Military sources say such attempts have been intercepted in recent times in the Jammu sector. It points to high confidence, and an intent to raise alarm, possibly to push the Air Force into retaliation in terms of deliberate flights close to the India-Pakistan border. That could raise bilateral temperatures very quickly.
Scare In The Air: There has been a spate of drone activity along the border, but we need to separate military drones from improvised vehicles. PTI
IN what can be classified as an escalation in violence, drones were used to cause at least two explosions in the technical area of Jammu airport, which is being used by the Air Force. Though it caused only minor injuries to two personnel, the incident could have been much worse. The drone could have hit a parked aircraft, resulting in a terror attack of no small proportion. This is a quantum jump in terrorist capability in India. No doubt about that at all. That said, it is not the drone itself that is the sole issue, but the intent and intelligence in how it is used.
Commercial drones relatively available in India, like the DJI Phantom 4, with an added payload of explosives of up to a kilogram or more, would have an operational range of about a kilometre. Since the explosion was at night, the onboard camera was probably not of much use for targeting, explaining why it missed any worthwhile target.
Even if coordinates were fed in, it is important to understand that commercial drones are simply not geared up for this kind of precision task. Showering flowers on a visiting VIP, yes; targeting a specific aircraft, no. If it was a commercial drone, then the operator was close to the airport, probably on the roof of a building, guiding the drone. Reports, however, seem to indicate that the drone flew across the border and back, a total of some 40 km, indicating a far more technology-intensive and probably larger machine, that raises a different set of possibilities.
The Jammu airport is just about 14 km from the Pakistan border, which makes it vulnerable to such attacks. Islamabad has a vigorous (UAV unmanned aerial vehicle) programme that includes long-range ones of upwards of 1,000 km and tactical drones with a range of some 80 km. The ‘Bravo +’, for instance, has a wingspan of about 14 feet and a payload of some 145 kg. But it defies logic as to why Pakistan’s military would launch such a strike which could squarely implicate it, if shot down. By now, Islamabad knows full well that this is not a government that would hesitate to retaliate. Being Pakistan, there is always the possibility that a part of the armed forces don’t want even the beginnings of a rapprochement with India, that is reportedly on the cards, given sustained backdoor negotiations and apparent overtures by the Chief of Army Staff General Bajwa. But again, a Pak military drone would hardly miss a stationary target.
The more likely possibility is apparent in reports of a spate of drone activity along the border. In October last year, a Chinese surveillance quadcopter was shot down by Indian troops in Kupwara, probably used by smugglers. In June, a rather strange-looking quadcopter was shot down, carrying an assault rifle and grenades. That’s quite a payload. Military sources say diverse such attempts have been intercepted in recent times in the Jammu sector. Available data seems to indicate that all these intrusions were by relatively small machines, that fall under a commercial type of drone, but improvised for its role. A day after the Jammu blasts, alert troops fired at drones over the Kaluchak military station, however, to little effect. The machines seem to have disappeared thereafter. There are no inputs of what these were, and what they were supposed to do. But it points to high confidence, and an intent to raise alarm, possibly to push the Air Force into retaliation in terms of deliberate flights close to the India- Pakistan border. That could raise bilateral temperatures very quickly.
For terrorists, a small drone is a perfect weapon. Barbed wire, armed guards or even a radar can’t spot a weapon that has such a small cross-section, particularly in low altitudes where it can disappear in background ‘noise’. Drones have long been used by terrorists, delivering more psychological effect than actual damage. Hezbollah used drones supplied by Iran to target Syrian rebel strongholds in 2013. The Islamic State has a DIY capability that it has used to gain a strategic advantage, though not much of a battlefield weapon. What it did get was good intelligence and surveillance capability. Then there have been assassination attempts using commercial drones, such as the one against President Maduro of Venezuela in which seven soldiers were injured. The most spectacular use of drones was by Houthis against Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities, which resulted in upending world supplies as its production halted. But those were UAV-X military drones with long range and used ‘kamikaze style’ with warheads of some 18 kg of explosives, according to a UN report. With about 10 of these used, that was not terrorism, it was war. Few remember that Houthis also used Qasef-1 drones to little effect, even though these carry a large warhead. Small drones deliver more in terms of a spectacle, but cause little actual damage. True, in Jammu, one hit against a parked aircraft would have been damage enough. But the key here is not the vehicle. It’s the explosives expert. Find the explosive, and you’ll find the culprit.
It is important, therefore, to separate the clearly military drones from the improvised vehicles used so far, in generating a response. One requires better border policing, the other a huge change in military doctrines. What is clear is that we need to up the alert, but guard against the usual knee-jerk reactions to swoop down on the commercial use of drones that have wide applications at a time of economic stress. There are already attempts to stifle the use of drones through the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) that will effectively prevent legitimate commercial activity. The DGCA’s present ‘Blue Sky’ parameters for instance, may be replaced with stringent KYC procedure, similar to banking systems for an effective oversight. Terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba aim to create panic in an already paranoid bureaucracy, and thereby earn more publicity that increases their stature. It’s a fine line to walk. React with firmness against the real culprit who provides them with shelter and sustenance, but also show that the State is more than capable of protecting its own.