All ranks in the Defence Forces up to the rank of Brigadiers and equivalents, got a pay and pension boost in the form of Military Service Pay (MSP) in the 6^th Central Pay Commission (CPC). Generals and equivalent in the three Services did not get any MSP. This created a situation where the Generals ended up drawing lower pay and pension than senior Brigadiers and Colonels. This glaring anomaly was identified and submitted but never resolved.  

The 7^th CPC dealt another blow, this time to Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels, Brigadiers and some senior JCOs/OR whose pay was artificially capped in the new Pay Matrix. Ironically, when the Colonels & Brigadiers got a pay hike up to Rs 20,000 later (after the government resolution in 2017), it further exacerbated the pay and pension inequity for Generals. A simple solution to this problem within existing Government rules was submitted but orders were never issued.

It is only in September 2024 that the pension of officers of the rank of Major General, Lieutenant General, VCOAS/Army Commanders and equivalent in the three Services was increased and went up to Rs 1,16,550, resolving the problem of Brigadiers and Colonels getting higher pension than Generals. At this juncture, it will be worthwhile to recount how this problem played out, especially after the turning point in the year 2016.

Background

In the run- up to the 7th CPC, the three Services after extensive research and debate submitted a very well rounded, unanimous Joint Services Memorandum (JSM) on Pay, Allowance and Pension duly signed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC). This was followed up by a number of briefings to the Chairman 7th CPC for more than a year, beginning April 2014. He was also taken to various tri-service establishments from high altitude areas to A & N islands to interact with all ranks and gain first-hand experience of the hardships faced by soldiers. Although the attitude of Chairman 7th CPC towards the Services appeared jarring many times, the Services were optimistic of resolving long standing anomalies, based on their solid, well researched submissions.

Unlike earlier Pay Commissions, the 7th Central Pay Commission submitted its report well before time in Nov 2015. The new pay scales were sought to be implemented from 01 Jan 2016. All Central Government Departments got busy scanning the report to see what it had for them. The first realization was a below average increment of 14.29% for computing new Basic Pay (after merging previous BP and DA). Earlier Pay Commissions had given a more substantive increment. The award also changed the system from the four Pay Bands of 6th CPC to a new Matrix system. The erstwhile Grade Pays became Levels or Columns of the new Matrix system while stages (rows) of the matrix denoted the number of years of service in a particular rank or Level (Grade Pay). The new pay figures were pre-fitted in this matrix, with each succeeding row (for a particular Level) pencilling in an increase of 3% (same annual increment as earlier), duly rounded off to a higher figure. Prima facie, this appeared a visible improvement as each Central Government employee could himself / herself verify the pay fixation by the Pay Office.

The disagreement between the Chairman 7th CPC and its only member (ex IAS), as far as critical features like continuation of NFU granted by 6th CPC, was evident from the text of the report. The largesse towards the IPS officers was also clear. The IPS were granted two additional pay increments for promotion to three ranks (total six additional increments). The unstated intent, clearly, was to bridge the gap between IPS and IAS while the Indian Forest Service benefitted automatically being the third All India Service. There were some benefits for other civil services also but surprisingly, the 7th CPC report was silent on the JSM proposals submitted by the Services.

The Defence Services also discovered to their surprise that Civil Pay Matrix (CPM) was not applicable to defence personnel and a separate Defence Pay Matrix (DPM) had been awarded. On preliminary examination, everything in the DPM appeared the same as CPM. It had the same Index of Rationalisation for different Levels, the same annual increment, the same Levels (with two additional columns, for Captains and Lieutenant Colonels, i.e. 10 B, and 12A respectively, who were granted unique Grade Pays by 6th CPC, different to civilians).  But was the requirement of these two additional Levels/ Columns sufficient reason for delinking defence pay structure from CPM? After all, these additional columns could have been inserted into CPM itself without causing any confusion.

The intent became evident when one looked at the number of stages (rows) in the matrix. For the JCOs/OR, the number of rows in the DPM were restricted to 24 i.e. for the top of scale for a rank, the number of annual increments was restricted to 24. On the other hand, the CPM had 40 rows. i.e. 40 increments for corresponding levels. For defence officers also, this anomaly of lower number of rows was repeated in the DPM, leading to lower top of scale for three ranks as compared to their civilian counterparts. The anomaly is summarized for these three officer ranks in the table below.

There was no reason specified in the 7th CPC report for abruptly abridging the stages (rows) of the DPM for all ranks. For JCOs /OR and equivalents there were only 24 rows in the DPM. This meant capping the salary for the few who serve till the age of 54 / 55 / 57 (Army/Navy/Air Force) in the last few years of their service and stagnation which was done away in earlier Pay Commission.  The 7th CPC increased the MSP of JCOs/OR to Rs 5200 pm and Officers to Rs 15500, in consonance with the multiplication factor of 2.57 applied to pay and allowances of all Central Government employees. If one looks at the column “Loss in DPM” in the above table, it emerges that what was given to defence personnel as compensation for unique military hardships by the 6th CPC, in the form of MSP, more than that was sought to be withdrawn by 7th CPC through the separate DPM mechanism. There could be no other reason. It was ensured that the gross Pay (Basic Pay plus MSP) on top of the scale for all ranks, from the Sepoy to a Brigadiers, will always be lower than Basic Pay of his civilian counterpart. The Generals (Major Generals and Lieutenant Generals), as it is got no MSP and their top of scale was always equal / a tad lower than their civilian counterparts i.e. Joint Secretary/ Additional Secretary/ Secretary to Government of India.

The Defence Forces realised that the adverse effect of this unfair practice could be best negated by entirely doing away with the DPM and making CPM applicable to defence personnel also, with a few additional columns for specific ranks / Grade Pays / Levels in the forces. This was not difficult. Hence a new proposed CPM matrix, incorporating just two additional columns, was formulated and submitted to MoD for sanction, along with the case for removing other major anomalies. Briefings and presentations were given to the Raksha Mantri and top bureaucrats, including Cabinet Secretary. Nobody had an answer as to what was the need for a separate DPM and why the rows in it were lesser than the CPM. Meanwhile the Government resolution promulgated in July 2016 just reproduced the Pay Matrices recommended in 7th CPC report and the anomalies were not resolved.

The degradation in pay and perceived loss of status as compared to civilians, led to serious consternation and dissatisfaction amongst the defence personnel. Frantic all-round efforts were made to get the anomaly rectified but to no avail.  The CoSC wrote to the Defence Minister that the Pay award should be held in abeyance till the major anomalies were resolved. Ultimately, the Government took note of the unprecedented and serious impasse and the CoSC was granted an audience at the PMO for across the table confabulation. The CoSC (CAS and COAS) decided to take the Chairman Army Pay Commission Cell (CAPC), a two star General, with them, on the appointed date.

The Turning Point

The CoSC (CAS and COAS) was ushered in the office of Principal Secretary to PMO and were seated across his large office desk.  They made the CAPC sit in between them, facing the Principal Secretary, as he was to pilot the discussion. It was a rather uncomfortable situation for any two star General but he had no choice. He knew he would get very little time to present the case and discuss the anomalies; hence, he had rehearsed his lines. He started with the major anomaly of the Pay Matrices and the conversation went like this (in brief) –

CAPC:  Sir, in earlier Pay Commission, the pay of civilian and defence personnel was governed by a common Pay Band Structure. But this time, separate Pay Matrix has been awarded to defence personnel. Sir, we did not ask for a separate Pay Matrix and would like the pay of defence personnel to be also governed by the Civilian Pay Matrix, which should be termed a Common Pay Matrix.

Principal Secretary:  (cutting the Army Man short) No, No, we cannot grant you the same Pay Matix.

CAPC: Sir, in that case, many anomalies will arise; we are only striving for pay parity with civilians.

Principal Secretary: (again interrupting rather angrily) Why do you compare yourselves with civilians? You have so many things which civilians don’t have. Should we give the things that you have to the civilians?

(At this point the CAPC understood that the Principal Secretary was referring to the MSP, CSD facilities, Cants etc. so he decided to be bold.)

CAPC: (without looking at the CoSC) Yes Sir, we have no objections; you may grant whatever perks we have to the civilians, no problems. This was earlier conveyed to Chairman 7th CPC also when he posed a similar query to me. Our only request is to be granted parity in pay via a Common Pay Matrix.

Principal Secretary:  No CPM cannot be granted. What’s your problem with DPM?

The CAPC knew that the Principal Secretary had been briefed by the Joint Secretary PMO (whom he had met earlier to debunk his wrong theory on OROP) not to cede to the demand for CPM. Although, the Principal Secretary had firmly rejected the strategy devised by the three Services, yet the CAPC realised that a new opportunity has now manifested itself.

CAPC: (rolling out the CPM and DPM) Sir, please look here, the CPM has 40 rows till column 11 while the DPM has only 24 rows. This implies 16 fewer annual increments of pay to defence personnel.

Principal Secretary: (looking non-plussed and addressing the Joint Secretary) What is the reason?  

Joint Secretary (JS): But the junior ranks in Services, retire much earlier, don’t serve till 60 years of age, hence lesser number of rows.

CAPC:  Sir, JCOs in Navy and AF serve till 55 / 57 years of age, although the numbers may be small.  A soldier can be recruited at 17 years of age and if he serves till 57 years of age, he would have also rendered 40 years of service, just like civilians. So there needs to be no disparity in number of rows, i.e. pay increments between CPM and DPM.

(Principal Secretary and JS are quiet)

Chairman CoSC and CAS: Yes that’s right, we cannot have senior soldiers (JCOs/ NCOs) not getting their annual increment of pay, which is to be given to all.

CAPC: Sir,  please  look  further at the Columns 12 A, 13 and 13 A of the DPM, these columns have been terminated at 18, 16 and 14 rows respectively, much earlier than Columns 13 and 13 A of CPM.

Principal Secretary:   (Addressing the JS) Why do these columns have lesser number of rows?

(The CAPC is sure that the JS, an IIT Kharagpur alumni, is smart enough to understand the unstated intent of 7th CPC but he cannot admit their unfair approach in front of the CoSC)

CAPC: (seeing the JS fumbling for a reply) Sir, it could be an oversight or a typo. Extending the three columns by 2-3 rows in the DPM, to bring it in conformity with CPM, won’t make a difference.

COAS: In all fairness, this needs to be done.

Principal Secretary: (Addressing the JS) Any problems?

(JS again mumbles something)

Principal Secretary:  OK, any other problem in DPM?

CAPC:  Sir, the Lieutenant   Colonels and Colonels, Columns 12A and 13 have to be given higher Index of Rationalization (IoR) of 2.67, instead of existing 2.57, like Column 13 A, both in CPM and DPM.

Principal Secretary:  (peering at the pay matrices) Then we will have to increase IoR of Column 13 of CPM also.

CAPC: Yes Sir, the CPM can also be given higher IOR.

(The JS nods in approval this time)

Principal Secretary: (addressing the JS) All right, please issue instructions to extend the rows of DPM as discussed.

(CAPC exults silently; the pay stagnation issue of JCOs /OR serving beyond 50 years of age, is resolved. He knows that Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels and Brigadiers & equivalent will now have much higher top of pay scale. After adding MSP, it will exceed the pay of Generals, even VCOAS and Army Commander. But this is a happy internal anomaly and will have to be resolved by giving compensatory increase to the Generals, sooner or later, as a junior cannot get higher pay than a senior.)

Principal Secretary:  (addressing the CoSC now) Ok, so your major issue stands resolved.  Other issues can be referred to MoD.

The CoSC thanks the Principal Secretary to PMO and leaves with CAPC in tow.

Also Read: Top 10 innovations that have revolutionized the military in the 21st century

Revised Government Resolution

The meeting in PMO office had gone well, despite the not so favourable vibes. However, until the orders for the amendments got promulgated, nothing could be assumed.  Fortunately, the wait was not long and the revised DPM was received soon after. Even the orders for amendment to earlier Gazette notification for Armed Forces were issued after a few months on 22 June 2017. It encompassed the following:-

• The revised DPM, increasing the number of rows, as discussed in PMO office.
• Increase in IoR of Columns 12A and 13 from 2.57 to 2.67. Even the CPM Column 13, benefitted by increasing the IoR to 2.67.
• Pay Matrix of MNS was also revised to reflect higher IoR and remove some errors.

Comparison of top of pay scales of Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel and Brigadiers & equivalents, original DPM and revised DPM is as follows:

The deliberations in PMO that day ended in benefitting many ranks of defence, including MNS as well as civilians.  It was a most satisfying outcome; an increase of approx Rs 20,000 in the pay of Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels and Brigadiers (and consequently pension by half that amount) was definitely a hammer blow in their favour. These officer ranks had really ascended the Pay Summit.  However, it created a fresh anomaly as the pay plus MSP of Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels and Brigadiers on top of their respective scales, far exceeded top pay of Generals till VCOAS / Army Commanders & equivalent. The top of pay scale of a Brigadiers could be Rs 2,17,600 + 15,500, i.e. a total of Rs 2,33,100 which exceeds pay of Apex scale of Rs 2,25,000. This situation of a junior officer getting more pay than senior officer was untenable and violated principles of natural justice. It was reasonable to expect that this anomaly will be rectified sooner than later in a nation governed on the tenets of fair play and equity.

Over the years, the Services have repeatedly realised that the anomalies in their pay and allowance are either not processed at all or moved at a snail’s pace. As a result, their anomalies keep piling, while the case of civilians move in the fast lane.

The Aftermath

The issue of Generals getting lower pay and consequently lower pension was discussed in the tri-Services Pay Remuneration Committee (PARC).  This anomaly could have been straight away resolved by granting MSP to Generals but this was neither done so by the 6th CPC or 7th CPC despite cogent arguments fielded by the three Services. PARC knew very well that granting MSP to Generals will result in them getting higher salary than even Secretary to Government of India which was the real reason why it has not been accepted by the Government since 2008. Thus, an alternate solution of grant of Personal Pay (PP) was devised, as per provisions of Government FR/SR, which are meant to resolve such situations where a junior is getting higher salary than senior. After discussions with MoD (Fin), the proposal of PP for Generals was put up to Principal Personnel Officers Committee (PPOC) and approved by them.

The proposal thereafter was moved on file by PARC for concurrence of MoD (Fin) which was accorded. CAPC then personally took the file by hand to MoD, DoP&T and finally MoF, explaining the solution threadbare to all the officers. Since the solution was as per the existing Government provisions and had paltry financial implications (just about 500 Generals and equivalents being the beneficiaries in the three Services), the proposal was endorsed on file by all. MoF then conveyed that the file has been put up for approval of the Finance Minister (FM). A couple of months later replying to a journalist in a TV interview the FM emphatically stated that the anomaly cannot be allowed to continue and Government will soon resolve it. However, the proposal of grant of PP to Generals never saw the light of the day, perhaps shelved due to opposition from usual quarters.

Legal Recourse

The anomaly of junior getting more pay and pension than a senior was not resolved despite a simple solution, enumerated above, been submitted for approval in 2017. Consequently, a case was filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court which directed the Government in Feb 2022 to redress the glaring incongruity within a time frame of six months. Since the directions were not implemented, a notice was issued to the Government as to why contempt proceedings should not be initiated.  Thereafter, in partial resolution to the problem, MoD granted pay protection to Major Generals drawing pay less than Brigadiers, in June 2023.  But this came with a rider cap of Rs 2,25,000 imposed on the Generals. Clearly, the MoD was not willing to allow pay of Generals to exceed the pay of Secretary to the Government of India, despite earning the opprobrium of the HC and despite Brigadiers Pay reaching Rs 2,33,100. 

Also Read: Future-ready technology and the new age battlefield

However, the judgement of Punjab & Haryana High Court now stands implemented in the latest OROP tables issued in Sep 2024 and pension of all Major Generals, Lieutenant Generals, Cs-in-C and equivalent stands upgraded and protected as compared to Brigadiers. The struggle of last several years has fructified and the top pension of Generals is Rs 1,16,550 (corresponding to top pay of Rs 2,33,100 of Brigadiers). This would make it even more difficult for MoD to retain the pay cap of Rs 2,25,000 for Generals. Once this pay cap is removed through the legal recourse or otherwise, the only pay and pension issue left will be to get the pay arrears for all Generals, starting from 6th CPC regime and pension arrears from the date of retirement in 7th CPC regime.

Conclusion

The Pay and Pension of senior NCOs/JCOs, Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels and Brigadiers & equivalents got substantially enhanced, as per their aspirations in 2016. The pension resolution of Generals now achieved is a case of “Justice delayed but not denied”. However, the grant of justice for the Generals is only partial as of now. The irony is that pension has been enhanced without pay being enhanced to corresponding level!!  

Resolution of the problem just requires a one line order of MoD to annul the pay cap of Rs 2,25,000 imposed on General officers. The whole saga is also a tribute to the patience of Generals and equivalent who have silently suffered acute injustice but have never allowed pecuniary benefits to overshadow their sense of duty and responsibility. Meanwhile, Colonels and Brigadiers and their equivalents in the three Services can rejoice, having ascended the Pay and Pension Summit, with nothing more yonder.

MY tenure in Lebanon as the Commanding Officer in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war will always be etched in the depths of my heart. With a tinge of sadness these days I watch on TV the skyscrapers in…

MY tenure in Lebanon as the Commanding Officer in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war will always be etched in the depths of my heart. With a tinge of sadness these days I watch on TV the skyscrapers in Beirut, which I used to drive past, getting razed to the ground by high-precision air-strikes by the Israel Air Force. The footage triggered a memory of my visit to Israel that year.

It all happened one late night when the Force Commander directed me to represent the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for a seminar being organised by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The next day, as my convoy of Toyota Land Cruiser Prados, escorted by Quick Reaction Teams, neared the barrier at the Israel-Lebanon border, the leading QRT was flagged down by a smart lady IDF soldier.

My men expected inconsequential queries from her and her team. ‘Kahan se aye ho, kahan jaa rahe ho, kisko milne ja rahe ho’. (From where have you come, where are you going, whom are you going to meet). But they were in for a rude shock when all of us were instructed to alight from our vehicles, irrespective of our ranks. A body scanner was run over our bodies and all four vehicles thoroughly searched with metal detectors plus a physical search of every nook and cranny. All personnel and vehicles were photographed and details sent to the next check-post by secure digital means. I was then given the most respectful salute by their security chief and let off after about 15 minutes.

Since the seminar was scheduled in the evening, the Israeli Deputy Brigade Commander had, on my request, invited me to attend a Tactical Exercise Without Troops — a discussion on the ground — to get an insight into their functioning. We climbed onto a small hillock where all the young Israeli men and women officer-soldiers were seated on a rocky patch, their weapons slung over their shoulders.

I soon realised they did not differentiate amongst each other across gender or rank. It took me a while to identify the instructor and senior officers attending the exercise. In the discussion that followed, on the plan of attack on a feature in Lebanese territory, every officer participated. No one deferred to a senior officer. Everyone had a different yet innovative attack plan. No one carried a shred of paper to make notes.

lI was highly impressed — here was a pragmatic approach to tactics in which senior officers were giving a carte blanche to their juniors. Soon the lunch break was announced. Everyone unpacked their lunch, which they had carried in their backpacks. I noticed that not a single officer had unhooked his or her weapon from the sling across their chests while eating.

Driving back from the seminar, I realised that the lack of hierarchy between seniors and juniors, across gender and rank, was, indeed, remarkable. Though we are a professional army back home in India, there’s always something new to learn.

India should acquire the desired degree of TBM capability so that Delhi acquires the appropriate degree of equipoise in engaging with Beijing.

SOME unrelated events of the last week draw attention to India’s modest trans-border military (TBM) capability and the manner in which certain disruptive technologies are impacting the conduct of war. The military operations in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war (that began in February 2022) and the spiral of violence triggered by the Hamas terror attack on Israel (in October 2023), now roiled by the entry of Hezbollah and Iran, testify to the latter trend to a certain degree. Some preliminary policy inferences can be drawn that are relevant for India.

The first development pertains to the October 9 Cabinet Committee on Security approval for the acquisition of two nuclear propelled submarines (SSN); these platforms are also referred to as attack-submarines or hunter-killers. They will be indigenously designed and built at Visakhapatnam. This is a major policy decision and an ambitious one at that.

India was yet to acquire the requisite level of technological competence to design and build a conventional diesel-electric submarine, but yet it had moved straight to design and build a SSBN (a nuclear powered submarine with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles) —- the INS Arihant. The SSBN has a strategic role, which is to ensure credible second-strike capability to render nuclear deterrence more robust. India joined this select group of nations in 2018, one which includes the USA, Russia, the UK, France and China.After a long gestation period of almost 17 years since the acquisition of an SSN was first mooted, India is now embarking on the project, though this approval has to be followed by adequate budgetary allocations. An SSN is a totally different platform by way of technological features and as is the case with the first type of any naval platform, the journey will be long, arduous and expensive.

The two SSNs are reported to cost Rs 15,000 crore each, though this is an initial estimate. When these two boats enter service in an operational manner — with full ordnance package, which means submarine-launched missiles — India will have a credible underwater capability, wherein the SSN can be tasked with attack, surveillance and special operations roles, depending on the tactical exigency. In essence, the SSN can remain on extended underwater ‘prowl’, and unfriendly navies will have to factor this capability when operating in maritime areas of relevance to India.

In the same week, on October 7, the CCS also approved phase III of the Space Based Surveillance system (SBS), which will allow India to launch 52 spy satellites in low earth and geostationary orbits. Expected to cost Rs 27,000 crore, the trans-border surveillance capability of this cluster will be enhanced by artificial intelligence and give a fillip to India’s comprehensive TBM index.

Air power is a core element of a nation’s TBM capability and this aspect came into focus with the assumption of office by the new air chief, Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh, who took over in end-September. During the traditional media interaction in the run-up to the Air Force Day on October 8, ACM Singh noted the gap between India and its principal strategic challenger, China, in the air power domain and dwelt on the need to ramp up domestic production of fighter jets to redress dwindling numbers. Moreover, he said, his first effort would be not to allow “the fighter aircraft strength go down below 30 squadrons” and that HAL should stick to its promise to deliver 24 aircraft every year to bridge the numbers gap.

The 30 squadron figure has to be seen against the aspiration of the IAF to have 42 fighter squadrons to deal with a two-front operational requirement against China and Pakistan. This number was arrived at after the 1965 war with Pakistan; and none other than the legendary JRD Tata, an accomplished pilot and founder of Air India, was a member of the group that made this assessment.

The manner in which air power has been transmuted is evident in the Russia-Ukraine war as well as the violence in West Asia, where the use of relatively less expensive unmanned drones and missiles/rockets have replaced the once-familiar deployment of fighter aircraft and long-range bombers. The writing on the wall, air power experts agree, is that the days of the land-based, manned fighter aircraft are numbered.

While modern fighter aircraft are moving from the fifth to the sixth generation, and will be even more technologically advanced with recent strides made in avionics and the entry of AI, the cost of designing and manufacturing such platforms has become truly astronomical.

Major military powers are grappling with how to acquire affordable and effective air power that is also sustainable. India, too, is in a complex and difficult spot. There is no denying that air power is an imperative tool for ensuring national security. The question, of course, is, what kind of air power — manned or unmanned platforms — and in what distribution (Air Force, Navy, Army and space-cyber commands). That will be a complex issue to resolve for the higher defence management hierarchy, both military and civilian.

TBM capability is a combination of the classical military tripod — the ability to deliver ordnance over long ranges with proven accuracy; ensure surveillance, both defensive and offensive, incorporating the latest technologies in communication warfare; and being capable of moving tangible military assets to distant theatres when warranted.

The Indian military is going through a period of transition towards greater jointness, while theatre commands have been mooted. There is a case for the evolving military architecture to objectively review individual service or domain-specific trans-border capabilities across the tripod — and move towards acquiring a holistic national TBM capability.

The specific scenario where this would come into play is in relation to China. Even as the geo-economic and trade compulsion introduces one layer of robust bilateral interaction, there is a need for India to acquire the desired degree of TBM capability in a progressive manner, so that Delhi acquires the appropriate degree of equipoise in engaging with Beijing — and does not need to be either deferential or belligerent.

Later this month, the trauma of October 20, 1962 will be recalled. It is hoped that the right policy cues regarding TBM will be internalised by the Indian security apex.

The Indian Air Force’s Vayu Veer Vijeta Car Rally, commemorating the 25th anniversary of the victory in the 1999 Kargil conflict, was flagged off from Chandigarh for its next leg to Dehradun today. The rally that comprises participants from the..

The Indian Air Force’s Vayu Veer Vijeta Car Rally, commemorating the 25th anniversary of the victory in the 1999 Kargil conflict, was flagged off from Chandigarh for its next leg to Dehradun today.

The rally that comprises participants from the IAF and Army as well as veterans and civilians had been flagged off from Thoise in Ladakh on October 8 and will finally culminate at Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh on October 27.

The rally aims to inspire the youth to join the Indian Armed Forces and spread awareness about the achievements of the Air Force among common people. The team members are also interacting with students and veterans enroute.

To end on Oct 27

The rally arrived in Chandigarh from Jammu. After reaching Dehradun, it will traverse through Agra, Lucknow, Darbhanga, Bagdogra, Hashimara and Guwahati.

• Will culminate at Tawang in Arunachal on October 27

Called the MQ-9B, the drones are adapted for operations over sea and over land

Ajay Banerjee

The Ministry of Defence on Tuesday inked a contract with the US Government for procurement of 31 armed drones.

Called the MQ-9B, the drones are adapted for operations over sea and over land. These fall in the category of ‘high altitude long endurance (HALE)’ drones. The US armed forces use the same MQ-9B platform and it carries missiles to do precision strikes at targets.

The contract was signed with General Atomics Global India Pvt Ltd for logistics of these drones. Certain types of maintenance, repair and overhaul of these drones will be done in India. The deal will cost $4 billion (approx Rs 34,500 crore).

The Indian armed forces will start getting the drones over four years. The Indian Navy will get 15 of the 31 drones while the Army and the IAF will get eight drones each.

The Cabinet on Committee Security (CCS) chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, at a meeting on October 9, okayed the 31 armed drones from the US.

The CCS also okayed the acquisition of 31 drones under a Foreign Military Sales contract between the two governments.

These drones can fly up to 40 hours at a stretch. These can be armed with precision strike missiles which can hit targets at sea, on land and in air. These can provide surveillance with real-time imagery and videos.

In a move at bolstering logistics support to remote forward posts, the Army has entered into a first-of-its-kind contract with civil aviation service providers. This contract is designed to provide helicopter support along the northern and western borders that get…

In a move at bolstering logistics support to remote forward posts, the Army has entered into a first-of-its-kind contract with civil aviation service providers. This contract is designed to provide helicopter support along the northern and western borders that get cut off during winter, official sources said on Monday.

The move, aimed at bolstering logistics support to such posts, exemplifies India’s commitment to civil-military fusion and leveraging the PM Gati Shakti initiative, they said.

Civil-military contract

Army has entered into a first-of-its-kind contract with civil aviation service providers to provide helicopter support to the force’s remote forward posts that get cut off during winter

• 16 remote posts in the Jammu region and another 28 posts in Kashmir and Ladakh will benefit from this support for 150 days next year
• The contract’s terms specify that the civil aviation service provider will manage the entire load-carrying effort required to sustain these cut-off posts
• This shift is not just about reducing costs; it is a strategic move to preserve the service life of military helicopters for more critical roles in combat or emergency scenarios

The contract, for a period of one year, will ensure that 16 remote posts in the Jammu region are sustained throughout the year, while another 28 posts in Kashmir and Ladakh will benefit from this support for 150 days next year.

The contract’s terms specify that the civil aviation service provider will manage the entire load-carrying effort required to sustain these cut-off posts. “The helicopters will ferry food, fuel, medical supplies, and other essential items, ensuring that these high-altitude positions remain fully operational and well-supplied during winter,” the source said.

The initiative marks a decisive shift in how the Army maintains its critical positions in high-altitude regions during the harsh winter months, when these areas are rendered inaccessible due to snow, the source said. One of the standout aspects of this contract is the use of “civil aviation helicopters” instead of the Army’s own aviation or Indian Air Force assets.

The use of civil aviation helicopters will reduce costs and preserve the service life of military helicopters for more critical roles in combat or emergency scenarios.

It is a strategic advancement that will boost development and open up the possibilities of further economic growth and tourism in India’s remotest regions, the officials said.

The helicopters, provided under the contract, will operate from seven bases in Ladakh, two in Kashmir, and one in the Jammu region, covering a total of 44 posts. The bases have come as part of the Border Area Development and PM Gati Shakti infrastructural development push, which focuses on building an integrated and efficient logistics network across India’s borders.

The Army’s initiative will also validate the use of civil aviation infrastructure in case of wartime contingencies, ensuring that these assets and facilities can be repurposed for military needs if required.

The Army’s plans are already in motion to expand the model to other strategic regions, including Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and the North-East.

“Furthermore, this initiative has the potential to unlock the region’s tourism prospects. Civil helicopters operating in these remote areas could provide the necessary infrastructure and accessibility for tourists to explore India’s breathtaking but challenging frontier regions,” the sources said.

He will be the 26th DG of the force and specialises in navigation and direction

Ajay Banerjee

Paramesh Sivamani took over as the Director General of the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) on Tuesday.

The Ministry of Defence said he will be the 26th DG of the force and specialises in navigation and direction. Sivamani has commanded ICGS Samar and ICGS Vishwast. Both the ships are offshore patrol vessels

He has served as Coast Guard Commander Eastern Seaboard. He is an alumnus of the National Defence College, New Delhi and Defence Services Staff College, Wellington.

Sivamani was elevated to the rank of Additional Director General in September 2022, and was subsequently posted at the Coast Guard Headquarters, New Delhi. Sivamani was given the additional charge of Director General Coast Guard in August 2024, after the DG Rakesh Pal collapsed and died following a sudden heart attack.

Coast Guard, in the past few months, has carried out many significant operations and exercises. This includes the seizure of drugs and narcotic substances and gold worth crores of rupees, rescue of mariners during severe cyclonic storms, joint exercises with the Foreign Coast Guards, anti-poaching operations, humanitarian assistance during cyclones and naturals calamities.

Sivamani was conferred with the Tatrakshak Medal in 2014 and the President Tatrakshak Medal in 2019 for his illustrious service. He was also awarded the DG Coast Guard Commendation in 2012 and Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief (East) Commendation in 2009.

paying homage to his comrades whom he lost on this day fighting LTTE in Sri Lanka.

He is the lone survivor of the 30 Soldiers of 13 SIKH LI led by MAJOR BIRENDRA SINGH who were heli dropped in Jaffna University in Srilanka in 1987. They had been flown the same morning 1000s of Kms from Gwalior to Sri Lanka.

Due to faulty intelligence, they were all surrounded and Killed in Action after a brave fight by the LTTE.

One of the most poignant saga of the Indian Army

India and Pakistan are now at a point where even if they want to sit across a table and talk to each other publicly, they cannot do so for fear of enraging domestic constituencies.

Nirupama Subramanian

THE visit of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to Pakistan to participate in the October 15-16 meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is unlikely to have a thawing effect on the 10-year freeze in bilateral relations.

This much the minister has made clear, ruling out any bilateral agenda. “The visit will be for a multilateral event. I’m not going there to discuss India-Pakistan relations. I’m going there to be a good member of the SCO,” he said.

Jaishankar’s statement is almost identical to that of then foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari in May 2023, before he arrived in Goa for the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers meeting: “My decision to attend this meeting illustrates Pakistan’s strong commitment to the charter of the SCO…during my visit, which is focused exclusively on the SCO, I look forward to constructive discussions with my counterparts from friendly countries.”

Nonetheless, bilateral drama is written into the script of every India-Pakistan encounter, or even a non-encounter.

That was how it was in Goa, where Zardari and Jaishankar managed to have a showdown without exchanging a single bilateral word. It may be the same in Islamabad.

Jaishankar claimed the other day that he is a “civil and courteous person, and will behave accordingly.” That was possibly self-deprecatory humour.

He is no Diljit Dosanjh who won Pakistani hearts the other day by calling up Pakistani singer Hania Aamir on stage during his Europe tour. The galleries back home would be terribly put out if Jaishankar returns without his signature-style tough talk against Pakistan, this time on Pakistani soil.

After all, this is what India-Pakistan diplomacy has been reduced to, not just now, but over several years — a performance for domestic audiences defined by the need to demonstrate toughness toward the other, even in body language. So, Jaishankar’s “namaste” to the Pakistan minister in Goa last year got approving media coverage, as “Jaishankar gives the cold shoulder to Zardari.”

India and Pakistan are now at a point where even if they want to sit across a table and talk to each other publicly, they cannot do so for fear of enraging domestic constituencies.

This is a logjam that can be broken only with statesmanship and political will. A back-channel process between the two NSAs in 2016-2017, and another the UAE claimed it had mediated in 2020-21 shows a willingness to speak.

When the process makes progress, as in February 2021 when the two armies reaffirmed their commitment to the two-decade-old ceasefire on the Line of Control, things freeze up again, because then the process must be made public.

The lessons of the past are not helpful. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit in 2004 came after several years of back-channel contacts and a massive shift in relations between the US and Pakistan after 9/11.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh continued the engagement that began then, but India-Pakistan ties have never recovered from the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s outreach lasted only a week, from his Christmas Day stopover in Lahore on his way back to Delhi, to the Jaish e-Mohammed (JeM) attack on Pathankot.

Today, the dynamic has changed from what it was even 10 years ago. Jaishankar will arrive in Islamabad after the successful holding of an election in the post-August 5, 2019 truncated Jammu & Kashmir. In Kashmir, the victory of the National Conference (NC) is viewed as a verdict against Delhi and the changes the Modi government wrought on August 5, 2019. But the NC knows, and has said as much, that in running the government, a confrontation with the Centre is not the way forward.

From Delhi’s point of view, Pakistan’s internal turmoil is a further disincentive for engagement. Who to talk to in Pakistan — the civilian government or the army — was a question even in normal times. But now, General Asim Munir, the embattled army chief, is in the midst of a self-inflicted do-or-die battle with not just the untameable and ever-growing popularity of the jailed Imran Khan, but also sections within his own force.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and his brother, Prime Minister Emeritus Nawaz Sharif, once thought of as the most likely of the Pakistani political class to make a paradigm shift in relations with India, are now beholden to Munir for their survival.

The Beijing-Islamabad relationship, the increasingly communal lens in India on ties with Pakistan plus Delhi’s demand for a review of the Indus Waters Treaty further complicate the relationship.

For his part, Munir has not spoken his mind on India. What Delhi can see and feel is that the Pakistan army’s preoccupations, including with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and its Afghan Taliban patrons, the resurgence in Baloch militancy — with Chinese nationals in their crosshairs — have not led to the quietening of groups like the JeM and Lashkar-e-Toiba. A shadowy group, the so-called ‘People’s Force Against Fascism’, has owned the regular attacks in Jammu since 2021, but Indian security agencies link it to the LeT and JeM.

Delhi believes it can handle the costs of cross-border terrorism and leave ties in deep freeze. But flip the script for a moment. Imagine that Jaishankar is taking with him the message, like Vajpayee in 2004, that Modi has accepted Pakistan’s invitation to attend the SAARC summit it has been waiting to host since 2016.

India’s unquiet quitting of SAARC due to tensions with Pakistan is one reason why it faces so much resentment from smaller countries in the neighbourhood. When India laments the growing influence of China in the region, it needs to recognise its own role in letting the region go.

A revival of SAARC would put the energy back into India’s neighbourhood policy and earn it the goodwill of neighbours. It would certainly put some pressure on Pakistan to conduct itself responsibly.

The revival of SAARC may or may not resolve the differences between India and Pakistan, but it will provide bilateral engagement opportunities, normalise interactions in multilateral fora and make them less of a circus than they are now.

Bonus: An India engaged with Pakistan may help Prime Minister Modi to be taken more seriously by the world in his efforts to stop the war between Ukraine and Russia — and give that peace initiative greater heft.