Monthly Archives: August 2018

Riedel has reminded the US that it had made ‘many mistakes’ in Afghanistan by not paying attention after the Soviets left and allowing it to descend into a ‘failed’ state, permitting the Taliban and al-Qaeda to enter that vacuum. Riedel blamed former President George W Bush for taking his ‘eye off the ball’ in Afghanistan after the 2001 US invasion and letting Osama bin Laden escape into Pakistan.

Feared: Power vacuum in Afghanistan after US troop withdrawal will spawn terror. Reuters

Vappala Balachandran

Author and Columnist

On July 17, Bruce Riedel, formerly of the CIA and now at Brookings, warned that the power vacuum in Afghanistan after the US troop withdrawal will adversely affect India by spawning terrorism. Similarly, The New York Times (July 15) reported Chinese fears of insecurity in the region after the killing of nine Chinese workers in a ‘Belt & Road’ hydroelectric project in Dasu, Pakistan’s Northwest, due to a suspected explosion.

Riedel had issued a similar warning on April 27, 2021, by reminding President Joe Biden of what President Barack Obama had said in his memoir A Promised Land: “The Riedel report made one thing clear: Unless Pakistan stopped sheltering the Taliban, our efforts at long-term stability in Afghanistan were bound to fail.”

What was this Riedel report? In February 2009, Obama chose Riedel to chair a White House Review to synthesise suggestions from heavyweights like Richard Holbrooke, special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Gen David H Petraeus, Central Command Chief, and Admiral Michael G Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the next NATO summit.

In a joint press conference at the White House on March 27, 2009, Riedel and Holbrooke outlined Obama’s strategy for NATO presence in Afghanistan: “To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda, and to ensure that their safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot threaten the United States anymore.”

They added that the US exit strategy would depend on that.

Biden’s White House address on April 14, 2021, also claimed that they had achieved the “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda” strategy. However, Riedel did not agree. He said that Joe Biden, who inherited “a terrible deal from Trump’s feckless negotiators” had “failed to engage with Prime Minister Imran Khan”, which was a mistake. This is because Pakistani generals “will be more hubristic and dangerous than ever”, as Pakistan is the winner “again” in Afghanistan, by outlasting two superpowers.

Riedel reminded America that Washington DC had made ‘many mistakes’ in Afghanistan by not paying any attention after the Soviets left, allowing it to descend into a ‘failed’ state, permitting the Taliban and al-Qaeda to enter that vacuum. Riedel blamed former President George W Bush for taking his “eye off the ball” in Afghanistan after the 2001 US invasion and letting Osama bin Laden escape into Pakistan.

In my opinion, a bigger mistake was made in 1992. This was after the failed coup d’état in the Soviet Union in August 1991 and eventual disintegration. In September that year, three Baltic states seceded and declared their independence. A limited ‘Belovezha’ accord signed on December 8, 1991, was modified by the December 21 Alma Ata Protocol in Kazakhstan, creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Western powers, including the United States, recognised these independent countries.

On March 9, 1992, President Mohammad Najibullah made a direct appeal to the United States through The New York Times to help him in maintaining stability in Afghanistan. This was after President Boris Yeltsin stopped all direct assistance to Afghanistan, which grounded the Afghan air force and encouraged defections, which affected the Afghan army too.

Senior journalist Edward A Gargan reproduced Najibullah’s text of appeal to the US in The New York Times. Najibullah’s tone was premonitory: “If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will continue for many more years… Afghanistan will turn into a centre of world smuggling for narcotic drugs. Afghanistan will be turned into a centre for terrorism.” However, none in Washington DC listened.

Najibullah also echoed the then Secretary of State James Baker’s statement that Islamic fundamentalism had posed a significant threat to regional stability: “You may think that the Central Asian republics are significant for the United States of America… That’s right. But I must say that the strategic and political significance of Afghanistan is much more than these republics. If Afghanistan is lost and is turned into a center of fundamentalism, you will lose the Central Asian republics.”

During this period, even King Zahir Shah’s US-based representatives had appealed to the State Department and the CIA that the retention of Najibullah in Afghanistan was very necessary as he was the only Afghan leader who would be able to hold the country together, obstruct the jihadis from coming into power and prevent Afghanistan’s splintering. They even conveyed that Najibullah should be accepted by the US, just as it had recognised the CIS leaders, who were mostly authoritarian.

Unfortunately, the rivalry between the State Department and the CIA prevented this from happening.

Steve Coll, in his book The Ghost Wars, vividly records the clashes between the State Department and the CIA over Najibullah. Initially, the State Department’s special envoy to Afghanistan Edmund McWilliams had differed with CIA’s Station Chief Milton Bearden over Najibullah’s fate. The CIA wanted him to go, as desired by Pakistan’s ISI. Milton Bearden started resenting “interference” by the State Department over their turf.

In Washington DC, this rift between the CIA and the State Department was carried higher by the then CIA Deputy Director Thomas Twetten and Peter Tomsen, State Department’s new special envoy to the Afghan Resistance. Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, told The New York Times (January 3, 1991) that Secretary of State Jim Baker had wanted to “coax the rebels and the Najibullah regime into democratic elections”, but that “they (meaning CIA) are just bucking policy.”

However, during that period, Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson, member, US House of Representatives’ Appropriations Sub-Committee for Defence, was exercising disproportionate influence over Afghan operations. It resulted in other voices being ignored.

Wilson regretted this later. An article in The World, a public radio and podcast programme, on February 11, 2010, said that Wilson, to the end of his life, regretted that “more wasn’t done to stabilise the country” and “the moderate, pro-Royalist factions in the resistance were ruthlessly suppressed by more extreme Islamic militants on our side.”

These ‘regrets’ of ‘mistakes’ are not going to help the hapless Afghans now who continue to be the victims of external interference.

Lieutenant General DP Pandey hands over Swarnim Vijay Mashaal to war veterans and NCC cadets after paying tribute to the 1971 martyrs, at 15 Corps headquarters, Badami Bagh, Srinagar. PTI

Srinagar, July 16

The Army on Friday said it was encouraging to see an overwhelming response from people in Kashmir to the ‘Swarnim Vijay Mashaal’ — the victory flame to celebrate India’s victory over Pakistan in the 1971 war — as the force paid floral tributes to soldiers who laid down their lives for the country.

Army officers and war veterans, led by General officer Commanding (GoC), 15 Corps, Lieutenant General DP Pandey, paid their tributes in front of the victory flame which was kept at the war memorial at the headquarters of the 15 Corps at Badamibagh Cantonment here.

The victory flame was lit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on December 16 last year. It reached Badami Bagh Cantonment, the headquarters of the Army’s 15 Corps, on July 12.

Lieutenant General DP Pandey noted it was encouraging to see an overwhelming response from the people in Kashmir to the victory flame as it was carried around several places in the Valley, including in the Srinagar city.

“As a mark of solidarity, roadside events were organised by citizens and local NGOs at Lalded hospital, Iqbal Park, Pratap Park, Jogger’s Park and Rajbagh to pay homage to the victory flame,” he added.— PTI

Gratitude to all

People from all walks of life thronged in thousands to pay their respect to this honourable flame. I indeed want to convey my gratitude to all. DP Pandey, Lieutenant General

The Sarang helicopter display team of the Indian Air Force performed for the first time at the ‘MAKS’ international air show held at Zhukovsky International Airport, Russia.

Tribune News Service

Zhukovsky, July 20

The Sarang helicopter display team of the Indian Air Force performed for the first time at the ‘MAKS’ international air show held at Zhukovsky International Airport, Russia.

The air show is a biennial fixture and this year’s edition started on Tuesday. This is the first occasion when Sarang Team performed its four-helicopter aerobatics display in Russia with ‘Made in India’ ‘Dhruv’.

Jagjeet Singh Grewal

New Delhi, July 20

When the UK’s biggest warship, aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, arrives in India for an exercise, on board will be Indian-origin Jagjeet Singh Grewal. The warship and its accompanying strike group are to meet the Indian Navy for a series of maritime exercises this week. A leading engineering technician with the Royal Navy, Grewal works in the Marine Engineering Department. — TNS

Rs 43,000-cr project aims at indigenous production of advanced vessels

Within six weeks of having okayed a plan to make six next-generation stealth conventional submarines, the Ministry of Defence on Tuesday formally invited bids for the Rs 43,000 crore ($5.8 billion) project. – File photo

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, July 20

Within six weeks of having okayed a plan to make six next-generation stealth conventional submarines, the Ministry of Defence on Tuesday formally invited bids for the Rs 43,000 crore ($5.8 billion) project.

The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), the apex decision-making body of the MoD headed by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, had on June 4 okayed to issue a Request for Proposal (RFF). Today, the RFP was issued to selected Indian and global companies.

The RFP was issued to shortlisted strategic partners (SPs) or Indian companies — Mazagaon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) and Larsen & Tubro (L&T), the MoD said. The MDL is largely owned by the MoD while L&T is a private entity.

The two Indian companies will collaborate with any of the shortlisted foreign submarine makers — Naval Group, France; TKMS, Germany; JSC ROE, Russia; Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Co Ltd, South Korea; and Navantia of Spain.

A foreign manufacturer will tie-up with an Indian partner to make these submarines under what is termed as strategic partnership (SP) model. This is the first project on which this new ‘SP model” policy is being tried.

The project envisages indigenous construction of six conventional submarines.

Indian Navy has asked for the vessels to have a fuel-cell based Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology, which allows a vessel to dive for 12-15 days, much more than the 4-5 days of endurance of existing subs.

India at present has 17 submarines, including one nuclear powered INS Chakra on a 10-year lease ending March 2022. Meanwhile the US Department of Defence report ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020’ talks about a growing threat from China.

Officials in the ministry said the plan was yet to be made “fully operational” and, hence, the MHA recently sent a communication to these forces to update it about the development of software managing transfers and postings of the personnel.

Tribune News Service

New Delhi, July 20

The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has asked the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), including the CRPF, BSF, ITBP and SSB, to apprise it of the progress on creating an in-house software to implement Home Minister Amit Shah’s proposal to ensure troops spend at least 100 days a year with their families.

The idea was first mooted by the Home Minister in 2019 with an aim to provide rest, recuperation and quality family time to the forces’ personnel deployed in some of the harshest locations and difficult climatic conditions across the country. The purpose of such a move was to reduce stress and enhance the happiness quotient of the troopers, which will effectively reduce the cases of suicides and fratricidal killings.

Officials in the ministry said the plan was yet to be made “fully operational” and, hence, the MHA recently sent a communication to these forces to update it about the development of software managing transfers and postings of the personnel.

They said as per the plan, the software was going to be the precursor to “at least 100 days with the family per year” proposal. A considerable time has elapsed since the Home Minister gave the direction and the proposal is yet to see the light of day.

“It is envisaged that the digitisation of posting and transfer processes for soft, hard and very hard locations will eliminate personal bias and allow a free-and-fair system leading to easy rotation of the troops,” a senior MHA official said.

The over 10-lakh personnel strong paramilitary or the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) include the CRPF, BSF, ITBP, CISF and SSB apart from the Assam Rifles which draws its officer strength from the Army. Officials in the MHA said while the CISF, ITBP and the SSB have developed their respective software, the CRPF, BSF and the Assam Rifles are still in the process.

The tournament is being organised by the Leh-based 14 Corps.

Ajay Banerjee
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, July 19

The Army has chosen a unique location to organise the first-ever Siachen Cricket League to mark the 50 years of victory over Pakistan in the 1971 war. The tournament will be held at Nubra Valley, the base of Siachen glacier along the Line of Control (LoC).

50 years of war

• To mark 50 years of victory over Pakistan, the Army is organising Siachen Cricket League
• It will be played between 8 teams of local youth at Nubra Valley at the base of Siachen glacier
• The Battle of Turtuk was fought here in 1971 when the Army captured 800 sq km area from Pakistan
• The Northern Command is also commemorating 22 years of the Kargil conflict

The Battle of Turtuk was fought at this valley in 1971 when the Indian Army captured 800 sq km of Pakistan-occupied area in Gilgit-Baltistan and Turtuk, Dhothang, Tyakshi and Chalunkha villages, which is now part of India. The tournament is being organised by the Leh-based 14 Corps. Eight teams comprising youth from Nubra Valley are participating, said Col Emron Musavi, spokesperson, Ministry of Defence.https://5b61d4f9035cfb783507e4c133c74618.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html

Major Chewang Rinchen of the Ladakh Scouts had captured the territory without any artillery support and in below-freezing temperatures in December. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. Major Rinchen and his troops had captured this vital territory as the Shyok river enters Gilgit-Baltistan from this valley.

The Northern Command is also commemorating 22 years of the Kargil conflict. A motorcycle expedition comprising 15 riders was flagged off by Lieutenant General PGK Menon, General Officer Commanding of the 14 Corps, from Leh on Monday. The expedition will be crossing the formidable Chang La and Khardung La passes at altitude of over 18,000 ft covering a total distance of 1,000 km from Leh to Daulat Beg Oldie (along the LAC with China) before culminating at Drass. The expedition will go past the Galwan flashpoint.

Supervisors gave hints via body language

The gang, which helped candidates cheat during the online examination for the post of airman in the IAF, had fixed special ‘codes’ to provide help to the aspirants. Photo for representation only

Sonepat, July 19

The gang, which helped candidates cheat during the online examination for the post of airman in the IAF, had fixed special ‘codes’ to provide help to the aspirants. The gang was busted on Saturday.

The gang members struck deals with officials at computer labs at 50 per cent commission per candidate of the total money they took from each of the candidates.

Inspector Anil Chhiller, in charge, CIA-3, said the accused had fixed some codes based on the supervisor’s body language to tell the answers to their paid candidates in the computer lab.

Before sending the aspirants to the lab for taking the exam, they trained them about the codes, he added.

“If a supervisor puts his single hand into his pocket, it means ‘A’ is the answer of the question. If he puts both hands in his pockets, it means that option ‘B’ is the correct answer. If he ties his hands at the back, ‘C’ is the answer. If he ties his hands at the chest, then ‘D’ is the answer. If he claps after rubbing both hands, it means go to the next question,” Chhiller said. —T

The MoD’s obsession with securing an ever higher percentage of indigenous content for its locally manufactured equipment is counterproductive, predicated as it is to the expectation that this would render it cheaper, thereby effecting savings. But no independent studies are there to corroborate this assumption.

Halting affair: Delay in modernisation hampers operational efficiency of the defence forces, which can compromise security. Reuters

Amit Cowshish and Rahul Bedi

Ex-Financial Adviser (Acquisition), MoD and Senior journalist

The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) interminable deadlines in concluding procurements of urgently-needed materiel is not at all surprising in a country that prides itself on timelessness and where the word for today and tomorrow — kal — is paradoxically the same.

The equally enigmatic timelines of parson and tarson — the day after or the third day or thereabouts — remain similarly nebulous when it concerns the MoD’s snail pace in concluding pressing defence equipment buys. This, in turn, adversely impinges on the military’s operational efficiency and its long-postponed modernisation.

Instead of swiftly vindicating its acquisition responsibilities within its own stated deadlines, the hidebound MoD expends inordinate effort in publicly iterating its revised procurement measures that, too, have sadly failed to deliver. Conversely, the services, too, continually stress their competence in formulating realistic qualitative requirements for assorted materiel they are seeking and in conducting timely trials for it.

But somehow, there is little that is tangibly achieved. It forced the MoD to abruptly execute Rs 20,000 crore worth of ‘emergency procurements’ last year when the Chinese military challenge erupted unexpectedly in Ladakh.

The list of projected military equipment under MoD negotiations is immense, but column space forecloses the option of tabulating even a fraction of these.

However, four long-pending procurements, which the MoD has frequently dubbed as ‘low-hanging fruit’, highlight the broader malaise of its Byzantine acquisition procedures, bureaucratic procrastination, financial constraints and allegations of wrongdoing in awarding contracts.

These include the Russian Kamov-226T ‘Hoodlum’ light utility helicopters (LUH) for the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF), Kalashnikov Ak-203 assault rifles for all three services and heavyweight torpedoes (HWT) for the Indian Navy’s (IN) six licence-built Kalvari (Scorpene)-class diesel electric attack (SSK) submarines.

Negotiations for all these four have been going on for years, bedevilled by issues of cost and transfer of technology for local manufacture. These have recently been further complicated by the nebulous goal of securing atmanirbharta or self-reliance in defence equipment needs via a scheme that is still a work in progress.

Both the Ka-226Ts and Ak-203s were badly needed to fill operational voids, presently being managed through emergency imports or via creative jugaad or innovation, at a time when the military is facing enduring challenges on its disputed northern frontier. The Kamovs are also intended to replace the Army’s and IAF’s obsolete and accident-prone licence-built legacy, Chetak and Cheetah helicopters, dating back to the sixties.

The projected Ka-226T deal was initiated in 2014, following which the India-Russia Helicopters (IRHL) joint venture (JV) was constituted in which Russia’s Rostec Corporation had a 49.5 per cent stake and the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) the remaining 51.5 per cent. The JV was projected to deliver 200 Ka-226Ts, of which 60 were to be directly imported, 40 locally assembled and another 100 built by the IRHL.

But over the past seven years, differences have emerged that threaten to imminently derail the Ka-226T programme. These include its overall cost and the quantum of technology Russia was willing to transfer to the IRHL. Besides, the per unit cost of 140 indigenously produced rotorcraft would be nearly double that of 60 similar platforms that are to be procured in flyaway condition. The price of each indigenously produced twin-engine Ka-226T via a technology transfer is estimated at around $11 million apiece, compared to around $6 million for one manufactured in Russia.

The same confusion prevails over the Ak-203 7.62×39-mm assault rifles project. In March 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had inaugurated an ordnance factory facility at Korwa, near Amethi, to licence-build some 750,000 Russian Ak-203 assault rifles with collapsible stocks. The JV to implement the project followed an inter-governmental agreement between Moscow and New Delhi, in which the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) had a 50.5 per cent stake in the IRPL, the Kalashnikov group 42 per cent and Russia’s state-owned arms export agency Rosonboron export, the remaining 7.5 per cent.

The intent was for the IRPL to import some 100,000 Ak-203s for around Rs 81,000 apiece followed by the licensed production of the remaining 6,50,000-odd units. But again, price differences emerged. The Russians were reportedly demanding a $200 royalty per Ak-203 rifle produced by the JV, making it an astronomical licence fee of $130 million for 6,50,000 units, in addition to the cost of erecting the plant, the bulk of which would be borne by the OFB.

Furthermore, the OFB is believed to have cost each licence-built Ak-203 rifle initially at around Rs 86,000, amortised over time to average around Rs 80,000 per unit. Embarrassingly, the import of a repeat import order for 72,400 assault rifles from the US-based Sig Sauer in early 2019 was considerably cheaper. Hence, the Ak-203 rifle contract remains in limbo, compelling the bulk of Army personnel to field inefficient indigenously designed Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) rifles. Frontline units deployed on counter-insurgency operations were dependent on imported rifles.

The HWT requirement was even more operationally critical as the Navy has already commissioned three Kalvari-class submarines without the torpedoes, leaving the SSKs toothless. In 2016, the MoD had initiated moves to acquire alternates torpedoes, following the termination of the $300-million tender for 98 Black Shark torpedoes from Italy’s Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS), but no progress had been made.

In conclusion, the MoD’s obsession with securing an ever higher percentage of indigenous content for its locally manufactured equipment is counterproductive, predicated as it is to the expectation that this would render it cheaper, thereby effecting savings. But no independent studies are available to corroborate this assumption. The three measures needed to achieve better results — composite indigenisation policy focused on major equipment and platforms, an overarching organisation to coordinate these efforts and an adequate funding mechanism — are missing.

Besides, the MoD continues to function more like an industry-development agency, rather than fulfilling its primary responsibility of developing India’s military capability speedily within the available financial resources. This obligation entails undertaking difficult and opportune decisions to resolve hold-ups, which, somehow, the MoD seems unable or unwilling to accomplish. 

Central Asian countries are standing by the government

Together: It’s vital for everyone to keep their nerve and take on the challenge. Reuters

Manoj Joshi

Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation

The US walked away from Afghanistan in the dead of the night. That was an understandable manoeuvre to prevent any Taliban grandstanding attack on them. Instead of the dramatic photos of the evacuation of the Saigon embassy, all we have as a visual is a frame of the detritus of the American civilisation left behind in Bagram, their biggest base.

The developments in Afghanistan pose an agonising challenge for India. Since 2001, it has operated in the country, mainly in executing development programmes under the US/NATO security umbrella. Now the latter have walked away, and we along with many others are scrambling for a strategy.

India would be advised to measure its steps carefully. Minus security, it cannot, obviously, operate the way it did for so long in Afghanistan. India hardly has the capacity to take up the US burden. Indeed, there could be a good argument for simply walking away from the whole mess. It would be a cold-hearted decision, but the situation there is not of our making, and we have been tertiary players anyway.

For more than a decade after defeating the Taliban, the US discouraged any Indian military involvement in Afghanistan, deferring to the primacy of Pakistan in its calculations. By the time the US got around to accepting the need for Indian military assistance, the situation had deteriorated significantly.

The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) was constituted in the early 2000s and in the first decade, the US and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was careful in limiting its size and capabilities so as not to offend Pakistan. Unlike regular militaries, they were deliberately kept deficient in artillery and air power. They were viewed as a support element whose primary task was counter-insurgency.

Since 2012, when President Obama spent just six hours on a visit to Kabul, it has been clear that the US would leave Afghanistan. Even though it signed a strategic partnership agreement with Kabul at the time, it did not quite spell out what that meant in terms of financial and military commitments.

In 2013, President Karzai turned to India to provide artillery and military transport aircraft, but New Delhi, too, balked, not wishing to annoy Pakistan. As per a strategic partnership agreement signed in 2011, India had promised to assist in the training, equipping and capacity building of the ANSF, but hesitated in supplying the equipment. In 2015, India did begin a programme that led to the Afghan Air Force getting eight Mi-35 attack helicopters.

In the past decade, however, the US and the ISAF put in a systematic effort to build up the ANSF. But their goal was to train a force with counter-insurgency capability, and not the capacity to militarily disrupt or block the Taliban supply chain leading to Pakistan.

Since 2014, the US began providing some artillery, helicopters and armoured vehicles, but the ANSF’s biggest weakness is in the air force. The US has limited their close air support capacity to some 20 A-29 Super Tucanos and 10 AC-208 Cessna. These are light fighters and can be lethal for the Taliban, without worrying Pakistan. However, there are simply not enough of them. The bigger problem the ANSF faces is in maintaining this equipment.

There is little point in crying over spilt milk. The US and ISAF could have done better, and so could India. All is not lost. If the ANSF is crumbling in parts, the Taliban, too, are not the kind of force that fought in the 1990s. The surge of attacks we are seeing are essentially psychological warfare, aimed at paralysing the ANSF and the government in Kabul. It is important for everyone to keep their nerve and take on the challenge.

It would be foolhardy to underestimate the Taliban. But the ANSF are numerically superior to the Taliban, and perhaps through trial and error, they will find their own set of strategy and tactics and let go of those taught to them by the Americans and the NATO. What they need is unambiguous support.

As of now, the US has promised to provide $3 billion to support the ANSF, which is about 75 per cent of its requirement. The Europeans, too, need to spell out their commitment. Countries like India can play an important supporting role in assisting the Afghans in ensuring the serviceability of their equipment and training their personnel.

Geopolitically, too, things are not bleak. All the Central Asian countries are standing by the Afghan government. The Chinese, too, have cautiously expressed their support for Kabul. Turkey has said it is willing to have its forces defend the Kabul airport.

Perhaps the most important player here can be Iran which shares a large border with Afghanistan, and through whose Chabahar port, India can access the country. The recent visit of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to Tehran is not without significance here.

A Taliban Afghanistan is not a threat to Kashmir. Afghan jihadis have been there earlier and failed. India needs a strong, stable and independent Afghanistan to prevent Islamabad from being tempted to use the country as its ‘strategic depth’ area.

Contrary to the popular adage, history does not usually repeat itself. There is no certainty that the Taliban will prevail in Afghanistan. If the US and NATO countries step up with financial assistance, which they can easily provide, effective regional diplomacy and Afghan determination can lead to another, more positive outcome for the unfortunate country.