Director General of Police of Jammu and Kashmir Shesh Paul Vaid is absolutely correct. The trend of flash mobs being concentrated at encounter sites in the valley is now witnessing a virtual suicidal tendency on the part of many local Kashmiri youths. Suicide terror has never been associated with local terrorists. Actions of the so-called fidayeen have seen the involvement of local terrorists, but these are essentially ‘resist unto death’ type of actions, not the classic suicide-bombing activities seen in sub-conventional conflicts in parts of the Islamic world.
Chest-baring young men are now daring the security forces to fire at them. The dilemma for the state and its institutions is usually intense whenever such violence has to be dealt with. Punitive actions by the security forces in typical law-and-order situations are calibrated to detract people from taking the law into their hands; these situations are temporary and overcome by turning the screw just a bit. However, what is being witnessed in Jammu and Kashmir is not a law-and-order problem but one involving serious public disorder with threats to national integrity. In the rest of India, there are negative passions galore, recommending extreme steps by law enforcement authorities with advisories not to soft-pedal such brazen anti-national acts. This is not the first time that we see serious challenges to state authority in Jammu and Kashmir. Anger seen outside the state is legitimate, as brazen resistance against law enforcement cannot go on with impunity. Yet, enforcement authorities are also not expected to abide by public advisories, which may be ridden with passion and irrationality. What is definitely expected is that these situations are to be seriously war-gamed and solutions found. The problem is not local but national. It, therefore, cannot be left to the state authorities alone. The stamp of application of experience needs to be nationwide. Personally, I am confronted by ordinary people almost every day who ask why the situation is not being handled more professionally.
We need to be clear about what exactly is happening in Jammu and Kashmir and how things pan out in the events being witnessed. Let me explain from experience and observation. For many years, one has been aware of just how well the separatists have been structured. District, Tehsil and block-wise hierarchy exist with ‘specialists’ assigned responsibilities. Their virtual intelligence arm is well-embedded. There are rabble-rousers ready to respond in quick time. Outreach to media is instantaneous to get their point of view home. Care is taken to ensure that there is no over-exposure of this level of leadership. One of the known ways of preventing intelligence from being effective is to bring stone-pelters and flash mobs from neighbouring towns and villages so that they are not easily identifiable to the local troops and police. Leadership at the local level is faceless and diffused with power concentrated in the hands of many rather than a few. This prevents compromise and identification. The faces in front are projected to be that of juveniles so that there is reluctance on the part of security forces to arrest and prosecute.
Social media groups employing mobile technology are very active. Many of them are controlled from across the Line of Control with a constant flow of instructions from handlers who have the benefit of analysis of data being fed to them on a daily basis. The entire mechanism is professional and designed to irritate and instigate the Indian public, government officials and security forces personnel. Passionate responses from the rest of India such as “exterminate them all” are exactly what the separatists and their handlers wish to see. These angry responses are exploited on social media to spread greater anti-India sentiment. More the outpouring of negative emotion, more successful are those instigating this response from people.
In the face of this situation, how does one define national interest? Is it the appeasement of public or the attainment of a professional aim arrived at through gaming, ideation and discussion to overcome a situation in favour of the state’s interest? I can recall a few examples of responses to such threats in the past. In 2003, the then chief secretary of Jammu and Kashmir, the general officer commanding, 15 Corps, and the director general of Jammu and Kashmir Police undertook a mission of regularly speaking together at different places, taking questions and offering explanations. It was perhaps the high mark of cooperation and coordination with a civil-military interface. It was also the best use of the Unified Command concept. The challenges then were different, but effectiveness was high considering the threats of that time. It was regular meetings between the core group and Unified Command in 2010 which delineated responsibilities and identified the vulnerabilities of the security forces to eventually overcome the challenge that year.
The situation today is admittedly far worse, necessitating a more comprehensive response which must first rest on defining the meaning of ‘engagement and outreach’. These are terms being loosely used in the media. It is unfair to expect from the political leadership bold and meaningful initiatives in the midst of serious, violent situations, notwithstanding the fact that initiatives should have come long ago. If anything, the initiative has to happen quietly and behind the scenes, and the outreach has to be directed to the right quarters. While it may be partially right to assume that mainstream separatist leaders have lost their significance, the inability to identify the new executive leadership is putting the authorities in a quandary. This leadership is diffused and has remained under wraps, probably under the guidance of men from across the Line of Control. Interrogation reports of detained rabble-rousers have not been made public, but from these, the intelligence authorities would probably have a fair idea of where the brain trust lies. This is the intelligence problem which needs immediate action.
The issue of ‘outreach’, which is always recommended to the political leadership by the intelligentsia and the lack of which is inevitably rued by intellectuals, needs a measure of explanation. Even in times of stability, outreach has not been easy. In these challenging times, it may be even more difficult. With vigilantism of the young, less-educated and reasonably mindless, it is difficult to organise public meetings without expecting trouble. No one wishes to create negative situations. So outreach has got to be first to personalities – and these can be from all walks of life and different towns and villages. The clergy has an important role to play and must be taken on board.
Outreach is primarily an exercise in listening, something most important people are not comfortable doing. It is about confidence-building all over again, with the ability to listen and withstand venom spewed against the state, against the leaders and against institutions. Small gestures and concessions which can make a difference to the public can be made in such meetings. This spirals higher as confidence enhances along with public curiosity. This is not the blueprint for a solution to the intense problem which has gripped the valley. It is only suggestive of ways and means by which better understanding can prevail. Regarding harsher measures, if the situation deteriorates, the authorities will probably consider a full blanket ban on internet and mobile services, like in 2016. It is to India’s credit that the media remains free even in as challenging a situation as was witnessed in 2016 or could potentially come to the fore in 2017. This is our national strength, and that is how it must remain.
In dealing with separatist machinery, while principally we have been acting against the visible faces of Hurriyat leaders – detaining them and placing them under house arrest, the seriousness of tackling the infrastructure at their command appears limited. That seems to be mostly intact, considering the ease with which public ire is aroused. Perhaps the focus needs to shift even as the eyes remain on the visible face of leadership. The police and intelligence set-up are competent to do this when it decides to act. There have been preventive detentions and arrests made in the past. The police know how to take this a step further; it would, however, need full political backing.
The vulnerability of the local police personnel has also come into question. In 2016, the targeting of police families demoralised the personnel. The situation was overcome fairly early, but it appears that the adversaries continue to identify this as a major vulnerability. There is a need for astute leadership to overcome the problem. It cannot be left to the police hierarchy alone and would need political cooperation between all parties. Police stations are the core institutions whose sanctity cannot be compromised. They must remain strengthened with Central Reserve Police Force reinforcement and stand-by arrangements for army’s response. Local police personnel need recognition and empathy, which must come in droves.
Lastly, the one thing that such situations do not need is unprofessional advice and instigation of security forces against the public. The situation is admittedly bad, but India, its security forces, intelligentsia and political leadership have faced worse times before. The nation will not bend despite malicious attempts to pressurise it, even as it responds with the right blend of head and heart. A country of India’s reputation will always do that.
