Monthly Archives: August 2018

The most worrisome aspect of China-Nepal partnership for India is the emerging synergy on railway connectivity. China and Nepal are moving firmly towards finalising agreements on some key railway projects.

Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Indian Defence Accounts ServiceSoon after his India visit, Nepal Prime Minister KP Oli packed off his Foreign Minister Pradip Gyawali to China. While Oli returned from New Delhi with a basketful of projects and assurances, Beijing is luring Nepal with a bigger basket. Gyawali had gone to prepare grounds for Oli’s Beijing visit. Nepal, it seems, is making a clear but incremental shift towards its northern neighbour. In doing so, it is changing the geographically determined inclination towards New Delhi. At a psychological level, Nepal is integral to ‘spatial idea of Indianness’ if not the political idea of India. The border is irrelevant and incontexual in regulating each other’s citizenry’s behaviour, guided by historical and sociological connections as propellents. The psychological feeling is more confederational than international, challenging the very concept of ‘territorial consciousness’ of modern states. Cross the open border and the homogeneity of affiliations is visible in language, kinship and a cobweb of relations overriding the national barriers. It simply does not feel like a different country! However, the India-Nepal border also affirms Charles S Maier’s hypothesis (Once Within Borders; Harvard University Press, 2016) that views frontiers as ‘reflecting steep gradients of inequality and zones of differential privileges’. Unlike India, Nepal is an example of political instability and economic stagnation. Partly, it is because Nepal has not allowed easy diffusion of ideas, institutions and practices that make India a vibrant democracy and an emerging economic power. Additionally, the local politics in Nepal is fueled by anti-India semantics. India perhaps is a victim of ‘power paradox’ in Nepal where it has spent billions without achieving its larger strategic goals. This ‘relationship of paradox’ is getting wider due to Chinese geographical overtures. Whispers from Beijing indicate that China is bringing Nepal within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with $7-8 billion investments. Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister, has proposed a China-Nepal-India economic corridor as part of the BRI for common development of the Himalayan region. Nepal also feels that the proposed BRI encompassing cross-border roads, railways, oil pipelines, information highways, energy grids, skyways and transmission highways could improve the quality of lives in the hill state. However, from an Indian perspective, the proposal could bring Nepal under the ‘Chinese sphere of influence’ through the positioning of Chinese men, material and money on permanent basis. Probably, the most worrisome aspect of China-Nepal partnership is the emerging synergy on railway connectivity. China and Nepal are moving firmly towards finalising agreements on some key railway projects. The two foreign ministers discussed conducting a feasibility study for the proposed Nepal-China Cross Border Railway from Keyrong to Kathmandu, and from Kathmandu to Pokhara and Lumbini. One is not sure if the statement by the Nepal Foreign Minister was a pleasing one made in passing, but certain inferences deserve mention. 1First, China has the expertise to build high-altitude railways in Tibet and is gradually extending them southwards towards Nepal. Connecting Nepal should not be a major technical problem. China is also known for completing its railway projects in time; so it should not take much time once the detailed project review (DPR) is available. Beijing has already sent its first railroad freight express to Kathmandu, opening up possibilities of expanded trade and commerce between the two sides. 2Second, Lumbini is bang in the Terai zone, near the Indo-Nepal border. Any railway project with Chinese assistance may undermine India’s established influence in the southern part of Nepal. It also shows that Nepal, under Oli, a known China supporter, would not hesitate to play the China card in its southern part even if it means compromising India’s interests. Nepal is turning its geographical limitations into advantages. 3Third, in the geographical game, India is losing out to China with Nepal increasingly relying on the latter. More and more projects in Nepal are going the Chinese way with Chinese footprints everywhere. One example would suffice. The buses plying from the border cities of Nepal to Kathmandu are of ‘Higher’ company of China than the Indian make earlier. As Robert D Kaplan hypothesises (The Revenge of Geography, 2013), “India’s advantages and disadvantages as it seeks great power status in the early twenty-first century lie in its geography. India is yet to dominate its high-altitude shadow zone (ie like Nepal), so that India remains the lesser power.” New Delhi, to use Teresita C Schaffer and Howard B Schaffer’s euphemism, “can no longer exclude Chinese influence from its smaller neighbours but can instead serve its interests better by altering its tactics.” India, therefore, needs to adopt smart power narrative and forge greater convergence, making Nepal a volitional partner. For instance, while the Kathmandu Raxual railway line would take years, India can facilitate the east-west connectivity requirement of Nepal in the Terai region and link them to its own railways for mutual benefit. With the gauge conversion between Janakpur and Jainagar expected to be completed by this year-end, it should not take much effort to connect Janakpur to Sitamarhi or Darbhanga since both the cities are hardly 50 km away and are in plain lands. This is just a representative example where India can take half a dozen railway projects to connect border towns of the two countries.In dealing with Nepal, India needs to fully tap the potential of network power for propelling its agenda setting (without bothering too much for Chinese overtures) and make New Delhi an attraction for Kathmandu. A well-knit cobweb of communication linkages and combination of hard and soft power strategies would perhaps slow down further transition of Nepal towards the Chinese side.

Views are personal

Army Training Command known as ARTRAC was raised in 1991 at Mhow and moved to Shimla in 1993 .It acts as the nodal agency for all institutional training in the Army and also evolves joint doctrines in conjunction with other services.

Beijing, April 16

China wants to stick to the “right path” of bilateral ties with India, explore new areas for cooperation and ensure sound and steady development of the relationship, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said on Monday.Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying’s remarks came during a media briefing as she replied to a question on a series of high-level meetings between the two countries.After last year’s stand-off in Doklam, India and China have stepped up dialogue at various levels to reset the ties.Hua said China’s ties with India had seen new progress and allround cooperation this year.“This year, under the guidance of the two leaders (Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi), China and India relations have been developing with a sound momentum,” Hua said.“China attaches great importance to developing relations with India and we would like to work together to implement the consensus reached by leaders, stick to the right path of the bilateral ties, accumulate more positive energy, explore new areas for cooperation and ensure sound and steady development of bilateral ties,” she said.“We have seen close exchanges at all levels and new progress in allround cooperation,” Hua said without elaborating.On April 13, a meeting was held between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Yang Jiechi, Director of China’s Foreign Affairs Commission and member of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) in Shanghai.  Besides the meeting between Yang and Doval, the two countries “successfully” held the 11th Joint Economic Group meeting and the fifth Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), she said.Hua said officials from the two foreign ministries also met. The two sides also held working mechanism meeting on border affairs and cross-border rivers, she said.“These interactions show that China and India share wide range of common interests and our bilateral cooperation holds great potential,” she said.External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman are also due to visit China on April 24 to take part in the meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).Prime Minister Modi himself is scheduled to visit China in June to take part in the SCO summit in the Chinese city of Qingdao. PTI

Tribune News Service

Srinagar, April 5

Days after three separate counter-insurgency operations left 13 militants dead on a single day, the Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen D Anbu, on Tuesday reviewed the security situation in the Valley.Accompanied by Chinar Corps Commander, Lt Gen AK Bhatt, the Army Commander visited the hinterland formations in south Kashmir and was briefed by the commanders on ground with regard to operational preparedness, an Army spokesman said.“The Army Commander complimented the troops for their recent success and commended them for their dedication to duty and high standards of professionalism. He was appreciative of the measures and standard operating procedures instituted by the units and formations to meet the challenges by inimical elements,” the spokesman said.Lauding the excellent synergy amongst all security forces, the Army Commander exhorted all ranks to maintain a safe, secure and peaceful environment for the people of the Valley.

Jammu, April 6

Governor NN Vohra released ‘Information War-Disinformation Will Decide Future Wars’, a book written by veteran journalist Ramesh Bhan, at Raj Bhawan on Friday.The book expounds the manner in which information is being manipulated the world over to serve vested interests. Based on his journalistic experience in J&K, Afghanistan and Crimea, the author has reflected on how terrorism and insurgency can be fought effectively by using media.Complimenting Bhan, the Governor hoped that his writing would generate interest among the readers about the non-combat modes of warfare. He wished Bhan success in his future literary endeavours. —TNS

Salute to her Military bearing

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Tribune News Service

Mohali, April 1

The Mohali police claimed to have got a tip-off that Lt Col BS Sandhu (retd) might be staying in Uttar Pradesh.A senior official of the Mohali police said they got the tip-off that Sandhu could be staying in Kanpur or Gorakhpur.“He is not using his phone number, but some new number. We are trying to locate him,” said the official.Notably, the Mohali police have got Sandhu’s non-bailable arrest warrants from a court in Kharar on Saturday as he (Sandhu) failed to join police investigations in the case of murder of CTU employee Abhishek Guleria so far. Sandhu was nominated in the case on March 27.Meanwhile, four persons, Ramesh, Ramesh Chand, Dharampal and Davinder, who were also named in the case by the Mohali police on Saturday, have also gone underground, said the police. The foursome are said to be security guards at Forest Hill Resort, owned by Lt Col Sandhu, at Nayagaon.The police said these four persons were not found at their respective residences when the police party went there to summon them for investigation. Despite instructions, they did not turn up so far.As per the police, these four persons were involved in stuffing the body of the victim in a sack and then in a polythene bag before disposing it off at a deserted place along the Pinjore-Baddi road. The body was recovered by the police on March 24.It is to be noted that a four-member SIT has been formed to work out the case.Four persons named in FIR go undergroundFour persons, Ramesh, Ramesh Chand, Dharampal and Davinder, who were also named in the case by the Mohali police on Saturday, have also gone underground, said the police. The foursome are said to be security guards at Forest Hill Resort, owned by Lt Col Sandhu, at Nayagaon.

Need radical new thinking to improve ties with China

MK Bhadrakumar

The summer is at our doorstep. With June approaching, memory mixes with anxiety. It’s going to be one year since the Doklam faceoff began. One year is not a long time in the life of a nation but in last June a terrible beauty was born in the India-China relationship. Alarmist reports appeared lately regarding Chinese deployments. Timely clarification at the official level dissipated the scaremongering. Compared to the impetuosity of the past three-year period, a sense of proportion is discernible in the government’s approach to the relationship with China.The question that begs an answer, nonetheless, is what it was that we had hoped to gain by crossing the established border into Doklam last year? A range of explanations may be possible and, indeed, the two most-popular ones are: the security of Siliguri Corridor (‘chicken’s neck’) demanded it, and/or two, that as the provider of security for Bhutan, India was obliged to act. Both explanations are heavily laden with emotions and appeal to public imagination, but are intrinsically fragile and insufficient to explain the gravity of what happened.In the recent exchange between our ambassador to China Gautam Bambawale and Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, a third unspoken leitmotif appeared — Doklam as a template of the India-China border dispute. Hua unequivocally refuted Bambawale’s innuendo of Doklam being a segment of the “un-demarcated and un-delineated” India-China boundary, where “we are discussing where the boundary will lie”. In Bambawale’s words, “I can tell you very frankly… The Chinese military changed the status quo in the Doklam area and therefore India reacted to it. Ours was a reaction to the change in the status quo by the Chinese military.” He did not even mention Bhutan. But Hua differentiated Doklam from the India-China border dispute, and remarked that India must learn lessons from last year’s faceoff. India keeps strategic ambiguity as regards the 1890 pact between India, Sikkim and Tibet.Amidst the triumphalism last August following the denouement to the Doklam faceoff, this was what M Taylor Fravel, professor at MIT and expert on China’s boundaries, had written in War on the Rocks magazine on September 1, in an essay titled “Why India Did Not Win the Standoff with China”: “Ironically perhaps, India’s actions underscored to China the importance of enhancing its military position in the Doklam bowl. Before the standoff in June, China’s permanent presence in the area had been quite limited. China had maintained a road in the area for several decades, but did not garrison any forces. In contrast, India has maintained and developed a forward post at Doka La (Sikkim) adjacent to Doklam.“Now that India has chosen to confront China at Doklam, however, China may well seek to rectify this tactical imbalance of forces… If China does this, it would likely build facilities farther away from India’s position at Doka La, making it more challenging for India to intervene and block China next time. When India challenged China’s construction crews in June, it only had to move its forces a hundred metres from the existing border. In the future, India may be faced with the uncomfortable choice of deciding whether to risk much more to deny China a greater presence farther inside Doklam or to accept it. This will be a tough decision for any leader to make. Even if India won this round, it may not win the next one.”What an extraordinary reading of tea leaves! No matter the caricaturing by elements in our strategic community or incitement from abroad, what Fravel predicted has happened and it puts Delhi on the horns of a dilemma. The big question here is how far Bhutan is interested in India pushing the envelope? It appears that Bhutan’s border claim is historically flimsy and a massive amount of Tibetan historical land records attest to the Chinese claim. Curiously, Bhutan over-asserted its claim over Doklam only fairly recently in the late ’90s. Of course, the Bhutanese claim is (partially at least) not without some historical foundation, although Doklam as such used to be under the control of the Tibetan administration in Lhasa. Put differently, China cannot be expected to relent, given the access Doklam gives to the highly strategic Lumbi valley that leads to Lhasa. Above all, the cut-off point is that “not a single inch of our land will be or can be ceded from China” — as President Xi Jinping stated on the concluding day of the National People’s Congress in Beijing on March 20.In the circumstances, megaphone diplomacy serves no purpose and could even be counterproductive. Meanwhile, time may not work in India’s favour, either. In Bhutan itself, there is no evidence of fear from Chinese invasion or even encroachment from north. Do the concerns voiced by Ambassador Bambawale find echoes in Bhutan? There are no easy answers. Some recent reports by travellers have cited a growing feeling of awe and admiration among the Bhutanese people regarding China’s economic miracle. Such inchoate feelings can arouse nationalist sentiments in unexpected ways. The fact remains that the sharply rising trajectory of China-Nepal cooperation, especially the economic spin-off from the Belt and Road Initiative, is also poised to transform Nepal phenomenally in the coming decade. Bhutan will watch with interest Nepal’s transition to a new mode of production relations and what it could mean for development, social mobility and prosperity. Suffice to say, Delhi should anticipate that given the irresistible pulls of modernisation, the quotient of “happiness” in Bhutan may give way.When the region is changing so rapidly, there is need for a radical new thinking on our part instead of reacting to emergent situations with the advent of summer in the Himalayas. Fundamentally, we ought to figure out whether we want China as friend and partner or continue to regard it as rival and enemy against whom we should prepare for the decisive war eventually. The former Soviet Union made that strategic decision when Mikhail Gorbachev travelled to Beijing in 1989; and, the two countries’ quasi-alliance ensued. One possibility is to “re-invent” SAARC. We had conceived it as a vehicle of regional leadership. Perhaps, we should now turn it around as a dynamic vehicle for regional cooperation. Does China’s SAARC membership damage Indian interests, or, can it provide a window of opportunity? Much as the thought seems preposterous today, we can be open-minded and receptive. It is entirely conceivable that our core interests over Doklam can be safeguarded within a matrix of regional cooperation involving China.The writer is a former Ambassador

Jammu, April 21

Havildar Charanjeet Singh, 42, grievously injured in the Sunderbani sector on April 17 during ceasefire violation by Pakistan troops, succumbed to his injuries on Friday. He was cremated with full military honours at his native village Kalsian in Nowshera sector on Saturday. Hundreds of people from Kalsian and adjoining villages paid their last respects to the soldier, who is survived by his wife Neelam Kumari. “Havildar Charanjeet Singh sustained bullet injuries, was evacuated and provided intensive medical care in military hospitals. Despite all efforts, the gallant soldier succumbed to his injuries in the early hours of Friday,” a defence spokesperson said. — TNS