Pakistan’s relations with America and India could attain the status of positivity and durability only after its civil and military leadership reaches a consensus on critical issues.
Shahzad Raza
Empirical evidence suggests the Americans are more comfortable working with successive dictators in Pakistan. They get the job done without going through a laborious process of approvals and getting stakeholders on a similar page.
The fauji dictators first provided the Americans to use the Pakistani airspace and military bases to keep a check on the former Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Red Army opened a new vista of cooperation and prompted global jihad against the common nemesis — Communism.
Jihadists from all across the globe thronged Pakistan, yearning to earn a place in heaven through an American-funded war. With the collapse of Soviet Union following the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan, the utility of Pakistan also diminished prompting hawks-like Larry Pressler arm-twist Pakistan vis-à-vis its nuclear programme.
The 1990s witnessed a political turmoil in Pakistan, inviting little attention by the Americans. The military coup of 1999 followed by twin towers attack transformed the nature of relation between Pakistan and the US. Once again, General Musharraf got his name written in President Bush’s buddy list. The Americans declared the South Asian nuclear power its non-NATO ally. The war against Taliban and Al-Qaida was fought with cooperation of the Pakistani army and the intelligence agencies. With the fall of Kabul and the installation of Karzai regime, the decaying process started.
Before Imran Khan took over as the prime minister, the relations between Islamabad and Washington were at an all-time low. The Pentagon had chocked military funding. It also refused to invite Pakistani military officers to its elite military academies. The Americans also used their influence to place Pakistan onto the grey list of Financial Action Task Force over allegations of money laundering and terror financing.
Now, the trajectory of Pak-US relations hinges upon Pakistan’s relations with its neighbours. Washington seeks Pakistan’s help to resolve the Afghan quandary. It wants less Chinese influence over the Pakistani decision-making elite. The Americans are also wary of Pakistan’s desire to further its relations with Iran. And last but not the least, the Americans urge Pakistan resolve its differences with India.
The complexity of Pak-India relations makes things atrociously difficult. Both countries contributed to deepen the crises over the decades. The two countries fought two full-scale wars. On both occasions, Pakistan was ruled by the military dictators. The Kargil War took place when a few adventurous Pakistani generals thought to liberate Kashmir with minimum deployment of troops. It backfired spectacularly.
The inability of Pakistan’s civilian governments to resolve critical issues with India had an internal stumbling block — the General Headquarters. The military top brass never thought the civilian leaders were capable of dealing with their Indian counterparts. Branding any patriot a traitor had always been the favourite hobby of India bashers. The historic meeting between Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi was labelled as a sell-out. Later, the People’s Party government was accused of handing over the list of Sikh separatists to India, which allegedly helped India crush the Khalistan movement.
In his second tenure, PM Nawaz Sharif was inching closer to resolving the Kashmir dispute along with Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The Kargil misadventure sabotaged those efforts.
There are a few examples that expose an inherent flaw the new Pakistani government has to deal with. Pakistan relations with America and India could attain the status of positivity and durability only after achieving the most essential synchronisation of Pakistani civil and military leadership. Neither the GHQ nor the PM house could prepare and implement the foreign policy agendas if they continue to work in isolation.
A glimmer of hope was glimpsed after Imran Khan’s win. In his victory speech, he underlined the importance of good relations with India. Later, he exchanged pleasantries with his Indian counterpart over the telephone. He also received the Indian High Commissioner at his Bani Gala residence. Regardless of what extremists in India think of minister Navjot Singh Sidhu’s visit to Khan’s oath-taking ceremony, the announcement of the opening of Kartarpur border for Sikh pilgrims was indeed a positive overture.
The information minister recently told the BBC that the civilian government had the backing of the armed forces to improve bilateral relations with India. Chief of Army Staff General Bajwa also spoke his mind. He turned out to be one of the strong proponents of bilateral economic relations between India and Pakistan.
For a long time, Indian leaders built a narrative that in order to resolve the Kashmir dispute, both countries needed to develop a congenial atmosphere. Former Pakistani rulers were less interested in subscribing to that notion. However, things seemed to have changed in Islamabad. Both Pakistani civilian and military leaders want trade relations with India and pluck some low-hanging fruits before bringing critical issues such as Kashmir to the table.
It offered a rare opportunity to India to grasp. The opening of Kartarpur border could be followed by a similar gesture by the Indian side. With a little effort and convincing, India could get the status of Most Favoured Nation, which has long been overdue.
What both countries need to do is to hit the reset button and start writing together a bright future for the coming generations on a tabula rasa.
— The writer is an Islamabad-based journalist
