he utility of officers employed for the proposed three-year service would be highly suspect. We will end up being flooded with officers of the Captain rank who will be going around looking for odd jobs in the civil market. To draw on the right material that can meet the demands of exacting standards of performance in the defence services, the terms and conditions offered for short service commission have to be attractive enough.
THE news that the Army is considering a proposal to allow civilians to join the force for three years, claimed to be an effort to attract talented young people, is laughable. How does one attract good talent with the offer of just three years’ service? What will be the utility of an officer when taken in for such a short period is the question the higher command needs to address.
The proposal is part of efforts to bring in reforms in the 13 lakh-strong Army. The military appears to be under pressure to cut its expenses in every possible manner. This is in keeping with the proposal to reduce the defence budget. The military’s higher command, in response to this demand from the government, is going about like a bull in a china shop rather than applying its mind and standing up for what is inescapable for national security.
Several committees have looked into reorganising the Army, essentially to cut costs, reduce teeth-to-tail ratio, make the Army more efficient (lean and mean, a phrase often used) and improve the career prospects of the officer cadre. Still, there appears to be continuing pressure on the military to further decrease expenses. There is little realisation that in areas of national defence, as in life, some things do not come cheap.
However, the government (MoD) has been cherrypicking only those recommendations of various committees that conform to its thinking and plans. Thus, many of the more useful recommendations of the Ajai Vikram Singh Committee and more recently those of the Shekatkar Committee have been left out. Since most of the recommendations are interlinked, so when you do ‘cherrypicking’, it leads to disruptions and complications and the end result is often the opposite of what was intended.
The number of civilian employees paid out of the defence budget is around 3.75 lakh. These are from various groups such as the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), ordnance factories, Military Engineer Services (MES), defence PSUs. MoD, etc. Though they are around 25 per cent of the strength of the defence forces, in terms of pay, allowances and pensions, their take-home, in proportionate terms, is much higher.
This is due to non-functional financial upgradation (NFFU) granted to these civilian employees and the availability of far more vacancies for them in higher pay bands, compared to those in the defence forces. Further, their advancement in career to higher pay bands (due to NFFU) comes with far shorter service than that of defence forces officers. Thus, an officer in Class A service — most of them among these 3.75 lakh are in this class — climbs to the pay band of a joint secretary to the Government of India with 19 years of service, while a Major General, unfairly equated with a joint secretary, gets to that pay band after around 29 years of service.
This group of 3.75 lakh is the actual tail that needs drastic pruning and yet it has never been touched. In the defence forces, there are about 20 in the apex scale of pay, whereas among these civilians, with a far smaller cadre strength, the figure is well over 100.
Nearly 70 per cent of the Army’s budget is tailored towards revenue expenditure, leaving little money for other essential requirement of modernisation etc. A former Chairman, Chiefs of
Staff Committee, Admiral Arun Prakash (retd) highlighted this aspect in an article. What seems to be missed out is that revenue expenditure is 70 per cent because the budget itself is small (during 2019-20, it was about 1.46 per cent of the GDP). If the allocation for defence were to be 3 per cent of the GDP (as proposed by the Parliamentary Committee of Defence), this percentage would perhaps come down to 40 per cent or less of the defence budget.
A review of the officer cadre involves the ratio between regular and short service cadre and rank structure of various appointments within the service. In the past, the Ajai Vikram Singh Committee recommended a ratio of 1:1.1 between the regular and short service cadre. The more appropriate ration should be 60:40 (60 per cent regular and 40 per cent short service).
The authorised strength of the officer cadre of the Army is nearly 40,000. Presently, the shortage of officers is around 12,000; it has persisted all along and impacts the performance of units.
Presently, the short service commission officers serve up to 10 years, extendable to 14. Such length of service has drawbacks and problems of readjustment and re-employment in civil life. Equally, such terms and conditions of service just cannot attract good material.
On the proposed three years of service, the utility of officers employed for such a short period would be highly suspect. We will end up being flooded with officers of the Captain rank, released from the Army, who will be going around looking for odd jobs in the civil market, which will have its own impact on the military’s standing in civil society.
To draw on the right material that can meet the demands of exacting standards of performance in the defence services, the terms and conditions offered for short service commission have to be attractive enough.
Therefore, the duration of the short service should be five years with additional four months for training. Their academic qualification should be Class XII (science stream) or graduation. As regards their resettlement, a small percentage may be absorbed in regular commission and all others given assured admission and free technical education with stipend for the duration of their education. Some can be absorbed in CPOs and central civil services.
Those who wish to altogether opt out should be given an appropriate one-time financial grant. These officers could be given CSD canteen facilities.
Finally, from what has been appearing in the press, asking the military to accept second-grade weapons and equipment, reducing the strength of officers and men in units, and changing organisations of field formations throws up a dismal picture.
Possibly, we are moving closer to our state that prevailed before 1962. The military’s higher command owes it to the nation to keep the country safe and stand up for national security interests.