, since the mid-1960s have followed the IGA route, with India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) dealing directly with Rosobornexport (ROE), Moscow’s sole state agency for materiel export and import of dual use defence products, technologies and services. For decades this arrangement worked well, despite periodic glitches, and was solely responsible for effectively building India’s arsenal and augmenting its war-waging capability.
The bulk of US defence acquisitions 2002 onwards, worth around $ 20 billion, too have been via the FMS route and more recently in 2016 the Indian Air Force (IAF) acquired 36 French Dassault Rafale fighters via an IGA, deliveries of which are nearing completion.
The MoD officials as well as the armed forces are ‘comfortable’ adopting the IGA template, especially the FMS, for diverse reasons, of which expediency is the foremost. Ironically, even for them, the DAP2020 – and all its earlier manifestations – has always been far too convoluted in its processes, rendering them wary of taking decisions in the event of something going awry. Many corruption scandals in recent years involving MoD and military officials – some of which remain unproven – have centred on their questionable interpretation of the complex procurement regulations; pursuing the IGA route obviates such possibilities.
The IGAs are also not required to follow standard multi-stage acquisition procedures or conform to the rigid contractual conditions envisaged in the DAP. Instead, they are negotiated on mutually agreed terms between the governments of both countries, allowing a greater degree of flexibility in finalising the deals and their eventual execution.
This compressed IGA – and FMS – procedure typically begins with the approval of the broad framework for the proposed agreement by the MoD’s Defence Acquisition Council headed by the Defence Minister. It is followed by negotiations between the foreign governmental agency and an MoD appointed inter-disciplinary committee which determines the overall terms and conditions of the purchase, including the cost, delivery schedules, maintenance support package, and any possible transfer of technology for local manufacture.
The empowered committee is also authorised by the MoD to liaise directly with the original equipment manufacturer as part of the overarching inter-governmental negotiations. Once the draft terms and conditions of the purchase are mutually accepted, the IGA is signed with the approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security headed by the Indian Prime Minister.
In almost all instances, an IGA compresses the total period for finalising a contract, from the time the proposal was initiated to when it is finally inked. The purchase of 36 Rafales, for example, was first announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Paris in April 2015, and the Rs 59,000 crore contract for them was signed via an IGA 17 months later in September 2016, followed by commencement of deliveries in July 2020.
Procurement from the US under the FMS program is even more alluring for MoD officials, despite the DSCA following its own set procedure, including the terms and conditions of sale. The MoD accepts this as a fait accompli, and its officials are content abiding by the FMS procedure as the DSCA assumes responsibility for the entire process, especially with regard to negotiating the cost – by far the most risk-prone aspect of defence procurements – with potential US vendors.
Under the FMS process, the DSCA negotiates with the original equipment manufacturer as it would if the US military was acquiring the materiel and charges the MoD a standard ‘facilitation’ fee for its endeavours. With 189 countries and international organisations currently participating in it, the FMS process is widely considered transparent, reliable, and secure. This is further vindicated by the reality that no FMS deal between India and the US has so far come under any cloud.
India’s FMS purchases have included 22 ‘AH-64E(I)’ Apache Guardian and 15 Chinook CH-47F heavy lift helicopters for the IAF, 14 P-8I Neptune long-range maritime multi-mission aircraft and 24 Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky MH-60R multirole naval helicopters for the Indian Navy.
Six additional Apaches were on order for the Indian Army, while the IAF had also commissioned 12 Lockheed Martin C130J-30 and 11 Boeing C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft. In 2016 the Indian Army had signed up for 145 BAE Systems M777 155mm/39 calibre lightweight howitzers – of which around 100 had been delivered – in addition to acquiring 72,400 SIG716 assault rifles from Sig Sauer in 2019.
To conclude, the IGA or FMS contracts provide ‘psychological comfort’ to MoD’s civil and military bureaucracy, as the responsibility for procurement deals concluded under it is borne collectively by the empowered committee on the Indian side and the concerned government, or its agency like the DSCA, on the other.
This minimises the risk for the officials of being questioned subsequently for their decisions and facing allegations of committing irregularities in the acquisition process which, in recent times, has been the bane of efficient decision-making and one that has adversely impacted the Indian military’s long-delayed modernisation.
Amit Cowshish retired from the Indian Defence Accounts Service in 2012

Mi-35 attack helicopter squadron in service being sent for overhaul
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is set to formally raise its first unit of indigenous Light Combat Helicopters (LCHs) in Jodhpur in the first week of October coinciding with Air Force Day on October 8.
Ten LCHs will be inducted in the first batch completing one unit, a defence official said on Monday. The IAF is still working out the total number of LCHs to be acquired, the official stated.
The IAF operates the older Russian Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters, of which one squadron has been phased out following the induction of 22 Boeing AH-64E Apache attack helicopters. The existing Mi-35 squadron is in the process of being sent for overhaul which will extend its life by many years, the official stated.
The Army had already raised its first LCH squadron on June 1, 2022 in Bangalore. As reported by The Hindu earlier, the unit will move to Eastern Command along the Line of Actual Control (LCH) on completion of the raising next year.
The Army plans to acquire 95 LCHs of which seven units, each having 10 helicopters, are planned to be deployed for combat role in the mountains.
In March 2022, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had approved procurement of 15 Limited Series Production (LSP) variants of the LCH at the cost of ₹3,887 crore along with infrastructure sanctions worth ₹377 crore. Of the 15 helicopters, 10 are for the IAF and five for the Army. The LCH is designed and developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).
The Defence Ministry had stated earlier that the LCH LSP is an indigenously designed, developed and manufactured state-of-the-art modern combat helicopter containing approximately 45% indigenous content by value which will progressively increase to more than 55% for Series Production Version.
The LCH is the first dedicated attack helicopter of the Army, which otherwise operates 75 Rudra helicopters, the weaponised variant of the indigenous Advanced Light Helicopter. It will start receiving Apache attack helicopters from early 2024 onwards, six of which have been contracted under an estimated $800 million deal from the U.S. in February 2020. It is also in talks with Boeing for the procurement of 11 additional Apache helicopters.

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, August 29

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on Monday visited an important radar station of the Indian Air Force, where he witnessed the functioning of the IAF structure on how a picture of the battle space is acquired and how the information is passed on in real time to pilots and air bases.

The system is known as the Integrated Air Command & Control System (IACCS). It is the backbone of IAF’s network centricity and is a key enabler in operations. The system’s capabilities allow situational awareness that reduces IAF’s reaction time. The system has redundancies built into its functioning which enable seamless operations between its assets across the country.

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, Aug 30

The Indian Navy will get a new ensign – the flag that is hoisted atop all Naval warships, ground stations and naval air bases.

This is the fourth time since 1950 that the Naval ensign would undergo a change.

The new one would be unveiled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on September 2 when the first indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant is commissioned at the Cochin Shipyard Limited Kochi, Kerala.

“During the event, the Prime Minister will also unveil the new Naval Ensign (Nishaan), doing away with the colonial past and befitting the rich Indian maritime heritage,” The Prime Minister’s Office said in statement on Tuesday.

On 26 January 1950, when India became a republic, the Navy Crest and flags were duly changed to represent an independent India. Part of the flag retained the British legacy — the Red St. George’s Cross. The Union Jack was replaced by the Tricolour on the left top corner of the flag.

The Red St George’s Cross was retained till Aug 15, 2001, when the Cross made its way out and the Navy blue colour Indian Navy crest was added.

In 2004, the St George’s Cross was back with the addition of the Ashoka emblem in the intersection of the cross. And the Naval crest was dropped. In 2014, acting on directive of the Union Home Ministry, the national motto “Satyameva Jayate” was added under the Ashok Emblem.

The one adopted in 2014 is the current ensign of the Navy. A white flag with horizontal and vertical red stripes, symbolising the Cross of Saint George, with the Ashoka emblem and the words ‘Satyameva Jayate”. The tricolour is placed in the right top corner.

Possible additions to be unveiled by Modi include reverting to the 2001 status when the cross was removed. Possibly the naval crest depicting an anchor would be added.

The Vikrant is named after her illustrious predecessor, India’s first Aircraft Carrier which had played a vital role in the 1971 war. It has a large number of indigenous equipment and machinery, involving major industrial houses in the country as well as over 100 MSMEs.

Srinagar, August 29 The J&K police on Monday informed the Supreme Court that it was not feasible to hand over the bodies of people, killed by security forces in encounters, to their families as it would open the floodgates of similar litigations. Even the J&K administration said that handing over of bodies to families could lead to law and order issues. On November 15, Amir Magray, along with two civilians—Altaf Bhat and Mudasir Gul—and a militant were killed in an encounter at Hyderpora locality in Srinagar. Their bodies were buried in Zachaldara Wudar in Handwara, nearly 100 km away from Srinagar, triggering protests and forcing authorities for the first time to return the bodies of Bhat and Gul. Magray’s father Muhammad Lateef filed a petition to seek his body. Lateef claimed Magray was innocent, but according to the police, he was a militant. A Bench comprising Justices Surya Kant and JB Pardiwala, after hearing all parties, reserved judgment in the case. J&K counsel Ardhendumauli Prasad argued before the court, “…there are many terrorists being encountered. If this (returning of bodies) is allowed, the high court will be filled with similar prayers seeking to perform last rites.” “As far as the state is concerned, he (Amir) was a terrorist. It is not in dispute that there are certainly such people who have been buried and they are purposely not buried in native places for the reason that it takes into account the glorification…young minds are swayed..the terrorists sneak in and they say very good things and the younger minds are drawn into terrorism. That is the reason why the state consciously does not bury them in the same town or in the same village,” Prasad said. Since April 2020, the police have not handed over the bodies of militants and civilians killed in anti-militancy operations in Kashmir to their families, citing Covid restrictions. They are instead buried in remote graveyards in border areas. In 2020, at least 158 people, mostly militants, were buried in these locations, while last year, nearly 180 bodies were buried.

BY

MANOJ JOSHI
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, OBSERVER
RESEARCH FOUNDATION

Formally, China insists that it wants good ties with India and
sees it as a part of its vision for Asia. Practically, however, it
envisages an India with a subordinate status.

T HIS has not been a happy year for the Chinese leadership. The Ukraine war, economic headaches arising from the mortgage crisis compounded by the difficulties of adopting a ‘zero Covid’ policy have hobbled the march to the coming 20th Communist Party of China Congress. Yet, none of these developments have hampered the party general secretary Xi Jinping’s plan to be re-elected for an unprecedented third term. This is being sold as a necessity, given that China is now entering turbulent waters, economically and politically, and needs the steady hand of an experienced helmsman. Xi Jinping has given shape to China’s current pursuit of a great ‘national rejuvenation’ and declared that it cannot be achieved without Taiwan. Meanwhile, China’s immediate troubles have also spurred thinking along longer-term assessments. One scenario is that China is headed for a sharp decline. Its demographic profile has begun to deteriorate at a fast pace, sharply reducing its working age population. The rising household debt-to-GDP ratio at over 60 per cent — a World Bank red line — will undermine its strategy of promoting domestic consumption. But China watchers like Oriana Mastro and Derek Scissors say that China’s decline from its peak will not be precipitous, but gradual, and the Chinese are heavily investing in R&D and infrastructure to offset the decline. Their blunt assessment is that ‘current income and defense spending trajectories suggest that China will have more resources to compete militarily with the United States over the next 10 years than it has had over the last 20.’ Both scenarios make for a China that is dangerous. In the ‘sharp decline’ scenario, Beijing will be in a hurry to cement its Asian dominance and, more importantly, resolve its Taiwan ‘problem’. Chinese military strength, backed by deep reforms and modernisation, has professionalised its military at all levels. The Military Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy had injected considerable civilian expertise into enhancing the supporting infrastructure of the PLA. Its navy is already the largest in the world and could have six or seven aircraft carriers in the next 15 years. Besides debt and demographics, China is also facing a resource crunch which makes it more dependent on imports of food, energy and other strategic raw materials. In the past two years, there have been electricity outages, compelling Beijing to reverse course on plans to do away with dependence on coal. China is by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, though it is also an undisputed leader in expanding renewable energy. Being import dependent is not an issue, China is not short of money to finance them. But Beijing has also increasingly belligerent relations with the US, the world’s foremost naval power which has the capacity, if the occasion so demands, to interdict its supply routes. Under Xi Jinping, China has ratcheted up the use of Chinese power. It has been able to make Xinjiang a vast prison camp without a peep from the Islamic countries. It took the risk of destroying Hong Kong’s free status without much of a fuss from the international community. It also conducted an exercise of coercion against India by amassing forces in Tibet and altering the Line of Actual Control. Now, of course, has come the issue of Taiwan whose own industrial capacity, especially in the making of semiconductors, makes it a global resource. Taiwan has some twothirds of the world’s chip foundry capacity and its disruption would have a fallout around the world. Many suggest that a forcible Chinese attempt to incorporate Taiwan is a matter of when, not if. The US-Japanese response to the growth of Chinese power in the IndoPacific is their Indo-Pacific strategy. This includes a quadrilateral grouping, of which India is a part, and which is aimed at shaping a network of democratic countries in the Indo-Pacific in economic, social and political spheres. Linked to this is the formation of the Australia, UK and US (AUKUS) alliance aimed at shoring up the military power ranged against China in the western Pacific. Meanwhile, through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), the US is reorganising and revamping its own forces, just as the Japanese are. More recently, Washington has come out with the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), of which India is also a member. It is a flexible programme to tackle issues relating to infrastructure, supply chain resilience, clean energy and digital trade. Faced with the growing military power gap with China, New Delhi, has signed up to Quad and IPEF to balance China. India has a 4,000-km disputed border with China claiming significant Indian territory. In a recent interview, Kevin Rudd has noted that the Chinese view their Indian claim on a par with those of the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea. The Indian approach so far has been incremental and cautious, as manifested by the somewhat belated Indian critique last week of China for militarising the Taiwan straits. The overall situation offers opportunities, but also comes with dangers for India. Quad’s growing agenda of health cooperation beyond Covid, supply chain resilience, emerging technologies and their standards, maritime domain awareness can be an economic game changer for India. Yet, there is need to be careful in dealing with an assertive and powerful China. Formally, the Chinese insist that they want good relations with New Delhi and want it to be a part of their vision for Asia. Practically, however, they envisage an India with a subordinate status. Many of these issues will play out in Xi Jinping’s third term, and, possibly a fourth term till 203

FROM the outset, it made little sense for the Chinese to send a spy
ship to Sri Lanka when the country was reeling under its worstever economic crises. Colombo could have done without getting
caught in strategic rivalry. It was chicanery on Beijing’s part to have
sought permission from a dying regime for a ‘research ship’ — which
spies on a country’s coastal defences on the side — to dock at Hambantota. The Presidential Palace in Colombo was about to be stormed and
President Gotabaya Rakapaksa was literally packing his bags. A new
administration in Colombo under Ranil Wickremsinghe as President
was served a Chinese fait accompli when it took over because the ship
was a few days’ sail away from Hambantota.
After the new regime withdrew permission to dock and with no
alternative port immediately available, the Chinese pulled the strings
to gain a reluctant permission. The matter should have ended at that.
But the Chinese envoy sought to set off Sri Lanka against India in a
series of tweets. Some were laughably naïve, such as equating the Taiwan crisis to the docking of the spy ship. But there was a crude bid to
drive a wedge between India and Sri Lanka by alleging that Sri Lanka had been invaded by its northern neighbour 17 times. He, perhaps,
tabulated all the local skirmishes involving ancient and medieval
kingdoms on either side of the Palk Strait.
The Chinese envoy was also wrong when he faulted India for
raising ‘security concerns’ without any evidence. He omitted to
inform that when Sri Lanka relented and allowed the ship to dock,
three conditions were imposed. It had to keep its Automatic Identification System switched on and was barred from scientific research
in the Lankan waters, which meant that the ‘research’ equipment
on the ship had to be shut down. Lastly, no Chinese crew was
allowed to disembark. In other words, Colombo took care of the
security concerns as far as it could. For now, as the Indian Foreign
Office said, Sri Lanka needs support, not unwanted pressure or
unnecessary controversies to serve another country’s agenda.