Monthly Archives: August 2018

Chinese strategist Sun Tzu’s most famous aphorism goes something like this. He said, “If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles”

Strategists learn about adversaries by observing their actions and statements, interpreting their behaviour, and studying their leaders. But the more astute understand the enemies’ mindset by studying their culture.

Leaders and tactics may change, but strategies and doctrines are embedded in the culture and mindset of a nation and are, therefore, far better predictors of their actions. Both China and India have a rich culture and several texts that explain respective mindsets but an easier way to explain the difference is to study the strategy games of the two nations.

Chess originated in India. The game is played by two players on a board of 64 squares with 16 white and black pieces each. The opponents start the game with all their pieces arraigned against each other and each player moves alternatively. The pieces have powers in hierarchical order with the queen being most powerful. All pieces change their positions continuously during the game.

As those familiar with chess know, it is a game of manoeuvre that has one centre of gravity — the king; and the objective is to capture or “kill” the opponent’s king. The loss of rest of the pieces or their positions at the end of the game is immaterial.

The Chinese strategy game, however, is “igo” — commonly known as “Go”. It is played on a much larger board that has 19×19 sides resulting in 361 points compared to the 64 squares in Chess. In Go, the stones are positioned on the “intersections” of the squares to deny “liberty” to the opponent’s stones. Go also has white and black pieces called stones, but that is where the similarity with chess ends. The objective of Go is not to capture any single piece; instead, it is to surround a larger total area of the board with one’s stones before the opponent. As the game progresses, the players position stones on the board to map out formations and potential territories. Contests between opposing formations result in the expansion, reduction, or capture and loss of stones. The winner is decided by counting each player’s surrounded territory along with captured stones.

China has been playing Go, not chess with India. It has been playing the game on a multi-dimensional canvas much larger than the Indian landmass and across several spectrums, ranging from the military to the economic “intersections” blocking India’s “liberty” or manoeuvrability over a long period. It has inveigled every neighbour of India by coaxing, cajoling, or enticing them into its camp. It has infiltrated into India’s economic, infrastructure, health care, communication and technological value chain so inextricably that, contrary to silly calls for boycotting Chinese goods, India cannot meaningfully disengage its dependence on China.

While there is no doubting the valour of our army, the cost of militarily confronting an adversary whose economy is over five times as large as ours and whose defence budget is four times ours would be horrendous in human and economic terms for decades to come. This is particularly so because China has turned India’s northern and western neighbours into its surrogate pincers tying down a large part of our military assets and strategic mindshare. If India does consider the military option, it will have to factor in China’s overwhelming superiority in the Ladakh region specifically, and in electronic warfare, cyberwar, drones, missiles and the nuclear arsenal of the People’s Liberation Army generally.

The word “igo” in Mandarin literally means to encircle, and that is China’s strategy with a combination of the “String of Pearls” (which refers to the sea line communications from China to the Horn of Africa through strategic choke points and maritime centres in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Somalia) along India’s coastline and the Belt and Road initiative in the North. Nepal, Bhutan and now Ladakh are additional “stones” being placed to constrict India’s manoeuvrability from every direction.

Instead of treating these episodes as singular events, India must join the dots to appreciate the Chinese game plan and design a counter-strategy along three thrust lines.

First, an encirclement cannot be broken only from inside. Instead, India must expand the ‘board” by cooperating with countries such as Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam which are increasingly threatened by China’s hegemonistic moves. Simultaneously, it must build pressure from within the encirclement by rapprochement with immediate neighbours such as Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. This requires us to think like a Go player and appreciate that unlike chess, the stones in Go don’t have relative power. India has far greater historical synergies with every one of our neighbours including Pakistan, than China does. Each stone, or in this case, country, is important, regardless of its physical or economic size. We need to value them as equal partners in the struggle against Chinese hegemony. Second, India must recast its national security strategy horizons to decades instead of election cycles. If a government’s image is interlocked with tactical timelines, then, by definition, strategy will suffer because tactical and strategic goals are usually at cross purposes. Divorcing national security from politics will enable long-term indigenous capacity-building and strengthening external alliances.

Last, and most important, India needs to consolidate its internal critical mass. The country is facing multiple challenges on several fronts, most seriously the economy. Political power, as Mao said, may grow from a barrel of a gun, but national power emanates from a strong and vibrant economy, which, in turn, requires internal peace, cooperation, and harmony to inspire customer and investor confidence. Unless those conditions are achieved, no country can aspire to be a regional power or thwart attacks on its sovereignty.

The June 15 clashes between India and China have finally broken the four-decade record of relative peace on the Himalayan frontier. Reactions have been sharp, ranging from calls to evict the Chinese from their entrenched positions to others calling for a Cold War.

The debate over China’s rise has been raging for the past two decades, if not since 1950, when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) swept into Tibet. India-China relations have seen it all — from engagement to a dramatic collapse in 1959, a brief-but-traumatic war in 1962, a hiatus of no- war, no-peace in the decades that followed. And, finally a diplomatic breakthrough with the 1988 modus vivendi that paved the way for India and China to build a relationship without settling the border dispute. The core premise was that the stable development of relations is predicated on a peaceful periphery. It reflected pragmatism and broader shifts in Chinese and Indian priorities in favour of economic transformation at home and a peaceful neighbourhood. The June 15 clashes have dented that agreed-upon edifice.

It is clear that the next phase of the relationship depends on a peaceful frontier. But this should not mean merely a restoration of the status quo ante. If, by the status quo, we mean two large nuclear-armed countries resuming their aggressive jostling and humiliating each other, that is unsustainable. To anyone who has viewed leaked videos of the border face-offs in recent years, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) grey zones have been transformed into a nasty tit-for-tat game, waiting to explode.

For the past decade, both sides have adopted forward policies matched by new connectivity links to the frontier. A belief that an array of confidence-building measures (CBMs) would cushion this changing balance of power in the forward areas has been misplaced. It is time now for stock-taking and re-envisioning a new conflict-management framework. There were two main reasons to engage in proactive probing in the grey zones — as a symbolic ritual of showing the flag to demonstrate consistency over claim lines, and, keeping an eye on each other so that nobody changes the status quo on the ground. But there was a complementary political element too. High-level talks between the special representatives were intended to lay out a framework within which each side would bring forward their claims for serious bargaining to commence. But with that political process stalling in recent years, tactical forward probing along LAC has assumed a life of its own, disproportionate to the envisaged goals.

Why can’t Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping settle the dispute? Chinese scholar Yun Sun summarises the key problem obstructing a settlement — “Key concessions India demands from China on the border settlement are hard commitments that cannot be reversed. By contrast, what China seeks from India, such as its neutrality in the US-Chinese strategic competition, is ephemeral and easily adjustable.” This problem of uncertainty and fluidity in strategic intentions has no apparent solution for the foreseeable future. However, stabilising the frontier through new norms is possible and in the interests of both states. Creative approaches such as agreed buffer zones in the most contentious pockets and coordinated or restricted patrolling regimes to avoid violent scuffles must be integral to the new status quo.

In their excitement or jingoism, many have declared a breaking point in the India-China relations. This is precisely the time to avoid such hyperbole.

The relationship has not suddenly gone south. The warning signs have been apparent for some time. It has been falsely claimed that Delhi has been oblivious to China’s rise. In fact, Modi’s China policy has been uncompromising across the board. From the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) to maritime security to emerging high technologies such as 5G, Delhi has been bold in its rhetoric and actions. Even in the geopolitical arena, India has been unabashed and dogged in engaging the United States (US), despite an unenthused president in the White House. Across Asia too, Delhi has been proactively tapping China’s neighbours as a future countervailing hedge. With traditional ally Russia too, Modi’s renewed outreach in recent years is reminiscent of the old geostrategy — promoting a balance of power in Eurasia.

If anything, India’s policymakers could be critiqued for getting ahead of themselves and precipitating counter-balancing moves from China without having a credible strategy in place. But Delhi’s real failure has been to not match its realpolitik words and deeds with a broader foreign policy framework where sustained engagement with China was also part of a grand strategy to emerge as a “leading power” in a multipolar world. Instead, Delhi has found itself leaning against China with an empty treasury and unpredictable partners.

History shows that when India possessed strong and positive ties with the great powers, it was taken seriously by China. Yet, history also shows the clear limits of what leveraging that balance of power can do for India. The India-US and India-Soviet (Russia) ties worked to stabilise the India-China relationship when India remained firmly grounded in recognising and pursuing its own interests rather than becoming an object in a great game. So only when two conditions simultaneously held was India able to shape a mutually beneficial relationship with China — shrewdly leveraging the international environment and maintaining a sophisticated China policy.

Zorawar Daulet Singh is an adjunct fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, and author of Power and Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policies During the Cold War

China has not halted — and instead has ramped up — its military activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, with a concentration of soldiers, military vehicles, earth-moving machinery, and erection of structures, including near the same point where Indian and Chinese troops clashed on the night of June 15, according to two senior officials and satellite imagery of the area on June 22.

The Indian army has observed a new structure, suspected to be an observation post, come up near Patrol Point (PP) 14, the site of the clash which left 20 personnel of the Indian army and an unconfirmed number of Chinese troops dead, said one of the officials cited above.

There was no official word from the army on either of the developments. India and China agreed to pull back from friction areas on Monday.

New satellite imagery, released by US firm Maxar Technologies, supports the claim that not only is the PLA holding ground in Galwan Valley but has also shored up its military positions in the area. One of the Maxar images too possibly points out a new and bigger observation post near PP-14. An Indian squad, led by the slain Colonel Santosh Babu of the 16 Bihar Regiment, had flattened some structures in this area including an observation post, on June 15.

The satellite images are from June 22 — the day senior Indian and Chinese military commanders reached a “mutual consensus to disengage” from all friction areas during an 11-hour meeting at Moldo on the Chinese side of the LAC.

Officials and China watchers, who reviewed the images for Hindustan Times, said the visuals clearly indicated a Chinese buildup and also a new outpost for carrying out surveillance on Indian areas. But they also added that it was important to give the armies time to disengage and pointed to the complexities of satellite imagery.

“A large number of tented camps, military vehicles, heavy trucks and bulldozers are clearly visible on the riverbed. Road construction is also taking place. The Chinese positions are bang on the LAC,” said former Northern Army commander Lieutenant General DS Hooda (retd), one of the experts who reviewed the satellite imagery for HT. Hooda said the observation post appeared to have come up again near PP-14.

The Chinese buildup in other areas along the LAC including Depsang, Gogra Post-Hot Springs and Pangong Tso, hasn’t thinned either. The PLA’s armoured vehicles and artillery units remain deployed in Chinese areas facing Depsang and Gogra Post-Hot Springs sectors.

The army is keeping a strict vigil along the LAC and is fully prepared to respond to any provocation or adventurism by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), said the second officer cited above. Given the observed build-up, the army is also prepared to keep its guards up till disengagement takes place on the ground on a verifiable basis.

But experts also said that it was important to be cautious.

The process of disengagement is likely to be arduous and challenging, and will require moving ahead cautiously in phases, as reported by HT on Wednesday.

“Disengagement can’t happen overnight. While the images are a cause for concern and somewhat reveal China’s intentions to hold ground near LAC in Galwan Valley, the result of the talks between senior commanders will not reflect on the ground in just two days,” Hooda said.

The interpretation of satellite imagery is also tricky and can result in reaching incorrect conclusions, said Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia (retd), a former director general of military operations.

“It’s about how you superimpose the LAC on satellite images. It allows you to reach your conclusions. However, some of the interpretation may be correct,” said Bhatia who heads the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, a defence ministry think tank.

China has deployed more than 10,000 troops in its ‘depth areas’ across the LAC in eastern Ladakh and the military buildup consists of fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, artillery guns, missile systems and air defence radars. India has matched the neighbour’s military moves.

While disengagement in some friction areas is believed to be a “low-hanging fruit” and can be achieved in a reasonable time-frame, the “real test” would lie in the restoration of status quo ante in the Finger Area in Pangong-Tso, where the PLA has set up permanent bunkers, pillboxes and observation posts, officials said. China watchers believe that the disengagement process is likely to be less complicated in the Gogra Post-Hot Springs and the Galwan Valley sectors, where there are no real issues about the alignment of the LAC, if Beijing abides by the understanding.

As Indian and Chinese forces prepare to act on an understanding to disengage from all friction areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it is crucial that the army keeps a strict vigil along the contested border with a special focus on eastern Ladakh’s Depsang plains, officials and China watchers tracking the dispute said on Wednesday.

The heightened concerns about Depsang come from an earlier intrusion in this sector in 2013 when the PLA set up positions 19 km into the Indian side of the LAC and triggered a face-off that took three weeks to resolve.

The Depsang plains lie south of Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) in a strategic area that the military calls Sub-Sector North (SSN). DBO is the country’s northernmost outpost where India operates an advanced landing ground to support forward military deployments.

Keeping strict vigil along the disputed border, especially in sensitive areas in SSN, during the disengagement process is vital, said Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia (retd), who was the director general of military operations during the Depsang face-off.

The 2013 Chinese intrusion into Indian territory blocked the access of Indian soldiers to several patrolling routes including the ones leading Patrol Points to 10, 10-A, 11, 12 and 13.

Indian and Chinese military commanders reached a “mutual consensus to disengage” from all friction areas during a 11-hour meeting at Moldo on the Chinese side of the LAC on Monday. The talks were aimed at cooling tensions and thinning the military build-up on both sides of the border which has been tense since a brutal brawl on June 15 left 20 Indian army personnel and an unconfirmed number of Chinese troops dead in Galwan Valley.

“The SSN, including Depsang area, is of huge strategic significance and there’s no question of the army lowering its guard there. The Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DS-DBO) runs through this area that is near the Karakoram pass,” said former Northern Army commander Lieutenant General DS Hooda (retd).

India is building a second road from Sasoma to Saser La in eastern Ladakh and it could eventually provide an alternative route to DBO, as reported by Hindustan Times on June 9. The Sasoma-Saser La road axis is south-west of DBO.

“India will have to progress cautiously during the disengagement process as the possibility of the PLA opening a new front cannot be ruled out,” said a senior officer on condition of anonymity. The disengagement process, to be carried out in different sectors, in phases is yet to kick off, he said. It is expected to gather momentum after commanders on the ground hold more meetings in the coming days.

China has deployed up to 10,000 troops in its “depth areas” across the LAC in eastern Ladakh and the military buildup includes including fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, artillery guns, missile systems and air defence radars. India has matched China’s military moves.

Neither India nor China is likely to immediately thin its deployment in the rear areas, given how volatile the disputed border has been, especially after the brutal clash at Galwan Valley, as reported by Hindustan Times on Wednesday. The clash derailed a previous disengagement plan worked out by senior Indian and Chinese commanders after their first meeting on June 6.

India and China on Wednesday said the speedy implementation of disengagement and de-escalation measures agreed on by their senior military commanders will help calm tensions triggered by an ongoing border standoff.

However, the strains and pressure simmering beneath the surface were evident in Beijing’s reiteration of accusations that New Delhi had violated bilateral agreements and provoked the June 15 clash in Galwan Valley that resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers and unspecified Chinese casualties.

During a more than three-hour meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on border affairs, the Indian side conveyed its concerns on developments in eastern Ladakh, including the violent face-off on June 15, and emphasised both sides should “strictly respect and observe” the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The stance adopted by both sides indicated the ongoing military and diplomatic engagements to end the standoff, especially in Galwan Valley, which has been the focus of tensions, will be a long-drawn affair with no early resolution in sight.

The meeting of WMCC, held via video conference, focused on developments along the disputed border, especially the situation in eastern Ladakh, the external affairs ministry said in a statement. The Chinese readout of the meeting described the talks as “candid” and “in-depth”.

The two sides referred to the June 17 phone conversation between external affairs minister S Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi and the meeting of the corps commanders on June 22 and “reaffirmed that both sides should sincerely implement the understanding on disengagement and de-escalation that was reached by the Senior [military] Commanders on 6th June”, the Indian statement said.

“The two delegations agreed that implementation of this understanding expeditiously, in accordance with the bilateral agreements and protocols, would help ensure peace and tranquillity in border areas and the development of broader relationship between the two countries,” the statement added.

The Chinese readout said the two sides will “actively accommodate with the two military forces to implement the outcome reached during the two rounds of commander-level meetings on June 6 and 22… strengthen communication and coordination through military and diplomatic channels, and peacefully resolve relevant issues in the border areas through bilateral dialogue and consultation”. It also spoke of strengthening military confidence-building measures.

This was the second meeting of the WMCC since June 5, and the Indian side was led by joint secretary (East Asia) Naveen Srivastava of the external affairs ministry, while the Chinese side was headed by director general Hong Liang of the department of boundary affairs of the foreign ministry.

People familiar with developments on condition of anonymity said the meeting also discussed possible contours of future diplomatic engagements and parameters for taking forward the measures agreed on by military commanders to ease tensions. “This is going to be a protracted process and we have to be ready for the long haul,” said one of the people cited above.

The two sides will maintain communications at the diplomatic and military levels, including through WMCC, to resolve the situation peacefully.

But even as the meeting was underway, China’s defence and foreign ministry kept up a shrill barrage of accusations against India, blaming the Indian side for the Galwan Valley clash and alleging the external affairs ministry was behind “false reports”.

The allegations came two days after the corps commanders of the two sides reached “mutual consensus to disengage” in all “friction areas” along the LAC. People familiar with the military talks too said the process is expected to be arduous and completed in phases.

China’s defence and foreign ministry separately castigated India for allegedly violating bilateral agreements and provoking the clash. There was also a reiteration of a claim of sovereignty over Galwan Valley. India has already dismissed these allegations and said the contested valley has always been under its control.

Asked why China’s foreign ministry was repeating these contentious points amid renewed talks of peace and tranquillity on the border, spokesperson Zhao Lijian told a news briefing: “What I have just said…is meant to clarify the whole situation, tell the truth to everyone. We made the statement because the [external affairs ministry] and Indian media have made some false reports.”

In a statement read out after the briefing was over, Zhao repeated accusations that Indian troops had trespassed into Chinese territory and provoked an incident on May 6. He claimed the Indian side had agreed to withdraw from Galwan Valley and had “dismantled its facilities as requested by the Chinese side”.

Referring to the corps commanders meeting of June 6, Zhao contended the Indian side had committed it would not “trespass” into Galwan Valley for “patrol and for building”. The two sides agreed to set up observation posts on both sides of the Galwan river estuary, but “the Indian side went against these agreements and asked China to dismantle China’s posts and also it crossed the [LAC] to provoke which led to the clash”, he added.

Zhao also reiterated China’s accusation that the June 15 clash occurred because Indian troops went against the agreement reached on June 6 and “crossed the LAC and sabotaged the tents Chinese side set up”. He also alleged the Indian side attacked Chinese personnel – such accusations have been dismissed by India, which has maintained the “premeditated and planned” actions of the Chinese side led to the violence and casualties.

Separately, China’s defence ministry spokesperson Wu Qian made similar accusations during an online interaction with selected media.

Analysts questioned the divergent positions taken by the Chinese side during bilateral discussions and while making public remarks on the border stand-off.

Leading strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney tweeted: “In keeping with China’s standard playbook for camouflaging offence as defence, its foreign ministry almost daily has been branding India as the aggressor. But today, its foreign and defence ministries launched twin attacks on India. Is the ‘disengagement’ deal already unravelling?”