Shift in strategy has many implications — for both India and Pakistan

Now for some calm: It is time for de-escalation of tension.

THE ‘surgical strike’ by India on September 29, after the fidayeen Uri attack, generated public euphoria and initial support by opposition parties, albeit more fearing public opinion than impressed by claims of a government entangled in a web of its own making. Winning mandate by rabble-rousing the Indian electorate over corruption scandals in his predecessor’s second term and allegedly his pusillanimous Pakistan policy, PM Narendra Modi was cornered by his followers baying for disproportionate and immediate retribution. The monster of public expectation was seeking a cathartic response. The Economist recently analysed this phenomenon, afflicting leaders globally, as “post-truth” politics. Donald Trump to Brexit supporters in Britain and anti-globalisation and anti-refugee political leaders in the West are all feeding popular prejudices and exploiting public angst rather than shaping public opinion with responsible alternative policies. The Modi government, in addition, faces crucial state elections, particularly in UP which provided his party a quarter of its MPs. The ‘gau rakshaks’ have by blind evangelism alienated not only Muslims, but also Dalits — the two together constituting around 40 per cent of the electorate in UP. The unrest in the Valley since the mid-July killing of militant Burhan Wani and Pakistan’s blatant exploitation of the situation by alleging in international fora Indian breaches of human rights triggered a Pakistan policy review in New Delhi. The Indian riposte came via PM Modi’s Red Fort address in which he raised Pakistan’s own poor rights record in Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Balochistan. The Uri attack, in which 19 brave soldiers lost their lives, hardly compared in its intensity with attacks in Mumbai in 1993, 2006 and 2008 (referred to as 26/11 attack). Nor did it equal the attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001, which could have decapitated India’s ruling elite. But Indian Government’s frustration with Pakistan’s civilian government’s ineffectiveness and assessment that they had succumbed to their army’s surmise that Kashmir was ripe for plucking, steeled the resolve to take the fight to Pakistan, literally and figuratively. Poking a finger in Pakistan’s eye over their brutal putting down of Baloch insurgency was only a beginning. Threats surfaced that India may grant asylum to descendants of Nawab Akbar Bugti killed by the Pakistan military in 2006. The Uri attack became a catalyst for changing strategy and tactics. On September 29, a high-level Ministry of External Affairs source briefed the writer and a dozen other strategic thinkers. Like Lt-Gen Ranbir Singh, Director General Military Operations, the action was described as a counter-terror operation to eliminate launch pads of militants who, according to Indian intelligence, had gathered to attempt infiltration into India. The exact phrase was ‘along the Line of Control’ and not across it. The aim appeared to be to contain international reaction and not give Pakistan army an excuse to retaliate. The message, after all, had already been conveyed that a new preventive intervention doctrine was now in place. However at the political level, first Minister of State RS Rathore baited Pakistan followed by his senior colleague Venkaiah Naidu. The NDA government’s diplomatic policy was in conflict with its domestic compulsions. Seeing the BJP’s political point-scoring, opposition parties became more vocal in questioning the government’s claims. Pakistan, in any case, denied that such a raid occurred in its territory. The government came under pressure to release the proof, if any. What then is the significance of the Indian action? Undoubtedly, it spelt a change of strategy as previous punitive raids had been conducted clandestinely and away from the prying eyes of the media. This was done to satisfy Indian public opinion and declare a new doctrine of preventive action. The implications are many. Firstly, the US has been unable to deter Pakistan and its army from collaborating with the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani group, despite its drone attacks, hunting of Osama bin Laden and massive military and civilian assistance, and now, the killing of Mullah Mansour, the head of Taliban. Pakistan is already reported to be moving camps of jehadis away from the LoC and near, or even inside, military facilities. Secondly, the government is now locked into automatic and enhanced response if another attack of similar or higher intensity occurs. World War I was triggered by treaty obligations compelling a military response when space for diplomacy still existed. The initiative thus has passed to the jehadis to determine the trajectory of Indo-Pak relations. Post-1998 bombings of US embassies in East Africa, the US conducted missile attacks on suspected Al-Qaeda (AQ) camps in Afghanistan. Result was not the elimination of AQ, whose operatives fled the camps anticipating US retaliation, but the plotting of 9/11. The Indian strategy has to be broader than a military one, with politico-economic pressure points. On the positive side, Pakistan got insignificant international support for its rights abuses charge or India’s cross-LoC action. The Uri attack, in fact, enabled India to shift the focus to Pakistan’s abetment to terror. Pakistan’s nuclear flash-point argument also found little traction with the UN or the P-5. Pakistan can react in one of many ways. It can abet a major terror strike in India during the Dasehra/Diwali period to cause maximum pain and panic as markets are full of shoppers to test India’s escalatory resolve. It could target Indian assets in Afghanistan. Consensus in New York is that Pakistan would lose even more international credibility if this was to happen. Pakistan can also do a cross-LoC operation to either capture or damage a vulnerable army post or facility. It is least likely that it cuts its losses and does nothing. The release of the raid video footage may compromise Indian capabilities, provoke Pakistan as its army loses face and definitely set-off an action-reaction. PM Nawaz Sharif, again praising Wani as a freedom fighter in their Parliament, will harden Indian stand. It is unlikely that tension will start abating before the UP election. Nawaz may also be using the Kashmir bogey to outflank his army chief Gen Raheel Sharif who retires next month. Snow in the Valley and the passes, a healing touch and with domestic priorities of both prime ministers resolved space for normalisation may be available. At the moment,  the initiative has passed to hawks on both sides and militants. — The writer is a former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs