The joint military exercises between China and Nepal reaffirm doubts about China’s larger strategic intentions. The constitutional stalemate in Nepal, the domination of pro-China elements in internal politics and the off and on bitterness with India strengthen Chinese grip over the landlocked country.

diplomatic power: Chinese Defence Minister Chang Wanquan (C) arrives at Tribhuwan International Airport in Kathmandu, to discuss joint military exercises. AFP

China has been conducting joint military exercises with many countries of the world. Yet, many of those have not generated as much heat as the recent Sagarmatha exercise with Nepal did. True, the scale of exercise was brought down due to internal apprehensions and external doubts and limited to generic issues of counter-terrorism and disaster response but it has reaffirmed doubts about China’s larger strategic intentions towards India and South Asia. The strategic intentions become clear if contexualised within the contours of emerging strategic realities related to China. First, China is going through another phase of military reforms. There is a single theatre command against India and other South-Asian countries, including Nepal. In earlier stages of military modernisation, China undertook massive development of logistics in Tibet, including roads, railways and other communication network to facilitate movement of troops. Though the approximate numbers are not known but China has positioned huge number of missiles of different ranges, tanks and armoured brigades enhancing its strategic advantage near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. Second, while China has not named India as adversary in its February white paper on defence focussing, instead, on Asia Pacific neighbours. Its treatment of neighbours is increasingly becoming more assertive and, often, quite offensive. It has been pricking India through recurring intrusions across the LAC and has hardened its position in border negotiations through new demands on Tawang. Third, Nepal is fast metamorphosing into China’s grand strategy of soft-boxing India. China is extending road and rail networks from Tibet to the Nepal border and inside. It would prefer reaching upto Nepal’s southern peripheries. China is also developing some airports and power projects that could become an alibi for testing infrastructural support and terrain for futuristic requisition. China has also been pampering Nepal with soft tools of military diplomacy like friendly treatment akin to an ally, training of Nepal troops and supplying them with light weapons. In the bargain, the goal could be terrain familiarisation and route mapping of Nepal. The joint exercise reflects the complex contest for supremacy in Nepal where India has been doling out Rs 2,000 crore every year in defence pensions only to Gurkhas, apart from other elements of a benevolent neighbourly policy. China is building up and consolidating geographic and strategic advantage in its favour. There are various hypothetical scenarios of increasing Sino-Nepal military cooperation becoming permissive cause of rift and even war between China and India. At its minimum, the Chinese could use Tibetans, Nepalese or even themselves to spy on India by sitting in the Terai tract of Nepal. Since the India-Nepal border is open and not well-guarded, Chinese could play hide and seek in border areas. China could also be planning out a long-term strategy to reduce Nepal’s dependence on India and make it look northwards through the Tibet gateway. Nepal’s willingness for inclusion in China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) is a step towards economic and strategic dependence of Nepal towards its northern neighbour. Even if it happens partially, Nepal becomes part of Sino-centric regional order threatening pax-Sinica (peace at Chinese terms) to India. At its worst, China could use the Nepalese corridors to push through an attack on Northern UP and Bihar in no time. Humphrey Hawksley in his fiction Dragon Fire (2000) had partially alluded to such a futuristic scenario. India does not have any defensive corps presence or any major military formation north of Ganga to hold on to the Chinese till reinforcements arrive from Bengal or UP. Some border roads in Bihar that were constructed in the wake of the 1962 War are yet to be developed as strategic roads. The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) is yet to take up any road development project in North Bihar or UP. It is debatable if such a hypothetical Chinese attack using Nepal is imagined in India’s threat perceptions since no research institutes have come out with any publication alluding to such hypothesis. This despite the fact that the Sino-Nepal axis could be equally damaging to India like the Sino-Pakistan axis since China is exploiting Nepal’s military diplomatic requirements into an opportunity for itself. India, therefore, needs to initiate several policy steps. First, India’s think tanks need to develop and proliferate a complete database about the military formations, logistics development and stockpiles of arsenals in Tibet. Second, steps are needed for hyphenating Nepal with China. Should India have a forward defence along the Sino-Nepal border akin to the spirits of 1950 treaty? Does India need to play a more proactive role in the military modernisation of Nepal? Should India compete with China and help the development of roads and rails in southern Nepal? These are issues that need consideration. Third, India needs to develop military logistics and infrastructure along with reasonable military deployment in northern Bihar and UP for better deterrence. Probably, that can help India manage Chinese overtures towards Nepal without affecting its own national security. The writer is in the Indian Defence Accounts Service. The views expressed are strictly personal.