Monthly Archives: August 2018

The furore over the latest arms procurement scandal in India — this time over the Rafale deal should have led to calls for greater indigenisation of the military industrial complex in the country
The furore over the latest arms procurement scandal in India — this time over the Rafale deal should have led to calls for greater indigenisation of the military industrial complex in the country. Unfortunately, we don’t prefer it. All that we prefer is politicking around the same. Why is there always a corruption cloud surrounding our deals with foreign countries? We should also remember that the problem is not foreign suppliers alone, but a defence marketplace where domestic industry produces low-quality weapons at great cost.
Excluding foreign sellers only reduces the number of players and externalises the problem; it does not stop corruption. As a rising power, India is better off buying technology rather than stealing it. It is better off inviting the world to participate in its rise than keeping the world outside and suspicious. There is a tremendous transparency in the country’s development in this aspect. India does not make the world suspicious at all. India also does not mind sacrificing its secrecy. What is required is reforming our procurement system rather than winnowing down the market.
Whenever India buys weapons from foreign suppliers it not only develops military capacity but also builds relationships with other key countries that facilitate its rise. In spite of this, it always throws up a question as to whether it knows that economic efficiency in the market and pricing does not hold good when we are talking about armaments. Weapons in the same category made by different manufacturers are not readily comparable, especially at the higher rungs of the technology ladder. There are too few sellers and even fewer buyers to make a truly competitive market.
Further, the value of a particular weapon-system in the context of a national security strategy is hard to calculate. As defence experts say, figuring out whether missiles or attack aircraft have greater utility is not that easy. India’s defence market faces these challenges and more. Apart from adopting their political stands, our leaders seem to be disconnected from national objectives when they talk of armed forces. We expect our services to define their threat perceptions and prepare for their wars.
To top it we have our service rivalries. Only during crisis time they seem to unite. The problem is exacerbated by the lack of military expertise in the political and bureaucratic class. Strangely our country has a scientific advisor to the Defence Ministry who is also a head of the military labs which means he is supposed to evaluate his own work. Moreover, these dysfunctions persist behind the trope of secrecy.
Closed-off organisations generally fail to innovate; little wonder that only three per cent of DRDO scientists and engineers have PhDs. Opening up the military research and weapons procurement process to public view would reduce the potential for corruption, and it would not be worse than the present glacial acquisition process. Indian defence badly needs reform, but the recommendations of several high-powered committees — including those headed by Arun Singh, Naresh Chandra and the irreplaceable K. Subrahmanyam (Kargil review) — remain ignored by several governments. Talking of corruption alone will not help. The sooner our Netas understand it, the better.

Wrong to claim that the IAF is a ‘mere supporting’ arm to the armed forces

Counterview: The IAF has categorically made it clear that it has very different views from those expressed by General Rawat (right). PTI

Manoj Joshi

There is considerable alarm in India’s strategic community as to whether the moves towards restructuring the armed forces to create theatre commands have been sufficiently thought through. A great deal of it arises from concerns that the man chosen to lead the task in 2017, Chief of Defence Staff Gen Bipin Rawat, has never really had the intellectual heft to handle it. He proved this spectacularly last week in declaring at a seminar that the Indian Air Force was merely ‘a supporting arm to the armed forces, just as artillery support or the engineer support the combatant arms in the Army.’

In one sentence, he negated the advances in warfighting that have taken place since World War II, and raised huge question marks about the intellectual underpinnings of the process he and his team are planning to put the Indian military through.

It doesn’t take a genius to know that the next conventional war will, in all likelihood, be initiated by cyber attacks, followed by air strikes on the land and sea. To be successful, the Army, Navy and the Air Force will have to use the Indian variants of the American AirLand and AirSea battle doctrines. There will be no room for single service ego trips here; ignore the compulsions of fighting on an integrated war plan, and you lose the war.

The purpose of creating a theatre command is the need for a structure that can fight an integrated battle. This is not about ordering a platoon on parade to make a right or a left turn. It is about taking a million-and-a-half-strong, somewhat archaic, war machine and putting it through new paces. The danger is that bits and pieces of that machine may fall off, be forgotten, or be incapable of meeting the new demands.

The IAF has categorically made it clear that it has very different views from those expressed by General Rawat. These were put forward at the same seminar by Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria. In such circumstances, it would be foolhardy for the military to undertake the leaps being envisaged.

Decisions taken without careful study could unbalance the armed forces which, in India’s case, are half-mobilised all the time. For this reason, the Naresh Chandra Task Force of 2011-2012, recommended that a CDS-like figure be appointed immediately, but the process of creating theatre commands be carefully fleshed out through experimentation based on paper studies and joint exercises to debug issues relating to command and control and joint logistics.

There are other reasons for caution as well. In 2001, India created the Andaman & Nicobar joint services command, hoping that its experience will show the path towards more geographic joint commands. Few will deny that the experiment has been a failure.

India has a long history of dysfunctional jointness of its military. Even though combined arms operations were a legacy of World War II, the Indian military never quite took to them. One of the biggest fiascoes of the 1965 war was when the IAF was not even informed that the Army was launching an attack towards Lahore. The Army’s designation of the 1999 Kargil operation as ‘Op Vijay’ and the IAF’s nomenclature as ‘Op Safed Sagar’ in 1999 tells their own story.

It is easy enough, and General Rawat intends to show us, to issue the orders and create the theatre commands. But it will be quite another level of challenge to get these to work as intended. The process of taking forces that have been used to fighting their individual battle and getting them to work with others is not easy. It requires not just paper orders, but large-scale war gaming and simulation, training and exercises on the ground at various levels of complexity. Only when a certain structure becomes viable should it be incorporated into the war plans. The issue is not theatre commands but their shape and the sequential timeline of their creation.

The structure of a theatre command also requires a foundation of jointness in a range of other areas. For example, the need for seamless communications between fast moving combat aircraft, slower armoured and ground force units. It may be a better idea to first put in place a series of functional commands — a joint logistics command, aerospace command, a cyber warfare command — to lay the groundwork for the geographic theatre commands.

Even greater is the need to establish their intellectual underpinning through joint operations doctrines. One such document was issued in 2017, it was widely criticised for its shortcomings. Just as you need a map to figure out the best and easiest way to reach your destination, so, too, you need a doctrine to first set a goal, then provide a guide that will enable the many parts of the system to work along the commonly agreed path. For practical reasons, doctrines are the intellectual product of collaboration of the different component services. To work effectively, they must be consensual documents, rather than a diktat.

The making of all these military moves without first articulating a national security strategy (NSS) is truly to put the cart before the horse. A changed military posture must be based on a larger politico-military guidance from the political leadership as to what is expected of the military. The task of crafting an NSS was assigned in 2018 to the National Security Adviser, as the chairman of the powerful Defence Planning Committee. Since then, there has been radio silence.

It has just been one year and six months since the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) was set up on 01 Jan 2020
Airpower is a crucial contributor to accomplishing any military mission and is considered pivotal to win a war. Indian Air Force (IAF) in the present configuration has carried out its duties of not only defending the Indian skies throughout the history of independent India, but also ensured that the air assets are fighting fit and contemporary.
However, it is now being considered to absorb the professional arm of IAF into various Theatre Commands (of Maritime and Indian Army), for reasons still incomprehensible to experts.
While the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and his department are yet to define the Theatre Command concept clearly to satisfy the military experts, the re-distribution of a crucial fighting air arm based on incomplete appreciation of modern warfare has fanned controversy.
“IAF in the present form has carried out its duties of not only maintaining a fighting fit air asset, but also defended Indian skies efficiently despite the shortages of air squadrons,” opined a former senior IAF officer who wished to remain anonymous.
Financial Express Online has been regularly reporting on the multiple roles being played by the IAF in peace time, and has always been in a high demand due to the exceptional abilities it has to carry out Human Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) etc. It is well known that Indian skies are safe only because of the dedication and capabilities of IAF. The role of the Air Force world over has been understood to be for the offensive to win a war.
“Theatre Commands being formed with lesser understanding on principles of jointness, is akin to leaving each service on their own fate within the Theatre Command, with a hope that at some stage in future some sort of equilibrium is reached,” the officer quoted above stated.
Theatre Commands And IAF
It has just been one year and six months since the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) was set up on 01 Jan 2020. Military experts consider it too early for DMA to be non-service biased and independent enough to take a decision which influences all the Armed Forces, specifically setting up of Theatre Commands by reducing the efficacy of IAF.
The first CDS appointment itself was a historical step for India, and establishing Theatre Command within the tenure of the very first CDS seemingly looks over ambitious drive to achieve some end-goal which is militarily incomprehensible by most experts.
For a large Armed Forces like that of India, first CDS would have been expected to initially streamline the closer inter-services interactions, with joint training plans or enhanced active role of Integrated Defence Headquarter. The Armed Forces are yet to achieve interoperability within their own services, let alone inter-services.
“Instead of first upgrading the Indian Army through systems like the scrapped Battlefield Management Systems, DMA has somewhat compensated for these inadequacies by making IAF relinquish their advanced technologies like fighter-jets and helicopters,” observed another officer.
As per aviation experts, “Indian Army is not even geared to integrate IAF, let alone taking control of the Theatre Commands with modern era fighter jets. The grooming and training of senior level officers first need to be carried out for tri-services operations at least for next five years, before we have senior level officers with a deep grasp of each service’s tactical role.”
“Unfortunately, CDS himself simply changed positions from being a Chief of Army Staff (COAS) to Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) the very next day, without having any tri-services operational role experience. While on-the-job experience is always essential in the complex field of Army, Navy and Air Force, each Service Chiefs reach the specialized position at senior level after about four decades of work experience. A gap here is glaring, especially with no Service Chief with an operational Theatre Command experience, taking a decision for the IAF,” observed another officer.
As reported by Financial Express Online earlier, Multi-Domain Operations is an art and technology not yet known to India and it forms the basis of Theatre Commands world-over.
Concerns of IAF
There are concerns raised especially on the risk of the long term degradation of IAF’s efficient service. The more worrying aspect being highlighted is that those taking a decision today to dis-assemble IAF assets surely are not going to be there to see the next war India faces. Hopefully, those in a rush to dismantle IAF may not be held responsible by history. A war never has a replay button.
Expert View On The Comments By The CDS On The Process Of Establishment of Theatre Commands
Sharing his views with Financial Express Online, Col RS Sidhu, Indian Army veteran, “The remarks by Gen Bipin Rawat, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at a seminar held on July 02, 2021, comparing the Indian Air Force (IAF) operations akin to the operational support role played by the Corps of Engineers and Corps of Artillery, has raked up controversy on the process of reorganizing the Armed Forces into Theatre Commands.”
“The CDS is also attributed to have remarked that the establishment of a Maritime Theatre Command (MTC), an Air Defence Command (ADC), and two geographical Theatre Commands against China and Pakistan have Government sanction and would be created in a time bound manner whether the IAF likes it or not. The existing Northern Command of the Army, is likely to remain untouched as it is actively involved in fighting a cross-border fuelled insurgency. Speculation is rife that an official announcement on establishing all or some of the above Unified Theatre Commands may be made by 15 August 2021.”
“The issue at hand is not the view of CDS on IAF, but the more serious aspect of adopting a harmonious process for the most comprehensive ever and long overdue reorganisation of the Indian Armed Forces by setting up of Theatre Commands. Here I see a jumbled mindset,” Col Sidhu opines.
According to him, “On one side the justifiable two Maritime Theatre Commands, Eastern and other Western, are likely to be amalgamated into one Maritime Theatre Command for such a vast maritime region. On the other hand, one Northern Theatre Command along Tibet frontier is deemed to be too large and the thought process is to carve out two Theatre Commands. Incidentally, China’s South Western Theatre Command is responsible for the entire frontier from Myanmar to Kazakhstan.”
“As per the initial Government Order (GO) on CDS and DMA, the appointment was not meant to be in the operational chain. The Theatre Commanders were to be directly under the Government, through RM, for operational matters.”
“Having two Theatre Commands opposing Tibet frontier willy-nilly necessitates a coordinating mechanism over them. Thus surreptitiously assigning operational roles to CDS & DMA. So we’ll be back to square one! It smacks of empire building and cutting IAF and Indian Navy to size,” the army veteran opines.
In conclusion he says, “The Theatre Commands are being used as ‘SPV’ to circumvent the GO! This is a specific case of well-intentioned reforms likely to be hijacked through bureaucratic machinations, with active connivance of military hierarchy.”

On a cold November day in 1991, a 25-year old laid his life in action after sustaining injuries while pursuing the enemy from across the border at a forward post in Jammu & Kashmir. It had been only two years since Capt Gurjinder Singh Suri was commissioned in the Army.© Provided by The Indian Express

On July 4, nearly 22 years later, his father Lt Col Tej Prakash Singh Suri (Retd) made a special journey from Mohali in Punjab to a remote post on the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K to inaugurate a memorial to his son’s sacrifice. July 4 was also the birth anniversary of his son who was awarded with the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously.

Lt Col Suri travelled to the forward location, situated at a height of more than 10,000 ft, along the LoC to accomplish his dream of visiting the battlefield, where his son had made the ultimate sacrifice during a raid on Pakistan Army post.

An alumnus of National Defence Academy and commissioned in the Army Ordnance Corps in June 1997, Capt Suri had been serving with 12th Battalion of The Bihar Regiment when he died in action.

Named Operation Birsa Munda, the action was a punitive raid conducted against the Pakistani post in November 1999, at a time when Kargil conflict had drawn to a close.

“This was the time when Operation ‘Vijay’ had drawn to a close, but the LoC was still active with sporadic incidents of trans-LoC violence. In a swift and meticulously planned operation, the entire Pakistani post was destroyed, killing 17 Pakistani soldiers,” defence spokesperson Col Emron Musavi said in a statement.

Lt Col Suri, and Lt Gen GS Chandel, (Retd), the then CO of 12 Bihar, participated in a solemn ceremony at the forward post in Gulmarg sector where the memorial dedicated in memory of the soldiers who died in the operation has been set up. An urn containing the soil from the post was also presented to Lt Col Suri.

A few years back, Capt Suri’s MVC medal was stolen from his parent’s house in Mohali in a burglary. Despite his parents’ strenuous efforts and appeals it could not be recovered. The Army later presented a replica of the medal to the parents.

Citation for award of MVC to Capt Suri

Captain Gurjinder Singh Suri was the Ghatak platoon commander and was located at forward-defended locality in Jammu & Kashmir. On 9 November 1999, the enemy launched an attack on own post, which was successfully repulsed, and the enemy retreated.

Seizing the opportunity, the Ghatak platoon was ordered to pursue the fleeing enemy. Captain Suri immediately deployed his support group to take care of any reinforcement or interference and set out to clear the bunkers one by one. When he saw that one comrade was grievously injured in the process, he quickly moved on with his buddy, to clear the bunker.

He killed two enemy soldiers with his AK rifle and silenced the machine gun. However in the process he received a burst in his left arm. Unmindful of his injury, Captain Suri continued to inspire his men to accomplish the task. He then lobbed two hand grenades into a bunker and entered inside spraying bullets with his AK rifle killing one enemy soldier instantly.

At this point he was hit by an enemy rocket propelled grenade and was critically wounded. He refused to be evacuated and continued to exhort his men till he breathed his last. Inspired by his leadership, the Ghataks fell upon the enemy with vengeance and annihilated them.

Captain Gurjinder Singh Suri, thus, displayed conspicuous bravery and junior leadership of the highest order in the face of the enemy and in the process made the supreme sacrifice.

Chinese supplied CH-3 (badge named Burraq by Pak) combat capable drone
New Delhi: Pakistan enhanced its unmanned strike capabilities — procuring armed drones from Turkey and China extensively — when India was caught in border disputes with China, sources said on Monday.
The security threat from armed drones allegedly coming from Pakistan in the border areas of Jammu and Kashmir has increased, and the drone attack at the Indian Air Force station in Jammu on June 27 is the best example of that, sources said.
India and China are involved in border disputes for some time now and so far 11 rounds of diplomatic and military-level talks have taken place to resolve issues.
Chinese supplied drone and AKD-10 anti-tank missile named Burraq and Barq respectively (Note the Pakistanis have even got their own name of the missile wrong, spelled Burq instead of Barq) 😁

However, apart from de-escalation at Pangong Tso — a glacier at 14,000 feet in Eastern Ladakh — disputes still remain at the other friction points like the disputed areas of Gogra, Hot Springs, Demchok and Depsang along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh.
Intelligence agencies said that the Pakistan Army is carrying out training of mini unmanned systems group, Supercam S-250, one of the best unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in terms of tactical and technical characteristics, in the border areas.
These Supercam S-250 mini UAVs are being utilised for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) exercise.
“As part of the exercise, all formations have been instructed to forward a detailed report regarding the employability of mini UAV S-250 for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance during various phases and operations of war,” the source said.
On June 24, Pakistan had planned to conduct test firing of a missile from a UAV. The missile and UAV are assessed to be Barq laser guided missile and Burraq UAV. Burraq is an unmanned combat aerial vehicle developed and built by the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM). Personnel from Strategic Command, National Development Complex (NDC), Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC), Air Weapon Complex (AWC) and National Engineer and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) were involved in the test, the source said.
Sources also said that a joint delegation of Pakistan Army and Strategic Plans Division Force led by Director General, Inspection and Technology Development, had visited Turkey between May 31 and June 11, 2021.
During the visit, the delegation attended a technology briefing and took a factory tour of MS Bayktar. Post the visit, the delegation proposed two models of Bayraktar UAS for joint production in Pakistan which include Bayraktar VTOL UAS and TB2 UAS.
Further, the Drone Regulatory Authority of Pakistan is in the process of procuring a drone detection system named ‘Aartos’ from Aaronia, Germany.
This system primarily monitors drone/UAV traffic and is also equipped with navigational jamming capability.
The Pakistan Air Force is also exploring the possibility of integrating ‘Aartos’ with an indigenously developed wide band receiver. It has planned to install this system at five most sensitive and important places in and around Islamabad.
Further, a joint delegation of Pakistan Army, Pakistan Navy, Pakistan Air Force and the Strategy Planning Division (SPD) is presently in China to visit the NORINCO facility.
The Pakistan Air Force team will also evaluate the advanced High to Medium Altitude Air Defence System (HIMADS) with China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC).
CATIC has a plan to deliver Wing Loong-II UAVs to Pakistan in 2021, 10 J-10CE fighter aircraft in 2023 and 10 Z-10 armed helicopters in 2024-25.

Restoration of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir became a talking point as Prime Minister Narendra Modi met the leaders of parties from the state in the Centre’s first political outreach following the abrogation of Art.370 in August 2019. Former J&K chief minister Omar Abdullah said it cannot be expected that Art.370 would be restored, but a former deputy chief minister of the state, Muzaffar Hussain Baig, suggested that the Centre could use Art.371 to extend special provisions to J&K, including on permanent residents of the state. Although J&K’s special status was unique in India, Art.371 does include special provisions for 11 other states, mostly in the Northeast. Here’s a look at how the Indian Constitution has extended special provisions to different states.
What Is Article 371? How Is It Different From Art.370?
Both Article 370 and 371 are included in Part XXI of the Constitution of India, which deals with ‘Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions’. However, Art.370 was specific to J&K while the various clauses of Art.371 cover separate states, from Maharashtra to Mizoram and Assam to Andhra Pradesh.
Art.370 was a part of the Constitution right from when it was inaugurated in 1950 and was included as a result of negotiations between Kashmiri leaders led by Sheikh Abdullah, the father of former J&K CM Farooq Abdullah, and the the Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru. Among the key provisions it enabled was for J&K to have its own constitution and, resultantly, to make its own rules regarding permanent citizens of the state via Art.35A.
But with the abrogation of August 2019, J&K lost its special status and all articles of the Indian Constitution now apply to the state and the privilege conferred by Art.35A, too, stands abolished.
Art.371 does not have the same wide ambit as what Art.370 did vis-à-vis J&K and only contains specific provisions that mainly recognise social, cultural and religious practices in the different states.
What’s The Modi Govt’s Take On Art.371?
Following the abrogation of Art.370 Union Home Minister Amit Shah had clarified that there were no plans to remove the special provisions for other states enshrined in Art.371. Removal of Art.370 was a long-standing aim of the BJP and also found mention in the party’s manifesto for the 2019 Lok Sabha polls.
“I have clarified in Parliament that this (scrapping of Art.371) is not going to happen and I am saying it again… that the Centre will not touch Article 371”, Shah had said in Guwahati weeks after the abrogation of Art.370. While Art.371 itself concerns special provisions for Maharashtra and Gujarat and was part of the Constitution right from its inception, the remaining clauses dealing with the other states were added later through amendments.
Which States Have Special Provisions Under Art.371?
The earliest of the special provisions under this article were extended to the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. It allows the President of India, among other things, to ask the governor of the states to issue a special order for “the establishment of separate development boards for Vidarbha, Marathwada (or, the rest of Maharashtra) or Saurashtra, Kutch and the rest of Gujarat” and ensure “equitable allocation of funds for developmental expenditure over the said areas”.
Art.371A has detailed provisions for Nagaland. The jey feature is that the Parliament of India cannot legislate on any matter touching upon the “religious or social practices of the Nagas, Naga customary law and procedure, administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law, (and) ownership and transfer of land and its resources”, unless the Nagaland Assembly votes to accept it.
Art.371B covers Assam and allows the President to order the formation of an Assembly committee, or multiple committees, consisting of members elected from specific tribal areas.
Art.371C says the President may call for the creation of “a committee of the Legislative Assembly of the state consisting of members… elected from the Hill Areas of that state”. Also, “the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of directions” to Manipur regarding the administration of the Hill Areas.
Art.371D concerns Andhra Pradesh and, after its bifurcation, to Telangana as well and empowers the President to provide for “equitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to different parts of the state, in the matter of public employment and in the matter of education”. It further allows the President to make “different provisions… for various parts of the state”. The President may also ask the state government to set up different local administrative cadres “for different parts of the state”. Art.371E says that the “Parliament may by law provide for the establishment of a university” in Andhra Pradesh, which was done in the form of the Hyderabad Central University in 1974.
The Sikkim Assembly is not allowed to have “less than 30 members” under Art.371F, which pertains to the state.
For Mizoram, Art.371G says that no Act of Parliament will apply to the state without the assent of the state Assembly if it seeks to regulate the “religious or social practices of the Mizos, Mizo customary law and procedure, administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Mizo customary law, (and) ownership and transfer of land”. The provisions for Mizoram are akin in this respect to that governing Nagaland. Art.371G also says that the Mizoram Assembly shall consist of “not less than 40 members”.
Art.371H confers “special responsibility with respect to law and order” on the governor of Arunachal Pradesh and also says that the state Assembly shall have a minimum of 30 members.
The Goan Assembly, too, has its strength mandated by a special provision with Art.371I saying that it “shall consist of not less than 30 members”.
With Art.371J, Karnataka is the last state that enjoys special provisions. Under this Act, the state government can establish a separate development board for the Hyderabad-Karnataka region.

Consensus eludes plan to integrate theatre commands

Chief of Defence Staff Gen Bipin Rawat. File photo

Halfway into the three-year time span granted to implement the biggest military reform in independent India, it is clear that the stakeholders are far from reaching a consensus on the creation of integrated theatre commands. In early 2020, soon after taking over as the first Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Bipin Rawat had stated that the Indian armed forces would complete the theaterisation process — integration of the capabilities of the Army, Air Force and Navy — by January 2021. But the process is not moving smoothly, as is clear from the protracted deliberations and comments by the parties involved. On Friday, Gen Rawat said: ‘Air Force is required to provide support to the ground forces… Do not forget that Air Force continues to remain a supporting arm to the armed forces…’ Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria, speaking at the same seminar, said: ‘It is not a supporting role alone. The airpower has a huge role to play. In any of the integrated battle areas, it’s not an issue of support alone.’

The Indian military has 17 single-service commands across the country — the Army and Air Force have seven each, and the Navy has three commands. The Andaman and Nicobar command, based in Port Blair, is the sole tri-service command. The theaterisation model being considered involves setting up of at least six new integrated commands, after the merger of the existing commands. However, sharp differences have emerged — the Army and Navy are in favour of the theaterisation model but the Air Force has concerns over the division of its air assets and the nomenclature and leadership of the commands. There are concerns also about the reduction of the powers of the Chiefs of Staff.

Even as the deliberations continue, it is evident that concerns over one’s turf are hampering progress. The Air Force’s anxieties would not have been soothed by Gen Rawat terming it a ‘supporting arm’, which seems ill-advised because air power is the primary tool to achieve tactical gains in warfare. The existence of inter-services competition can’t be denied; due to this reason, the massive project of theaterisation should not have been left only to the three services — a more holistic approach, with involvement of Parliament and relevant ministries, was needed. What we are witnessing is a public clash of ideas, which must be avoided at all costs.

A news report dated 28 June 2021 in Bloomberg makes the assertion that India has undertaken ‘a historic shift’ towards an offensive military posture against China by redirecting 50,000 additional troops (and new equipment) to its Northern border at different locations. It goes on to suggest that whereas before commanders had to adopt a defensive posture against Chinese threats, this rebalancing from west to north provides them offensive-defence options, thereby, making the overall deterrent posture against China that much more robust. This claim also finds mention in other online news platforms and print media. While the facts mentioned in various reports are correct in a bare minimum sense, it is their interpretation of perceived effects, as also past decisions that enabled such a rebalancing, which require a more in-depth look to view the issue pragmatically.
The India-China standoff in Eastern Ladakh shows no signs of any thaw, other than disengagement at Pangong Tso and the Kailash Range. While the onset of the summer campaigning season did witness a renewed push by both sides to bolster capabilities and play mind games. It was evident last year, from the bloody fight at Patrolling Point 14 in Galwan Valley in June and shrill Chinese reactions to Indian pre-emption along the Kailash Range in August, that this was no ordinary India-China standoff along the line of actual control (LAC). By then, both countries had built up substantial forces and these have been maintained at more or less the same levels. So, coming back to the curious case of the historic shift of 50,000 troops, it has definitely not occurred all of a sudden. The build-up of infrastructure and forces has been as per a capability development plan, based on a series of classified assessments of strategic threats that have been underway since 2006-07 onward (the author has been involved in two such studies to look at transformation of the army), and directions of the China Study Group (CSG) for the development of infrastructure in the border regions with China. A quick glance at the timeline of military tensions of the past decade along the Indo-Chinese border is instructive to arrive at a few reasoned conclusions about the rebalancing of forces.
The India-China standoff in Eastern Ladakh shows no signs of any thaw, other than disengagement at Pangong Tso and the Kailash Range. While the onset of the summer campaigning season did witness a renewed push by both sides to bolster capabilities and play mind games.
The Chinese claims in Eastern Ladakh, the Central Sector (Himachal and Uttarakhand), Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh are well-known and documented. Ever since 1993, a series of border protocols and agreements between India and China have been signed and adhered to (though more in the breach by China), till the arrival of President Xi Jinping at the helm of affairs in 2013. That year saw a provocative build-up of troops in the Depsang Plains in Eastern Ladakh and was only resolved after a series of talks over three weeks in April-May 2013. The following year, on the eve of President Xi’s first visit to India, Indian and Chinese troops faced off at Chumar in SE Ladakh over Chinese road building activity in what India considered its territory. It was resolved after 16 days, with India building up nearly a brigade-sized force there. The most serious standoff occurred in June 2017 near the India-Bhutan-China border tri-junction in Sikkim on the Doklam plateau. It involved India intervening on Bhutan’s behalf to prevent Chinese road construction across a very narrow portion of the Torsa River, which could have allowed Chinese troops, in times of conflict, to pose a faster threat to India’s Siliguri corridor, bypassing defences. The standoff lasted over two months with both countries building up forces up to division size with reserves in depth areas. The Indian Air Force and Indian Navy were also involved. While it was resolved after parleys at the highest level, the Indian Armed Forces, having wargamed a Pak-China collusive threat scenario for nearly a decade when Doklam transpired, were now faced with the actual prospect of having to earmark dedicated forces for such an eventuality, without giving up on territorial claims in any of the disputed areas. Then, the PLA upped the ante in April 2020 in Eastern Ladakh and we are where we are today.
The recap of Sino-Indian military tensions has a two-fold objective: First, to highlight a growing threat, of which India’s strategic leadership and its military have been aware for nearly a decade (if not more), and second, to point out that if today in the Ladakh Region, and in Arunachal, India is capable of positioning additional military hardware and forces, maintaining and sustaining them over extended periods, right close to the friction points, it is because of the culmination of processes that were conceived way back at the turn of the century and given an initial impetus by the UPA government, and which have been vigorously followed through by Prime Minister Modi in both his tenures. There’s no denying the sustained and comprehensive allocation of funds for infrastructure development that the NDA government has pumped in over the last seven years. Ladakh and Arunachal are better connected by rail, road, and air than they’ve ever been. It is India’s better connectivity to its far-flung border regions that may have indirectly contributed to China’s belligerent posturing.
There’s no denying the sustained and comprehensive allocation of funds for infrastructure development that the NDA government has pumped in over the last seven years. Ladakh and Arunachal are better connected by rail, road, and air than they’ve ever been. It is India’s better connectivity to its far-flung border regions that may have indirectly contributed to China’s belligerent posturing.
There’s a plethora of force accretions and major acquisitions that’s been undertaken by all three services since 2012 with China as the primary adversary. Concentrating primarily on the Army and a few Air Force platforms, the army accretions and equipment range from additional infantry divisions for Eastern Command, the raising of the Mountain Strike Corps (the second division possibly still under strength), long range rocket and missile artillery, EW units, air defence, the M777 light gun, and logistics infrastructure for supporting additional troops in high altitude all year round and in difficult terrain. Of late, the rebalancing of forces from the West includes the reassigning of roles of the two infantry divisions of the Mathura-based offensive corps (which was a secondary charter for them in any case, under the dual tasking policy of military operations) and additional forces for the Central Sector as well as a corps headquarters for controlling all additional troops in Ladakh for offensive options. The IAF has, of course, got the heavy strategic lift and tactical special operations capability in the C-17s and C-130Js respectively, the Chinooks for quick lift of troops and logistics as per the dictates of mountainous terrain in Ladakh and the Eastern sector, along with the formidable AH-64E multi-role attack helicopter. The newest augmentation to the IAF’s offensive capabilities being the Rafale multi-role combat aircraft, the sixth batch of which was inducted recently. It is also expecting to receive the S-400 Triumf surface to air missile system as per contract from Russia later in the year.
To conclude, the direction and pace of India’s military transformation is historic, at times forced by the hand of its neighbours, but mostly due to the slow yet deliberate rebalancing process that’s been ongoing for a decade now. The security set up may have been slow to react initially but you have to grant that the threats emanating now have been identified, definitely wargamed at the strategic and operational levels for some years now and the rebalancing of forces is but the culmination of processes that may not have been visible for some years had the Chinese not shown their hand so obviously since 2017. That their belligerence has coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic and India’s tightening of reins over peripheral borders only highlights that our policies may not match expectations all the time but they do deliver when the dragon is on your doorstep.

Vidya Balan

Basking in the success of her recently released Sherni and making the nation proud by becoming the only actor from 395 new invitees to join the Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences, the governing body behind the Oscars, Vidya Balan has now achieved yet another feat as a military firing range in Gulmarg, Kashmir, is named after the actress. Honouring the varied accomplishments of Vidya, the Indian Army has named a military firing range in Gulmarg as the Vidya Balan Firing Range.

Meanwhile, Vidya along with husband and producer Siddharth Roy Kapur had attended the Gulmarg Winter Festival organised by the Indian Army in February this year. On the work front, Vidya is currently gearing up for her upcoming film with Tumhari Sulu director Suresh Triveni.

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New Delhi: The Indian Air Force (IAF) has sought to purchase 10 Counter Unmanned Aircraft System (CUASs) — known as anti-drone systems in common parlance — specifically from Indian vendors.

The force floated a Request for Information (RFI) to invite bids last week.

The RFI dated 28 June came after a first-of-its-kind attack at the Jammu air base, where two low-intensity improvised explosive devices were dropped from a drone, which exploded close to the station’s helicopter hangar and left two IAF personnel injured.

An anti-drone system was subsequently installed at the Jammu station.

According to defence sources, the procurement and the RFI for CUASs has been in works for the last several months.

In its RFI, the force said it is looking to procure 10 CUAS via indigenous routes. The systems are intended to “detect, track, identify, designate and neutralize” hostile drones, the RFI said, adding that a Laser Directed Energy Weapon (Laser-DEW) is essentially required as a “kill option”.

Also read: Army focuses on bridging capabilities against Pakistan & China, inducts 12 indigenous bridges

What the RFI states

According to the RFI, the system’s basic features listed include provision of a “multi-sensor, multikill solution” effective enforcement of ‘No-Fly’ zones for unmanned aircraft (drones) while inflicting minimal collateral damage to the surrounding environment.

The CUAS should also generate a composite air situational picture for the operator and generate alerts based on user defined parameters.

This means that the inputs from different sensors will be consolidated on a single screen to enable a composite understanding of the situation for the controlling agency and the commander, explained sources.

It should be possible to mount the CUAS on indigenous vehicles with cross country capability and powered by indigenous electrical power supply systems, and to transport it by air and road.

The system should have a phased array radar (for detection of the UAV); radio frequency sensor (for detecting the UAV frequency); and an electro optical and infrared (EO/IR) system for detection and tracing a hostile UAV by way of visual and heat signatures.

It should have a soft kill option, which can include a Global Navigation Satellite Jammer System and RF Jammer, and a hard kill option (Laser-DEW).

Soft kill refers to jamming the communication or navigation signals used by a drone. Hard kill refers to its physical destruction.

The RFI sought to know if the system would be able to jam radio frequency communication between the target drone and its controller, and also jam satellite-based navigation systems used by the drone such as GPS, Glonass etc.

It also asked the vendors about the range at which the Laser-DEW could destroy micro- and mini-UAVs, its dwell time, and how many targets it can engage in quick succession.

ThePrint earlier reported that the Services are yet to buy anti-drone systems in large numbers. The Navy was the first to place an order for Israeli anti-drone system Smash 2000 Plus, which turns assault rifles into smart weapons, enabling first-shot hits and anti-drone operations.

What is a CUAS?

These systems detect and intercept hostile drones and unmanned aerial systems, which can be used for intelligence gathering or smuggling contraband, or to deploy explosives.

CUASs are deployed to protect military bases, airports, critical infrastructure and other important sites.

Typically, there are two main aspects to an anti-drone system — the detection of a rogue drone, and its destruction with weapon system, or jamming its communication signals.

The detection takes place via radars, or/and radio frequency sensors and EO/IR systems. Modern anti-drone radar systems may use multiple radar technologies depending on the range required, size of the zone to be protected, and number of simultaneous targets.

To destroy a hostile drone, a CUAS can include jammers and be armed with different weapon systems. For the latter, anti-drone systems could use guns or missiles along with a targeting system to destroy a drone. Similarly a high-powered laser or microwave could also destroy a rogue drone.

(Edited by Amit Upadhyaya)

Also read: India Rafale deal under scanner in France, judge appointed to probe alleged corruption: Reports