Monthly Archives: August 2018

The two sides are now engaged in talks to extend the disengagement process to the remaining friction points

New Delhi, June 17

India on Thursday said early completion of the disengagement process in the remaining friction points in eastern Ladakh could pave the way for both Indian and Chinese troops to consider de-escalation and ensure full restoration of peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

At a media briefing, External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said such a step could enable progress in bilateral relations between the two countries.

“Early completion of disengagement in the remaining areas could pave the way for both sides to consider de-escalation of forces and ensure full restoration of peace and tranquillity, and thereby enabling progress in bilateral relations,” he said replying to a question.https://dac735d1aad68a67136649ddc9a7ffcb.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html

The 11th round of Corps Commander-level talks between the two sides was held on April 9 while the last edition of diplomatic negotiations under the framework of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on border affairs took place on March 12.

It is learnt that another round of WMCC talks could take place soon.

India and China were locked in a military standoff at multiple friction points in eastern Ladakh since early May last year. However, the two sides completed the withdrawal of troops and weapons from the North and South banks of Pangong lake in February following a series of military and diplomatic talks.

The two sides are now engaged in talks to extend the disengagement process to the remaining friction points.https://dac735d1aad68a67136649ddc9a7ffcb.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html

There was no visible forward movement in disengagement of troops in the remaining friction points as the Chinese side did not show flexibility in their approach on it at the 11th round of military talks.

Last month, Army Chief Gen MM Naravane said that there can be no de-escalation without complete disengagement at all friction points in eastern Ladakh and that the Indian Army is prepared for all contingencies in the region.

He also said that India is dealing with China in a “firm” and “non-escalatory” manner to ensure the sanctity of its claims in eastern Ladakh, and that it was even open to initiating confidence-building measures.

India has been insisting on complete disengagement in remaining friction points to de-escalate the situation in eastern Ladakh. PTI

Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT): The Division Bench of Justice Umesh Chandra Srivastava (Chairperson) and Vice Admiral Abhay Raghunath Karve, Member (A) held that there is no barometer that can assess the disability percentage to the extent of 1% and therefore, the percentage of disability which has been assessed as 15-19% may be 20% also and there may be variation of at least two percent plus.

Briefly stated facts of the case were that the applicant was enrolled in the Indian Air Force on 14-11-1995 and was discharged on 30-11-2015 in Low Medical Category (Permanent). At the time of his retirement, the Release Medical Board (RMB) assessed his disability ‘SEVERE OBSTRUCTIVE SLEEP APNOEA (OLD)’ at 15-19% for life and opined the disability to be neither attributable to nor aggravated (NANA) by service. The applicant approached the respondents for grant of disability pension but the same was rejected, pursuant to which the applicant had preferred the present Original Application.

The applicant pleaded that he was enrolled as Radio Fitter (Electronics & Telecommunication) trade and was working in advance defence ground environmental system which deals with Radar and Radio equipments and such units are usually at High Altitudes, thus environmental condition leads to stress and strain which had affected his health badly. He submitted that in the year Dec 1998, he was posted at High Altitude Area i.e. Dalhousie (H.P.) located above 10,000 feet and to protect from cold large heating blowers were used. Due to high altitude there was lack of oxygen and due to use of blowers there was lack of moisture content which resulted in breathing problems. In the last phase of his three years tenure, he started having breathing problems at High Altitude due to Nasal Blockage. He further submitted that claim for the grant of disability pension was wrongly rejected on the ground of disability percentage being less than 20% and NANA.

Regarding the issue of disability being assessed as less than 20%, the Tribunal stated that various Tribunals and Courts had found that,

“The assessment of disability to the tune of 15-19% itself is a doubtful assessment and cannot be final for the simple reason that there is no barometer which can assess the disability percentage to the extent of 1% and therefore, the percentage of disability which has been assessed as 15-19% may be 20% also and there may be variation of at least two percent plus also. In case of doubt as the benefit should always be given to the applicant.”

Noticeably, the applicant was enrolled in Indian Air Force in fully fit condition after rigorous medical examination and the disability was detected for the first time in January 2008 after more than 12 years of Air Force service. Therefore, the Tribunal held that disability of the applicant must be presumed to have arisen in the course of service which must, in the absence of any reason recorded by the Medical Board, be presumed to had been attributable to or aggravated by service. Further, there was neither any note in the service record of the applicant at the time of his entry nor was any reason been recorded by the RMBoard that the disease which the applicant was found to be suffering from, could not have been detected at the time of his entry into service hence the reasoning for denying disability pension to applicant was not convincing and did not reflect the complete truth on the matter. The Tribunal remarked,

“The opinion that ‘SEVERE OBSTRUCTIVE SLEEP APNOEA (OLD)’ is caused by obesity and included anatomical variations resulting in airway collapse and apnoea is an good opinion, but nowhere rules out that this may not occur due to conditions of service.”

In the backdrop of above, the Tribunal held that the benefit of doubt in should be given to the applicant and the disability of the applicant should be considered as aggravated by military service. Accordingly, the impugned orders rejecting claim for grant of disability element to the applicant were set aside. The respondents were directed to grant disability element of the pension at 15-19% to the applicant, which was directed to stand rounded off to 50% from the date of discharge.[Rohitash Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine AFT 1413, decided on 18-01-2021]

Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

New Delhi: On 15 June 2020, India lost 20 soldiers at the Galwan river valley in Ladakh. While India and China have had several border standoffs since the 1962 India-China War, this was the first time, since 1975, that a face-off had turned violent — albeit without the actual use of firearms, in line with the confidence-building measures in place for a long time now.

Since the clash, India and China have held several discussions at the level of senior ministers, military commanders and diplomats, and yet disengagement and de-escalation processes have not taken the direction that both sides had planned for.

While disengagement did take place in the Pangong Tso area where India had strategic advantage, the situation in rest of the areas remains the same.

India has now taken a stance that unless there is peace and tranquility in the border areas, the bilateral ties will not go back to normalcy.

ThePrint spoke to eight experts on how they view the Galwan Valley clash, one year later, and what it means for the future of India-China bilateral ties:

‘New low will push Asia into divisive, uncertain scenario’

“Expectations about India and China reaching a mutual accommodation of interests at the regional and global level have evaporated. The loss of the most significant achievement since the mid-1980s — a peaceful border — has come in the wake of worrisome power asymmetry. Nationalist sentiments and mistrust are rising and the strategic discourse is hardening.

“India’s continuing economic dependence on China jostles uneasily with China’s enlarging footprint in India’s neighbourhood. While geopolitical equations between the major and middle powers have yet to crystallise, between India and China also falls the shadow of the US. In the short to medium term, the wisdom and sagacity of leaders on both sides will be on test. This new ‘low’, if not resolved at the earliest, will push Asia and its much vaunted century, into a highly divisive and uncertain scenario.”

— Alka Acharya, Professor of Chinese Studies, Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University 

‘Indian ocean new theatre of India-China competition’

“The Galwan clash was a pivot that revealed China’s readiness to bear the enormous cost of bilateral damage, by using duplicitous means to coerce India. Incidentally, Galwan flagged off China’s active coercion campaigns against Australia, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

“China’s failure to enforce coercion and increased troop deployment and infrastructure at the LAC points to a permanent stalemate of deployment. Since not much headway can be made in the Himalayas, China exploits other dimensions. Revelations on Wuhan labs and brief power shutdowns in Indian cities are indications of bio and cyber warfare.

“India-China bilateral ties will be defined more by power balance in a divided Indo-Pacific. China has increased its leverage in the subcontinent — Sri Lanka and Nepal are examples. India feels a need for greater external balancing to counter China. Post Galwan, India shed pretensions of neutrality and grew closer to the US and QUAD. Indo-Pacific is a playground of future global tussles, with India as the fulcrum. The Indian ocean is the new theatre of India-China competition, given China’s naval expansion plans and India’s strategic alliance with an active America.”https://5b2ee1c902461071665e1eec99dbdcda.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html

— Probal Dasgupta, Army veteran and author of ‘Watershed-1967: India’s Forgotten Victory Over China’

‘Time and effort wasted in informal summits led to Galwan’

“One year after the Chinese incursions there has been nothing by way of an accountability exercise by the government. Clearly a series of mistakes were made in China policy. Instead of keeping China under pressure during and post-Doklam by banning Chinese apps and 5G then, the government gave Beijing an out with the ‘informal summits’. This betrayed a lack of understanding of how the Chinese system worked.

“China subsequently built up around the face-off site with New Delhi now ignoring the development. It is clear that the time and effort wasted in the informal summits led to Galwan. Current negotiations over disengagement and de-escalation show the government as too eager to reach a compromise with China. The government’s lack of both options and strategy is the result of a long-term process of blanking out and undermining critical voices and of the preference to focus on the more familiar issue of Pakistan.”

— Jabin T. Jacob, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University

Also read: A year since Galwan, China drags its feet on disengagement at four friction points in Ladakh

‘India, China must find alternate equilibria in their hugely transformed equation’

“Remembering Galwan incidents teaches us how our conventional mechanisms and mannerisms of resolving border standoffs have become ineffective and outdated. After dozen-plus long-drawn interactions between India and China at the level of military core commanders and senior ministers, we have not yet achieved even full military disengagement on the LAC to our satisfaction. We achieved disengagement only on the Pangong Lake area where India had managed to clinch critical strategic advantage on the South bank of the Pangong Tso whereas other points of confrontation still remain militarised with heavy deployment from both sides.

“History teaches us that such episodes were resolved only by structural changes plus bold initiatives by strong and ambitious leaders. This time again untying these knots would require direct intervention from the very top. The upcoming BRICS Summit in September could be that important occasion to find a breakthrough in disengagement followed by early demobilisation at the LAC to return to the peace and tranquillity template of their border management. But learning from Doklam and Galwan, both sides must explore building a new set of confidence-building measures to find alternate equilibria in their hugely transformed India-China equation.”

— Swaran Singh, Professor and Chair, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

‘Chinese hawks and doves seem to agree there is no need to turn India into a distinct enemy’

“An influential section within the Chinese strategic community believes that China’s ‘cooperative approach’ towards India in the past years has failed to deliver desired benefits, particularly reduction in strategic pressure on China in the southwest direction, so that it can concentrate on facing its main strategic opponent, the United States. And therefore, China’s India policy from hereon should focus on an occasional show of strength or an assertion of China’s strength advantage vis-a-vis India from time to time so as to effectively check and balance a rising and more confident India and undercut what is considered as its strategic opportunity period induced by the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific.

“However, there is also widespread concern within China if such a muscular approach will eventually lead to a rupture in China-India ties and what implications it will have for China in the present not-so-friendly international environment. Interestingly, Chinese hawks and doves seem to agree on one point that as of now there is no need to turn India into a distinct ‘enemy’. Rather, having India as an occasional partner on specific issues continues to serve the Chinese interest better — and hence China’s all-out effort to de-link the border issue from the rest of the relationship.

— Antara Ghosal Singh, Research Associate, Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP)

‘India must engage proactively with its neighbours’

“With it being one year since the Galwan Valley clash between Indian and Chinese troops, there is a need to reflect on the continuous implications of the tragic event. China’s incursions in Ladakh represent a dissatisfied revisionist rising power bent on altering the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Hemisphere in accordance to its narrowly defined interests. As China will continue to grow in terms of military and economic capability, more of these incursions will be expected despite the presence of cooperative agreements such as those in 1993 and 1996. India must realise that China’s assertive activities along the LAC represent a bigger picture. China views India as a major competitor in its strategic designs in the Indian Ocean Region. Thus, it will be inevitable for the former to craft measures to constrain India’s influence in the region. This is quite evident with Beijing’s increase in strategic engagements with states throughout the region.

“Moreover, as India is faced with the challenges brought by the Covid-19 pandemic, its preoccupation with containing that disease has provided China with a golden opportunity to alter the region’s architecture discreetly but effectively. These include recent reports on Chinese activity in Bhutanese territory, its refusal to follow through with the initially planned broader disengagement process, and the continued fortification of Chinese military presence in the depth areas of the LAC. The shock of the bloodshed from the Galwan Valley Clash alone ensures that the standoff will long remain in India’s public consciousness. India must internally and externally balance against China by: 1) advancing domestic policies for development and economic recovery, 2) engage proactively with its neighbours and 3) enhance deterrence.”

— Don McLain Gill, Fellow, International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC), Philippines

‘Still no clarity on casualties on Chinese side’

“A year after Galwan, there is still no clarity on the number of casualties on the Chinese side. It could be anywhere between four and 120 deaths. Currently, China is recycling troops in forward areas due to the harsh terrain and looking at new strategies like drone usage, which had helped Azerbaijan defeat Armenia last November. India isn’t far behind here. Going forward, India should be mindful of China’s attempts to develop border settlements and expand Han Chinese populations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They’ve set up 628 new villages already which means if India were to take action, there would be a real risk of civilian casualties.”

— Srikanth Kondapalli, professor in Chinese studies, JNU 

‘Open society with free media can’t reveal all that’s afoot’

“Managing a complex relationship with China is intrinsically difficult for India; an open society with a free media cannot reveal all that’s afoot. For me that translates into trusting my government to do the right thing.”

— Kishan S. Rana, former ambassador and currently Emeritus Fellow at Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS)

Also read: China has an Achilles’ heel. India must take the battle there from LAC

New Delhi: Given the changing nature of the India-China border, it would make sense to place the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) under operational control of the Army, former Northern Army Commander Lt Gen Deependra Singh Hooda (retd) said Wednesday. 

Hooda, speaking at a webinar organised by Delhi-based Institute of Chinese Studies, said: “We are looking at responding to a regular military (on Chinese side). There are limitations in the way ITBP can respond, not because the soldiers or officers are lacking, but because they don’t have the organisational structure and the capability to react to it.”https://bcb05fffede691cfcd88b6dc6b6ecb6e.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html

Launched in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the ITBP is India’s first line of defence at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the Army remains behind it. 

The ITBP guards the 3,488 km China frontier, which passes along Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. 

ThePrint was a digital partner of the webinar.

Also read: Chinese counterpart listening, Rajnath calls for freedom of navigation in South China Sea

Army is needed at ‘unsettled’ borders 

Hooda said that the Army is not needed at “settled” borders like with Bangladesh. 

“But where you have unsettled borders, like the Line of Control and LAC where you are likely to see the regular Army from the other side reacting, then it would be better to give the management of the border to the Army,” the Lt Gen said.

This would not entail the Army raising its own structures but rather building capabilities of the ITBP to ensure smoother, coordinated response in the event of a crisis. 

ITBP, one of five Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), comes under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry of Defence, however, is also responsible for its units, often resulting in a “turf war”. 

Hooda also said that because of the presence of two ministries, raising ITBP’s capabilities has been done in an “uncoordinated” and “wasteful” manner.

He said that, for example, while there were seven to nine ITBP battalions in Ladakh, the headquarters of the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) or the Inspector General (IG) wasn’t in Ladakh until 2019. “As far as the Army is concerned… the core commanders sit in Ladakh,” he added.

ITBP treated like a ‘poor cousin’

During the webinar, Jabin T. Jacob, associate professor at Department of International Relations and Governance Studies at Shiv Nadar University, said the ITBP is treated like a “poor cousin” by the central government. He spoke about the changing mandate of the ITBP and leadership issues that plague the institution.

“At the DIG rank, 80 per cent of the officers come from the ITBP cadre and 20 per cent are IPS officers,” he said. “One step above at the IG rank, 50 per cent are IPS officers and the rest are ITBP cadre. The DGP, the highest position, is always an IPS officer.”

He added that promotions are not handed out on time, cadre reviews do not take place as often as necessary and a wide gap of experience exists between what an ITBP cadre needs for a top post and vice-versa for an IPS officer. 

In the past, pay parities between IPS and CAPF officers were also a point of conflict that led to years of litigation. 

Asked about combining capabilities of the Army and ITBP at the China border, Jacob remarked that the ITBP would work better with the Army than under its own top brass.

Despite undergoing rigorous training to man the mountainous terrain along the LAC, ITBP troops are often assigned to non-specialised tasks, he said.

Criticising the MHA, Jacob said the political leadership “doesn’t care where the ITBP is posted”.

“In 2017, a bunch of ITBP units were pulled in to take care of the Amarnath Yatra, then they remained in Kashmir due to some disturbances,” he said. “Soon after, there were local elections so they were again deployed in the same area… Then when the units were relieved, they went back to their hardship posting. There was no R&R”.

R&R is a military abbreviation for “rest and recuperation” or “rest and relaxation”.

(Edited by Arun Prashanth)

Also read: A year since Galwan, China drags its feet on disengagement at four friction points in Ladakh

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New Delhi: The rollout of the military theatre commands could be delayed as all stakeholders, including the three Services, are not on the same page when it comes to its basic structure, which seeks to usher in a joint war fighting strategy similar to that of the US and China, ThePrint has learnt.

Sources in the defence and security establishment said that while a united and cohesive approach to war fighting is the way ahead, the big dilemma facing the government and the armed forces is whether to have theatre commands based on challenges or be country specific.https://5d7fcd004d0c9fabfecccf40b42b0169.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html

Multiple issues came up for discussions at a crucial high-level meet, which was held last week to discuss the draft note that will be sent to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for approving the creation of theatre commands.

Sources said that all relevant stakeholders have been asked by the government to sit together and discuss the issues further so that all kinds of reservations or diverse thoughts are settled and everyone is on the same page.

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Bipin Rawat, as the Secretary, Department of Military Affairs, has been tasked with “facilitation of restructuring of military commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations including through establishment of joint/theatre commands”. 

This envisages an unified military under specific commanders with area of responsibility, similar to Americans and the Chinese.

The CDS is keen to roll out two theatres first — the Maritime Theatre Command and the Air Defence Command.   

While the initial target for the rollout of the theatre concept was by 2022, there have been multiple inputs it could happen earlier.

While the nearly 17-lakh strong Indian armed forces have 19 individual commands as of date, only two of them are tri-service commands — the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command, which looks after nuclear assets. 

The idea is to cut down these different service commands to five theatres and functional commands like logistics and training.

Sources in the defence and security establishment said during the meeting held last week, a number of issues came up for detailed discussion. 

Also read: Chinese counterpart listening, Rajnath calls for freedom of navigation in South China Sea

Stakeholders asked to deliberate further 

During the course of discussion, it was felt that all stakeholders were not on board with the way the theatre commands are to be structured. 

Also, some of the issues that came up for discussion fell into the domain of other ministries such as the home ministry since it involved the BSF and the ITBP, sources said.

Concurrence and discussions with the finance ministry is also important because the setting up of theatres and integration of various structures would have financial ramifications as well, the sources said.  

Multiple sources that ThePrint spoke to stressed that the way forward is having a unified warfare strategy with integrated armed forces and assets.

“The whole issue is being looked into minutely. The way forward is unified commands or theatre commands,” a source said. “These changes will be long lasting and are the future of warfare. And hence it is important to get the process right.” 

“One needs to see whether the theatres should be based on challenges or country specific,” a second source said. 

Sources said that challenges mean adversaries — China and Pakistan. The other idea being to have one theatre command for the whole country to begin with.  

Another issue that came up for discussion was who the theatre commanders would report to. In the US, which was the first to roll out theatre commands, the commanders report to the political leadership.

Sources said that under the current plans, at least five theatres are to be formed – Northern Land Theatre (Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh and Central sector) Western Land Theatre (Pakistan centric), Eastern Land Theatre,  Maritime Theatre Command and Air Defence Command.

Sources said that the nomenclature used also came under discussion with some expressing reservation over it.

(Edited by Arun Prashanth)

Also read: A year since Galwan, IAF remains battle-ready in Ladakh with missiles, radars & fighter jets

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New Delhi: The Army has received such an overwhelming response to its initiative of recruiting women in the Military Police Corps — started two years back — that the shortlisting of candidates had to be based on a steep cut-off of over 80 per cent score in the Class 10 examinations, top Army officers told ThePrint.

In 2019, when the Army first invited applications from women for 100 posts in the Military Police Corps, the eligibility criteria for applicants had been an aggregate score of at least 45 per cent in the secondary examinations and an individual score of at least 33 per cent in all subjects. However, because of the 1.5 lakh applications received for vacancies numbering only a hundred, the cut-off for shortlisting candidates in 2019 became a much higher 86 per cent.https://38aeca62040cc687999359204f092b29.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html

The following year, in 2020, the cut-off for shortlisting candidates was 84 per cent, though the eligibility criteria had still been 45 per cent.

In both years, the notice inviting applications had mentioned that a cut-off list would be generated after the registration of the candidates was completed and only a limited number of candidates, proportionate to the vacancies, would be issued admit cards for the written exams for the candidates. This is followed by a medical examination.

Confirming this, a senior Army officer told ThePrint: “The demand was high. Thus, to shortlist candidates, the cut-off percentage had to be fixed at 86 and 84 percentage in the past two years.”

In both 2019 and 2020, the response to the recruitment notice was overwhelming. According to sources in the Army, up to 1.6 lakh women registered in 2019 and 2020, for the 100 positions advertised in both years.

Explaining the huge demand for the job, a senior government official said it could be because of the general attraction that many people have for military jobs — not only because of the thrill and adventure associated with such jobs, but also because of the security and other benefits usually associated with a government job.

“This assumes more significance in the current situation when the private job market is not at its best and unemployment remains high,” said the official.

When recruitment was opened for women in 2019, the idea was to recruit 100 women for the unit every year, so that the Military Police Corps would have a total strength of 1,700 women at the end of 17 years. This would be 20 per cent of the total strength of the Corps. A mid-term review is scheduled to be carried out after nine years.

The aim of this initiative was to give women more active military duties.

Dr (Major General) Rashmi Datta (Retd) told ThePrint the sheer number of women keen on joining the Army’s military police every year shows an attempt on their part to break the proverbial glass ceiling in the armed forces.https://38aeca62040cc687999359204f092b29.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-38/html/container.html

The Army last month invited online applications for the third batch of women recruits. As in the past two instances, the criteria listed for applicants is an age limit of between 17-and-a-half years and 21 years, and a higher secondary aggregate score of 45 per cent, with an individual subject score of 33 per cent.

The last date for sending in the applications is 20 July.

Also read: SC cleared way for permanent commission but women must measure up for their armed forces role

The progress so far

For male soldiers, the basic eligibility for applications is a 45 per cent aggregate score in secondary examinations. Following this, the first round of shortlisting is based on a test of physical efficiency, which is followed by a medical examination and written tests.

The number of vacancies for male soldiers is also considerably higher, since they are recruited in not just the Police Corps, but many other arms. Region-wise recruitment is done, as against for women being recruited in military police, where vacancies are limited and recruitment is done on a pan-India basis.

The first batch of 100 women recruits had successfully completed their 62 weeks of basic and advanced provost training that started in January 2020 at the Corps of Military Police Centre and School in Bengaluru. About 40 per cent of them have now been deployed in different units in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast in the rank of lance naiks.

Along with their basic military training, all the women have also been taught to drive.

The shortlisting for the second batch of women military police personnel has also been completed, but owing to the existing Covid-19 restrictions, their recruitment process is yet to be completed.

Army sources said their training could commence towards the last quarter of this year.

Women military police personnel in the future will have a role in combatting counter-insurgency, as well as in ceremonial roles and police duties such as crowd control and investigation of offences involving women and children.

Dr (Maj. Gen.) Rashmi Datta (Retd) told ThePrint that while the glass ceiling still exists for women in the defence forces, the volume of applications received for the positions in the Military Police Corps, shows women are keen to smash it.

“With women getting the required military training, I hope it turns out to be an eye opener for the other arms too and it prompts them to take in women recruits,” she said.

She said more women recruits joining here will also show the men what their daughters back home are capable of, and added that it would give a fillip to women empowerment in the country.

“But, a lot of responsibilities also lie with these women, in conducting themselves as professional soldiers, to ensure more and more women are encouraged to join the forces,” she said.

Last year, ThePrint had been the first to report that the Army had commissioned a study to assess the feasibility of inducting women in ranks other than officers, and the possible branches these recruits can be inducted into.

(Edited by Poulomi Banerjee)

Also read: Won’t be long before a woman commands a warship, say female Navy officers deployed at sea

Veer Nari Pushpa Devi, wife of the late Lance Naik Gullu Ram of 8 Grenadiers, being felicitated in Akhnoor, J&K.

Major Ishleen Kaur

The history of any army is replete with immortalised tales of selflessness, camaraderie and the ultimate sacrifice. While soldiers who have brought victory have been inscribed in the memories of the country as ‘Forever Young’, there are women who have faced the brunt of these wars not by facing the nameless bullet, but by bravely living the turbulent life that comes after a war. On the 50th anniversary of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, and to commemorate the victory, homage is being paid along the length and breadth of the country to the fallen, and respect to the veterans and Veer Naris.

As the Akhnoor-based Crossed Swords Division commenced on a humble odyssey to pay respect to veterans and felicitate Veer Naris, what emerged were stories of courage, valour, hardships and sacrifices. The Division set out to recognise and felicitate the wives, mothers and daughters of the men who returned home wrapped in the Tricolour without a chance to say their words of farewell.

“I do not want to be called a victim of war. I was strong enough to survive on my own,” a Veer Nari famously said, echoing the sentiments of many like her. To understand the story of a soldier, one must fathom the depth of their moist eyes. The war left us with many such stories, but those of Git Kaur, Kanta Devi, Karnataro Devi, Simro Devi and Pushpa Devi can melt any heart. These women were at the epitome of marital bliss, proud to be married to men who donned the olive green in a society that has a rich martial tradition. Belonging to Jammu and its nearby areas, these Veer Naris have struggled to live their lives without their husbands for the past 50 years, but have emerged as stellar examples of what true grit, determination and courage mean.

Git Kaur, wife of the late Sepoy Balwant Singh of the 5th Battalion, Sikh Regiment, lives a mere 30 km from Chhamb-Jaurian, the place where her husband made the supreme sacrifice. A mother of two, the latter of who never saw her father, she recounts how the indomitable spirit she imbibed from her husband pushed her on when times seemed bleak, with the relentless support of the Army.

Kanta Devi, wife of the late Havildar Amarnath, Sena Medal, of the 8th Battalion of JAK Light Infantry, still vividly remembers the playful jokes of her husband, who used to say that the Army would be with her long after he’d gone. He lost his life defending his homeland just 15 km from his home in Sunderbani. Times were tough thereafter; goons and thugs assuming her to be a soft target tried to extort money, but were warded off with the assistance of the Army. Her two sons and a daughter, one of whom serves in the CRPF, are now well settled and happily married.

Turned into a refugee in her own country during the 1971 war, Karnataro Devi, wife of the late Sepoy Sundurilal of the 5th Battalion of the Dogra Regiment, came to know about her husband’s martyrdom three months after the war, when his mortal remains arrived, as the roads from Kargil were blocked due to the hazardous weather. But fate had yet more tests for her; she lost her young son to an ailment soon after. However, with a will to fight on, she rallied her courage and worked even harder to provide the best for her daughter, the last living symbol of her eternal bond with a soldier.

The story of Simro Devi, wife of the late Sepoy Sahib Singh of the 9th Battalion of JAK Light Infantry, is yet another tale to draw inspiration from. Only a mirage remained of the dreams the couple had woven together of having a daughter and bringing her up with love and care, but after the demise of her husband, life was altered and gloom lay heavy upon the young woman. Nevertheless, she found her inner strength and took up tailoring to lead a life of respect and dignity. She adopted a girl and raised her the way they had dreamt of, to honour the wishes of her late husband.

The moist eyes of Pushpa Devi, wife of the late Lance Naik Gullu Ram of 8 Grenadiers, tell a story of perseverance without a single word being uttered. Sorrow and grief may have wrinkled her features, but not her spirit. Gullu Ram made the supreme sacrifice while fighting the enemy in the battle of Chakra in the Shakargarh bulge.

These stories form a part of the tapestry that is the Indian Army and the countless sacrifices made for the country. These also serve as an inspiration in these trying times of the pandemic, when uncertainty looms large. It sends out a message that even after such an ordeal if a person can survive and thrive in this world, there is no obstacle that the human endeavour cannot surmount.

Former Western Army Commander Lt Gen SS Mehta (Retd), who commanded a tank squadron that rolled into Dhaka as a greenhorn, remembers the epic battles beyond the brief

The 5 Independent Armoured Squadron (63 Cavalry) making a victorious entry into Dhaka. Troops of assorted units and some correspondents can be seen atop tanks.

Lt Gen SS Mehta (Retd)

It is now only a four-hour journey by road but 50 years ago, the Akhaura to Dhaka march that redrew the map of South Asia and rewrote its military history took us 13 tumultuous days. After a brilliant 72-hour operation at Akhaura, the enemy’s formidable stronghold — defended by a battalion of their elite 12 Frontier Force and elements of 12 Azad Kashmir, supported by tanks, artillery and air service — wilted, and whatever was left of them were in retreat.

The credit for this remarkable victory goes to 311 Mountain Brigade Group, commanded by Brig RN Mishra. The operation was a brilliant success, with 4 Guards, commanded by the dashing and inspirational Lt Col Himmeth Singh, infiltrating the enemy lines, and the lead company, commanded by Maj Chandrakant Singh, repulsing a counter-attack of infantry and tanks. Maj Chandrakant earned an instant Vir Chakra for his brave leadership.

As a young Major, I was in command of 5 Independent Armoured Squadron (63 Cavalry), equipped with PT-76 tanks. In early November, the squadron had been ordered to assist the 61 Mountain Brigade in infiltrating behind Lalmai Hills in Comilla, 63 km west of Agartala. We had done all the reconnaissance and coordination to execute the operation but, after a change in plans on November 28, the squadron was tasked to move with the infiltrating column with 4 Guards on the night of December 1. We had no time to reconnoitre and gather terrain and enemy obstacle layout along our route. It was therefore no surprise that on the night of our infiltration, we were caught in a cleverly laid anti-tank ditch on the fringes of Akhaura. 4 Guards, ahead of us, was wading through deep slush. A ditch is no obstacle for the infantry but for the tanks, it is designed to separate the infantry from the tanks.

After a night spent in recovery under intense enemy artillery fire, and faced with a relentless assault from the sky by the enemy Sabre jets next morning, we recovered in time to assist 18 Rajput, commanded by the gallant Lt Col Ashok Verma, in a successful day attack on the enemy defences guarding the Akhaura railway station. Earlier, a masterful frontal closing-in operation by 10 Bihar, commanded by the ever-cheerful Lt Col PC Sawhney — with lethal fire support provided by 65 Mountain Regiment, ably led by Col DS Bahl, and with the 57 Mountain Artillery Brigade fire support under Brig Jangi Bawa — the enemy was pulverised. Attack by infiltration was an unorthodox plan. It worked. For us, the start could not have been more propitious.

The masterstroke of crossing the Meghna river bypassing ground opposition is a classic example of an operational manoeuvre exercised targeting the enemy mind. It created shock and awe, a term now fashionable in Western capitals. The prospect of a captured Dhaka galvanised everyone up and down the security establishment. It saw Team India at its historic best. Indira Gandhi’s statement — ‘Dhaka is the free capital of a free country’ — exemplifies 20th century’s most successful humanitarian intervention against genocide surmounting all odds

Routed Pak brigade on the run

The momentous fall of Akhaura triggered a hasty retreat by Pakistan’s 27 Infantry Brigade towards Meghna river. The tank squadron and 4 Guards were in hot pursuit. Having captured the enemy advance defences at Talashahar, 4 Guards were ordered to break contact with the enemy and assemble at Brahmanbaria in anticipation of a new task, as yet under active consideration. Breaking contact with a withdrawing enemy in battle amounts to having the enemy on the ropes, yet not delivering the knockout punch. However, this is where experience and military judgement take over. At the tactical level, such a direction seemed strange; however, at the operational level, as it later turned out, the stage was being set for a bigger blow — Dhaka.

18 Rajput and 10 Bihar continued their relentless drive towards the bridge. This reinforced the enemy perception that our objective was to capture the bridge intact. Both battalions reached within 300 yards of the bridge on the Meghna. Such speed, always necessary when in contact with the enemy, is an adrenalin booster. So it was. However, the demolished bridges and culverts delayed their redeployment. Our troops were soon beyond artillery range; besides, our Forward Air Controller, Flying Officer Shahid, had been injured and his communication equipment destroyed. With an SOS from 18 Rajput, my squadron detached from 4 Guards and joined the firefight. When we arrived, the battle was raging. The enemy brigade commander had launched a spoiling attack with infantry and tanks, supported by anti-tank guns. A melee ensued. My squadron lost three tanks in the firefight. One of them was led by my brave troop leader Lt Rajindar Mohan, who was hit by an anti-tank gun after he had silenced two of the enemy’s. He escaped with severe burn injuries. The enemy was neutralised by our joint action and their counter-attack fizzled out. Some Pakistani soldiers were killed, others escaped over the bridge, while a few got across on country boats. However, due to the ferocity of our pursuit and to prevent the capture of the Meghna bridge, the Pakistani general in command of 14 Division, Maj Gen Majid, ordered its demolition. Commanders, who leave their troops stranded across an obstacle and order its demolition, tell the story of panic in the enemy garrison.

The masterstroke

With the bridge blown, our Corps Commander, Lt Gen Sagat Singh, was at the proverbial dead end. History is replete with instances when in a battle situation there is an unanticipated pause — because of one’s own actions, or that of the enemy’s. The former gives you food for thought; the latter invariably provides you a fleeting opportunity. Our GOC could have chosen to defer the advance and draw comfort from having completed his assigned task. However, Sagat’s lifetime experience of combat told him otherwise. It served only to stoke the flame within him. For him, an opportunity beckoned. He had Dhaka in sight. He knew it was the strategic centre of gravity, the focal point — although it was beyond his brief. His experiences of the past intuitively brought a glint in his eye. He later described that day as the most exciting of his life. He could not let a brilliant opportunity go unaddressed. He knew what Dhaka meant in the larger scheme. He wagered on his intuition.

Sagat conferred with his Air Force commander, Group Captain Chandan Singh, and ordered a battalion to be flown in helicopters across the Meghna for the march to Dhaka — this later came to be known as the ‘Helibridge over the Meghna’. The battalion was 4 Guards. There was some murmur about ground fire, to which Chandan retorted: “I will be in the leading chopper.” That provided closure to the debate. The heli-lift of 4 Guards was Air Force’s golden moment. 110 Helicopter Unit under Squadron Leader CS Sandhu’s leadership, supported by a band of brave young pilots, worked with precision and a tireless turnaround schedule. They positioned the battalion across the Meghna: a feat nonpareil.

Next, I was ordered to take my tanks across the Meghna. The Soviet-made PT-76 tank was designed to cross European rivers, which are generally 200-300 metres wide. In comparison, the Meghna was almost like a sea and in the midst of the battle and when ordered to cross it, to me, it seemed like an ocean! I could not see the other bank. However, my GOC’s intent was set in stone and when he asked me whether we could cross the river, my reply was in the affirmative.

Having said that, I was not sure of the ‘how’ part of the operation. I was a greenhorn and thank God for it! Greenhorns get smitten by commanders whose reputation and charisma settle for nothing less than the best. My answer had to be a ‘Yes sir’; and so it was. The speed of the water current in the Meghna was in double digits in knots. I don’t know exactly what it was, but I could see the flow was very swift. As the rivers get closer to the Bay of Bengal, they pick speed and the current is much stronger than what the PT-76 tanks could negotiate in a near perpendicular crossing across two banks, which is often the battle requirement when the opposite bank is held. Fortunately, in our case, the far bank was not held by the enemy. Anticipating that I would have to exit downstream of my entry due to the speed of the water current, I requested for a helicopter to do a reconnaissance of the river. It was granted. Not satisfied with the first sortie, I asked for a second sortie and that too was approved. In the meantime, my troop leader, Lt Raj Khindri, assisted by the locals, had reconnoitered the home bank and found a marsh-free entry route into the river. My aerial sorties helped me to mark out small islands in the river which would allow me to make short hops. The entry and exit points to the islands were laterally separated by miles. My idea was to move from island to island — island hopping, as it were. We hopped countless times and crossed.

Team India

The masterstroke of crossing the Meghna bypassing ground opposition is a classic example of an operational manoeuvre exercised by a military commander targeting the enemy mind. It created shock and awe, a term that has now become fashionable in the Western capitals. The prospect of a captured Dhaka galvanised everyone up and down the security establishment. It saw Team India at its historic best. It led to the march of a column, infantry, tanks and guns straight into the heart of the centre of gravity. Further, as part of the teamwork at Delhi and Kolkata, 2 Para, commanded by the daredevil Lt Col KS Pannu, was on standby to paradrop at Tangail with a column of 1 Maratha under Lt Col KS ‘Bulbul’ Brar gliding down from Tura in Meghalaya for a link-up. The Navy was punishing Karachi with missiles from ships, accompanied with Petya Class frigates. The Air Force, master of the skies in the East, having successfully flown an infantry battalion across the Meghna, was targeting the Government House at Dhaka where Pakistani options to surrender or fight till the last were perhaps under discussion. At that stage, we did not know which of the two options was finding favour. Leaflets were dropped over enemy emplacements, in which Pakistani soldiers were exhorted to surrender lest they should fall into the hands of those they had tormented — the unfortunate Bengalis of East Pakistan.

Behind the scenes, the staff were busy — Maj Gen Jacob in Kolkata was deliberating the Terms of Surrender. Lt Gen Jagjit Aurora at his HQ in Kolkata, Lt Gen Inder Gill, the DGMO, and COAS Gen Sam Manekshaw were monitoring the battlefield and the developing global reactions. They were conscious that time was at a premium.

The intelligence agencies and the diplomats were tracking the Nixon-Kissinger threat of deploying the US 7th fleet into the Bay of Bengal. The trump card of the Indo-Soviet treaty, signed in August 1971, came into play and India was supported with repeated vetoes by the USSR at the United Nations Security Council. Our diplomats were also fighting Bhutto’s canards at the UN. The administrators were gearing up for a temporary governance structure in the captured territory of East Pakistan, till Bangladeshis themselves took over. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her colleagues held their nerve amidst intense rumours of intervention by the powers beyond.

This sort of seamless synergy is an assured recipe for success. There were tasks cut out and delivered on all fronts — military, diplomatic, political, strategic, operational and tactical. It is this synergy that enabled the capture of Dhaka after Sagat’s breathtaking Meghna river-crossing manoeuvre. I learnt early in my service that initiative is not only a trait, it is a duty.

Mukti Bahini

In 13 days, 75 million were rescued from possible genocide; it emphasised the totality of victory; shock and awe with little or no collateral damage; a historical moment to be recorded in the archives of military history in India, and across the world. It was a lesson in the inextricable linkages between grand strategy and conflict-termination objectives. Unless the two are co-terminus, victory remains but a mirage.

In 50 years since, we have witnessed numerous military interventions where the absence of appropriate, thought-out conflict-termination objectives has resulted in face-saving withdrawals. If Dhaka had not been addressed, and its surrender not achieved, one more mirage would have been added to this ever growing list.

The Mukti Bahini kept the wheel turning, keeping the momentum in our favour. In today’s age we talk about battlefield transparency rendered possible by sensors, radars, artificial intelligence and satellites. In 1971, battlefield transparency was, whenever possible, provided by the Mukti Bahini. Their presence and their will to fight for a just cause made an outstanding contribution towards the capitulation of the enemy before the Joint Command.

Indira Gandhi’s statement in Parliament — “Dhaka is the free capital of a free country” —- exemplifies 20th century’s most successful humanitarian intervention against genocide surmounting all odds

WAR DESPATCHES

Sidney Schanberg, the Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent of New York Times who rode into Dhaka with us, had this to say: “I don’t like sitting around praising armies. I don’t like armies because armies mean wars. But this (Indian) army was something. They were great all the way. There never was a black mark… I lived with the officers and I walked, rode with the jawans — and they were all great. Sure some of them were scared at first — they wouldn’t be human if they weren’t. But I never saw a man flinch because he was scared. There was a tremendous spirit in the Indian Army and it did one good to experience it.”

From the battles fought on western front between Degh Nadi and Bein river emerged two PVCs (Maj Hoshiar Singh and 2nd Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal), eight Maha Virs, including Lt Col VP Ghai, Lt Col VP Airy and Havildar Thomas Phillipose, and many more who won Vir Chakras and other awards for their bravery

In this group photograph of the 3rd Grenadiers, Lt Col Ved Prakash Airy, MVC, is seated in the centre. To his left is Maj Hoshiar Singh, PVC, and to his right, Maj SS Cheema, SM.

Lt Col Dilbag Singh Dabas (Retd)

On December 3, 1971, at last light, the PAF simultaneously attacked the forward Indian airfields, including the Advance Landing Ground at Faridkot. When the expected pre-emptive ground attack by Pakistan did not materialise, the Indian Army decided to cross the International Border on the western front and enter the Shakargarh Bulge at dusk on December 5, with troops advancing on a broad front between Degh Nadi in the north and Ravi river in the south-east. The plan of the 54 Infantry Division, spearheading the advance, envisaged launching of operations against Zafarwal-Rajian-Dhamtal from general area Mawa-Galar, establishing a bridgehead across Basantar Nadi and capturing the Supwal Ditch.

The task allotted to 54 Infantry Division also included the destruction of Pakistan’s 8 (Independent) Armoured Brigade and the capture of Zafarwal. After some preliminary operations en route, its 47 Infantry Brigade was ordered to establish a bridgehead west of Basantar Nadi to include areas Barapind-Lalial RF-Sarajchak and south-west shoulder of Supwal Ditch during phase 1 of the Divisional attack, followed by capture of Jarpal and Lohal in the second phase.

The Pakistan army had predictably concentrated the bulk of its armour to the west of Basantar between Supwal Ditch and Zafarwal and waited for the enemy armour to enter the dragon (chakravyuh). The Indian armour entered the chakravyuh and smashed it, but not without losing Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal, its Abhimanyu.

During the 1971 war, from the battles fought on the western front between Degh Nadi and Bein river emerged two Param Virs (Major Hoshiar Singh of the 3rd Grenadiers and Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal of The Poona Horse); eight Maha Virs, including Lieutenant Colonels VP Ghai, VP Airy and Havildar Thomas Phillipose, and many more who outperformed themselves and won Vir Chakras and other awards for their bravery.

Lt Col Ved Prakash Ghai, an alumnus of Mission School and DAV College, Dehradun, while commanding 16 Madras, raised in 1819 as the 2nd Travancore Nair Infantry, led it from the front and blunted three determined counter-attacks by the enemy to dislodge his battalion from the bridgehead established by his Madrasis. He was killed in action but not before ensuring that his gallant Thambis held on to the bridgehead they had established at a heavy cost.

Lt Col Ghai was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for outstanding command of his battalion during the bridgehead battle. The excerpts from the battle account read:

At 7:30 pm on December 15, during phase 1 of the Division attack, Lieutenant Colonel Ved Prakash Ghai, commanding 16 Madras, led his battalion for the capture of Lalial and Sarajchak as part of the bridgehead operation. The positions were captured after some of the sharpest hand-to-hand encounters. The enemy launched many counter-attacks at night to dislodge the battalion but under the inspiring leadership of Lt Col Ghai, his men beat back all attacks.

As the day dawned, the enemy again launched a determined counter-attack supported by artillery and armour. With utter disregard to personal safety, Lt Col Ghai moved fearlessly from one Company position to another encouraging his men. Inspired by his fearlessness, bravery and leadership, the battalion repulsed the attacks with heavy losses to the enemy. However, a stray bullet by the withdrawing enemy caught him in the chest, wounding him seriously. Before he could be evacuated, Lt Col Ghai died on the battlefield but not before ensuring that his battalion held onto the bridgehead for three nights and two days steadfastly against all possible odds.

Havildar Thomas Phillipose from Kerala was a Non Commissioned Officer in 16 Madras. During the 1971 war, his and the platoon’s dare-devilry during the bridgehead battle proved beyond doubt that the Madrasis (men in Indian Army belonging to Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana) are no less martial than the maliciously created martial classes by the British.

Havildar Thomas Phillipose was platoon commander in one of the companies of 16 Madras occupying the bridgehead across Basantar. During a counter-attack, after causing heavy casualties, the enemy captured a portion of the bridgehead after overpowering one of the forward sections of his platoon. Realising the criticality of the situation, Havildar Thomas rallied the meager strength of his platoon, sounded the battle cry ‘Veer Madrasi Adi Kollu-Adi Kollu-Adi Kollu (Brave Madrasi Hit and Kill – Hit and Kill – Hit and Kill)’ and led the dash with bayonets drawn. The spontaneous action inspired the small force of Madrasis to the hilt. During the dash, although he received a bullet on his left shoulder, wounding him severely, Thomas did not stop. The charge led by him was so determined that the enemy fled without giving a fight.

For his conspicuous gallantry, Havildar Thomas Phillipose was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. Major PV Sahadevan and Naik Sahadevan of 16 Madras, too, performed beyond the call of duty and earned Vir Chakras.

Lieutenant Colonel Ved Prakash Airy, an alumnus of Government School, Karnal, took over the command of the 3rd Grenadiers in April 1971. In the morning hours of December 5, the battalion, as part of 47 Infantry Brigade, was ordered to cross the IB and ‘Bash on Regardless’ (the motto of 54 Infantry Division).

On the night of December 5/6, the 3rd Grenadiers crossed the International Border. The first interference from the enemy’s infantry and armour came up at Bhaironath. With the bold planning by Lt Col Airy and dauntless courage by his paltan, by the first light on December 6, not only was the defended locality captured, but also taken were three prisoners of war and two Sherman tanks with Patton turrets.

The battles fought and won so far were only part of the preliminary operations. For the main task, the 3rd Grenadiers spearheaded Phase 2 of the 54 Infantry Division attack and, under the leadership of Lt Col Airy, did more than enough to earn the title of ‘PVC Battalion’ by capturing the heavily defended Jarpal deep inside Pakistan.

During the iconic battle, the 3rd Grenadiers not only captured the heavily defended Jarpal, but with support from the tanks of The Poona Horse and the guns of Divisional Artillery, including those of 161 Field Regiment and 75 Medium Regiment, held on to it defeating repeated enemy counter-attacks.

The role played by Lt Col Airy earned him the Maha Vir Chakra. The battle account reads:

The 3rd Grenadiers was tasked to capture the heavily defended localities of Jarpal and Lohal on the night of December 15/16, with a view to establish a bridgehead on Basantar Nadi for the tanks to break out. Lt Col Airy led his troops fearlessly even when his men were fighting the enemy hand-to-hand. Though the casualties of the battalion were marginally high, both objectives were captured. But after regrouping, the enemy counter-attacked in the morning hours on December 16, followed by the attacks supported by the tanks to dislodge the Grenadiers from the bridgehead but all the counter-attacks were ruthlessly beaten back one after the other.

During the battle, unmindful of his personal safety, Lt Col Airy moved from one Company to the other, with just his cap balaclava as headgear, motivating his men to hold the captured ground. Noticing the firm resolve of the Grenadiers, the enemy finally retreated with heavy losses.”

During the battle of Jarpal, ‘C’ Company of the 3rd Grenadiers under the command of Major Hoshiar Singh beat back repeated counter-attacks. Maj Singh was awarded the PVC.

The ‘B’ Company of the 3rd Grenadiers, under the command of Major SS Cheema, which was defending Jarpal adjacent to the ‘C’ Company of Maj Hoshiar Singh, too, repulsed repeated counter-attacks against all possible odds. For his exemplary leadership, Maj Cheema was awarded the Sena Medal (gallantry). Lance Havildar Jaswant Singh and Grenadier Ram Kumar also made the battalion proud by winning Vir Chakras.

After winning the toughest battle, Lt Col Airy, before endorsing the bravery of his battalion’s officers and men, did the honour to the bravehearts of the supporting arms, including Second Lieutenant Khetarpal of The Poona Horse, Captain Satish Sehgal of 75 Medium Regiment, Major Prahalad Toro of 161 Field Regiment and Captain RN Gupta of 9 Engineer Regiment.

Regarding endorsement of the bravery of Second Lieutenant Khetarpal, there is a piece of history that personifies the strong inter-arm camaraderie. Maj Cheema, commanding ‘B’ Company of the 3rd Grenadiers, along with his forward platoon, while fighting the enemy infantry with baited breath and at a visible distance, watched Arun in action. Even after his tank got hit, Arun did not abandon it (since the tank gun was still firing) and singlehandedly destroyed three enemy tanks from as close as 75 yards before dying a hero’s death. After the battle, Maj Cheema (from Infantry) narrated the most conspicuous bravery of Second Lieutenant Khetarpal (from Armoured Corps). And Lt Col Airy, a thorough professional, proudly endorsed the submission.

After the war, a senior General officer from the Pakistan army remarked, “If two armoured regiments (13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry) of our army could not evict two Indian infantry companies (Hoshiar’s and Cheema’s of 3rd Grenadiers) supported by just a squadron of armour (of The Poona Horse), it was foolhardy to pitch 35 Frontier Force battalion against them. It was nothing short of hara-kiri, suicidal.”

Incidentally, C (Sikh) Squadron of 13 Lancers, at Partition, formed part of The Poona Horse. So, during the 1971 war, in effect, the ‘son’ was fighting the ‘father’. And among the defeated 13 Lancers (by The Poona Horse) was the Officer Commanding B Squadron, Major Jehangir Karamat, who later became Pakistan’s COAS.

Lt Col Airy also displayed a high level of morality and professionalism by recommending Lt Col Mohd Akram Raja, Commanding Officer of 35 Frontier Forces, his counterpart, whose body was recovered with bullet marks on the forehead and right hand with a firm grip on his gun, for the highest gallantry decoration in Pakistan. The handwritten citation did not go unnoticed. Lt Col Raja was awarded ‘Hilal-i- Jur’at’, Pakistan’s second highest gallantry decoration.