P Stobdan

Strategic affairs expert

Basically, two broad questions have arisen regarding why this incident in the Galwan valley took place on June 15. One is that the Chinese had come prepared with a plan to escalate the situation, thereby provoking the Indian side by violating the agreed principle on which disengagements had been taking place, as per the meeting held between India and China at the higher level of military commanders on June 6. Now, this agreement has been violated by the Chinese side by provoking the Indian side.

Two, it is possible that the Chinese did not have any plan for this escalation; it could have been possibly triggered by not handling the disengagement process properly by both sides, because this disengagement was happening at the lower level of military commanders. And this may have happened because of micro-level mismanagement.

The problem is that the casualties on both sides appear to be quite high. It now depends on how both sides will interpret the incident. Was it a violation of the border agreement, called the Peace and Tranquillity Agreement, signed in 1993, and the subsequent border agreement signed in 2013, where there was a laid-down protocol to defuse the face-off situation at the LAC? It depends on the interpretation of both India and China whether these agreements have been broken/violated. It also depends on the political will of the two countries.

Since the casualty numbers have risen, the possibility of escalation remains high. At the same time, the situation can still be brought under control by political and diplomatic interventions at the higher level. Therefore, the June 15 incident should not affect the disengagement process. But it also now depends how both sides will tell the story of the incident to their people. The Chinese side is not giving the exact figure of casualties. We do not know if they are doing this intentionally or they want to hide the figures from their own people or from the world.

The other factor is whether the Chinese action in the Galwan valley has any strategic dimension. There are many interpretations and analyses in this regard, linking the issue to India’s closeness to the US and tension with Pakistan, Nepal and the internal problem of Covid-19 in India. The Chinese must be calculating all these factors in their strategy to put pressure on New Delhi. Therefore, the border tension is just a manifestation of a larger political issue at the global level.

The other dimension is that we are overlooking the local factors of not distinguishing between Ladakhi and Tibetan history. This distinction has been confusing over the past many decades. Actually, this kind of border tension is not new, as this has been happening for centuries between Ladakhis and Tibetans over the issue of defining borders, rights over grazing land and fight over trade disputes. As a result, all kinds of incidents like kidnapping and murder have been happening for centuries. It is not a new thing.

The main dispute was between Ladakh and Tibet. But for the past many decades, the distinction between Ladakh and Tibet has been replaced by the India-China dispute. This local history has to be factored in the current issues.

Thirdly, this area has been neglected in many ways for decades after Independence. It was in the hands of Jammu and Kashmir’s the then political leadership, which had its own obsession with issues in Kashmir. And now that India has made Ladakh a Union Territory, China seems to be worried about the future of Ladakh and its impact on it, including the border issue.

India needs not only to strengthen the military capabilities in the region, but also should have a forward policy in terms of economic expansion, road building, connectivity and resuming old trade links with Xinjiang and Tibet. In fact, Ladakh is geopolitically very important for India as it provides a gateway to East Asia, Central Asia, Europe and Russia. But we have not thought of exploiting the strategic importance of Ladakh to extend our influence in this direction. As a result of which, we have become defensive. We are only talking about defending our border. It should have been about going beyond our border and reaching out to the world. That is why China is now making offensive moves across the Himalayas into South Asia. It should have been our approach to go beyond the Himalayas as well.

The current stand-off in eastern Ladakh should be resolved amicably through discussions and talks. India must now prepare a bigger strategy, not only to protect our territory, but also to go beyond our territory. So, the local factor should also be taken into consideration, and how the area can be reconnected with the region beyond.

At the same time, we have to be very firm that we are not going to lose any territory further. Local people should also be involved in the defence of our border, especially the nomadic people of eastern Ladakh. They know border management better than anybody else.

The important point is to have higher-level diplomatic and political intervention from both sides of the LAC to defuse the situation.

Related articles:

Why India and China went to war in 1962

Indian, Chinese armies hold Major General-level talks for third straight day

China rattled by ‘boycott China’ campaign launched by Ladakhis, echoed by rest of India

Revisiting Mountain Corps to deter China

Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia & Lt Gen Anil Ahuja

The authors are retired military officers

The unprecedented violence in the Galwan valley in eastern Ladakh on the night of June 15, when 20 Indian soldiers — including the Commanding Officer — were martyred, has disturbed the fragile peace and tranquillity along the 3,488-km India-China border. It is another matter that reportedly, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), too, paid a price with around 40 fatalities. This tragic incident has converted the unsettled border into a contested border, thus changing the dynamics of ensuring territorial integrity. The till now robust agreements and protocols which ensured peace and tranquillity stand challenged. While the Indian Army is ensuring an equitable and proportional deployment all along the border with China, hectic diplomatic parleys will try to defuse the sensitive situation in the immediate term. The key question which needs to be addressed — Is the Army future-ready and optimally structured and equipped to face China’s aggressive behaviour?

Analysts observing the ongoing standoff have been critical of repeated Chinese boundary violations and military coercion to create a ‘new normal’, year on year, to seek a creeping advantage along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as well as geopolitically. There are calls for India to do a ‘tit for tat’ militarily to force a status quo ante on the Chinese. This will need capabilities for ‘active deterrence’, based on improved defensive and offensive capacities, including in the asymmetric domain.

It was precisely to create this ‘offensive (active)-defence’ capability that the Army, in the first decade of this millennium, sought the raising of a Mountain Corps, commonly referred to as the Mountain Strike Corps. The intent was to have a dedicated Corps to comprehensively look at the operational dynamics of the entire border with China, collate the entire ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) canvas of Chinese activities, provide acclimatised battle-ready formations, with inbuilt rapid air mobility to respond to situations, like the current intrusions, for effective and equitable quid pro quo options. The aim was to create capabilities to enable military-diplomatic negotiations from a position of relative strength. The Mountain Corps, once fully formed and operationalised, would have given multiple military employment options with integral ISR and rapid deployment capabilities exploiting mountain-specific platforms like ultra-light howitzers, helicopters (including heavy-lift ones like Chinooks and attack helicopters like Apaches), UAVs, missiles etc. It would have also enabled synergising the asymmetric warfare means. Notably, this geographically unified structure was proposed ahead of China creating the Western Theatre Command in 2016.

The overall intent was to induce an element of ‘active-defence’ rather than any aspirations of a deep offensive capability along the LAC. The Corps, trained and equipped for operations in mountains, would also be effective against Pakistan. The ‘strike’ part of the nomenclature was misconstrued and used as a propaganda tool by certain inimical elements to stymie the complete raising. The Army’s quest for this critical capability, against China’s coercion, was put through intense scrutiny by the National Security Council, Chiefs of Staff Committee and across Service HQs. Various alternative options were also considered: building maritime capability instead of land-based Corps, induction of long-range missiles, and raising of Special Forces units to interdict lines of communication. The option of raising small-size formations instead of a Corps was also considered. Despite the sound operational rationale, the underlying concern that remained was the financial consideration of raising and sustaining a formation of nearly 90,000 men.

On July 17, 2013, in the wake of the face-offs at Depsang, the government-sanctioned the raising of 17 Corps, with a non-defensive role along Northern borders. The aim was to create capabilities to deter China’s aggressive behaviour along the contested LAC. Manpower accretions and initial raising expenditure of about Rs 65,000 crore ($8.6 billion) was considered a prudent long-term investment against an increasingly hegemonic China. To mitigate the financial burden, the raising was to be carried out over eight years, to be completed by 2020-21.

Had India supported the sanctioned raising, 90 per cent capability would have been achieved by now, which could have been an effective deterrent, definitely raising costs for incursions by China. The raising, however, was not backed by the sanctioned financial resource and thereafter finally put on hold in 2018.

Events like the current LAC stand-off offer us an opportunity to review some capability development decisions in hindsight and transformation decisions in perspective. An overly aggressive China seems to have lost respect for mutual sensitivities, concerns, aspirations and is creeping menacingly into our immediate neighbourhood. India has no choice but to build defensive capability with an integral offensive content. This calls for expeditiously reviving the raising of the Corps for mountains with all its integral force multipliers. Substantial cost optimisation can be carried out by utilising the manpower savings accruing from Shekatkar Committee reforms.

It is rightly said that to respond to China, India must focus on economic development, with the ability to respond to weaponisation of trade. Aspirations of becoming an economic power with ability to fulfill global and regional aspirations cannot be realised without permanently securing our frontiers. Periodic Chinese coercive actions along the LAC only dampen the momentum and remain a perpetual drag. The cost of capability development, including reviving of the Mountain Corps, is an investment for a secure and self-reliant, risen, responsible and resurgent India.

Unfortunately, going by past experience as and when the present situation is restored, it will be back to business as usual with focus on Pakistan in the security domain, until again China resorts to military coercion along the LAC. It is a given that the incursions along the LAC will increase in frequency, scope, depth and intensity, which is the new normal. India needs capabilities to deter China’s aggressive behaviour, especially along the contested borders, and the Mountain Corps is one such imperative.

Related articles:

Why India and China went to war in 1962

India must stick to its guns

Indian, Chinese armies hold Major General-level talks for third straight day

China rattled by ‘boycott China’ campaign launched by Ladakhis, echoed by rest of India

Group Captain Murli Menon (Retd)

Defence Analyst

In many ways, the ongoing standoff with the Chinese across the LAC reminds us of our bitter experiences of 1962. But there is no excuse to be surprised a second time by a recalcitrant adversary. The manner in which the Galwan debacle played out is uncannily similar to what the Chinese did to the Russians on the Manchurian Ussuri river in March 1969, including the targeting of the commanding officer.

That the Chinese should choose to indulge in such adventurism in the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic and their own alleged role in creating it is surprising enough. And their ongoing aggressive forays in the South China Sea, Hongkong and Taiwan cannot be entirely coincidental. Clearly, there is a grand plan in the offing. A supposedly over keen Chinese Communist Party leader or a threatened President Xi Jinping attempting to counter internal ruffles within his establishment can only be other contributory factors.

But what India’s response needs to be is what should agitate all strategist minds now. Very clearly, the rules of engagement along the LAC need redefining. It is ridiculous to think of modern militaries fighting with stones and nailed batons. The basic principle in warfare is to pitch your strength against the enemy’s weakness.

In the Galwan valley, the terrain goes up to 15,000 ft AMSL (above mean sea level), with Leh and Thoise airfields being at around 11,000-10,000 ft AMSL and Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) at 16,614 feet. It is thus going to be a different kind of warfare altogether, something we ought to have equipped and trained for.

Now that both foreign ministers are talking of de-escalation, whilst we go along with any suitable proposals from the Chinese, we have to ratchet up our military’s tactical posturing in the area. That would mean the Army deploying troops to occupy advantageous high points and the IAF buttressing its air defence and offensive air support capabilities out of Leh, Thoise and DBO airfields.

A big blunder in 1962 was not resorting to our superior air power, which we had then in terms of our Hunters and Canberras. The equation has changed drastically no doubt, but India has to be prepared for a series of high-

altitude operations against the Chinese all across the LAC.

Meanwhile, infrastructure on the ground along the frontage of the LAC has to be expeditiously built up to enhance our logistic wherewithal in the difficult terrain. Though the Chinese may enjoy superiority in numbers, as far as the armies are concerned, we have to capitalise on our profound high-altitude air operations skills, honed since Siachen and Kargil, to smartly employ our air power to advantage against the Chinese.

As and when the likes of S-400 and THAD (terminal high altitude area defence) materialise, they have to be integrated into the air defence of the Leh area. Aircraft of the Mirage and SU30 class with their standoff and PGM (precision-guided munition) capabilities could be effectively employed to provide the force multiplier effect to our ground troops.

Also, our assets such as the new Apache/Chinook helicopters and the C-17/Hercules transporters would find valuable usage in this terrain. Trainer aircraft such as the Hawks and Pilatus would be good platforms to exploit too. The IAF already has high-altitude air ranges located at places such as Kartso, Kargil and Toshi Maidan, which need to be utilised for realistic operational training for weapon delivery and other aerial tactics. Our air power capabilities need to be deployed, albeit in a graded escalatory manner, to bring on unbearable pressure on the enemy.

Should suitable large targets, such as the formation HQ of the PLA or PLAAF, be available, the use of ground- or air-launched Brahmos missiles could also be considered.

One of the classic outcomes of the ‘Himalayan blunder’ was our government’s failure to declassify the Henderson Brooks report into the 1962 war. Had we done that in a timely fashion, many of the challenges of high-altitude warfare would have been addressed by now. But it is better late than never and capabilities have to be put in place forthwith.

Mountain warfare is not only critical for the Indian Army, but also for our air and sea elements. Some sea operations on the Pangong Tso lake could also be envisaged. Air defences need to cater to the Chinese SSM (surfeace-to-surface missile) threat too. High-altitude air warfare has its peculiarities owing to weapon delivery difficulties, aspects such as landslides and avalanches that could be intentionally triggered by air power and challenges in combat search and rescue.

Limitations in line-of-sight considerations for radar sensors and communications, terrain masking and its advantages are some other aspects to be considered. Passive air defence aspects, such as the availability of hardened shelters at Leh, DBO and Thoise, would also need to be addressed. Of course, any action along the LAC could have the possibility of Pakistan opening up a front in the West.

Battle staff management is another important aspect, where our experience in orchestrating the air war from Awantipur during Op Safed Sagar would come in handy. All in all, air power sensibly employed could turn the tide in favour of the initiator. Adaptation to base air defence, such as tactical usage of terrain to deploy mobile observer units, could compensate for ground radar limitations in the mountainous terrain. Recourse to shoulder fireds as opposed to impractical and unwieldy SAGWs (surface-to-air guided weapons) may need to be taken.

Clearly, all air capability for an air campaign in the mountains off Ladakh does not obtain as of now. So, the IAF will have to have a building-block approach to orchestrating any such campaign. But should we be able to pull it off, results in terms of overall campaign objectives would be out of proportion and in our favour.

It behoves the government to give a free reign to the three military chiefs to marshal a befitting tactical response to our land-grabbing neighbour.

Ravneet Singh

Tribune News Service

Patiala, June 17

Naib Subedar Mandeep Singh (39) had joined duty merely two weeks ago after a month-long leave during the lockdown. The soldier was among those killed during a clash with Chinese troops at Galwan Valley in Ladakh.

Resident of Seel village in the Ghanaur block of Patiala, Mandeep Singh was the only breadwinner in the family. His father had died several years ago. He is survived by his mother Shakuntala, wife Gurdeep Kaur, and two children, namely Mehakpreet Kaur (15) and Jobanpreet Singh (12). Villagers said he had been in the village for nearly a month before leaving for duty.

His cousin Manjeet Singh said Mandeep was liked by all. “He joined the Army in 1997. He used to visit home regularly and was affable.” One of his cousins, Nirmal Singh, had retired from the Army already.

The family was inconsolable after they received the news of his death. Administrative officials said his body was expected to reach Patiala in a day or two.