While unresolved issues from 1971 remain, they are no longer a barrier to engagement.
Divya Malhotra

Twelve senior Bangladeshi civil servants landed in Karachi last month for an executive leadership programme organised by Pakistan’s Higher Education Commission and Civil Services Academy. The training began with an engagement at the National Institute of Public Administration in Karachi, alongside visits to key public institutions in Pakistan’s financial capital. The delegation then proceeded to Lahore’s Civil Services Academy, the institute that had trained bureaucrats of undivided Pakistan before 1971. This marked the first such institutional exchange between Islamabad and Dhaka in over 50 years.
The development is significant because until recently, Bangladeshi officials trained in India. The Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA), Mussoorie, hosted mid-career officials under agreements formalised since 2014. Although a training cooperation agreement for 2025-2030 has been renewed, no Bangladeshi officer has visited LBSNAA since the Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in 2024.
Bangladesh emerged from the traumatic events of 1971. The Pakistan army’s war crimes are deeply embedded in its national identity. During Hasina’s 15-year tenure (2009-24), Pakistan was largely treated as a pariah partner, while the Awami League drew much of its political legitimacy from the liberation war narrative.
The student-led uprising that toppled Hasina and sent her into exile in India opened space for a reset with Pakistan. Islamabad moved quickly. Cargo shipping resumed between Karachi and Chittagong, senior Pakistani officials travelled to Dhaka and structured cooperation expanded across trade, connectivity and governance.
Thus, the Bangladeshi delegation’s orientation in Karachi was equally symbolic. Exposure to institutions in Pakistan reflected Islamabad’s effort to familiarise Bangladeshi officials with the country’s trade architecture at a time of expanding economic engagement. While unresolved issues from 1971 remain, they are no longer being treated as a barrier to engagement. By de-hyphenating past issues from present realities, both sides seem to have found a new diplomatic space.
But, the training programme’s significance goes beyond this. These programmes are designed to shape how officials think about governance, statecraft, regional politics and national interests. For years, Bangladeshi officials attended training programmes in India and were exposed to administrative practices, governance models and strategic perspectives shared by New Delhi and Dhaka. Pakistan now has an opportunity to engage a new generation of administrators. This is why the exchange of ideas may prove more consequential than the exchange of goods.
Exposure to Pakistani institutions, policy debates and administrative traditions will now shape their perspectives. Pakistani analysts have argued that such exchanges should be institutionalised through long-term agreements so that the relationship is not left vulnerable to changing political cycles.
For decades, Dhaka-Delhi ties defined the boundaries of the Dhaka-Islamabad engagement. That constraint has loosened following political change in Dhaka. Religious affinities have also become more visible in the post-Hasina period.
This does not mean Bangladesh has abandoned the Liberation War as a foundational national narrative. Rather, the post-Hasina political order appears more driven by national interest. The visit of officials reflects the willingness of both countries to test the possibility of normalisation, and that in itself is a milestone.
