Monthly Archives: August 2018

Outstanding officers with a strong individuality and intellectual curiosity get culled by the stubborn seniority system.

MOHAN GURUSWAMY@mohanguruswamy

In his seminal On the Psychology of Military Incompetence Norman Dixon poses the questions: “How, if they are so lacking in intelligence, do people become senior military commanders? And what is it about military organisations that they should attract, promote and ultimately tolerate those whose performance at the highest levels brings opprobrium on the organisations they represent?”

Fortunately we have not had a major war in recent times to test the mettle of our commanders. But even in peacetime, many have, unfortunately, managed by their acts of omission and commission to bring opprobrium on our military.

The upper echelons of India’s military are now visibly dense with incompetent and uninspiring leaders, who simply managed to get good ACR’s year after year with bland obsequiousness.

Also read: Why India is losing respect for the Army

They then go about expecting the same from their subordinates, and get it in plenty. Outstanding officers with a strong individuality and intellectual curiosity get culled by the stubborn seniority system, adopted from the bureaucracy.

The Indian military, like many others, doesn’t appreciate standout talent and personality, and prefers a uniform greyness. The system beats out the commander and dashing leader in an officer long before he becomes a general. We will never study this, as if this opaque system of evaluation is a military heirloom.

Also read: Hyper patriotism biggest dishonour for Indian Army

Younger officers in Western militaries often challenge mediocrity and are willing to run into their swords for this. Have we any serving officer who will write on this? No, I don’t think so. Even those who are retired seem to have deep tribal loyalties. Tribal loyalty is very different from institutional loyalty.

The nation cannot afford the military to be a bureaucracy where even the undeserving rise. 

However, it was not always this way. Thomas Ricks has argued in his book The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today that the US military used to expect its generals to fail. In the Second World War, the US Army fired 16 division commanders and at least five corps commanders.

The British Army fired generals Wavell, Auchinleck, Cunningham and Ritchie in North Africa alone. Many were given second chances.

Also read: Why Indian Army looks weak in front of China

Somewhere along the way this tradition has lost. Ricks writes: “To a shocking degree, the (US) Army’s leadership ranks have become populated by mediocre officers, placed in positions where they are likely to fail. Success goes unrewarded, and everything but the most extreme failure goes unpunished, creating a perverse incentive system that drives leaders toward a risk-averse middle where they are more likely to find stalemate than victory.”

At least the Americans have started the debate. In 2007, lieutenant colonel Paul Yingling published an absolutely blistering, full-frontal assault on American generals entitled “A failure in generalship”.

In it he challenged the US Army for producing generals with insufficient education, language skills, creativity and moral courage.

He attacked the general officer promotion system as fundamentally flawed. His core argument was clear: “Our generals are not worthy of their soldiers.”

Amazingly, the article – by a serving officer – was published in the Armed Forces Journal. Less surprisingly, Yingling is now a high school teacher. Can anyone imagine an Indian Army officer writing such an article, or the Army War College Journal publishing it?

Ricks further writes: “We often think of the military with a culture of clear accountability. This is only really true for lower ranks. In contrast, there is absolutely no question that if the British Army were a listed company (heaven forbid), a slew of generals would have been kicked out of theatre early.

“Boards of directors have very little patience for poor performance, and regularly give CEOs months rather than years to prove themselves. Recent examples include GM (four CEOs in eighteen months) and Hewlett-Packard (five CEOs in six years). In fact as many as a third of CEO departures are due to poor performance.”

This begs the question; must all officers be promoted to their levels of incompetence?

Once at the Farnborough Air Show, I ran into a serving Royal Air Force (RAF) pilot who looked well into his middle years and was still a wing commander.

He was flying an aircraft at the show. When he saw the surprise on my face, he explained that he loved flying and to keep doing that he opted out of vying for higher commands.

His juniors wear stars but he prefers to see the stars from close up. He made his choice but many more get passed over and serve under course mates or juniors. Heavens don’t fall when this happens.

But in India a general made a post-retirement career over his supersession, ensuring that the seniority rule is chiselled in stone.

Dwight Eisenhower became a brigadier general in September 1941. In December 1943, he was appointed as the supreme allied commander in Europe.

In January 1944, he also assumed command of the North Africa theatre and was re-designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) making him the overlord of all allied forces in the West. He was also promoted to general of the army, the US equivalent of field marshal. As SHAEF he was the master and commander of famous generals like Bradley, Patton, Montgomery and Dempsey.

Their views about Eisenhower were interesting. Montgomery said: “Nice chap, no general.” Patton wrote: “It’s too bad Ike had no personal knowledge of war.”

But Ike organised the greatest amphibious landing in history and oversaw the defeat of Nazi Germany in Africa and Europe. Not even Zhukov or Rokossovsky commanded such huge forces operating simultaneously in many sectors.

Eisenhower went on to become POTUS (President of the United States of America) and when laying down office after two terms, warned his fellow countrymen against the growing power of the “military industrial complex”. Our problem is that the complexity of military organisation eludes our leaders and the subject has become another sacred cow.

Nearer home, William Slim was a brigadier doing a staff job in the Indian Army in Basra in 1941. He was fortuitously appointed GOC of the 10th infantry division in the Middle East and his performance led to him becoming the GOC of the 14th army headquarters in Imphal.

There he led it to what is now arguably the Second World War’s greatest military victory.

Interestingly enough, he still held the official rank of a colonel with the wartime rank of major general and temporary rank of lieutenant general. He later became field marshal and chief of the imperial general staff (CIGS). He was the only Indian Army officer to become CIGS.

In 1965, an Indian GOC went to war with his briefcase containing papers pertaining to his passing over for promotion.

In the face of a Pakistani counter-attack, he withdrew in haste from his forward position on the Ichogil canal leaving behind his briefcase. The Pakistanis gleefully read the out the contents of his gripe over being passed over on Radio Pakistan. In 1971, an IAF pilot (later an air marshal) landed his Gnat in a Pakistani airfield, but that didn’t stall his climb to a higher command.

Clearly, we need to separate the wheat from the chaff in time before it becomes expensive.

As wars become shorter, we can ill-afford to test our generals in war. We have to do it well ahead and be ready for war.

The nation cannot afford the military to be a bureaucracy where even the undeserving rise. The solution to this can come only from within the military.

The politician is not interested. The bureaucrats will just bring more of their ideas, which could be fatal. The military must look within. But who will bell the cat?

The morale aspect of close air support can be best gauged by an example of the Gulf War. A marine captain, Robert Alexander, was blown off his jeep by an Iraqi shell. He asked for quick close air support to retrieve him. Marine Harrier Jets were immediately deployed. They destroyed the enemy mortar platoon and saved him. ‘It was the most beautiful sight I have ever seen when those four bombs were racing through the air,’ he said.

Turf wars: The desire to take credit for the success of joint operations is universal. PTI

Lt Gen Gurbaksh S Sihota (retd)

A few days ago, there was a flurry of writings in newspapers criticising the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for making a statement about the role of the Indian Air Force in relation to its close support function to the forward troops engaged in active battle with the enemy.

It was disheartening to note some columnists casting aspersions on the intellect of the CDS. I do not think they have given credit to the ribbons on his chest which have been earned by being through operations beyond the comprehension of most people. Aren’t they also indirectly questioning the authorities who placed him in this position and have tasked him with an important mandate which will change the functioning of the Indian defence forces for the future?

Turf wars are a universal phenomenon. They are not peculiar to our country or our defence forces. The Americans have been through this phase. One of the defence secretaries, who chaired the commission on roles and missions, had said, “I have decided that Machiavelli got it about right when he wrote, ‘there is nothing more difficult to carry out or more doubtful of success, nor dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For, the reformer has enemies — and only lukewarm defenders.’”

We have observed turf wars between various branches of the civil services, within the paramilitary forces and defence forces, as also going down further within the various branches of the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force.

There is always the desire to take credit for the success of joint operations. This has been so evident when a large number of paramilitary forces as well as the police started conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Valley.

The appointment of the CDS had to wait for a very long time as each of the services feared losing their supremacy. It is well known that many former chiefs had opposed it and let it be known to the then prime ministers.

The proposal to increase the number of senior commanders with a ratio of 3:1:1 between the Army, Navy and the Air Force, based on their strength, came under serious objection. In the interest of the country and to retain harmonious relations between the defence forces, the then Army Chief decided to accept the ratio of 1:1:1, despite his own senior officers’ “strong displeasure.” It is on record that the then Defence Minister commended the graciousness and magnanimity of the Army Chief

As the structure of the Indian defence forces is being re-imagined as theatres, their composition will be influenced by the threat perception, type of terrain for operations and budgetary constraints.

When it comes to the employment of air power and distribution of its resources, the recommendations of the Indian Air Force will matter the most. There is no doubt that they are the best judge for its employment.

However, concentration versus distribution is going to be impacted by the shortage of resources. There are enough experienced commanders who will find the right balance and resolve the issue.

In the past, counter air operations have always taken precedence over the availability of air effort for close support to the troops. The introduction of multi-role aircraft has further compounded the problem.

Young officers who have been affected on the ground have always raised this issue with their senior commanders. This has had an adverse effect on their morale and needs to be addressed.

As the Army Commander, before a pending operation, I had to invite my Air Force counterpart so that we could jointly convince the junior commanders about the primary role of the Air Force and assure them that whenever it became vital, close support to them would not be denied.

With the induction of attack helicopters, this problem will get mitigated to a great extent if all the machines are merged into the Army Aviation Corps.

The morale aspect of the close air support can be best gauged by an example of the Persian Gulf War. A marine captain by the name of Robert Alexander was blown off his jeep by an Iraqi shell. He asked for quick close air support to retrieve him. Marine Harrier Jets were immediately deployed. They destroyed the enemy mortar platoon and saved him. “It was the most beautiful sight I have ever seen when those four bombs were racing through the air,” he said.

It is in this context probably that the CDS talked about the necessity to provide close air support, besides keeping the skies clear of the enemy aircraft.

Some have also claimed that just like the air power of the developed nations, our Air Force too would be able to create a situation when ground troops will be able to achieve objectives without fighting. If this had been possible, not much blood would have been shed for the capture of Tololing and Tiger Hill.

Soldiers are often misunderstood as they have not had lessons in diplomacy. We need to see the CDS’s statement in that light and move on.

CDS Gen Bipin Rawat laid claims to superiority on behalf of the Army, because he believes it is ultimately all about control of territory. This mindset needs to be disparaged
by Lt General Prakash Menon (Retd)
It would be naïve to expect that anything good would emerge from the public spat between Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat and Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria on the politically mandated creation of the Theatre Command System. There is nothing wrong in professional disagreements but to air them in public is unacceptable to the military ethos. Worse, it comes at a time when threats to national security are assuming ominous proportions.
In all probability, both Gen Rawat and ACM Bhadauria would have got the political pipe down messages and one can expect that things will settle down. India’s military image would have temporarily taken a beating. But certain good things can come out of this unbecoming episode, if the next moves by the political leadership are appropriately and speedily managed.
CDS Encumbered With Multiple Roles
First, let us be clear that change and progress required for theatre commands are practically impossible without political intervention. In essence, the CDS-IAF chief fracas showed the base instincts of tribalism, wherein commitments to group goals are deeply rooted in the emotions of individuals who make up the tribes. CDS Rawat’s statement betrayed highly questionable professional views – unless he said what he meant but did not mean what he said.
What is also of concern is that when the IAF’s image was belittled, there was no attempt to control the emotions and resolve the issue behind closed doors. It seems the surge in the baser instincts of tribalism had overwhelmed prudence. Yes, it was a natural human reaction, but surely it has to be kept private and not allowed to find public expression. India is a nuclear power and it can ill afford its top military leadership displaying such standards of professionalism or letting wisdom succumb to emotions. The political leadership, it appears, has decided that the squabble be granted innocent passage in India’s democratic waters.
It seems that Gen Rawat has been unfairly encumbered with three hats — of CDS, Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (PC-COSC) and the head of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA). The range of his responsibilities as given in the MoD press note is staggering and the time frame of three years is unrealistic.
The political leadership must take note and shift the responsibility of crystallising the structure of the future theatre command system away from the CDS. Gen Rawat should no longer be the chief architect who conceptualises the structural blueprint and gives it shape and form. Instead, he should be the builder who oversees, guides and executes the decisions on the structure that should be externally crafted and politically approved after widespread consultations by a group of experts. These are challenging tasks because they have to be undertaken in an ambience of heightened geopolitical threats, financial stringency, internecine disagreements within the armed forces and between ministries.
No operational role was visualised for the CDS, but in practice, it was unavoidable as long as he was wearing the hat of the PC-COSC. In a conflict with nuclear overtones, it is not possible for the CDS to be easily available to the political leadership, if he is also PC-COSC. A separate four-star PC-COSC should be responsible for coordination of all joint service issues as elaborated in the MoD press note. The PC-COSC should focus on the complex and lengthy process of transition to theatre commands. One of Gen Rawat’s main challenges will fundamentally involve fostering jointness based on a shared and common narrative. Right now, the dominant narrative in each of the three services is polluted by lack of trust and the ascent of animosity.
‘Superiority’ Mindset Must Be Tackled
The extant default posture has a deepened sensitivity to protect stretches of turf that are believed to be under threat of encroachment by another service. It is apparent that the CDS has, on behalf of the Army, laid claims to superiority, perhaps because he believes that ultimately it is all about control of territory and therefore the other services serve to enable the function of the Army. This mindset needs to be disparaged. As always, and especially in the information age, it is more about the control of perceptions, and who is in support of whom is a dynamic concept depending on the political, strategic and tactical context. Deterrence, which is the primary objective of military exertions, is a mind game. Flexible combinations of military instruments during force application is best carried out when the notion of ownership is replaced by a custodial and shared ethos.
There is nothing strategic that inheres in any form of military power whether it is air, sea, land, cyber or space. Whether it is strategic or tactical depends on what effects are generated when used in a particular context. No service can claim superiority over the other. The predominance or importance is determined by the context alone. It seems that the higher Indian military leadership is missing out on this truism.
The newly appointed PC-COSC has to first repair the psychological damage and nurture the story based on perceiving the military as one instrument that is more than the sum of its parts. The story must promote the idea that the military instrument is like an orchestra or a musical band that can be flexibly assembled depending on the mission at hand. The story has to be first sold at the top and percolate downwards through personal examples that are buttressed with other forms of communications. It should be ingrained in the professional military education system from the entry level.
But right now, it is the extant top level military leadership that must receive the booster dose, which the PC-COSC must initiate and monitor. When professional reasoning is oriented towards jointness, it can foster synergistic efforts. None of this is going to be easy but without the senior military leadership being reoriented first, there is no hope for the theatre command system.
Fear And Hope In Indian Military
One of the undercurrents weakening the reform is the fear of domination by the Army and also the possibility of losing some three or two-star ranks. The CDS seemed to speak for the Army and his diminution of air power as a support force has understandably touched the rawest nerve of the IAF. It would have confirmed the Navy’s suspicion too. Only another PC-COSC can repair this damage. Not only will it take time but also require persistent tending.
The fear of inequity in distribution of various appointments is soaked in individual self-interests and should not be allowed to impede decisions that ought to be based purely on professional imperatives. However, since human ambitions are natural spirits that haunt the innards of professionalism, an assurance that no service will lose any of its sanctioned ranks may assuage the fear.
The IAF chief’s professionalism was displayed when he gave an assurance that despite the differences of opinion, the efforts towards the creation of theatre commands will be sustained. There is hope and maybe this episode could be the harbinger of change in mindsets that seem to be the major stumbling block obstructing, what is, a laudable PMO-driven reform.
In a discussion document, India’s Theatre Command System: A Proposal, the role of the military leadership in the transition was described thus by this author — “The military leadership will have to more than match the political vision that has mandated the Theatre Commands. Service parochialism must give way to a combined services outlook. It will not be easy and the transition to Theatre Commands will be a challenging process and its main threat will come from within the Armed Forces.”
The threat has surfaced on the public domain. The actors in play must change their outlook or have it reoriented through political diktat. The decision is for the political leadership to take. But one way or the other, they cannot be spectators and believe that the winds of discontentment will go away. Such a belief can pose a security threat for which they will have only themselves to blame.

The Indian Army has in a ‘tit for tat’ put up wooden poles fitted with digital cameras to watch Chinese movements, said sources
The episode comes at a time military veterans have been saying the Indian government’s serial capitulations on the talks table have emboldened the Chinese to get more aggressive by the day instead of adhering to the terms of the disengagement agreements.
China has erected concrete watchtowers with CCTV cameras atop them inside India-claimed lines in Ladakh to monitor Indian troop deployment, sources in the security establishment told The Telegraph on Monday.
The Indian Army has in a “tit for tat” put up wooden poles fitted with digital cameras to watch Chinese movements, the sources added. The episode comes at a time military veterans have been saying the Indian government’s serial capitulations on the talks table have emboldened the Chinese to get more aggressive by the day instead of adhering to the terms of the disengagement agreements.
The sources said the Chinese observational posts were among various military structures, including camps, that the People’s Liberation Army was continuing to build at the remaining friction points of Depsang Plains, Hot Springs and Gogra besides deploying more soldiers and tanks.
“The watchtowers and posts erected by the Chinese overlook areas held by the Indian Army. It’s a matter of extreme concern,” a security official attached to the Union home ministry said.
He said Chinese deployment of men and machines too was continuing along the Line of Actual Control between altitudes of 14,000 and 15,000 feet.
“The Indian patrols at these friction points are outnumbered by the Chinese,” an Intelligence Bureau official said.
He said there had been an unwritten understanding over decades that the two armies would not build permanent (concrete) or semi-permanent (makeshift) structures within 10-15km of the LAC on either side. However, the Chinese watchtowers — manned by armed guards — clearly count as permanent structures, he said.
“In a tit for tat, the Indian Army too is erecting poles fitted out with digital cameras to monitor Chinese movements inside their occupied zones,” the IB official said.
Military veterans have attributed China’s aggressive strategies amid the disengagement talks to what they see as India’s unwarranted concessions.
The retired generals have in particular questioned New Delhi’s agreement to having “buffer zones” in the Galwan Valley and the Pangong Lake where there has been partial disengagement.
Under the formula, troops of both sides moved back by an equal distance, meaning the Chinese still remained within India-claimed lines while the Indian Army stepped back further. To the veterans, this amounts to “ceding further Indian territory” to the Chinese. They have also criticised India’s failure to push for the restoration of status quo ante instead of continuing to negotiate only piecemeal matters.
It’s these shows of “softness” that the veterans believe have encouraged China to go back on assurances given at previous disengagement talks.
“The disengagement process agreed upon between the two sides seems to have hit a dead end now. The Chinese are in no mood to retreat from India-claimed lines,” a former lieutenant general said.
Another veteran said: “The problem is also that the Indian government has so far been very economical with the truth on the Chinese incursions on multiple fronts. The government talks about disengagement of the Chinese but has not revealed officially how far they have entered inside Indian territory.”
On June 19 last year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had said that no one had entered Indian territory or occupied Indian posts, prompting Beijing to immediately claim ownership of all the areas it held.
Defence ministry sources said the political leadership had been informed about the ground situation.
“Recently, the military brass apprised the political leadership on the ground situation at the China frontier,” a defence ministry official said.
The Chinese army is said to be entrenched 18km inside India-claimed lines on the strategically crucial Depsang Plains. It has cut off the Indian Army’s access to five traditional patrolling points — PPs 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13 — since the border standoff began in May last year.
China had agreed to disengage from Hot Springs and Gogra in July last year but continues to hold its positions inside India-claimed lines. Eleven rounds of military talks have taken place without any breakthrough since June last year.

‘Sant Sipahi’ Brigadier Sant Singh, twice Maha Vir Chakra awardee, retired in 1973 after a glorious military career. He remained associated with the War Decorated of India Trust till he breathed his last in 2015

The Bar to MVC from President VV Giri after the 1971 war.

Lt Col Dilbag Singh Dabas (Retd)

During the 14-day lightning campaign (it actually was 15 and a half on ground on all three fronts) between India and Pakistan in December 1971, among 513 bravehearts who went beyond the call of duty and earned the gallantry decoration, 11 were Brigadier-rank officers — seven fighting on the eastern, two on the western and two on the northern front. Two earned Bar to the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), the award won the second time. Brigadier Sant Singh earned the first MVC during the 1965 India-Pakistan war. He dared again during Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ in 1971 and earned the Bar to his MVC.

Brig Sant Singh is affectionately known as ‘Sant Sipahi’, the ‘Saint Soldier’. Son of AS Gill, Sant was born on July 12, 1921. He belonged to a marginal Jat Sikh farming family in Panjgrain Kalan in the princely state of Faridkot. After Intermediate from RSD College, Faridkot, Sant was enlisted in July 1941 as a clerk in Faridkot State Forces Engineer Field Company when World War II was on.

Noticing his aptitude as a leader, Sant was recommended by his British Commanding Officer for an Officer’s Commission. After six years in the ranks, on February 16, 1947, Sant was commissioned into 1st Battalion of the 14th Punjab Regiment as Emergency Commissioned Officer. During Partition, the regiment was allotted to Pakistan and Second Lieutenant Sant Singh was transferred to 2nd Sikh Light Infantry Battalion.

During the Junagarh operation in November 1947, Second Lieutenant Sant Singh, as Intelligence Officer of the battalion, at personal risk, provided vital information about the moves of the Junagarh forces that resulted in an almost bloodless takeover, and smooth amalgamation of Junagarh into the Indian dominion.

Sant Singh, now Lieutenant Colonel, went on to command the 5th Sikh Light Infantry from 1964-68. It was during his command that in 1965, against all possible odds, the battalion captured the most formidable, all-defying and heavily defended Chuh-i-Nar feature on Balnoi Ridge in the morning hours of November 3, 1965.

Chuh-i-Nar, the most dominating feature, is located south-west of the Mendaha-Balnoi road in the Poonch sector. It was used as a border post by the Indian troops till 1956. Thereafter, it remained unoccupied. On August 10, 1965, it was discovered that the Pakistanis had not only occupied but also developed it into a strongly-defended area. An attempt was made to get the post vacated through the good offices of the UN observers as the ceasefire was in force since September 22.

The feature dominated the LoC between Bhimber Gali, Mendhar and Balnoi and its occupation by the Pakistan army would result in total isolation of Balnoi from Mendhar and Krishna Ghati. Therefore, Chuh-i-Nar had to be captured at any cost. Since this would be a major ceasefire violation, there was the risk of restarting the war. But seeing the importance of the feature, the recourse to war was considered acceptable.

Attempts by earlier two battalions of Poonch-based 93 Brigade to dislodge the enemy from Chuh-i-Nar had not succeeded. The attacks and counter-attacks, partial successes and failures commenced in early October 1965 and continued for over a month, with the casualties mounting and no end result. Finally, in the first week of November, the seemingly impossible task of capturing Chuh-i-Nar was handed down to 5th Sikh Light Infantry.

On November 2, on receiving the 10th Guru’s holy verse “Nischay Kar Apni Jeet Karoon” from Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, the Army Commander, the battalion commenced advance to the Forming Up Place (FUP) with its Commanding Officer, Lt Col Sant Singh, in the lead.

And under the dynamic leadership of their CO, famous for leading the battalion always from the front during attacks, the Panjvin (5th) did what the Sikh Light Infantry is known for: ‘fateh’ at any cost. The Indian post on the Balnoi Ridge, occupied by Pakistanis and named Chuh-i-Nar, was recaptured by 5 Sikh Light Infantry and the post (feature) named ‘OP Hill’.

For the outstanding gallantry of its officers and men, 5 Sikh Light Infantry earned two Maha Vir Chakras (including Sant Singh, the CO), one Vir Chakra and four Sena Medals.

The battle account of the conspicuous gallantry of Lt Col Sant Singh reads:

“On the night of the 2/3 November 1965, Lieutenant Colonel Sant Singh, Commanding Officer of 5th Sikh Light Infantry, was given the task of clearing an objective which, notwithstanding the ceasefire, had been encroached upon by the Pakistani forces. This was a difficult feature and strongly defended by the enemy. Despite enemy mines, machine gun fire and intense artillery shelling, Lieutenant Colonel Sant Singh pressed home the assault.

When the attacking platoon was just about 200 yards short of the objective, Lieutenant Colonel Singh received a machine-gun burst on his thigh and fell. His radio operator said, ‘Sahibji tuhada zakham tan khatarnak lagdai. Tusin aithe hi pai jao. Main hunne hi Jeetant (Adjutant) Sahab nu dass dinna. Medical wale aa ke tuhanu FUP de pichhe lai jange’. [Sir, your injury seems quite serious. You lie down here. I will inform the Adjutant. The medical team will take you behind the FUP]. And the reply by the Commanding Officer was classic. ‘Bachchu! Rehan de te nahin dasna kise nu kujh vi. Kaka, oh FUP ni, oh tan Baba Deep Singh Ji de khande nal khichi lakeer ai. Uston pichhe fateh hasil keete bina ni jayeeda… Hun je paina hai tan Chuh-i-Nar de top te hi ja ke pawanga. Tu fikar na kar.’ [Son, there’s no need to tell anyone. This is not just an FUP but a line that has been drawn by the sword of Baba Deep Singhji. One doesn’t back down from there without victory. I will rest only after reaching the top of Chuh-i-Nar now. You just don’t worry.]

Lieutenant Colonel Sant Singh removed his patka from under his pugree, tied it tightly on the wound, got up with the help of his radio operator and with manageable quick paces forward joined the assault. And after half an hour of close quarter battle, including hand-to-hand fighting, the enemy withdrew, leaving behind its dead and wounded.

Taking advantage of the captured position, and also to exploit the success, Lieutenant Colonel Sant Singh quickly organised a Company strength of his men and led an assault onto the adjacent objective which also had been encroached upon by the Pakistani forces. Despite continuing automatic fire and artillery shelling, the men dashed forward, dragged the enemy out from bunker-to-bunker and cleared the subsidiary objective as well.

Throughout, Lieutenant Colonel Sant Singh displayed conspicuous gallantry and leadership of a very high order.”

After its recapture, OP Hill has been strongly held by a Company of an Infantry battalion deployed on Mendhar-Balnoi ridge with a mountain artillery battery deployed permanently 3,500 yards south-east of it. The writer was the Battery Commander of the above gun battery from 1988 to 1991.

Six years later, during Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, Sant Singh, MVC, now a Brigadier, dared again and earned the Bar (award won the second time) to his MVC.

On the outbreak of the 1971 India-Pakistan war, Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC, commanding the newly created F-J Sector in the eastern theatre, was tasked to advance towards Mymensingh on Haluaghat-Phulpur road. With a meagre fighting force (just one infantry battalion, an Engineer platoon and an artillery battery in direct support), the force led by Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC, fought with grit and determination and captured some strongly held localities during the advance to Dhaka. After giving a bitter fight, the force led by Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC, reached just short of the outskirts of Dhaka by December 13, thereby further tightening the siege on to Dhaka.

Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC, for his inspiring leadership and personal gallantry, was awarded the Bar to the Maha Vir Chakra he earned during the 1965 war. The citation on the Bar to his Maha Vir Chakra reads:

“During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC, while commanding a sector on the eastern front, achieved spectacular results with a mixed force, having one regular battalion, advancing 38 miles almost on foot, to secure Mymensingh and Madhopur in eight days. During the advance, in spite of very stiff opposition from the enemy, he cleared heavily defended positions at several places. Throughout these actions, Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC, personally led and directed the troops, often exposing himself to enemy MMG fire and artillery shelling. His personal gallantry, leadership, skillful handling of meager resources, audacity, improvisation and maximum use of local resources were responsible for the successful and rapid advance against the much stronger enemy in well prepared defensive positions.

Throughout, Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC, displayed conspicuous gallantry and inspiring leadership in keeping with the highest traditions of the Army.”

Sant Sipahi Brigadier Sant Singh, twice Maha Vir Chakra awardee, retired from the Army in 1973 after a glorious military career spanning more than three decades. The highly decorated Brigadier remained associated with the War Decorated of India Trust till he breathed his last on December 9, 2015.

PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) keeping pressure up in Ladakh and probing all along LAC may be diversionary as it prepares to move on Arunachal
Writing to US Secretary of State Cordel Hull in 1943, Averell Harriman, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, averred that, “If the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbours, penetration of the next immediate neighbours becomes at a certain time equally logical.” The logic of expansionism delineated by Harriman becomes acute when applied to the Himalayan frontier, characterised as it is by a peculiar historical geography that compels a power sitting to the north to always seek to exude influence south in what Mao called the five fingers of Tibet, i.e., Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. Conversely, the power sitting to the south must also seek to exert influence north, and this creates a bedrock of tension, tempered only by a balance of military capability. Perceived opportunities are difficult to let go of.
For China, the power sitting to the north, an India beleaguered by waves of Covid seems like that ‘certain time’ to execute a strategy of forward movement in the five fingers. While China has already shown its hand in Ladakh and is probing all along the Himalayan range, it is the PLA’s activities along the McMahon line that should be of the greatest concern to New Delhi. Indeed, there is a likelihood that Arunachal Pradesh could be the next finger on Beijing’s list, especially if India experiences a problematic third wave.
At the moment, however, media attention in India seems more focused on PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) exercises in the Gobi Desert, given that the Chinese have essentially reneged on the ‘written agreement’ that was reached in early February to disengage in the Hot Springs-Gogra area, much less the Depsang Plains. Besides continuing to block Indian patrols from reaching traditional patrolling points (PPs) in these areas, the PLAGF also seems to be involved in major construction activity, as indicated by commercially available satellite images. New Delhi should be particularly concerned about Chinese activities in and around the PLA’s Tianwendian forward post in the Depsang Plains. An analysis of imagery of the sector reveals that the Chinese are constructing a new border lateral which, when extended, has the potential to bisect points between PP-4 & PP-5.
The PLA also continues to put pressure on the Indian side through a general expansion of their sustenance bases in Western Tibet and the Tarim Basin, as well as through heightened drone activity. Regardless of these trends, the Chinese seem to have already extended themselves as much as they wanted to in Eastern Ladakh. Their operational tempo in the region is designed to keep the Indian side preoccupied there, while the PLA probes other sections of the LAC.
Indeed, contrary to expectations that they will keep it localised, the Chinese have also been rather active near the stretches claimed by them across the watershed in Himachal Pradesh and even Uttarakhand. However, Chinese claims across the watershed in these states are relatively modest and aimed at tying down some Indian formations in static defence. Likewise, Chinese activity in the passes to the north of Sikkim is also unlikely to turn into a forward movement, since India has credible options for a riposte in this vicinity. Also, for what it is worth, the Chinese premier publicly stated in 2005 that Sikkim was “no longer a problem between India and China.”
This is in sharp contrast to the periodic Chinese reiteration of their main claim on Indian territory — Arunachal Pradesh. Having never accepted the McMahon line, China has been overtly stating its claim in a variety of forms since 2006, including the arbitrary ‘renaming’ of locations in the Indian state. Beyond cartographic aggression, the PLAGF has been sending long-range reconnaissance patrols into areas where Indian infrastructure is still rudimentary, besides apprehending Indian nationals who they claim have strayed into ‘Chinese territory.’
Most egregiously, it was revealed earlier this year that the Chinese had expanded an erstwhile border post into a 101-home ‘village’ on the banks of the Tsari Chu, some 4.5 km south of the watershed in Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh. China, perhaps, would like to argue that this Tsari Chu development and the creation of other ‘model’ border villages is in keeping with its 2021 White Paper on Tibet, which calls for improving the conditions of border populations. However, it doesn’t take a lot of imagination to see that such villages could well be thinly disguised staging grounds.
As such, the PLAGF certainly seems to be preparing for an escalation. While the summer exercises in Xinjiang and Western Tibet have been much discussed, what has been less talked about is a major exercise in Shannan Prefecture opposite Arunachal Pradesh that involved not only units from the Tibet Military District, but accretion forces from the 76th Group Army as well. This exercise, which carried on till late June, saw several new pieces of hardware, such as the 122-mm PCL-171 mounted gun system, being tested.
It also coincided with a PLA Joint Logistics Support Force exercise which was aimed at augmenting the resources of Nyngchi, the main military hub in Shannan. Nyngchi today hosts a vastly expanded airbase, protected by a PLAAF S-400 surface-to-air missile unit, and was recently connected with a high-speed rail link to Lhasa. Simply put, the augmentation of Nyngchi means that the PLA is now much better placed in the region for long standoffs than it was at the time of the Sumdorong Chu incident in 1986-87.
Such a standoff could well ensue during a third Covid wave in India, which is expected to peak in October, which incidentally also marks the beginning of ‘campaign season’ along the McMahon line. The PLA would be especially tempted if it leads to a diversion of Indian military resources, quarantines and a fall in the output of defence industries as was witnessed during the second wave.
Indeed, the Indian Army vacating a strategic peak in the Kailash Range that had been kept as surety to negotiate further disengagement in Eastern Ladakh in the middle of the second wave would do nothing to discourage the Chinese. Beijing would also think that a Covid wave is when cross-domain threats such as cyberwarfare or pharmaceutical supply chain disruptions would be effective in deterring Indian counteractions to an encroachment.
China may be planning to present India with a moth-eaten Arunachal Pradesh, and it is up to India to stand firm, no matter how trying the circumstances. To begin with, New Delhi must authorise more substantive human intelligence operations in places of interest along the Eastern Himalayas.

Currently, the IAF has around 25 Rafale jets and the remaining ordered aircraft are expected to be delivered by 2022

File photo of a Rafale aircraft.

New Delhi, July 13

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is likely to operationalise its second squadron of the Rafale combat aircraft by the end of July and it will be based in Hasimara air base in West Bengal, officials said on Tuesday.

The first squadron of the Rafale jets is stationed at Ambala Air Force station in Haryana. The first batch of five Rafale jets arrived in India on July 29, 2020, nearly four years after India signed an inter-governmental agreement with France to procure 36 of the aircraft at a cost of around Rs 59,000 crore.

Currently, the IAF has around 25 Rafale jets and the remaining ordered aircraft are expected to be delivered by 2022.

The first squadron will look after Pakistan border on western frontier and the northern frontier. The second squadron will look after the eastern frontier of India, the officials mentioned.

The formal induction ceremony of the Rafale fleet had taken place at Ambala on September 10 last year. Later on, other batches of the fighter jet also arrived in India.

The IAF officials said the second Rafale squadron would be operationalised at the next main operating base at Hasimara by July-end.

A squadron comprises around 18 aircraft.

The Rafale jets are India’s first major acquisition of fighter planes in 23 years after the Sukhoi jets were imported from Russia.

The Rafale jets are capable of carrying a range of potent weapons. European missile maker MBDA’s Meteor beyond visual range air-to-air missile, Scalp cruise missile and MICA weapons system will be the mainstay of the weapons package of the Rafale jets.

The IAF is also procuring a new generation medium-range modular air-to-ground weapon system Hammer to integrate with the Rafale jets.

Hammer (Highly Agile Modular Munition Extended Range) is a precision-guided missile developed by French defence major Safran.

The missile was originally designed and manufactured for the French Air Force and Navy.

Meteor is the next generation of BVR air-to-air missile designed to revolutionise air-to-air combat. The weapon has been developed by MBDA to combat common threats facing the UK, Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Sweden. PTI

The sniffer dog has in the past too saved a whole team of CoBRA commandos from a similar bomb attack by sniffing out explosives

Photo for representation.

Ranchi, July 13

Drone, a CRPF sniffer dog, died on Tuesday in an improvised explosive blast triggered by Maoists at Marwa forests in Jharkhand’s Gumla district while his handler Vishwajeet Kumbkar was injured, a top police official said.

Drone, however, did not die in vain, as the blast he triggered while searching for explosives saved the lives of the crack CoBRA commandos with whom he was serving.

The sniffer dog has in the past too saved a whole team of CoBRA commandos of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) from a similar bomb attack by sniffing out explosives, Jharkhand police spokesperson and Inspector General of Police, Operations AV Homkar said the injured jawan, Vishwajeet Kumbkar, was airlifted from the spot and admitted to Ranchi’s Medica hospital.https://18f2e09b2c78bbe25cff9e94b19a0a07.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html

“In an unfortunate incident, a sniffer dog belonging to 203 CoBRA, CRPF was martyred in an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) blast triggered by Maoists during an operation in Gumla district,” a statement from the police headquarters said.

Aged 6 years and 9 months, Drone, a male Belgian Shepherd dog of the Malinois variety, was serving with 203 CoBRA since December 27, 2015, the statement said.

“He had participated in 83 operations in almost all parts of Jharkhand state. One of his great achievements was on April 7, 2016 in Parasnath area where he found four containers of 40 kgs explosive each. That also contained detonators, cortex, mobile phone, walkie talky, GPS which helped in avoiding any mishap and saved valuable lives,” it said.

He was part of an operation in Gumla, where with his bravery and sacrifice he saved a whole team of CoBRA commandos from a powerful IED blast around 0730 am but was himself martyred in the process, the CRPF statement said.

“His selfless sacrifice will never be forgotten and will always be remembered as an act of valour. Shaheed Drone was cremated with a guard of honour and as per laid down procedure of the force,” the police said.

Earlier the headquarters had said that extremists had laid vast traps of IEDs in the entire area and a few villagers had died while grazing cattle in similar IED blasts laid by extremists in the forests.

In May this year, security forces had neutralised an extremist in an encounter in the same forest and recovered a stolen police pistol, .303 rifle, 63 live cartridges and 24 can-bombs. PTI

Receives anti-submarine warfare aircraft P-8I from Boeing

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, July 13

The Indian Navy has received the 10th anti-submarine warfare aircraft P-8I from US-based aerospace company Boeing, according to a statement issued on Tuesday.

India had ordered 12 such planes and is now the largest operator of the fleet besides the US. The Indian Navy was the first international customer for the P-8 and today operates the largest non-US fleet, the Boeing said in statement.

The patrol aircraft is an integral part of the Indian Navy’s fleet and has surpassed 30,000 flight hours since it was inducted in 2013.

Initially, India ordered eight planes and four additional aircraft were ordered by the Ministry of Defence in 2016.

“This is the second aircraft to be delivered under the option contract for four additional aircraft,” the statement said.

“In addition to unmatched maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, the P-8I has been deployed to assist during disaster relief and humanitarian missions,” it added.