Monthly Archives: August 2018

Jammu, December 13

The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, Lt Gen RP Singh paid a two- day visit to the Tiger Division to review the security situation in the Jammu sector. He was accompanied by Lt Gen Upendra Dwivedi, General Officer Commanding of the Yol-based Rising Star Corps.

He was briefed on the operational scenario and other aspects. The Army commander also visited the troops in forward areas and complimented them for maintaining a high degree of operational preparedness.— TNS

Tribune News Service

Singhu, December 16

A number of 1971 war veterans, while commemorating Vijay Divas at the Singhu border, on Wednesday opposed the three contentious Central agriculture laws and showed solidarity with the protesting farmers.

The war veterans said the new agiculture laws would prove detrimental to the farming community. Seeking repeal of the contentious farm Acts, the veterans said they were ready to fight the farmers’ battle.

Subedar Major Tarsem Singh (retd) from Moga said: “We are here because most of us belong to families of farmers. It is our moral duty to support their cause”.

Captain Bikar Singh (retd) said: “Farmers across the country are protesting against these laws, but the Union Government is not ready to budge. It is shameful for the government that both jawan and kisan are unhappy in the country.”

While their sons were keeping the borders secure, the farmers were forced to protest on the roads for their genuine rights, said Bikar Jogendra Singh, president of the Indian Veteran Organisation.

“The Central Government made a mistake by not consulting the farmers before introducing the agriculture Bills in Parilament. We thus appeal to the government to immediately consider the farmer unions’ just demands and repeal the controversial laws,” he said. The farmers’ stir is growing stronger and stronger with each passing day, with support pouring in from various organisations.

‘Uniformed’ man in stir raises concern

Chandigarh: The government is closely watching the impact of the farmers’ protest on the uniformed community as a large chunk of their manpower come from rural areas and agrarian background. Concern has been raised in official circles after the photograph of a turbaned person wearing the Army field dress bearing a name tag at a protest site in Bathinda cropped up on the social media, prompting a probe by intelligence agencies to ascertain his identity and antecedents. TNS

Tilak Devasher

Member, National Security Advisory Board

Since its creation, two issues have been critical in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy and have resonated in its domestic discourse as well: Kashmir and Palestine. On both, success has been a mirage despite which Pakistan has persisted with its ‘principled’ position even as the world around it has changed fundamentally. Now, however, as the shifting sands of the Middle East are leading the Gulf countries to recalibrate their foreign policies towards Israel, a debate has been ignited in Pakistan about re-looking at its own policy towards a country it does not recognise and its passports are not valid for travel to.

In 2005, the Pakistani media was agog about ‘fresh thinking’ on the subject of Israel. This was instigated by the Turkish-facilitated meeting of the then Pak Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri with his Israeli counterpart Silvan Shalom on February 9, 2005, in Istanbul. What followed was a ‘historic’ meeting between General Musharraf and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at the UN in New York on September 14, 2005, during a photo opportunity for world leaders attending the UN General Assembly. Musharraf was also invited to address the American Jewish Congress on September 17, 2005, when he was greeted with a standing ovation for initiating public diplomatic contacts with Israel. A moved Musharraf said he did not expect a Pakistani leader “to be greeted by this community with this sort of ovation.” Nothing much, however, came out of these exchanges.

Speculations had persisted even before the 2005 meetings that Pakistan and Israel had maintained informal contacts for more than a decade, which continued after the Musharraf-Sharon meeting as well. More recently, in October 2018, there were reports about a private Israeli business jet travelling to Islamabad from Tel Aviv via Amman and remaining on the ground for nearly 10 hours. Pakistan, however, denied the report. Three months later, Pakistan permitted a Pakistani Jew to travel to Israel and also encouraged him to publicise this permission.

The current controversy over Israel was triggered by the peace deals between the UAE and Bahrain with Israel, quite possibly with a nod from Saudi Arabia. Similarly, though there is opaqueness over the reported covert meeting between the Israeli prime minister and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on November 22, 2020. Many analysts believe that it is only a matter of time before the two sides normalise relations, nudged no doubt by the outgoing Trump administration. The mutual hostility of Saudi Arabia and Israel towards Iran has been a major factor in bringing them closer.

Unlike the Gulf states, Pakistan has not been in war with Israel. Yet, normalisation, despite obvious advantages, remains distant due largely to Pakistan’s ideological underpinnings and equating the Palestinian struggle with efforts to ‘liberate’ Kashmir. In an interview with Dunya TV in August 2020, Imran Khan quoted Jinnah saying in 1948 that Pakistan could not recognise Israel unless it gave freedom to the Palestinians. He added, “If we recognise Israel and ignore tyranny faced by the Palestinians, we will have to give up (the cause of) Kashmir as well, and this we cannot do.” In another interview, he said there was pressure to recognise Israel but without a resolution of the Palestinian issue, it could not be done. Moreover, Pakistan’s religiously-oriented parties and terror groups are not merely fiercely opposed to any relationship with Israel, but have repeatedly called for its destruction.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE certainly have sufficient financial leverage over Islamabad to make it think seriously about a change in policy towards Israel. This would have the advantage of weaning Pakistan away from Iran. However, given the ideological pitfalls, the moot point is why has the Israel issue been raised at all and why now.

There are several possibilities. Quite apart from developments in the Middle East, Pakistan has an exaggerated sense of its importance. It believes that being the only Islamic nuclear power with links with the Arab world, Israel and the US would like it to play the role of a facilitator with Arab countries. As a quid pro quo, Pakistan could use the support of the strong Jewish lobbies in the US for the resolution of the Kashmir issue.

There is also a domestic angle, in that Imran Khan is beleaguered with a crumbling economy and the Opposition seeking his ouster. Under these conditions, controversy over Israel could be used to divert domestic attention, at least momentarily.

More than the civil government, the Pak army would have to agree. Since it would invite a backlash from the clerics, quite possibly selective debates where pro-establishment journalists and retired Generals have talked about a relook of Pakistan’s Israel policy has been initiated to prepare public opinion for some normalisation in the future. A concrete signal in this regard would be when Islamic lobbies will be prevailed upon to come up with relevant Quranic injunctions that refer to prohibition of having intimate and trusting relationships with Jews, but not for having a working relationship with them. This will enable the government to claim that remaining within such injunctions, it would be possible to re-evaluate its policies in line with the changing global realities.

Pakistan’s dilemma is that moves towards Israel, apart from ideological considerations, would upset the delicate balance that it has sought to maintain between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While chumming up to Israel may ease its relations with the Arabs to a limited extent, it would be at the cost of ties with Iran with whom it shares a somewhat troubled land border. Then there are Pakistan’s own substantial Shia population and the street power of the clerics. This would be quite a lethal combination for a weakened Imran Khan to take on at this stage.

Views are personal

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)

Military commentator

Myanmar, which is seen to be the springboard of India’s Act East policy and the third strategic frontier, held its third election last month, attracting considerable attention in New Delhi. Elections held under the military-drafted constitution of 2008 which is regarded as the roadmap to full democracy returned National League of Democracy’s (NLD) Aung San Suu Kyi to power with a landslide victory despite incumbency, sub-par economic performance, the Rohingya crisis, failed peace talks with ethnic groups, nationalistic Buddhist resurgence and the Covid pandemic.

Myanmar has a unique hybrid civil-military power-sharing system in which the Senior General calls the shots. The clash of two power centres complicates decision-making.

The National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) is the apex body controlling the three services and police. The military calls itself the guardian of the nation justifying interference in domestic politics as it has to protect the constitution, according to which 25 per cent of the seats in the central, state and regional legislatures are reserved for it. Making a constitutional change which requires a two-thirds majority in both houses is very difficult, if not impossible. Internal, defence and border affairs ministries are reserved for the junta. De facto, the military controls politics, security, economy, wealth and the Buddhist clergy.

Relations between the NLD and the military have been worsening, though Suu Kyi defended the military at the International Court of Justice against allegations of genocide against the Rohingya, thereby tarnishing her international image but boosting her domestic standing. The military faces calibrated challenges from two dozen active and dormant insurgencies.

Suu Kyi is a canny politician in a party led by elderly politicians with no second-tier leadership. The NLD has not been able to stand up to the military. The Rohingya crackdown by the army in 2017 has led to the rise of the Rakhine Rohingya Salvation Army, a new anti-state insurgency.

In April 2021, the military supremo is likely to change after a decade, but Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has said he will stay on in another civilian or military post. He has been hobnobbing with opposition parties and expressed a wish to become vice-president. If this happens, it will be the first time a C-in-C will occupy a government post which is number five in the pecking order. He is a political general, openly critical of government institutions for lack of discipline and efficiency.

Sharing a 2,100-km border, China is the Big Brother in Myanmar involved in domestic politics, development and economy, peace talks with ethnic groups and enjoying deep ties with both the NLD and the military, which is not entirely happy with Beijing’s enlarging footprint. China has said it will support Myanmar in safeguarding its legitimate rights, interests and national dignity.

Beijing’s flagship project under the BRI is the 1,700-km China-Myanmar Economic Corridor CMEC (38 projects of which nine approved) which packs infrastructure projects linking China’s Yunan province with the strategic deep sea port of Kyaukphyu in Rakhine province, which India had once eyed, that will provide access to the Bay of Bengal. Yunan, in fact, is integrated with North Myanmar up to Mandalay. The $100-billion CMEC which includes building the $8-million Yangon New City may outmatch the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in the long run.

Myanmar is heavily indebted to China, which accounts for 70 per cent of the FDI in the energy sector alone. China holds 40 per cent of Myanmar’s $5-10 billion debt. Both countries have a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Agreement with the new 2+2 first ever dialogue arrangement.

Still, the seeds of mistrust have grown, prompting the military to accuse China of supplying military equipment to rebel groups, including the Arakan Army in Rakhine and Chin states. In 2011, Senior General Than Shwe had turned to India for reducing dependence on China, which it finds necessary but irksome.

In October, India showed rare prescience in dispatching its first ever joint civil-military delegation led by Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla and included the Army Chief, General Naravane, to Myanmar, signalling its nuanced recognition of the civil-military power-sharing mechanism.

Connectivity through Myanmar, the centrepiece of India’s Act East policy, is hobbled by insurgencies in both countries and tardy decision-making. The India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral is moving at a snail’s pace and requires a loop line through Mizoram to bypass insurgencies in Nagaland and Manipur. The multi-modal Kaladan project, from Sittwe port to Mizoram through Rakhine and China, has been disrupted by the Arakan Army, reportedly aided by China after it failed to block the project, including Sittwe.

The Imphal-Mandalay bus service started in April 2020 will pick up after the pandemic. India has offered to build a $6-billion petroleum refinery as investment in energy security even as it has completed 140 infra projects. India’s assistance, which is mainly in grants is $1.4 billion (and line of credit of $1.5 billion) is minuscule compared to China’s $3.5 billion, but mainly as loans. India has provided debt service relief of Myanmar’s cumulative liability of $10 billion.

Though Myanmar’s military equipment is 80 per cent Chinese, defence and security cooperation has increased significantly. Besides supplying small arms, tanks, artillery, offshore patrol vessels, a kilo-class submarine was gifted recently.

With a two-million Indian diaspora as an asset, people-to-people relations and links of Buddhism need to be boosted. While playing catch-up with China is a bridge too far, increasing investment in education and agricultural sectors will be useful.

Like Pakistan, Myanmar is stuck with its generals, some of whom are being investigated for alleged genocide and will come under sanctions and, ultimately, be tried in international courts. Consequently, Myanmar’s relations with the West and the Islamic world have plummeted. There is little chance of the democracy deepening, the military submitting to civilian control and peace with ethnic insurgencies. Myanmar will suffer from status quo.

While China will remain a spoke in India’s Act East policy, it also has the potential to turn India’s two-front dilemma into two-and-a-half fronts. Defence diplomacy is India’s best card for now.

Abhijit Bhattacharyya

Commentator and Author

WAS the birth of the linguistic state of Bangladesh in 1971 a rare accident of history? Or was it owing to invisible and inexorable forces of history? It’s the ‘geography of the demography’ that played a pivotal role, which, more often than not, has been ignored.

India rightly claims credit for her ‘politico-military midwife’ role in the creation of an independent Bengali-speaking state in 1971, despite apprehension and concern in some quarters as India’s border areas are vulnerable to turbulence caused by China-aided and Pakistan-backed actors. Hence, the completion of 49 years of sovereign Bangladesh is all the more creditable if one assesses the overlapping physical contours of geographical Bengal as a whole.

The stark geography of the east was succinctly described by Dr Sudhindra Nath Bhattacharyya, an eminent historian of Dacca University, in The History of Bengal. How the Mughals faced problems in suppressing Bengal: “The task of conquest and consolidation was rendered more complicated owing to insuperable difficulties arising out of the nature of the country (side) and its peculiar geography. Bengal, with its numerous rivers, streams, nalahs, creeks, swamps, its damps and moist air, and its prolonged rains half the year, peculiar vegetation, absence of barley and wheat, its no less peculiar language, foreign to Urdu and Hindi alike — all these made Mughal grandees intensely dislike service in Bengal.” Did the Pakistani army repeat the Mughal history in 1971? Notwithstanding the brute force and savagery perpetrated on ‘blacks of the east’, as infamously referred to by its army brass?

‘Blacks of the east’, nevertheless were not the sole obstacle to Pakistan’s forces. There existed something more deep-rooted. The geomorphology and terrain being the biggest mismatch of demographic civility and civilisational chemistry between the eastern geography of Bengal and the non-eastern topography of South Asia, as gleaned from the monumental research work of Dr Nihar Ranjan Ray in his path-breaking History of the Bengali people (1950).

Thus described Yuan-ch’uang: “People of Pundravardhana (south of Brahmaputra) were straightforward, virtuous and had great respect for culture and learning… Tamralipti (coastal town Tamluk) people were brave, industrious, fond of learning but rough in their manner. People of Samatata (coastal area) were hard-working, while those of Karnasuvarna (central Bengal) were gentle, of fine character, and gave much support to scholarship.”

On the linguistic front, however, things didn’t appear optimistic. Bodhayana Dharmasutra didn’t have good things to suggest on Bengali. “On return from Vanga (Bengal) to central lands, or Aryavarta, it was necessary to perform expiation” owing to ‘Vanga being barbarian territory and their people of low origin” (does it have an uncanny similarity with the views of the army of undivided Pakistan?) The contrary view, too, speaks for itself. The in-built contradiction and confrontation between Bengal and Aryavarta: “Aryan language and culture had neither understanding of, nor respect for, the language, customs and culture of non-Aryan or pre-Aryan people of Gauda (Central Bengal), Pundravardhana and Vanga.”

The uniqueness of Bengal’s geography, therefore, constitutes an oft-forgotten reality. That a country’s political boundaries and natural geographical boundaries may not always be the same even if there exists a common linguistic or homogenous ethnic group. Hence, the fertile land of Bengal invariably attracted those who hailed from a comparatively barren and less fertile land — for a better livelihood.

Another important scenario of the east pertained to language, literature and learning, traditionally the strongest features of the demography of Bengal. Its true that ancient India’s learning is well known to have begun with Vedas, Brahmanas and Upanishads. “However, the learning and scholarship embodied in Vedas, Brahmanas and Upanishads, even in the Dharmashastras and Dharmashutras, had no effect on Bengal for quite a long time,” according to Dr Nihar Ranjan Ray.

That said, there also existed a notable characteristic of the Bengali language: the flexibility to take/accept words, and usage, from the likes of Mon-Khmer and the Kola-Munda group of languages. The latter brought about by a stream of the Dravidian family of languages. Further came the language of the Tibetan-Burmese people. This introduction, acceptance and induction of diverse languages in Bengal, which began centuries before the birth of Christ, ultimately led to what one sees today as the rich and easy-to-learn and understand lingua franca of 32 crore people of the world. Thus, those known as Bengali today are not all from one, but diverse ethnic groups, their commonality and strongest bond being the Bengali language.

Regrettably, however, the historical challenge of geography, coupled with the depth of sensitivity and conviction of Bengali-speaking people, conspicuously remained incomprehensible to the gun-toting army rulers of Pakistan. Thus, when the former chief of Pakistan’s Eastern Command, Lt Gen AAK Niazi, wrote in his book, The betrayal of East Pakistan (1998) that “Bengalis had little chance of standing against my well-disciplined and experienced troops”, it showed the undiminished and ingrained arrogance and ignorance of the vanquished General. Essentially, a military junta’s lack of knowledge led to an unprecedented battlefield disaster. Little wonder the history of the Bengali-speaking demography stands tall, dwarfing the army of Pakistan before its former eastern wing. Sovereign Bangladesh has truly added a rich chapter to the history of South Asia. The change from the Karachi-Dhaka axis in the 1950s to the Delhi-Dhaka friendship of the 2020s appears impressive. At least for now.

Washington, December 16 

The US Congress has officially passed the USD 740 billion defence policy bill, which among other things include calling out Chinese aggression against India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The US House of Representatives and the Senate on Tuesday passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which included key components of Indian-American Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi’s resolution language urging the Chinese government to end its military aggression against India along the LAC.

China and India have been locked in a military standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh since May this year. Several rounds of talks between the two countries to resolve the standoff have not yielded any concrete outcome.

The House and Senate versions of the bill were reconciled by a bipartisan Congressional conference committee earlier this month.

The inclusion of this provision, which Krishnamoorthi led as an amendment when the bill passed the House, reflects the US government’s strong support for its allies and partners like India in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

Krishnamoorthi’s measure, which passed each chamber with overwhelming bipartisan support, will become law if President Donald Trump signs it.

Trump has threatened to veto the bill as it lacks a repeal of legal protections for social media companies. However, the NDAA has been passed by Congress for the last 59 years.

“Violent aggression is seldom the answer, and this is especially true for the Line of Actual Control, which is the disputed border region that separates the People’s Republic of China from India,” Krishnamoorthi said.

“By including my resolution language in the NDAA and signing that legislation into law, the United States government will send a clear message that China’s military provocations of India will not be tolerated,” he said.

“The United States is committed to standing with our allies and partners like India in resolving the border standoff using diplomatic means,’ Krishnamoorthi said.

As approved by the conference report, the powerful NDAA says that it is the sense of the Congress on the aggression of China along the border with India and its growing territorial claims.

The Senate agreed to include the provisions of the bill that was passed by the House in its version of the bill.

The House bill contained provisions that would express the sense of Congress on cross-border violence between China and India and the growing territorial claims of Beijing.

Expressing “significant concern” over the continued military aggression by China along the border with India, the NDAA says that China “should work with” India toward de-escalating the situation along the Line of Actual Control through existing diplomatic mechanisms and refrain from attempting to settle disputes through coercion or force.

Attempts by China to advance baseless territorial claims, including those in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and with respect to Bhutan, are destabilising and inconsistent with international law, says the bill.

China is also engaged in hotly contested territorial disputes in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea. China claims sovereignty over all of the South China Sea. Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan have counterclaims.

Beijing has built up and militarised many of the islands and reefs it controls in the region. Both areas are stated to be rich in minerals, oil and other natural resources and are also vital to global trade. PTI

Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, December 16

To commemorate Vijay Diwas, that marks India’s spectacular victory over Pakistan in 1971, homage was paid to martyrs during a solemn wreath laying ceremony at the Veer Smriti war memorial at Chandimandir here on Wednesday.

On behalf of the General Officer Comanding-in-Chief, Western Command, Lt Gen Yogendra Dimri, Chief of Staff, Western Command, paid floral tributes at the memorial.

A number of senior veterans, including former Army Chief Gen VP Malik, former Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, former Navy Chief, Admiral Sunil Lamba, Lt Gen Tej Sapru (retd), Lt Gen Amar Aul (retd) and Vice Admiral HCS Bisht (retd), were also present on the occasion and paid their tributes.

Vijay Diwas this year also marks the commencement of Golden Jubilee year of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, which is being celebrated across the nation as ‘Swarnim Vijay Varsh’.

A year-long tri-services commemorative event also commenced on Wednesday at the National War Memorial, New Delhi, with the lighting of the Victory Flame.

Western Command had played a stellar role in the 1971 Indo-Pak war that was fought both, on the eastern and western fronts, from December 3-16, culminating in the surrender of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation.

The 13-day war is among one of the fastest and shortest campaigns in military history. With 93,000 Pakistani soldiers taken prisoners-of-war, it was also the largest surrender since the Second World War.