A CDS with operational control and effective participation in HR issues is required. Control of operations, currently highly centralised at the HQ, needs to be delegated to theatre commands, as is prevalent in most advanced armed forces. We need integration, albeit a full-spectrum one, extending all the way to the Defence Ministry through cross-manning and joint staffing. The model has to be supported by an approved national security strategy.
Needed: An empowered Chief of Defence Staff.
Lt Gen KJ Singh (retd)
Former GoC-In-C, Western Command
The PM, in his trademark style of springing surprises, announced the institution of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in his Independence Day speech. This was followed by a flurry of articulations, centred on the CDS, limited to: who and when? As the deadline of November-end for the committee to finalise the contours of the proposed system approaches, speculation is further fuelled by the impending superannuation of the Army Chief. It is time to attempt to get the focus on the most relevant issues — what, if any, will be the transformative ecosystem accompanying the CDS? Alternatively, as is our wont, will it once again be incremental tinkering with the existing system?
Speculation emanating from informed circles, based on the purported report of a well-connected think tank, has thrown up ominous signals. As per this report, the CDS is likely to be a souped-up version of the current Chief of Integrated Staff (CISC), who heads the coordinating mechanism instituted consequent to some honest introspection after the rude jolt in Kargil. There is no mention of joint theatre commands, which are globally accepted as the essential framework for integration. Locked in our turf- and pelf-centric outcomes, debate is primarily focused on a four- or five-star status for the CDS, influenced by the bureaucratic fetish of ‘coup proofing’.
The general expectation is that the CDS will be four and quarter star, in the mould of ‘primes inter pares’, first among equals, yet keeping alive the possibility of politico-bureaucratic lobbies playing favourites. It really implies that the remit of the proposed incumbent will be limited to the coordination of capability building and perspective planning with no real control on two major functions — operations and personnel management. Ask any professional to name the most powerful branches, invariably the answer is: military operations and military secretary (dealing with officer management). The new dispensation, like the current CISC, will remain ineffective without control over these two vital functions.
The reform process is resisted till we are jolted out of our inertia by shocks and setbacks. We were surprised in 1947, 1962, 1965 and Kargil. Mercifully, except the Chinese debacle, the forces have saved the situation. Kargil was followed by a critical analysis and a series of committees — Kargil Review Committee, followed by sub-groups and, later, the Group of Ministers deliberations headed by the Deputy PM. The consensus was for a CDS and joint commands. In keeping with our bureaucratic DNA, notwithstanding the initial euphoria and consensus, back-pedalling took over. The first manifestation was cobbling up an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) HQ instead of a full-fledged CDS. Nearly a decade later, the Naresh Chandra Task Force came up with an incongruous Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and just skipped the issue of joint theatre commands.
The government created two joint commands, initiating a pilot project as the forerunner to the proposed integrated structure. The first one, on a functional basis, established the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). The second one, on a regional basis, led to Fortress Andamans (Fortran) being converted to the integrated Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). Essentially, it was a ploy to buy time to overcome the inherent resistance and paranoia of the IAF, of being subsumed and obstinate insistence on fighting standalone centralised air war. Reservations persist and the main argument advanced now is the dwindling inventory of fighters. This obviously disregards that surveillance, air defence, communications are organised on joint and integrated theatre grids. The IAF assets, like radars, unarmed aerial vehicles and helicopters, both attack and logistics, have a pivotal role, even if aircraft are centrally applied.
The most pertinent requirement at this juncture is to take stock of the pilot projects. The IDS HQ, despite getting no role in operations and a raw deal in staffing, has managed to reinforce the need for jointness. The SFC has been a hugely successful experiment and has paved the way for the setting up of integrated agencies on emerging disciplines of cyber, space and special operations. Presently, these agencies are headed by Major General-level officers and it is hoped that they will be incrementally upgraded to the desired level of joint commands.
It is rather unfortunate that the directive on regional joint command was implemented in the most lackadaisical manner. The Services, treating it as unwanted baby, provided neither cutting-edge assets nor quality manpower. The current thinking in the ministry is that the ANC should be headed by the Navy. Missed out in this ill-advised formulation is the cascading debiting effect in our spoils-driven system. This move would deny the Navy a rotational share in the top slots in the CISC and SFC. It is ironical that while we are committed to the triad in strategic weapons, leadership in the SFC will be in the diad mode.
The tortuous process of integration is based on forging consensus, resulting in sub-optimal lowest common multiple (LCM) solutions. It is hoped that the government will emulate the top-down approach displayed in Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 in the US and promulgate an eco-system that will promote operational synergy. The way forward is to reduce the complexity of 14 regional commands by creating the optimum number of integrated theatre commands. Instead of aping the Chinese or American models, we should customise our own theatres, based on our unique challenges.
We do need a CDS, but an empowered one, with operational control and effective participation in HR issues. Control of operations, currently highly centralised at the HQ, needs to be delegated to theatre commands, as is prevalent in most advanced armed forces. We need integration, albeit a full-spectrum one, extending all the way to the Defence Ministry through cross-manning and joint staffing. The proposed model has to be supported by an approved national security strategy, enhanced budgeting, functional procurement system, National Defence University and clarity on interfaces with other security management structures.