Lt Gen Pradeep Bali (retd)
Ex-Commander, Sikkim-based 33 Corps
Due to its distinct culture, a language difficult to pick up and the iron-fisted control of its regime, China has remained little known over the ages for a country of its size. The perception of China in the past few decades has been shaped mostly through the Western prism and as the developed world views it. Somewhat surprising indeed, as India and China have existed on either side of the Great Himalayas, as ancient civilisations for a few millennia. This understanding is somewhat flawed and may best be described as ‘lost in translation’. A clearer view would emerge by interpreting and analysing the Chinese behaviour, spoken and unspoken, from what has been expressed by their leadership and executed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
A peculiarity is the transliteration of complex characters and utterances of Mandarin, which tends to over-simplify it. To quote a few, the naked aggression against India in 1962 was labelled as ‘counter-attack in self-defence’. Closer to the present, the Central Military Commission spelt out the strategy of ‘active defence’. Well, there is nothing defensive about this strategy. Simply put, it means an aggressive posture which may involve reaching out militarily across the existing boundaries (temporary or permanent), to enhance the security of perceived Chinese territory.
In the maritime domain, we have Deng Xiaoping’s famous ‘Nine Dash Line’, which carved up a major portion of the South China Sea as Chinese property. The claims on Senkaku islands in the East China Sea and creating artificial islands to extend territorial waters, to the detriment of its neighbours, have been the hallmark of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategists.
Coming to the ongoing conflict and standoff in eastern Ladakh, it’s apparent that the Chinese Western Theatre Command and its subordinate formations have interpreted the active defence of territory in a very proactive approach at the tactical level, bordering on brashness. A backdrop to this, influencing the military leadership, would be the galling action of the Indian Army in stopping the PLA juggernaut in Doklam in June 2017.
On May 27, 2020, Xi Jinping was quoted by state news agency Xinhua as saying, “It is necessary to explore ways of training and preparing for war because epidemic control efforts have been normalised.” Was this to be interpreted as a green signal for the stalemated ground troops of the PLA in Aksai Chin?
Two distinct traits of the CCP leadership and PLA troops, at two ends of the Chinese authoritarian spectrum, make for interesting examination. At the government level, China always takes a maximal position in staking its territorial claims, however misplaced their veracity and however suspect their legitimacy. This possibly gives the CCP leadership and the Chinese diplomats and negotiators a vantage position to start with. This approach of the Chinese has to be firmly and patiently countered with an unyielding stance, as they play every trick in the book and outside it to wear down the opponent.
At the ground level, the PLA troops always try to display great belligerence and rampant indulgence in bullying, while facing an adversary. The old truism of standing up strongly to such behaviour and in fact bullying them right back holds good, as can be seen from the way events unfolded in western Bhutan three years ago and as things now stand in Ladakh. Even during various small-scale face-offs and physical brushes with the PLA, on the LAC, this is the one language that they respect and understand.
This brings us to the present imbroglio and the major question it throws up. Will China go to war with India, in the conventional sense as we understand it? What happened in Doklam and its aftermath and what is now happening along a few parts of the LAC in Ladakh is an aggressive planting of the flag, quite akin to staking claims on small islets in South China Sea. Physical occupation of territory, at times leading to aggressive jostling, is not how well-equipped and well-trained modern armies, with a lethal array of weaponry, go to war.
So what is CCP’S China looking at? It very definitely appears to be a long-drawn strategy of creeping forward, at places even risking scuffles which can turn nasty, to take the PLA flag further west. After protracted confabulations, militarily and diplomatically, the Chinese may at best concede minor adjustments to lower the rhetoric and belligerence. With time, a new line will emerge defining the ground realities, whatever be the perceptions of the LAC. After a suitable pause, the same shenanigans may be re-enacted as PLA hopes to continue fighting for land grab with this completely new form of non-conventional contact warfare.
However, what is very different here is a reactive-turned-proactive Indian Army, which will not only give as good or better than it gets, but will also not shy away from battle. Thirty-four summers ago, PLA had the first such experience at Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal’s Kameng sector, where it was effectively checkmated by the Indian troops in a game of counter deployment. Doklam was a different ball game where for the first time, the Indian Army stepped on foreign soil to confront the big bully from the north. While India may well claim a tactical and operational victory of sorts at Doklam, the fact is that the PLA troops continue to be in semi-permanent structures, less than 200 metres from the red line of the Torsa Nallah. However, eastern Ladakh is Indian territory and Aksai Chin is our claimed territory. The gloves are now off and the CCP may have to do some serious introspection about how to employ the PLA for furtherance of its revisionist and expansionist policies, without getting into a contact battle, in which it will have too much at stake. Its carefully cultivated image of an emerging superpower and challenger to the US may not survive even a limited clash of arms in Ladakh or anywhere else along the LAC with India.
