Sanjha Morcha

Afghan deal caught in Covid conundrum

he historic peace deal with Taliban is actually a US troop extrication agreement sans admission of military failure, the price for which is being paid by the Afghans who curse Taliban for sparing foreign troops, but killing fellow Afghans. For the US, presidential elections, not the situation in Afghanistan, will dictate the pace of withdrawal.

Afghan deal caught in Covid conundrum

Reconciled: With Abdullah as head of reconciliation process, President Ghani has said Afghanistan no longer has a two-headed government.

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)

Military commentator

President Trump is so deeply distracted by the Covid pandemic, sparring globally with China and his re-election campaign, that the Afghanistan peace process consummated on February 29 has gone off the radar. Still last month, both President Ashraf Ghani and chief of the High Peace Council for Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah, spoke virtually to the international community about reconciliation and the intra-Afghan dialogue. A deal struck between Ghani and Abdullah in May led to Ghani being accepted by Abdullah as President and Abdullah named head of the reconciliation process with some of Abdullah’s people made government ministers.

Speaking on June 11, Ghani mentioned Afghanistan no longer has a ‘two-headed government’, paid rich tributes to American tax-payers and soldiers, adding Afghanistan would shift focus from security to development. On the peace process, he said while 3,000 of the 5,000 Taliban were released, very few of the 1,000 Afghan soldiers had been freed. He said General Bajwa visited Kabul on June 9 and there was the closest alignment with Pakistan, adding that both agreed on India’s importance in the peace process. The Afghan talks team was inclusive and Abdullah had been elected by the Loya Jirgah to lead it. General David Petraeus who was among the audience, said the US force level below the 8,600 combatants — 4,800 soldiers were taken out as part of the US deal with Taliban — was unacceptable.

On June 24, Abdullah, attired in a Bond Street suit, observed that Taliban violence was mounting, with 422 attacks in last two weeks, resulting in 291 Afghan soldiers killed and 515 wounded. He said 75 per cent of the Taliban prisoners were released and intra-Afghan talks, scheduled for March 10, were likely to start in end-June, but the agenda had not been drawn. He emphasised that the US troop withdrawal was ‘condition-based’ and that even if the foreign forces withdraw prematurely, the Taliban could not take out the government though only US commando forces, air and logistics support were available. While a mutually hurting stalemate was missing, the Taliban was divided over the talks. When asked who was the final decision-maker, he admitted it was President Ghani.

The Taliban have received an image makeover; recognised by the US as Islamic Emirate — not Republic as Kabul would like; Trump speaking to co-founder of Taliban, Mullah Baradar; its deputy military leader Sirajuddin Haqqani carrying a US bounty of 10 million dollars being published in an Op-ed of New York Times (February 20); and the Taliban promulgating a second three-day Ramzan ceasefire.

In 2010, Taliban control extended to 90% of Afghanistan; today, out of 421 districts, they control only 74 and hold just 22 of them. They have been unable to take and hold any provincial capital, even Konduz, which they have sought thrice. Serious differences exist between Baradar and the deputy head of Taliban’s Qatar office, Sher Stenakzai. Hardliners among the Taliban who worry they will lose their pay and perks are ambivalent about integration with Afghan security forces. Questions remain on the Taliban commitment to the peace agreement with US as the UN Report of 2019 on terrorism confirms that the Taliban have not severed contact with the Al Qaeda and other militant groups (as required by agreement), adding that 615 Pakistani nationals are fighting in Afghanistan. Doubts about the Taliban acceptance of Afghan Constitution, power sharing and cessation of hostilities abound. In a rare message during Ramzan, supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, said: “US should not waste this opportunity to end its longest war”. Emboldened by the deal, Taliban had launched since the agreement till May, 3,800 attacks with Kabul suffering an average attrition of 68 soldiers daily.

While Mullah Yakub, son of the founder of Taliban, Mullah Omar, has been appointed military commander, which may create friction with Haqqani, four unnamed Taliban stalwarts have been included in the talks team.

According to all but the blind, Pakistan continues to remain in significant control of Taliban through sanctuaries, training, armaments and logistics it provides. Rawalpindi’s obsession with strategic depth, friendly government in Kabul or a government more amenable to its strategic concerns than it is to India’s, is the bottomline. Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy is circumscribed by five Noes: no two-front situation; no Taliban in full control of Kabul; no hasty US withdrawal; no Islamic Emirate and no support for Pakistani Taliban. These concerns stem from deep insecurities from India. Changing Rawalpindi behaviour in Afghanistan will require combined pressure from the US, the international community and FATF. But it has two friends in the P5 in the UNSC it can count on — China and Russia.

India has taken a backseat in Afghanistan despite its 3 billion dollar investment in its development, which has won it affection and popularity, but no political influence. Despite myriad advice on opening lines with Taliban whose role in a future government in Kabul is inevitable, New Delhi has consistently stuck to no contact with Taliban, a terrorist organisation, till it is earnestly engaged in an intra-Afghan dialogue. Both the US and Kabul have been telling India it will have an important role in the peace process. India has ceaselessly repeated the mantra of Afghan-owned, Afghan-driven and Afghan-controlled peace process when it knows the Americans and Europeans are piloting it. On July 5, India signed five agreements with Kabul under its new development partnership. In his Afghan policy enumerated in 2017, Trump had called India the key development partner in Afghanistan. Nearly 135 days after the accords with Taliban and Afghanistan, as agreed, the US has vacated five bases, retaining Bagram and Kandahar. 420 dangerous Taliban prisoners not being released is being attributed to deadly attacks this month reflecting its bargaining leverage.

The historic peace deal is actually a US troop extrication agreement sans admission of military failure, the price for which is being paid by the Afghans who curse the Taliban for sparing foreign troops but killing fellow Afghans. US Central Command’s General Frank Mckenzie’s avowal that full withdrawal will take place as per agreement (May 14, 2021) and will depend on the Taliban has to be taken with a pinch of salt. US elections, not the Taliban or situation in Afghanistan, will dictate the pace of US withdrawal.