New Delhi needs to be wary of the increased Chinese influence in the neighbouring country
EVEN as the somewhat over-the-top Maldives drama plays out, India’s foreign and security policy managers need to turn their eyes eastward to Myanmar, where important developments are taking place. Beijing has played the middleman and managed to work out a ceasefire between the country’s military rulers and a rebel alliance that has made serious inroads into the military’s control of the northern parts of the country bordering India and China.
India has long viewed the South Asian region as being within its sphere of interests. This has been challenged by China through trade, security assistance and aid to countries in the neighbourhood.
In February 2021, the military, also known as the Tatmadaw, had overthrown the civilian government and declared that the results of the November 2020 general election were invalid. State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior officers of the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) were imprisoned.
The Tatmadaw ruled the country from 1962 to 2011. Under the 2008 Constitution, the country was ruled (till the 2021 coup) as per a power-sharing arrangement under which 25 per cent of the parliamentary seats were reserved for the military; the defence, home and border security portfolios remained with it.
After the coup, the military, which named itself the State Administration Council (SAC), carried out a nationwide crackdown involving mass arrests, killings and torture. This triggered an insurgency led by the pro-Suu Kyi forces, which called themselves the National Unity Government (NUG) and significantly escalated ongoing ethnic insurgencies in other parts of the country. By 2023, the military-run government was in control of less than 40 per cent of the country. In October, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army) made further gains and captured several towns and state capitals in the Shan state bordering China.
Now, following talks at Kunming in south-western China, the rebel alliance agreed to “an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of military personnel.” These ethnic rebels are more concerned with autonomy rather than a return to democracy, which remains the goal of the NUG and its loose network of fighters grouped in the People’s Defence Force. The Chinese worry is that the Myanmar situation is creating instability in its border areas. It remains to be seen whether the ceasefire will hold and whether it can be expanded to involve the NUG as well.
This development is not entirely new. In 2016, too, China had persuaded the Three Brotherhood Alliance to participate in a biannual Union Peace Conference organised by the Myanmar government. But this initiative didn’t have much traction.
In April 2017, China offered to help resolve the Rohingya crisis by mediating between Myanmar and Bangladesh, but little came out of this. As for ceasefires, the Tatmadaw had declared one in 2015,
but had itself violated it.
As a neighbour of Myanmar, China has always played a significant role there. In recent decades, Chinese firms have constructed oil and gas pipelines linking Myanmar’s deepwater port of Kyaukphyu with Kunming. There are plans for a railway there as well, thus linking China to the Indian Ocean. China has invested in dams, bridges, roads and ports in the country.
The Chinese response to the 2021 coup has been restrained. Beijing opposed condemnation of the SAC at the UN, but did not make any statement in support of the council. The NUG has taken pains not to alienate the Chinese and ordered its fighters not to target Chinese projects. The Chinese are concerned that this instability could affect its investments. But equally important has been the interest in having the SAC deal with telecom scams, drug smuggling and human trafficking by pro-military elements along the border with China.
China often boasts that it “does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries”. In this way, Beijing has befriended a clutch of unsavoury regimes and dictators and avoided taking a stand on a range of burning issues of the day. But China is also a leading global trading power and cannot ignore issues that have a direct impact on its economy, if not security. It also has a burning desire to position itself as a global model in terms of governance and diplomacy. Incidentally, during his Egypt visit on Monday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for a “large-scale and authoritative peace conference” on Gaza, followed by a specific timetable and roadmap to implement a two-state solution.
As for India, it has long viewed the South Asian region as being within its sphere of interests. This has been directly challenged by China through trade, security assistance and aid to countries in the neighbourhood. China has also offered to mediate disputes between India and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Myanmar and its ethnic rebels.
But China’s big success so far has come not in South Asia but in West Asia, where it brokered the Saudi Arabia-Iran deal last year — and the pact is still holding.
The developments in Myanmar pose two immediate challenges for India. The first is the increased Chinese influence in the country, which is our neighbour. The Myanmar civil war has led to many refugees taking shelter in India. New Delhi has been forced to abandon its liberal border regime through which people could access border areas without a passport.
The second is the fact that things are being played out in that part of Myanmar which borders the vulnerable state of Manipur. New Delhi has calmed many northeastern insurgencies in recent years. However, it has allowed things to drift in Manipur. What’s happening in Myanmar could worsen the situation.