Lt Gen KJ Singh (retd)
Former Western Army Commander
Satellite imagery has picked up a buildup of Chinese armour — medium and light tanks — in proximity to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It is the operationalisation of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) concept, practised in mechanised exercises, in recent years. Manoeuvres have included a heavy drop of armoured vehicles, simulating the capture of passes. There are reports that the 6 Mechanised Division has deployed assorted AFVs (armoured fighting vehicles) — medium and light tanks — to leverage their coercive messaging potential, as part of psychological warfare.
At the outset, it will be appropriate to categorically state that India has adequate forces in a prepared and trained state, not only to take care of the threat but even cause criticalities for the Chinese. However, the PLA has more versatility in its fleet with the introduction of light tank, ZTQ, first fielded during the Doklam crisis. Our BMP-2s and ICVs (infantry combat vehicles) can be adapted to a limited extent for relevant tasks.
In the past few weeks, transport aircraft have been making repeated sorties to shore up our mechanised deployment in Ladakh. What is indeed baffling is that there have been discussions, questioning the very relevance of mechanised forces. The unfortunate truth is that it has become almost a compulsive habit to occasionally tinker with our force mix. Mercifully, a crisis jolts us out of such forays. It is also relevant that articles have appeared in magazines, in support of this exercise, sounding the death knell of tanks and calling for major cuts in inventory. Like the proverbial cat with nine lives, tanks have not only survived, but have a battle-winning presence, generating deterrence and psychological pressure, as is being felt in Ladakh.
The fielding of light tanks across the Zoji La pass in 1947 operations, Chushul in 1962 and PT-76 tanks of the 63rd Cavalry racing to Dhaka, are abiding examples of their relevance, provided commanders employ them boldly with imagination. Our armoured cars were in the vanguard in the Katanga (Congo) UN peace-keeping operations in the 1960s and later in counter-insurgency operations in the North-East. Tank battles of Asal Uttar, Basantar and Chawinda in 1965 and 1971 operations are proof of their potential.
One of the widely proliferated images of the ongoing standoff has been the Chinese Humvee type of patrol cars. Yet, we have chosen to eliminate light tanks and armoured cars, part of most modern armies, from our arsenal, citing a host of reasons. The primary justification has been budgetary constraints, especially in the past decade. Naturally, the guillotine has to fall on cost-intensive platforms. The other overriding factor has been a Pak-centric approach with excessive focus on proxy war.
Consequently, we have diluted our conventional options, which entail the use of mechanised forces. Such blinder- driven approach has meant that we are trapped in Pak’s preferred domain of hybrid war and lack deterrence against China. Our mainstay, infantry, has been denied the much needed protection. Ideally, it should have some proportion of lightly armoured vehicles for quick reaction teams, reconnaissance and commanders. A proposal for such vehicles was torpedoed within the Army in 2012, despite multiple screening and demand from the other two services. Considering that it takes six to seven years for the proposals to fructify, we are already pushed back. This proposal was revived and is now in its last stages. Interestingly, it was shot down on specious grounds that once mounted, the infantry would lose orientation, a gross under-estimation of their resilience.
The light tank has been another sad story and a part of the blame lies with the hierarchy of mechanised forces, who have felt that limited budget should be applied on medium tanks like T-90s, T-72s and indigenous Arjuns. Our current force mix in Ladakh and Sikkim can match the Chinese medium tanks— ZTZ-99 and ZTZ-96 (Types 99 and 96) — though in the long run, it will be appropriate to induct the T-90s. The only way to deter the Dragon is by upgrading our equipment profile. There is also a crying need to create an ecosystem for retrofitting and upgrading our tank fleet, as the prohibitive cost of replacement dictates a need for life extension, coupled with modernisation. The current production base is a combination of Avadi (Chennai) and Medak (Telangana). The logistics cost of transportation of equipment for overhaul to South India even when the platforms are deployed on the western and northern borders has been imposed due to parochial preferences. The new infrastructure for light tanks, armoured cars and retrofitting should leverage the available land and skill base in the vacant HMT Pinjore complex. It can be mentored by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) labs in the vicinity, such as the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL) and Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE), coupled with IIT Ropar and PEC.
The Chinese light tank, ZTQ, is a hybrid variant and essentially a lighter version of the medium tank, weighing 36 tonnes. It is equipped with low-pressure 105 mm gun and has 1,000 HP power pack. India should strive to field agile and versatile — air portable light tank, with missile and gun firing capabilities. It is an ideal platform for high altitude — Rann of Kutch, Siliguri corridor, riverine terrain, island territories and peace-keeping operations. Most importantly, it is crucial for quid pro quo options. It is learnt that some development work has been done by the DRDO and industry. There is also a possibility to optimise the hull (chassis) of K-9, Vajra self-propelled gun system. It will be prudent to quickly fix the qualitative requirements and initiate the project, in mission mode, synergising capabilities on work-sharing basis. If we can find partners like South Korea and Vietnam, it will be a new beginning.
Finally, notwithstanding the Chinese muscle-flexing, it’s the men behind the gun who make the vital difference. Our tank crews have shown their grit in operations and the most notable was overcoming the vast disparity between the Pattons and our Centurions in 1965.
Major General Babar Iftikhar, Director General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations. Twitter
