Joint operations and precise planning in the war led to India’s victory sooner than Pakistan expected
dEFENCE mINISTER jAGjIVAN rAM WITH iNDIAN TROOPS AFTER THE VICTORY IN THE EASTERN SECTOR
KV Prasad
The iconic picture (see page 1) of General Jagjit Singh Aurora seated next to General AAK Niazi and overlooking the signing of the instrument of surrender of 93,000 Pakistanis on December 16, 1971, and flanked by senior officers of the Indian Armed Forces remains permanently etched as a prized trophy of the war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.
The war itself may have lasted slightly over 12 days but its preparations began a good nine months before the commencement of open hostilities on December 3, when Pakistan Air Force pounded major airfields in the northern India.
A classic battle plan drawn on boards much in advance and gone through with a fine tooth comb in the war rooms included the thrust in the Eastern Sector, the real area where teeming millions from across the then East Pakistan began pouring into India to escape atrocities and brutalities inflicted by the Pakistan army against its own citizens.
Military historians have recorded in detail the plan mounted in the Eastern Theatre to work its way around Pakistani army stationed in East Pakistan and factoring possible Chinese collaboration with the Indian Navy and Air Force playing a complementary or supplementary role in the final march towards Dhaka.
The Indian Army was tasked to mount strikes from three directions through the Siliguri Corridor where the 33 Corps under Lt. Gen ML Thapan were to capture Gaibanda and Bogra via Pirganj, while containing Rangpur and Dinajpur. Push to Jessore through 2 Corp under Lt. Gen Tapeshwar Nath Raina with key objectives to capture Jhenida and Magura with a view to secure ferry sites on River Padma and Madhumati. 4 Corp under Lt. Gen Sangat Singh with three army divisions, three squadrons of armour and eight battalions of East Bengal regiment was to cut through to Dhaka taking Chittagong, Ashuganj and Sylhet sectors. The Gorkhas played a significant role in the fall of garrison at Sylhet.
Navy: The Eastern Theatre also saw for the first time operations in tandem by the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. The latter moved in its sole aircraft carrier INS Vikrant under Captain Swaraj Prakash along with frigates INS Brahmaputra and INS Beas to attack Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar after Pakistan’s American-built diesel submarine PNS Ghazi sank outside Visakhapatnam harbor in the wee hours of December 4. Besides Chittagong, the naval manoeuvre choked Pakistan’s sea lanes of communication to vital ports of Khulna and Chalna.
Air Force: Participation began early when it started lifting troops and material to forward locations. Besides providing support to ground forces, IAF Gnats downed two Pakistani Sabres and damaged the third intruder over Boyra on November 22, in the Eastern Sector. The Indian Air Force established supremacy in this sector two days after the war was declared with devastating attacks on major Pakistani air fields in East Pakistan, besides dropping para-troops across rivers.
The IAF delivered the coup de grace on December 14 with four MiG-21s and four Hunters bombing the Government House in Dhaka where Governor AM Malik was holding meeting with officials which ended all resistance.
While jointness is much talked about in military circles, the 1971 War showcases joint operations. In his book, India’s Wars — A Military History 1947-1971, Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramanian quotes Lt. Gen Shamsher Mehta (Retd) recalling, ‘informal camaraderie, pre-launch bonding, and free-flowing operational communication, where rank and protocol did not matter, was the hallmark of operations in the 4 Corps Sector. However, what was also clear was that this synergy was “personality driven” and not “institutionally driven” joint operations that was on display’.