Major General Harvijay Singh, SM (Retd) is a third-generation soldier, and his two sons are also Army officers. An alumnus of National Defence Academy, Pune, he was commissioned in the Corps of Signals in 1981. He is a specialist trainer and has trained soldiers in military training establishments at various stages of his career. As the Chief Instructor of the Military College of Telecommunications Engineering, he was strategizing issues and training professional soldiers on Communication Networks, Cyber Security and Electronic Warfare. A prolific writer, he contributes regularly to various professional journals. He has written three books related to Military History and Leadership and is the recipient of the prestigious ‘Scholar Warrior Badge’.
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is a striking example of how asymmetric warfare is evolving – especially when the weak become emboldened to take high risk, high-reward actions demonstrating that the concept of strategic depth with the weapon systems of today, is a myth. Ukraine Strikes Deep Operation Spider’s Web was a high-profile drone strike deep (upto 4000 kms) inside Russia carried out on 01 June 2025. The strike was led by Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny or Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU). SBU is Ukraine’s principal internal security and counterintelligence agency. It conducts counterintelligence operations, combats organized crime and terrorism and protects state secrets and national security. Notably, it is subordinated directly to the President of Ukraine, is staffed by military personnel and operates specialized units like the Alpha Group (Special Forces).
The operation was planned over 18 months and strike drones were smuggled into Russia in trucks camouflaged as standard cargo loads. The attacks, using 117 remote-controlled First-Person View (FPV) drones, struck 41 strategic Russian Air Force aircraft at four locations and destroyed at least 13 while damaging others. Uniquely executed, the drones were launched from inside Russian territory after being transported from Ukraine in wooden cabins mounted on flatbed trucks and assembled in Russia on the sly. The ready to launch drones were smartly placed inside these wooden structures and moved close to the target areas disguised as commercial goods. The flatbed trucks had been hired and even the drivers were unaware of the contents. Once in place, the remotely operated roofs of the cabins were retracted and the hunters freed to target their unsuspecting prey, reminiscent of modern-day Trojan Horses! Notably, no Ukrainian personnel were harmed as agents who helped assemble the drones or enabled technical and communications support were evacuated prior to drone launches. Operation Spider’s Web establishes a template for deep strategic strikes at unsuspecting and underprepared target areas using adversary territory as a launch base. This methodology was partly replicated in Operation Rising Lion, wherein Israel targeted Iran’s military leadership, nuclear assets and critical infrastructure on 13 June 2025
. Thus, in a vast country like India surrounded by hostile elements, Rear Area Monitoring and Security assumes significant importance at all times. Strategic Objectives The main objectives of Operation Spider’s Web based on the effects, appear to have been to severely damage Russia’s long-range bomber capability, for which four aircraft types were targeted: • Tupolev Tu-95 (Bear) and Tupolev Tu-22M3 (Backfire) – Both used for missile strikes on Ukrainian cities. They carry Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-22, and Kh-32 cruise missiles designed for long range precision strikes. • Beriev A-50 (Mainstay) – Similar to AWACS, the A-50 functions as a flying command post and radar station. Its extensive rotating radome enables it to detect aircraft, cruise missiles, and other aerial threats from hundreds of kms away. It therefore serves as a crucial force multiplier by coordinating all air actions. This has been an extremely valuable asset for the Russian Air Force. The strategic objectives were also to demonstrate Ukraine’s deep-strike capabilities using unconventional methodology integrated with drone technology, thereby, undermining Russia’s sense of strategic depth, exposing vulnerabilities in rear-echelon defences, and reshaping the psychological landscape just prior to the peace talks that had been scheduled on 02 June at Istanbul. The operation psychologically and materially disrupted Russian air power resources across the airbases. The Bases Targeted As highlighted earlier, there were no Ukrainian boots on the ground, just the telling use of technology, well coordinated timing, and comprehensive analysis of the terrain, the targets and the operating environment. 117 FPV drones targeted four Russian airbases as under: • Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast, Siberia (4000 km from the frontline). In addition to strategic bombers, it hosts the MiG-31K carrying Kinzhal missiles. • Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast in the Russian Arctic. It functions as a forward staging base for Arctic and Atlantic missions. • Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast. Functions as a rear area bomber base with training and refuelling capabilities. This dual role amplifies its strategic importance far beyond that of a conventional air base. •
Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. Acts as a nerve centre for airborne command and control. Supports strategic bomber coordination and missile targeting. The pilots of the FPV drones, operating from Ukraine, targeted vulnerable points such as fuel tanks in the wings with the limited load of explosives that a FPV generally carries, leveraging the precision provided by the drones. The Drone Arsenal Ukraine deployed a multi-layered drone strike force combining FPV A FPV-drone struck military plane Tu-95 at Russia’s Olenya airbase during the attack
kamikaze drones, AI-guided autonomous systems, and long-range delivery platforms. The Osa Drone – Ukrainian for “Wasp” is an indigenous FPV quadcopter. Its payload was dual charges of 800 grams each (Shaped Charge and High-Explosive), which were designed to burn through aircraft fuselage and trigger internal explosions. A standard explosive then detonates outwards in all directions. The flight time of the drones was approximately 15 minutes and top speed 150 km per hour. A Shaped – Charge High – Explosive, uses a specically shaped casing to focus the explosive energy, (a V or U-shape made of a soft metal like copper). Upon detonation, the explosive core collapses the metal liner onto itself, forming a high-velocity jet of molten metal.
This jet can travel at several kms/second and has immense penetrating power, acting like an industrial cutting torch or a plasma cutter. The key purpose of this warhead is not to create a large blast, but to cut or sever the target along a line. Communications for Operation Spider’s Web were designed to tap into the existing civilian infrastructure. Active guidance by operators / pilots was kept to the minimum with reliance on AI and autonomy in flight, in effect, minimising interference by Russian SIGINT. Ukrainian operatives inside Russia used secure communications to coordinate logistics, including the movement of drones camouflaged inside the cabin cargo, by riding on Russian Telecom Networks using burner phones or anonymous SIMs. Civilian Russian truck drivers, unaware of the mission, received instructions on mobile phones to park at MEDALS & RIBBONS Oct. – Dec. 2025 designated locations and activate drone release mechanisms, oblivious of the intent or the effect. Possibly, the cabins equipped with batteries and solar panels could have used satellite uplinks, enabling remote activation of the drones. Each drone was equipped with multiple types of communications to ensure resilience, autonomy, and redundancy, encompassing analog video transmission for real-time piloting and encrypted digital links for command and control. The drone pilots coordinated the attack from undisclosed combat control points, using encrypted channels to manage drone swarms in real time. In addition, embedded autopilot systems with AI-driven trajectory planning allowed drones to operate semi-independently, reducing reliance on continuous operator input.
AI-Powered Autonomous System In addition to the truck delivered FPVs, a Mother Drone system (developed by Brave1 Tech Cluster (Ukraine’s defence innovation platform), that carries and deploys two FPV strike drones up to 300 km behind enemy lines using Visual-inertial navigation and LiDAR-based terrain mapping is likely to have been used. With no GPS dependency, it is immune to jamming and spoofing. Once launched, the system can identify, navigate to, and strike targets without human intervention. AI-based target recognition enabled these drones to autonomously identify, classify, and engage targets with minimum human inputs. At the core of this capability are machine learning (ML) and deep learning algorithms trained on vast datasets of images and sensor data. Some drones were trained to identify and strike fuel tanks on aircraft for maximum damage, which they effectively did. Extensive use of technology allowed the pre-programmed FPV drones to autonomously reach their designated targets. However, from videos released by SBU, at some time during the approach human pilots were seen to remotely intervene and guide the drones towards exact weak points on the aircrafts as planned, ensuring desired effects. Notably, while Ukraine stated that they launched 117 Drones, OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) analysts confirm only 41 FPV drone strike videos in the target areas are available. This indicates that some of the drones probably lost contact with the base station. Such losses are always likely and adequate reserves would have been planned for these operations.
Redundancy in technology and communications remains a strategic necessity for the survival of plans. The Impact – Financial and Strategic The drones specifically targeted exposed aircraft parked in the open, making them easy targets for precision strikes. The engine compartments and fuel tanks were struck, maximizing the chance of detonation and destruction. On the A-50 aircraft, the radar domes were 36 COMMENTARY precisely hit. In the maintenance and repair zones, at Dyagilevo Air Base, aircraft undergoing repairs were hit, compounding damage and delaying recovery An Independent Damage Assessment is as shown in the adjacent table. Destroyed Heavily Damaged A acked – Damage Unknown TU-95 7 1 2 TU-22M3 4 Ukraine claims that the strike damaged / destroyed 41 aircraft and estimates $7 billion in losses to Russia’s strategic aviation. The strike damaged Russia’s long-range strategic bomber fleet, some of a vintage that prevents repair or replacement, thereby crippling their strategic reach. A-50 2 6 AN-12 2 1 Total 12 3 10 Key Takeaways In modern warfare, the battlefield has no boundaries and can be shaped as per identified vulnerabilities. There is no FLOT – Front Line of Own Troops, just a web of hybrid tactics, psychological manoeuvres, and technological infiltrations. Complacency will prove costly and strategic depth is a fallacy. Strategy, planning and preparedness are essential but bold and audacious execution is difficult to defend against, hence security forces must master the fundamentals, and execute out of the box plans.
Propaganda and sabre-rattling are tools of perception warfare meant to blur the truth, twist the narrative, and create just enough doubt to stall decision-making. Victories emerge from the shadow of the Noise. Finally, drones are rewriting operational art and being used in wildly creative ways. In the future we are likely to see more disruptive technologies at work, with narratives difficult to envision now. Countermeasures will require layered technology and multi domain shields and doctrines. Surprise and deception remain crucial factors in modern warfare. Though difficult to achieve, these are essential in a world saturated with data, sensors, and satellite visibility. To achieve surprise, the Ukrainians assembled the drones in rented warehouses and launched them from civilian trucks blurring the line between military and civilian identities – thus citizens have to be aware and alert on issues of internal security. Human suicide bombers are a relic of the past, and erstwhile body switches are now being pressed thousands of miles away on ‘suicide drones’. Everything that needs to be secured must be secured. Major General Harvijay Singh, SM (Retd) is a third-generation soldier, and his two sons are also Army officers. An alumnus of National Defence Academy, Pune, he was commissioned in the Corps of Signals in 1981. He is a specialist trainer and has trained soldiers in military training establishments at various stages of his career. As the Chief Instructor of the Military College of Telecommunications Engineering, he was strategizing issues and training professional soldiers on Communication Networks, Cyber Security and Electronic Warfare.
Ahe Government and the Army have many welfare schemes and grants for widows and wards of soldiers who die in operations or in harness. Very often, many of the entitled beneciaries are unaware of these incentives, and continue to live primarily on the pension and medical benets provided. Several widows are informed about education facilities and support, but are not well versed with the processes to avail such benets. This report elucidates steps taken by the Radiant Group to assist. The Idea and the Spirit of the Initiative Radiant Sambandh is a welfare project of the Radiant Group of Companies.
This is a “Taking Care of our Own” initiative by the founder, Colonel David Devasahayam (Retd), CMD, Radiant Group of Companies. To lend weight to the initiative, Lieutenant General Devraj Anbu, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, (Retd), former Army Commander Northern Command and former Vice Chief of Army Staff has joined the initiative as its chief mentor. Radiant Sambandh primarily works to educate the Next of Kin (NOKs) of Physical Casualties (PCs) of the Army on the welfare schemes and financial grants provided by the Ministry of Defence and the Directorate of Indian Army Veterans (DIAV); and assists them in availing these benefits. Before you get confused by ‘military jargon’, let me just throw light on some of the terms. A PC is a soldier who dies while in service in a peace or a field area but is not classified as a Battle Casualty. The Army has many effective welfare schemes which are not availed by many NOK of PCs for multiple reasons including lack of awareness and language comprehension in filling mandatory forms resulting in MEDALS & RIBBONS Oct. – Dec. 2025 CHENNA