Muted anxiety has been triggered that the fauj will be plagued by the erosion of professional competence at the altar of political expediency.
PRIME Minister Narendra Modi’s Independence Day speech was akin to blowing the bugle for the 2024 General Election. The presumptuous certitude exuded by Modi about the outcome at the hustings was reflected in his assertion that that he would be back next year as the PM to present India’s report card. “Next time, on August 15, at this very Red Fort, I will speak of the achievements of our country, the potential and resolve of our people and their success and self-confidence,” he said in the speech.
The probability of this exigency is very high, though this message could have been conveyed in a modest manner, but that is not the Modi model when it comes to electioneering. Specific to national security, PM Modi said: “India has gained a new strategic strength in recent years and today our borders are more secure than ever.”
Ironically, this claim to India’s new-found ‘strategic strength’ came against the backdrop of the 19th round of India-China Corps Commander-level talks, where there was no sign of any breakthrough or even limited progress in the tense military stand-off along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. The ground reality is that after the Galwan clash (June 2020), India has forfeited patrolling rights in an area of almost 900 sq km and Delhi is seeking a return to the status quo, which Beijing has refused to accept and restore.
It is being speculated that when PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet at the BRICS summit in South Africa (August 22-24), there could be a political nudge to arrive at a modus vivendi to a complex territorial dispute that has been festering since October 1962. If this does happen, the prospects of a successful G20 summit in India in September are bright, and a satisfactory resolution of the dispute would burnish the Modi report card apropos of national security in a distinctive manner.
However, the signals from China remain opaque and India will have to live with the latest formulation in the joint statement, which noted that in the absence of any breakthrough, the two sides ‘agreed to maintain peace and tranquillity on the ground in the border areas’.
The inference that follows is that if India is to remain credibly resolute in its stand on the contested territorial impasse, the index of its ‘strategic strength’ would have to be of effective quality and quantity. A brief review of this domain under Modi 2.0 would suggest that there are complex national security challenges ahead that will merit objective scrutiny by the government of the day in a non-partisan manner.
On the external front, the old chestnuts remain on the radar — the revisionist agendas adopted by China and Pakistan. Apropos of internal security, the recent violence that racked Manipur and parts of Haryana are illustrative of the challenges. Left-wing extremism that has in the past challenged the efficacy of the state is currently dormant, but it remains a cause for concern that can flare up in an unanticipated manner.
The material state of the armed forces and their individual inventory status were deemed to be inadequate by the BC Khanduri committee in 2018, but the requisite funding support has been less than adequate to redress this gap. This is one tangible strand of India’s strategic strength.
The more critical but intangible elements of India’s strategic strength are the professionalism of the fauj (military), the steadfast apolitical orientation of this institution, and the military’s abiding commitment to the country and the national flag. From the first war to defend Kashmir in October 1947 to Kargil of 1999 and in a wide spectrum of internal security duties, the Indian armed forces have never wavered, despite a range of constraints.
However, this core strategic strength has been diluted under Modi 2.0 as the ‘spine’ of the institution has been tampered with. While the creation of the post of CDS (Chief of Defence Staff) in January 2020 was welcomed and it must be acknowledged as a major political decision, subsequent developments have apparently disturbed the institutional integrity of the military and the equipoise of the civil-military relations.
After the tragic death of Gen Bipin Rawat in December 2021, the Modi government kept the office vacant for many months and finally appointed the second CDS only in September 2022. But in a very radical departure from the norm, a retired three-star General was handpicked and appointed the CDS with a four-star rank.
Whatever may have been the compulsions for such a decision, this has resulted in introducing a political dimension in the steep pyramidical ‘rat race’ that characterises promotions in the military. Muted anxiety has been triggered that the fauj will soon be plagued by the erosion of professional competence at the altar of political expediency. Were this to happen, its much-valued ‘strategic strength’ would be frayed.
In the run-up to the October 1962 debacle, then PM Jawaharlal Nehru allowed his domestic political compulsions to trump abiding national security considerations and the country paid the price. As PM Modi prepares for a possible third tenure, paying heed to the rhythms of history may be a desirable detour before the election momentum relegates matters of strategic and security import to the back-burner.