(Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM)

6 Jan 2024, REUTERS: Maersk reroutes all container vessels via Cape of Good Hope due to Red Sea disruptions.
…………Shippers across the world are switching away from the Red Sea – the shortest route from Asia to Europe via the
Suez Canal – after Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen stepped up attacks on vessels in the Gulf region to show
their support for Palestinian Islamist group Hamas fighting Israel in Gaza.
The trip around Africa adds about 10 days to journey time, more fuel and crew-time……… jacking up shipping costs.
Interestingly, larger container ships can carry up to 25,000 containers and the largest oil tankers up to 4 million
barrels of oil, equivalent to about 168 million gallons, whao.
Red Sea: pivotal zone for trade, transportation, and power play. Spanning from Suez Canal to Bab el Mandeb Strait,
Red Sea connects Mediterranean Sea to Indian Ocean – a crucial maritime corridor connecting continents. Its
proximity to key markets and natural resources enhances its importance in many ways.
Red Sea’s Cocktail of Geopolitics
• Saudi Arabia, with its long coastline along the Red Sea, plays a pivotal role in shaping regional dynamics.
• Egypt, controlling the Suez Canal, has strategic leverage over Red Sea’s northern access.
• Israel and its military capabilities keep geopolitics of the region well spiced up.
• Yemen is facing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises as a civil war enters its eighth year.
• Somalia is in internal conflict and pirates prowling the Indian Ocean its byproduct.
• Eretria, one of the most closed and repressive countries in the world is in a simmering conflict with Ethiopia.
• A ‘cherry’ to this ‘Horn of Africa’ cocktail is Djibouti – a tiny country sitting astride the strategic Bab el Mandeb.
Interestingly, it has many military bases of the different friendly and conflicting/competing nations (USA,
China, Japan, Italy and France). Its strategic importance? Well, just location, location, location.
Evidently, there is much geopolitical manoeuvring by Global players in the Red Sea region:
• US claims it military presence to safeguard its interests and ensure the freedom of navigation.
• China, driven by its Belt and Road Initiative, seeks to expand presence and secure its economic interests.
• Russia, aiming to regain its influence as a major player has deepened its engagement.
In Mar 2015, a Saudi-led coalition – backed by USA – intervened militarily in Yemen to fight the Houthis, restore the
legitimate govt, and reverse growing Iranian influence. The Houthis are a movement of mostly Zaidi Shia Muslims.
Over the years, Houthi rebels have targeted strategic infrastructure across Saudi Arabia and UAE, including airports,
gas fields and oil tankers in the Red Sea, and, the coalition has retaliated with thousands of air attacks.
Could Russia be sponsoring the Heist? Well why not. Through its proxies Russia could be executing a ‘counterattack’
against the ‘sanctions’. If this counterattack was to succeed, it is likely to have serious consequences:
• On shipping supply chains, port congestions, container shortages and higher freight rates (higher rates of
insurance for those braving the Red Sea and higher operating costs for those choosing the Cape of Good
Hope route).
• Should Iran, which supports the Houthis want to continue to up the ante, it could exert pressure on the Strait
of Hormuz off its own coast, another key transit route, escalating supply chain disruptions further.
• The global economy is still recovering from the shocks of Covid and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Energy
importing regions will suffer the most especially Europe teetering on the verge of a recession. While the
Israel-Hamas war has yet to impact energy prices, Red Sea crisis might. Rising oil and gas prices will keep
inflation worldwide high.
Since the crisis in the Red Sea started, navies from various nations are being deployed to defend the shipping from

Houthi missiles and drones. As in Ukraine and other ongoing conflict zones, the battleships are deploying ultra-
expensive missiles to knock out cheap drones; a natural cost offset of asymmetric warfare.

Hamas’s belligerence in end 2023 and the ongoing Red Sea crisis make it quite clear that even at the beginning of
2024, nations are poorly postured to meet the growing irregular (both unpredictable and unequal) challenges.