Monthly Archives: August 2018

Complicated negotiations on kicking off the next stage of disengagement between the Indian and Chinese armies in eastern Ladakh saw senior military commanders from both sides hold an hours-long meeting at Chushul on Tuesday to discuss the road map for further reducing tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), people familiar with the developments said on Tuesday.

The talks that began at 11.30am were in progress when this report was filed.

The focus of the latest round of military talks was to hammer out a consensus on easing tensions in the Finger Area near Pangong Tso and Depsang plains as well as pulling back weapons and equipment from friction points in other sectors, said one of the officials cited above.

“Tricky issues are on the table. Addressing them will take time,” he said.

This was the fourth meeting between the corps commander-ranked officers who made previous attempts to reduce tensions along the contested border on June 6, June 22 and June 30.

The previous two meetings went on for up to 11 hours while the first one was the shortest at seven hours.

Negotiations are expected to be harder going forward as the continued presence of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Finger Area and the Depsang sector could be the sticking point of the talks, as reported by Hindustan Times on Tuesday.

In Tuesday’s talks, the agenda included the step-wise withdrawal of weapons and equipment to mutually agreed distances from all friction areas along the LAC and thinning the military build-up in the region, a second official said.

The military dialogue will be followed by another meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on border affairs. The military commanders set the time-frame and method of disengagement, while the WMCC monitors the process.

A limited military disengagement was initiated last month after the commanders reached an understanding on reducing tensions during their first meeting on June 6. But the Galwan Valley skirmish on June 15 dashed disengagement hopes, leaving 20 Indian and an unconfirmed number of Chinese soldiers dead.

The July 14 talks follow a series of steps taken by the two armies at friction points in Galwan Valley, Hot Springs and Gogra to implement a complex disengagement plan worked out during the June 30 meeting between delegations led by Lieutenant General Harinder Singh, commander of the Leh-based 14 Corps, and Major General Liu Lin, commander of the South Xinjiang military region.

The current disengagement process began after the June 30 military dialogue and a subsequent conversation on July 5 between national security adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi.

At the June 30 meeting, the Indian side reiterated its demand for the pullback of Chinese troops from friction points along the LAC and sought the restoration of status quo ante (the situation as it existed in early April) in the Finger Area, Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, Gogra and Depsang plains, apart from emphasising the need for thinning the military build-up in the region.

The disengagement effort involves rival troops pulling back a specified distance from face-off sites, with further retreat taking place in phases as the plan progresses on a verifiable basis on the ground every 72 hours by both sides.

The military build-up in Indian and Chinese depth areas hasn’t thinned, with both sides keeping their guard up. The deployment of thousands of soldiers, fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, artillery guns, missile systems and air defence weapons continues in the region.

The PLA pulled back 2km from Patrolling Point 14 (Galwan Valley), PP-15 (Hot Springs) and PP-17 (Gogra) last week, with the Indian Army also withdrawing proportionately in these areas.

The army observed some thinning of PLA troops, vehicles and removal of structures from a key spur in the Finger Area over the last week but the army doesn’t view it as disengagement, said a third official, asking not to be named.

The Finger Area, which refers to a set of eight cliffs jutting out of the Sirijap range overlooking the Pangong lake, remains the biggest test and the hardest part of the disengagement process.

The army is keeping a strict vigil along the contested border in the Depsang sector where the PLA’s forward presence is a matter of serious concern and where a 2013 Chinese intrusion blocked the access of Indian soldiers to several patrolling routes, including the ones leading to PPs-10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13.

Independence Day celebrations are expected to be muted this year because of the Covid-19 pandemic and fewer VIPs are likely to attend the annual August 15 event at Delhi’s Red Fort while schoolchildren will skip it altogether, people familiar with the matter said on Tuesday. Corona winners, or people who have recovered from the disease, will be the highlight at the celebrations. Around 1,500 such people are expected to attend the function and listen to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech from the ramparts of Red Fort, said one of the persons cited above.

The corona winners will include around 500 local policemen. The remaining will travel to Delhi from other parts of the country. The defence ministry, which plays a key role in organising the event, has asked the Union home ministry to implement the plan for inviting corona winners for the function.

Schoolchildren have traditionally been a part of the Independence Day celebrations. Thousands of them show up to hear the Prime Minister’s speech at the Red Fort. This time they will be missing at the event because of Covid-19, said a second official.

Modi mingled with over 8,000 children, who attended the Independence Day function at Red Fort last year, after his speech. The children enthusiastically crowded around him hoping to shake hands with him or speak to him.

Defence secretary Ajay Kumar, who visited the Red Fort last week to inspect the preparations for the function, gave clear directions that social distancing norms have to be strictly adhered to, said a third official. While schoolchildren will not attend the celebrations, cadets from the National Cadet Corps are expected to be a part of the function.

Fewer dignitaries will attend the event because of the social distancing norms, said the third official. Only 150 to 200 of them will be seated in the VIP enclosure compared to almost 1,000 in previous years. Last year, 10,000 people attended the Independence Day function.

In his sixth Independence Day speech from Red Fort last year, Modi highlighted the nullification of the Constitution’s Articles 370 and 35A to divest Jammu & Kashmir of its special status in August last year. He also spoke about the legislation that criminalised the practice of instant divorce among a section of Muslims, strengthening of anti-terror laws. Modi said the country was moving towards “one nation, one Constitution” while highlighting key accomplishments of his government in less than 70 days after it was voted back to power in May last year.

Modi also announced the creation of Chief of Defence Staff’s post for more effective coordination between the three services. This came after the proposal for the post remained in limbo for decades.

He also outlined India’s journey from 2014 to 2019 as one from disappointment to hope and urged citizen participation in environmental initiatives, water conservation, end of single-use plastic. He flagged the population explosion as a key concern.

The post-1988 framework of India-China ties rested on a simple principle. Both countries recognised they had a serious boundary dispute, but they agreed that the larger relationship should not be held hostage to the dispute. And therefore, while the border should be kept peaceful, and talks on the dispute could continue, pending a final settlement, India and China should continue to deepen ties in other spheres. This framework lasted three decades. Other elements of the relationship — high-level visits, trade and investment, cooperation on global issues — coexisted with the stalemate on the border dispute.

But to keep the border peaceful, the two countries also signed a range of agreements. In 1996, a pact on confidence-building measures in the military field along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in border areas laid out a list of restrictions to reduce the possibility of a clash and build trust. It recognised that the implementation of the agreement would require both sides arriving at a “common understanding of the alignment” of LAC, and therefore, both India and China decided to speed up the process of “clarification and confirmation” of LAC — by clarifying the alignment in areas where there were differing perceptions, and then exchanging maps “indicating their respective perceptions”.

It has been 24 years since the pact. India is clear about where its perception of LAC lies. It has repeatedly asked Beijing to clarify its perception of LAC and exchange maps. This will not be a solution — but it will at least prevent Beijing from shifting goalposts at will, and engaging in aggression to change facts on the ground. But perhaps precisely because it wants to keep that option open, China has been obstinate in not moving ahead with the process of clarifying LAC, especially in the western sector. So here is the fix. A longer term boundary solution is difficult because of the seemingly intractable nature of the dispute, especially Tawang (China will not get it back, but will keep alive its claim because of its past association with Tibet) and Aksai Chin (India will not get it back, but accepting that publicly will have costs). And China is not willing to do what is required for shorter term peace — by clarifying LAC. This leaves room for doubt about Chinese intentions, and its claims of wanting peace. If Beijing is interested in sustaining the overall relationship, it should clarify the LAC, be reasonable about its claims and live up to past agreements. Otherwise, the old framework of the relationship cannot last.

Much has been written about China following the clash between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley. These discussions have often suggested that the Indian corporate sector should in some way exact retribution on China. The government has, perhaps, with some merit, banned a number of Chinese apps. Others have encouraged consumers to boycott Chinese goods. Neither address the basic issue that needs to be fixed, which was more accurately pinpointed by in jest by a senior Chinese media figure.

This gentleman commented that an economic dispute with China was farcical because there were no Indian goods that the Chinese could boycott. There is a deep resonance in this satirical remark. No mechanism to strengthen India’s influence with respect to China can be created without a unidimensional determination to become an economic superpower. There are choices to be made.

India must also, as China has done, build up financial reserves through the creation of industrial powerhouse companies. This requires a combination of cheap financing for domestic companies and possibly a devalued currency. India must substitute the mental hang-ups that have prevented it from systematically adopting these practices if it is to gain greater economic relevance.

Since great economic institutions require capital, we need to relook at the ease of business processes which attract capital. In the case of China, local governments have been incentivised to run their provinces in the manner most likely to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Those who have done business in China speak of the overwhelming support they get from local governments. These include the identification of land, provision of ready lists of architects and contractors, free legal services, often to the point of providing dosa makers to encourage engineers to work there. The nature of factory inspections tends to be infrequent in contrast to the Indian licence-permit raj.

International capital has choices and will naturally flow where it is made most welcome. China is simply easier to do business in. India has followed a different growth path. That path influences how vigorously we can respond to Galwan.

Building economic powerhouses can also mean supporting national champion companies, as Japan and South Korea have done. India has been beset by concerns that such choices are prone to nepotism and the misuse of scarce national resources. It needs to enquire why these negative externalities of national choice were not equally applicable in Japan and South Korea. Even the United States (US), portrayed as a champion of market freedom, selectively awarded contracts for European/Iraqi reconstruction to a handful of chosen American companies. These policies did not result in the preferred companies falling to the lowest common denominator of quality. Instead, they often became world leaders in their chosen industries.

China has systematically sought to develop its soft power through investment, aid to countries, influence over multilateral institutions and the provision of research funding to universities around the world. It has chosen to be the driver behind the creation of banking institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank. While these banks or universities are all professionally-managed institutions, such largesse provides China with a degree of soft influence that others do not possess. Most meaningful infrastructure in Africa is today built by China with quid pro quos in play. These include preferential access to manganese, cobalt and other rare earth metals. China should not be blamed for this, as it is only copying the playbook used by European nations earlier. India is free to also make these choices. We need to introspect why, for instance, Indian apps could not become the world standard.

An argument may be made that in a democratic country, other policy choices are also important. Social justice has its place and economic growth cannot be the sole criteria for decision-making. These choices are not mutually exclusive or unique to us. It is India’s resistance to common sense reforms in labour, land or judicial processes has also led to an attenuation of economic wealth and the concomitant inability to push back against China.

India needs to want economic success as badly as China does. If this desire is too mitigated by its desire to address many other issues such as retribution for past injustices, regional or linguistic reaffirmation, or fears about elite domination, the country may fall short of its optimal economic potential.

At a philosophical level, it is entirely possible for a country to be successful and satisfied, with the kind of balance India has apparently sought, between being a mid-level economic power while also a disorganised democracy. However, in a world where the metric of power is largely Gross Domestic Product per capita, such a nation will need to accept a position of lesser influence. These choices can cause the angst of seeing others whom we may consider the “bad guys” finishing first. This government, more than others in the past, believes in an aligned pan-national vision around a common goal. This dispute with China provides an opportunity for policymakers to introspect about the choices we have made, as a nation. The road to victory in Galwan runs through the choices made in bureaucracy, the judicial system and the legislature.

By calling China’s claims to off-shore resources in South China Sea (SCS) unlawful and championing a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, the United States has reversed its perceived “isolationist” policy and has reaffirmed its strong commitment to its ASEAN partners and key allies Japan and Australia.

The statement on “US Position on Maritime Claims in South China Sea” by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo comes at a time when two US nuclear powered aircraft carriers – Nimitz and Ronald Reagan – with 120 fighters are exercising in South China Sea. The two super carriers are openly challenging the unproven might of PLA Navy by exercising near Paracel Islands off the Vietnam coast and north of Chinese nuclear submarine base at Hainan Islands.

Secretary of State Pompeo’s statement is not only a demonstration of enormous political will of US to stand by its allies in Indo-Pacific region but also reinforcement of SCS frontline. “The statement has turned the perception that Trump administration was only inward looking and isolationist on its head. By spelling out its SCS position in black and white, it is a doctrinal recommitment from the American side to this region. It indicates that US is standing firmly with its allies like Philippines and Vietnam and recognising the claims of Indonesia and Malaysia against Chinese bullying in the area,” said a China watcher.

The US statement that Xi Jinping’s predatory world view has no place in 21st century comes after Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his July 3 Ladakh speech made it clear that there was no space for expansionist regimes and future only belonged to those who believed in development. The Indian position of free and open South China Sea also synergises with Secretary Pompeo’s statement on Indo-Pacific.

India is expected to expand on its view about right to free navigation when Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte visits New Delhi later this year as his March trip had to be postponed due to coronavirus global pandemic.

The US statement has revived the Arbitration Tribunal at Hague rejection of China’s SCS claims on July 12, 2016. To remind China of its hubris, Secretary Pompeo has recalled a 2010 statement of then Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, who told his ASEAN counterparts that it was a fact that China is a big country and others are just small.

The US has openly taken sides with Philippines on Scarborough Reef, Spratly Islands, Mischief Reef and second Thomas Shoal and called the Chinese claims unlawful and unilateral. The Chinese PLA has virtually declared the SCS as its backyard by contesting claims with ASEAN countries and exploiting the exclusive economic zone by simply bullying these countries militarily into submission. Beijing has also used its closeness with Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar to ensure nothing adverse comes out against China in the so-called Asian tiger forum.

Secretary Pompeo has totally rejected China’s claim over James Shoal near Malaysia and made it clear that the world will not allow Beijing to treat South China Sea as its maritime empire.

The US SCS statement has not only challenged China but also given steel injection of support to countries like Japan, Australia and South Korea, who haver decided to look the other way to Beijing’s expansion in the past.