(Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM)
Despite great odds, vintage weapons, limited ammunition, dizzy heights and inclement weather, Indian troops fought valiantly. Stories of heroism emerged from the debris of war. Indian Army’s 200 years of unblemished history was routed in just eight days, four days each in Oct and Nov 1962. (The war was fought in two phases by the Chinese; they later declared unilateral Cease Fire and withdrew to previously held locs).

After Namka Chu, the PLA consolidated their gains and captured Lumpu-Ziminthang – next was Tawang. Till 20 Oct, defence of ‘Vital Ground’ Tawang was accorded low priority and placed under Commander 4 Artillery Brigade. He was at Division Tac at Zimithang on 19 Oct and could not fall back to Tawang since both heptrs assigned to 4 Infantry Division were destroyed, Tawang was two days by foot. The enemy following the hasty withdrawal of 7 Infantry Brigade from Namka Chu reached Lumla by early hours of 23 Oct. GOC 4 Infantry Divison (Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad) appreciated that Tawang was not defensible and that PLA would bypass 1 SIKH on Bum La-Tawang track and make for Se La. If Chinese blew up the bridge at Jang on Chaksang track, they would trap his troops on Tawang side of the river. He decided to withdraw all troops from Tawang to Se La and fight the main battle there. Forward HQ of Tibet Military Command ordered pursuit to commence at 4 PM on 21 Oct –

Advance along three different routes culminating in a three-pronged attack on Tawang. Force 419 (comprising three Infantry Regiments), 11 Infantry Division and four coys ex Shanan Military Sub District (SMS): roughly a total str of six infantry regiments were tasked for the capture of Tawang. (A PLA regiment comprised approx 2,500–3,000 troops, organized into three infantry battalions, supported by heavy weapons, logistics, and command elements). The outline plan: • Force 419 to advance from Lumpu via Lumla in the South West and capture Tawang in coord with 11 Infantry Division. • 1st Bn of 31 Infantry Regiment advance from Takson Gompa via Gangshen Pass directly to Tawang and assist Force 419 advancing from the West for capture of Tawang. • 33 Infantry Regiment of 11 Infantry Divison advance along Eastern flank from Bumla via Mukdong La directly to Tawang Chu and cut off route of withdrawal from Tawang, as also prevent any reinforcement. • 32 Infantry Regiment of 11 Infantry Divison and four coys of Shanan Military Sub District to advance on the main Axis Bumla – Tawang via Milakteng La and coord their actions with both the forces advancing on the West and East flanks. Having secured Lumpu and Ziminthaung, Tibet Military Command at 4.30 PM on 22 Oct, ordered troops ex SMS to capture Bumla and exploit to Tawang. The attack commenced at 5 AM on 23 Oct from Bumla and faced stiff opposition from the 1st SIKH platoon under Sub Joginder Singh. The Chinese had to call for reinforcements from 33 Infantry Regiment and readjust their plans. Having eliminated the platoon at Bumla, 33 Infantry Regiment troops continued their attack against the SIKH coy at Tongpengla which managed to make a clean break and withdraw to Jung in good order.

Tawang was defended by 1 SIKH, 4 GARH RIFLES, one artillery regiment, an engineer detachment all under command of Brig Kalyan Singh, Commander 4 Artillery Brigade. As per Chinese estimates Tawang had a total str of about 2700 troops. By last light 23 Oct Tawang came under attack from many directions, by first light 24 Oct Tawang was occupied by Chinese. The Chinese used bulk of their forces (four regiments out of six) to outflank and encircle Tawang. Only one third of the forces were used for direct advance on to the objective. Typical tactics that PLA employed even in the subsequent battles at Se-La and Bomdi-La. The Army Commander, Lt Gen P Sen was in Tawang on 22 and 23 Oct. Before landing at Tawang, he had flown towards Zimithang to get an idea of the terrain which he was not familiar with!! Once in Tawang, he did not appear very confident after the Nam Ka Chu rout. GOC 4 Infantry Division, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad was planning on falling back to Bomdila with Se-la only a delaying position. The withdrawal from Tawang was an exodus. Large dumps of ammunition, supplies and clothing painstakingly stocked were abandoned. Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad was sacked as GOC 4 Inf Div – for having lost the will to fight. After occupying Tawang, the Chinese did not pursue and there was a lull in the fighting lasting a little over three weeks. Was decision to abandon Tawang well thought of? …….. NO • ‘D’ Coy/1 SIKH fought a successful battle, stopping three Chinese attacks at Bumla. Chinese could not bypass Tongpeng La, reinforcement would have boosted the defence of Bum La. • Two Battalions (4 GARHWAL & 13 DOGRA) were deployed around Tawang, and adequately prepared to defend Tawang. • Had Director of Military Operations not stopped forward move of troops of 62 & 48 Brigade, three more Battalions would be available for defence of Tawang. • The enemy was following remnants of 7 Brigade & 4 Division along Zimithang-Shakti-LumLa-Tawang axis: their Lines of Communications were extended.13 DOGRA guarding Lum La Tawang approach could have effectively disorganised the enemy’s advance. • Even if the enemy rushed to the bridge on by 24 Oct morning, the enemy would have been engaged by own troops on either bank of Tawang Chu. • Tactical Advantages of Tawang – It was the best stocked position in the region. Tawang defences were prepared as a Vital Ground in the last two years. • After the fall of Tawang, Sela was chosen as the Vital Ground. It was not suitable because there was no adequate recce, the heights were unfavourable for deployment, it was easily by passable via multiple existing routes, No defences existed for withdrawing troops who were being closely followed by the advancing enemy, No stocking, No suitable Dropping Zone to cater for the eventuality on being cut off. The Impact of the loss of Tawang – With Tawang lost, the Chinese forces had unimpeded access to the Se La – Bomdi La line, and beyond that, the Assam plains. The lack of depth in Indian defences south of Tawang meant that there was no effective second line to delay or repel further advances. The psychological impact was severe – Tezpur was evacuated, and panic spread across Assam, with fears of a full-scale Chinese invasion.