Sanjha Morcha

What Soleimani’s death means for Iran, West Asia and the world

With his killing, the US has entered an area of unknowns. Iran cannot be underestimated
Soleimani was the Shiite power’s chief conductor in the Syrian civil war, designing a policy of fighting ISIS while expanding Iran’s reach in the vacuum left behind. He also was the architect of Iran’s overwhelming influence in Iraq’s politics AP

Kabir Taneja

On Friday, Iran’s notable military figure, Major General Qasem Soleimani of the state’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which operates under the direct auspices of the Ayatollah, was killed along with another senior commander in a United States air strike at Iraq’s Baghdad airport. This marks one of the most significant moments in the region’s fragile geopolitical environment in recent years. Soleimani led the Quds Force, IRGC’s foreign operations wing, and was the architect of Iran’s expansions into the Syrian civil war and beyond. As the Donald Trump administration hailed the strike, Iran vowed revenge, setting off alarms of another impending war in the region.

This dramatic escalation occurred days after supporters of Iran-backed militias breached the US embassy in Baghdad, with reports suggesting that Iraqi troops tasked with protecting the diplomatic mission did not do so beyond a point. A week earlier, on December 27, Iran-backed militias had targeted a US base in Kirkuk in northern Iraq, wounding US troops and killing an American contractor.

The death of Soleimani comes at a time of heightened tensions between the US and Iran, with Trump, who has now entered an election year, having worked to isolate Iran both economically and politically by making major decisions such as exiting from the Iran nuclear deal. Moreover, Trump, as exhibited by comments around the killing of ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October in Syria at the hands of the US Army, has shown that he prefers to go after high-profile names, rather than middle-rung or deputies of leaders of terror groups or militias, for a more marketable national security posture, distinguishing himself from his predecessors at the White House.

However, with the killing of Soleimani, the US has entered an area of unknowns in its dealings with Tehran. Soleimani was not just a leader of the IRGC, but over the past few years had become a revered and extremely powerful figure in Iranian polity and society. In 2013, a profile of him in The New Yorker, titled “The Shadow Commander”, highlighted Soleimani’s role as a powerful behind-the-scenes figure. He was the Shiite power’s chief conductor in the Syrian civil war, designing a policy of fighting ISIS while simultaneously expanding the reach of Iran in the political and geographical vacuums left behind. This architecture saw Iran prop up the embattled government of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, and develop an all-encompassing reach around Iraq’s politics (Soleimani even reportedly held meetings in Baghdad with Iraqi officials in place of the country’s prime minister), bringing Tehran’s influence to the doorstep of its enemies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. Since then, Soleimani had operated with much gusto. His travels to the frontlines in Syria were documented in photos and videos, and circulated widely on social media as he developed a strong support base back home. While gaining popularity and support in Iran, specifically among the conservatives, his actions also caused the loss of innumerable lives in the region.

Amid all this, the killing of Soleimani pushes the likeliness of a direct armed escalation in the region between America, its interests and Tehran more than ever before. The assassination may end up uniting divisions within Iranian politics, with both the moderates and conservatives converging in condemning the US strike. The agenda led by Soleimani of spreading Iranian power through the region may, in fact, get strengthened further. He may become the martyr of the Iranian cause, backed up by the existential threat faced by the seat of Shiite Islam from the poles of power in both Riyadh and Jerusalem. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Israel, despite being adversaries, find the push against Iran to be a point of convergence emboldens Tehran’s publicly aired resolve to retaliate against the general’s death. For Iran, this could become a direct American declaration of war, whether Washington meant it or not.

For the US, the Trump administration, facing heat on an impeachment orchestrated by the Democrats and other domestic political upheavals, national security successes such as Baghdadi, and now Soleimani, may grant the presidency greater leverage in the impending elections later this year. Comparisons, such as an attack on the Baghdad embassy being unlike the one in Benghazi in Libya under the Obama administration in 2012 where the US ambassador died, may well be the posturing Trump was looking for, and now has successfully designed. Nonetheless, the optics are different. Iran, despite perceptions to the contrary, is a State with built-up resilience, proven survival instincts despite isolation, and a competent military. A war will by no means, be a walkover.

Any major escalation as a fallout of Soleimani’s killing will have global repercussions, with crude oil prices and major oil and trade routes in the Persian Gulf at stake, coupled with regional and global security and economic concerns.

The collision in West AsiaIran and the US have crossed redlines. The future is uncertain

The United States and Iran once again totter on the precipice as the world holds its breath. But even by the hard-nosed standards of West Asia, the US’s assassination of the Iranian Al Quds Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, was unusually public. The Donald Trump administration has given Tehran no space for manoeuvre or chance for de-escalation by killing a man who was central to the Iranian regime. Iran has a policy of retribution for lesser slights and will strike back. And that is exactly why the rest of the world is watching to see what happens next. Iran may avoid a direct military confrontation, but it has a smorgasbord of options, including using Shia proxies to hit US assets in West Asia or using cyber weapons to cripple networks in mainland America.

Unlike previous confrontations over the past four decades of the US-Iranian rivalry, however, regional circumstances are different today. Oil is no longer the weapon it once was. Iran cannot afford to shut down the Straits of Hormuz even if it had the ability to do so. Its primary customer is its ally, China, while an oil-exporting US would financially benefit from such a move. Washington is all-powerful but its interest in the Persian Gulf in dipping. Mr Trump remains a reluctant warrior. If Tehran had not surrounded the US embassy in Iraq, a red line for a president whose generation was scarred by the 1979 hostage crisis, it is likely the present tit-for-tat round would have simply petered out. Iran, on its part, may have assembled an informal empire of influence extending to the Mediterranean but its economy is shrinking and it struggles with rising social unrest. A warrior without will versus another without a way complicates the matrix.

Iran will use Soleimani’s death to shore up support for the regime. Retaliation will probably happen in due course, but with care to avoid pushing Mr Trump’s buttons and focus on signalling Iranian resolve to the region. Tehran can afford to be restrained. The US continues to slowly lose influence in West Asia. Saudi attempts to push back Iran in Yemen and elsewhere have failed. Both the US and Iran have elections coming up and a full-scale conflict is not a winning gambit in either of the campaigns. What the immediate future holds is hard to predict. But the long-term will remain a tale of regional disequilibrium, with mid-level powers like Iran and Russia struggling to replace the vacuum left by a US whose interests are shifting eastward.