Deep-rooted factionalism, multiple power centres and an ongoing internal power struggle has become the order of the day .

A few months ago, I received an unexpected message from a well-placed source within the Taliban. That message led to a series of secured phone calls, revealing startling insights into the regime’s internal dynamics. Until then, like many others, I believed that the Taliban had consolidated power and was establishing an iron-fisted rule. As the world sees it, the Taliban Emir’s primary focus is the institutionalisation of a gender apartheid regime. However, beneath this rigid surface, the regime is grappling with its own survival.

The communications I received spoke of deep-rooted factionalism, multiple power centres and an ongoing internal power struggle. Every faction within the Taliban is manoeuvring to strengthen itself at the expense of the remaining institutions built during the past two decades of western intervention.

I took these revelations seriously and sought confirmation from multiple sources inside the Taliban and Afghanistan. The more I investigated, the clearer it became: an internal conflict within the Taliban is not a question of if but when.

Recently, these internal divisions have begun surfacing in public discourse. The prevailing narrative often frames the power struggle as a conflict between Taliban leaders based in Kabul and those in Kandahar. In reality, the divisions run much deeper, rooted in regional and ethnic identities. The once-cohesive and monolithic terrorist organisation is unravelling along these very lines.

Unlike its founder Mullah Omar, the current Taliban Emir, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, lacks the authority and unifying force necessary to hold the group together. In an attempt to solidify his rule, he has institutionalised gender apartheid, isolated Afghanistan from the international community and maintained alliances with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Despite these efforts, he has failed to consolidate power or maintain internal cohesion. His attempts to centralise authority — favouring commanders from his own Noorzai tribe —have only exacerbated the divisions.

The Taliban had a golden opportunity over the past three years to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Rather than establishing a constitutional government based on popular consent, they have ruled through repression, issuing decrees that strip Afghans of political, social and civil rights. Rather than creating economic opportunities, they have monopolised the nation’s wealth, particularly the lucrative mining sector.

The Taliban’s taxation policies have further burdened ordinary Afghans, leaving them with little purchasing power. For the past three and a half years, US financial aid has propped up the Afghan economy and kept its currency relatively stable. However, as discussions about halting this aid gain momentum, the Afghan currency is plummeting and inflation is skyrocketing. The Taliban regime now finds itself in an increasingly vulnerable position.

Beyond economic mismanagement, the Taliban had a historic opportunity to engage with the world and gain international legitimacy. Despite diplomatic overtures from the US and the UN, they have shown no willingness to become a responsible member of the global community. Instead, they have rejected every pathway to legitimacy.

A comparison with the situation in Syria is instructive. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group with origins in ISIS and Al-Qaida, faced widespread international condemnation and was designated a terrorist organisation. But, the HTS has actively worked to change its image, preserve Syria’s diverse and pluralistic society and address global security concerns. It is gradually gaining legitimacy both domestically and internationally.

The Taliban had far more diplomatic engagement and international goodwill through its Doha office before taking power. Yet, it has squandered opportunities to reform, choosing to institutionalise gender apartheid, alienating Afghans and global community.

Today, the Taliban stands as the world’s most isolated regime and one of the least popular governments in modern history. It is on the brink of collapse from within. The question is how soon they will bring the regime to its breaking point.

It is often assumed that international pressure and condemnation of the Taliban will have little effect. Recent developments suggest otherwise. The International Criminal Court prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant against the Taliban’s Emir and Chief Justice for crimes against humanity — specifically their gender apartheid policies — has had a significant impact. The warrant has intensified internal divisions, with some Taliban factions using it to challenge the Emir’s authority. Many Taliban leaders and their followers see it as a sign that their days in power are numbered. The warrant is a formal recognition of the systematic injustice inflicted on Afghan women. It has also struck a nerve within the Taliban, a group that remains highly image-conscious. It is perceived as a public-shaming, reinforcing the idea that the Taliban’s rule is neither legitimate nor sustainable. The international community must remain consistent in calling out the Taliban’s policies on women and human rights.

A second critical development has been President Donald Trump’s decision to halt US financial assistance to Afghanistan under Taliban control. This move has dealt a severe blow to the Taliban’s financial stability, further weakening their grip on power. The Taliban have long manipulated humanitarian aid for their own benefit, monopolising resources while the Afghan people continue to suffer.

Moving forward, aid must be restructured to bypass the Taliban, ensuring that it reaches the Afghan people without strengthening the regime.

Finally, Trump appears keen to regain control over billions of dollars’ worth of US military equipment left in Afghanistan and, if feasible, retake the Bagram Air Base. Two approaches have been suggested: direct engagement with the Taliban or collaboration with the Afghan opposition in exile. However, a third, more strategic option is required — one that blends elements of both.

Direct engagement with the Taliban has failed repeatedly, emboldening them rather than moderating their behaviour. A more effective strategy would be for the US to appoint a strong envoy to work closely with Afghan opposition groups while also exploiting the Taliban’s internal fractures.

A transformation within the Taliban — one that integrates elements of Afghanistan’s previous governance structure with aspects of their conservative ideology — is not inconceivable. A similar shift has occurred in Syria. Given the Taliban’s internal power struggles and the influence of US allies in the Gulf, a similar approach in Afghanistan is plausible.

The international community cannot afford to take a passive stance on Afghanistan. By sustaining legal and diplomatic pressure, restructuring humanitarian aid and adopting a more strategic approach to engaging with opposition forces and internal Taliban factions, the Taliban’s grip on power can be further weakened. The regime is already unravelling from within — these steps can accelerate its collapse.

Courtesy: The Cipher Brief

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