The government ordered the defence transformation more to reflect its political will in implementing its election manifesto (like it did with OROP) than an intent to revitalise the defence reforms process. Otherwise, it should have gone for a more holistic integrated review of security, defence development and foreign policy rather than fast-tracking and polishing up the existing products.
ew structure: The appointment of the CDS heralded far-reaching changes. PTI
Long delayed, the India-UK meet was marred by the virulent spike of Covid-19 in this country that resulted in the Indian delegation, led by Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, being confined to a London hotel. A key defence engagement was curtailed, though a British battle strike group led by aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth will this month embark on its maiden voyage of ‘tilt towards Indo-Pacific’. The mission follows ‘once in decades’ integrated review of British defence and foreign policy which has lessons for India whose strategic and security thinking is still British-oriented.
India is on the cusp of the most wide-ranging defence reforms since the Kargil Review Committee report 2001 was partially implemented. At the heart of tumultuous change is the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Department of Military Affairs and Theatrisation — the three combine the most dynamic integration of civil-military staff and jointness in tri-services. On April 7, CDS General Bipin Rawat made a compelling presentation at Vivekanand Foundation, Delhi, about the nuts and bolts of transformation. Even as these fundamental reforms were being implemented, intrusions similar to the ones at Kargil were executed by the PLA across the LAC last year, triggering a set of operational re-adjustments and rebalancing of forces. The stand-off in Ladakh was accompanied by the ongoing pandemic which has exposed the need for greater investment in health and social security even as Rs 21,000 crore was immediately necessary for emergency acquisitions for the new deployment.
The government ordered the transformation more to reflect its political will in implementing its election manifesto (like it did with OROP) than an intent to revitalise the defence reforms process. Otherwise, it should have gone for a more holistic integrated review of security, defence development and foreign policy rather than fast-tracking and polishing up the existing products. As the third largest armed forces (after China and US), India is unique as it has never produced a defence White Paper or a National Strategy doctrine or a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Surprisingly, Parliament has never demanded one. The US and even China are required to present such reports periodically.
We can learn from the UK, now a medium power out of Brexit which has in the new era of Great Power competition recently published its Integrated Review (IR) of security, defence and foreign policy based on SDSR 2015, setting out ambitions for the UK’s role in the world for the next decade along with matching resources.
Integrated Review is billed as the most far-reaching policy document since the end of Cold War, engaging all departments of government to produce a united vision of the UK’s role in the world, sketching its interests with priorities for a global Britain. In addition to Integrated Review, two adjunct papers accompany: Defence Command Paper and a Defence and Industrial Security Strategy. Dovetailed is a capability and deterrence review, tied to the Comprehensive spending review and Modernisation defence programme with additional funding of £16.5 billion till 2024-25.
For defence of British interests across multiple domains and acquiring global influence, reliance is put on the Royal Navy’s new carrier battle group with the Royal Marines and a future commando force that will secure shipping lanes and uphold the freedom of navigation operations in a rules-based international system. This month, HMS Queen Elizabeth, accompanied by the battle group will make its Indian Ocean and South China Sea debut in a return after half a century following the suspension of East of Suez operations. The CBG will reflect a meaningful tilt (not pivot) to the Indo-Pacific without weakening response to Europe where Russia remains the greatest threat. China is mentioned as an economic and security challenge. Greater reliance is placed on minimum credible nuclear deterrence to compensate for reduction in conventional capabilities. The nuclear warhead cap has increased from 180 to 260 warheads. The Defence Command Paper makes clear that while NATO will cover Russia, the Indo-Pacific tilt will lean on China. But global Britain will not be able to do another Falklands.
General Rawat’s confidence in India’s capability for prosecution of a full-spectrum war and projection of interests abroad while ensuring prosperity at home are achieved through a whole-of-government approach, but his observation that not having a national security strategy did not mean “we do not possess the framework and experience” struck a jarring note not in sync with his outstanding handling of the transformation process. When the appointment of the CDS suddenly appeared in the Gazette of India on the last day of December 2019 (Rawat was to retire the next day), along with his Charter of Duties, no one was wiser on how the troika of defence and security reforms was born. Especially the DMA, an innovation that is unique to India and seems a perfect fit. Unlike in the US, the UK and other democracies, an Integrated Review or SDSR is ordered periodically by the government, and its team members and mission are widely known. The last significant effort towards defence and security reforms was during the UPA-II by the Naresh Chandra Task Force which recommended a watered-down CDS as permanent chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. Though the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was keen on its implementation, it never saw the light of day as the then Defence Minister AK Antony was unwilling to allow the diminution of his Defence Secretary by the CDS.
So, it is a minor miracle that Modi 2.0 not only appointed a full-fledged CDS but also the DMA which has made the Defence Secretary irrelevant as most of his charter and responsibility has shifted to the CDS/DMA, leaving mainly the defence policy with him. Why the government kept such a wide-ranging orbit of transformation under wraps, is unclear. Let’s be clear: no SDSR or IR was done, otherwise a two-and-a-half front war might have been avoided. A legitimate opportunity was missed to institutionalise the SDSR and IR for arriving at apex reforms, cohering all departments of the government.