It would be incorrect to surmise that air power would have been a game-changer; however, it would certainly have been a face-saver and India’s armed forces may have possibly come out of the conflict in both sectors bruised, but not beaten and humiliated.
Much water has flowed under the bridge of recrimination over the last 60 years when it comes to carrying out a post-mortem of the 1962 defeat at the hands of the Chinese. Today, both Indian and Chinese militaries are powerful and technologically enabled entities facing off against each other along the Line of Actual Control. Although there is an element of uneasy stability that has been restored after the Galwan crisis, there are still some enduring lessons from 1962 that will hold true in any contemporary high-altitude conflict scenario that could unfold in the form of a limited conflict between the two Asian giants.
The three important lessons that still have an enduring relevance among several others are the necessity for bold strategic and operational leadership that translates into decisive tactical action on the ground, the continued relevance of firepower and the decisive impact of offensive air powe
Even in an environment of complete strategic hubris at the political level and shell-shocked higher echelon leadership at the Army level, two examples of sound operational leadership that forced the Chinese to reconsider their offensive plans after suffering heavy attrition were in the Chushul sector of eastern Ladakh and the Walong sector in North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). More importantly, the effective use of the non-kinetic elements of air power enabled both these sectors to give a bloody nose to the Chinese. In the Chushul sector, bold requirements of the need to deploy armour to coerce the Chinese, who were without armour, was conveyed by Brigadier TN Raina, Brigade Commander of 114 Brigade at Chushul, to a supportive Army Commander, Lt Gen Daulat Singh. Wasting no time, the IAF swung into action as An-12s were speedily modified to carry the AMX-13 tanks and land them at the Chushul airfield so that they could be deployed in a blocking position during the second phase of the conflict that began on November 18. This move forced the Chinese to abandon their plans for an attack on Chushul and announce a ceasefire on November 21, 1962.
In Walong too, after a heroic defence of the forward post of Kibithoo in late October, the 11th Brigade under Brig NC Rawlley withdrew to Walong and consolidated its position and counterattacked Chinese positions in November. Unable to sustain its operations in the face of overwhelming numbers thrown in by the PLA, the Brigade executed a fighting withdrawal southwards after inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. Clearly, the losses suffered by the Chinese at Chushul and Walong dictated the timing of the final ceasefire offered by Mao Zedong. In Walong too, one of the reasons why the 11th Brigade could sustain its operations and recycle its troops was because of excellent air support from the IAF’s Dakotas and Otters.
The first comprehensive aerial reconnaissance mission in the region was undertaken by Canberra fighter-bomber-reconnaissance aircraft of No. 106 Squadron on December 14, 1959, nearly two years after it came to be known to the Indian Government that China had built a road through Aksai Chin. Routeing via Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) and braving bad weather, the single aircraft mission brought back clear pictures of the Tibet-Xinjiang highway. Late Air Marshal Randhir Singh, who commanded the squadron during the tumultuous period of 1959 to 1962, recollected several intrusive missions that he and his flight commander Squadron Leader Jag Mohan Nath carried out into Aksai Chin and across the McMahon Line in NEFA, bringing back valuable information about troop deployments and the build-up of forces. Sadly, not much of the information was taken seriously by the powers that be.
On the issue of the non-use of offensive air power, much has been written over the years on the reasons why it was so. Air Marshal Vinod Patney was posted to a Toofani squadron (29 Squadron) at Tezpur during the 1962 conflict. He recollects being familiar with the valleys of the NEFA where they would regularly train for close air support (CAS) and interdiction missions. He recollects that joint structures for CAS with 33 Corps were in place in the form of a Tactical Air Centre (TAC) with forward air controllers. While effective CAS may have been a difficult proposition once the forces were engaged in a close-contact battle, particularly in the narrow valleys of Namka Chu, Tawang and Lohit, he maintains that the IAF could have effectively interdicted massed Chinese troop concentrations and logistics lines on the Tibetan side, north of Thagla Ridge, as the terrain on that side was devoid of the dense vegetation that marked the Indian side of the McMahon Line. Air Chief Marshal Anil Yashwant Tipnis reiterates that the terrain in Ladakh was ideal for both CAS and interdiction and that the relatively modern IAF Hunters, operating from Pathankot, were familiar with the terrain in eastern Ladakh and waited for orders that never came! Air Marshal Randhir Singh reiterated that the Canberra bombers with their heavier bombload could have chipped in with both shallow and deep interdiction missions.
In the absence of any sound operational assessment of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) by the IAF, the Indian Government and then PM Jawaharlal Nehru relied on several external inputs that advocated caution, an approach that was not contested either by the IAF or army leadership. It would be incorrect to surmise that air power would have been a game-changer; however, it would certainly have been a face-saver and India’s armed forces may have possibly come out of the conflict in both sectors bruised, but not beaten and humiliated.
The last game-changer in 1962 that holds strong even today is the ability to mass fire with artillery at decisive points with the aim of causing shock, dislocation and inflict serious combat attrition. The collapse at Namka Chu was primarily because of this massed fire that the Chinese rained down on the Indian Army’s 7 Brigade before they mounted an infantry assault. Though the Indian Army has strengthened its deterrent posture all along the LAC, there is still great asymmetry in the realm of artillery. Strong operational leadership, accelerated deployment of enhanced ground-based firepower and offensive air power around the Tactical Battle Area and in depth to cause serious combat attrition will be the game-changers in the