India and Pakistan fought a war that led to the birth of Bangladesh 45 years ago. An evaluation, as The Tribune National Security Forum today discusses “Defence at 70
On the offensive: Indian armour in action during the 1971 War photo: AFP
Stamp of defeat: Lt-Gen A A K Niazi signs the Instrument of Surrender before Lt-Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora. The picture remains one of the most iconic photographic memories of the subcontinent Photos Courtesy: MoD/Photo Division
Harish Khare
India had not sought the 1971 War. It was a conflict that was imposed on India by Pakistan and its bumbling generals. In the end, it became — and, remains — the perfect example of statecraft, with a national leadership displaying the requisite competence and self-assurance, optimally mobilising the nation’s intellectual, bureaucratic, diplomatic and defence resources, to accomplish the intended goals.
The 1971 War constitutes the only example in our recent history when our armed forces not only inflicted a crushing defeat on the adversary but also forced the vanquished enemy to sign an instrument of surrender.
There can be little doubt that the clinical victory over Pakistan was Indira Gandhi’s finest moment. She had just led her party to a decisive victory in the March 1971 Lok Sabha elections and was all set to reorient her government’s policies, personnel and priorities; but, all those best-laid plans soon got quagmired in the crisis in the then East Pakistan.
The Yahya Khan-ZA Bhutto duo stood committed to strategic stupidities and insisted on taking a suicidal route; India became involved in the game, much against its wishes.
The Arthashastra teaches us a simple lesson: the task of leadership is to safeguard the national interests. Indira Gandhi had the prescience to understand that there was no way India could absorb on a permanent basis all those thousands and thousands of refugees who were daily pouring into India after the brutal crackdown on the Bengalis, Hindus and Muslims alike, in East Pakistan.
Indira Gandhi and her advisers read the geopolitical scene astutely and cunningly concluded that except for offering lip sympathy, the global powers would do little to alleviate India’s growing and groaning burden. The Pakistani dictators’ bloody suppression of its own people was no longer Islamabad’s internal affair; the baneful consequences for India were all too evident. India would have to do something to sort out the generals.
Once the objective got defined and identified, all instruments and resources of the Indian state got mobilised. The armed forces and its leadership were empowered to finesse the strategic approach and tactical by-plays. The Prime Minister had formidable political colleagues in Jagjivan Ram, Y. B. Chavan and Sardar Swaran Singh; she had already enlisted the best of the bureaucratic talent — PN Haksar, DP Dhar, PN Dhar, TN Kaul, LK Jha. And, she had the practical common sense to encourage a perfect — and, as it turned out, a match-winning — synergy between the political/civilian leadership and the armed forces. On their part, the armed forces displayed an unprecedented intra-services convergence of temperaments, missions and egos.
But there was no bombast, no bragging. No xenophobia. No shouting nationalism. There was calm in the air, and there was a competence at work. The citizen was mobilised as the nation defied the United States and its implacably vengeful leaders like Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. As those cold practitioners of realpolitik sent in — as an exercise in intimidation and coercion — a naval flotilla towards the Bay of Bengal, Indira Gandhi was addressing a massive public rally in Delhi. The citizens were very much a part of the war effort.
The outcome of the 1971 was entirely satisfactory to the Indian psyche and to the Indian strategic interests. However, the world does not take kindly to such clinical overpowering of one nation by another. The USA-China-Pakistan axis got steeled up. At home, the economic consequences of the war began spelling hardships. The taste of victory in our mouths gave way to the bitterness of economic cost. We learnt a new lesson: all wars, even those won decisively, bring in their wake economic dislocation and dissatisfaction. Very soon we were introducing new fault lines in our national life.
How the war unfolded
May 15: Indian Army starts aiding Mukti Bahini.
August 16: Operation Jackpot, the commando operation that sabotaged Pakistan Navy and its assets in Chittagong, Chandpur, Mongla and Naryanganj.
August 30: Pakistan Army cracks down on Dhaka (then Dacca) guerrillas.
October 13: Dhaka guerrillas kill Abdul Monem Khan, governor of East Pakistan.
October 31 to November 3: Battle of Dhalai: Indian attack from Tripura into East Pakistan to stop Pakistani cross-border shelling.
November 20 to November 21: Battle of Garibpur, the Indian attack in Boyra in East Pakistan.
November 22 to December 13: Sporadic fighting followed by Battle of Hilli, the Indian attack on Bogra in East Pakistan.
December 3: Pakistani air attacks on India result in India declaring war on Pakistan.
December 4: Battle of Longewala, where India routs a large Pakistani armour attack in Jaisalmer.
December 5: Battle of Basantar: India attacks and captures Pakistani territory opposite Jammu. Navy launches Op Trident to bomb Karachi.
December 6: Bhutan becomes the first country to recognise Bangladesh after India.
December 7: Liberation of Jessore, Sylhet and Moulovi Bazaar.
December 8: Operation Python: Indian naval attack on Karachi in West Pakistan.
December 9: Battle of Kushtia: The Indian attack from West Bengal into East Pakistan, liberating Chandpur and Daudkandi.
December 10: Liberation of Laksham.
December 11: Liberation of Hilli, Mymenshingh, Kushtia and Noakhalx.
December 14: Selective genocide of Bengali nationalist intellectuals. Liberation of Bogra.
December 16: End of the Bangladesh Liberation War. Indian Army enters Dhaka and East Pakistan Army surrenders.
