The growing trust deficit and one-upmanship not only amongst the security agencies but also individuals responsible for security-related matters is a matter of concern. A cursory analysis of the two recent anti-terrorist operations in Punjab drives home this point.

A typical post-terrorist strike scenario is re-enacted time and again in our country. The attack on the Air Force Base (AFB), Pathankot, despite available prior intelligence  brings to the fore the same weather-beaten shortcomings; poor intelligence sharing, lack of coordination and standing operating procedures between security agencies, command-and-control problems, inadequate and inappropriate equipment etc. Availability of early and actionable intelligence is the start point for effective counter actions but has seldom been provided by intelligence agencies. In the case of Pathankot air base, prior intelligence was available but timely dissemination to  security agencies concerned was definitely not done. A clear indicator was the confused planning and inappropriate response. At what stage the BSF was provided (or not provided) this information/ intelligence is not clear. Now to expect them to admit and pinpoint undetected infiltration is very unlikely and mere conjecture.The terrain along the International Border (IB), especially the stretches of the riverine terrain, is vulnerable. The shortcomings have long been assessed and requisite counter-measures should have been in place. We repeatedly shut the stable gate with moth-eaten wood, thereby providing a recipe for reoccurrence sooner rather than later. The Air Force and the Army were also clearly out of the dissemination loop. Nothing could be more telling than the fact that the terrorists managed to breach the perimeter of the AFB and the Defence Service Corps personnel were caught napping, busy with their daily chores. The early induction of the NSG and late arrival of the Army on the scene is clearly indicative that the latter had no initial information. The delay in dissemination of real-time information available with the Punjab Police (PP) to the military is unpardonable. The flaws at Gurdaspur were distinct; complete lack of intelligence enabled the terrorists to reconnoitre and ensconce themselves in a building before the police reacted. The Army was requisitioned by the civil authorities but strangely they were not permitted to get into action. as evidently the DGP, PP wanted to prove his credentials and that of his force in handling such situations. This one-upmanship took toll of precious time and human loss as the DGP drove down from whereever he was and the Army columns just stood by twiddling their thumbs. Post the operation, amidst much bravado by the police SWAT personnel and the din of loud cheers, the poor conduct of the operation and the wasteful act of not utilising the Army were forgotten. Also, since the state did not allow the National Intelligence Agency to investigate, opportunity was lost to take remedial measures. At Pathankot, a high-ranking police officer was kidnapped under mysterious circumstances. As he yelled blue murder, no heed was paid to him for almost 14 hours. Was it sheer disbelief or trust deficit within the police force (affected by the past nefarious conduct of the police officer in question) or an effort to cover up some tracks? Post this operation, the Deputy Chief Minister’s statement that there is a need to strengthen the deployment of the BSF along the India-Pak border in the state and the intention to make Punjab Police a second line of defence carries merit. However, for this to fructify while the onus of upgrading the BSF troops is on the Home Ministry, for Punjab Police to change tack lies with the state government. The foremost need is to make a dramatic shift in the present work culture of the state’s police — from a “Politicians’ Police” to a “Peoples’ Police”. They need to reorient their intelligence grid (upwards from the village level) in close coordination with the Army and BSF intelligence setups and neutralise the drug nexus (reportedly involving politicians, central and state police forces personnel, rich businessmen and the smugglers’ cartel). This requires additional manpower, which is readily available if the politicians are willing to reduce the number of police personnel on their protection duty (which basically fulfils their desire for personal aggrandisement) and the red, blue and orange lights culture! Availability of manpower will allow the police to train better and perform wholeheratedly their duties, particularly patrolling and traffic control. The problem of command and control between various security agencies is perennial. The BSF, or for that matter all CAPFs and even a paramilitary force like the Assam Rifles, officered by Army officers, function under the Home Ministry. These seldom agree to function under the Army and are always looking back towards their line of command rather than operational requirements. Repeated display of one-upmanship in handling such situations at the Centre’s  level definitely shows a trust deficit in the Army. Like in Mumbai 26/11, also in Pathankot, the National Secuirty Adviser (NSA) took the call to send in the NSG ahead of the Army. The NSA has an advisory role but he seems to be moving to an executive role against all norms. The roles of the Army vis-a vis the NSG, are clear and criss-crossing of turfs only adds to confusion. Nothing could be more flawed then remote controlling a situation like this, sitting at Delhi without any knowledge of ground realities. In calling in the NSG, no lessons seem to have been learnt after Mumbai 26/11, where vital hours were lost in getting the NSG into the act. No attempt was made to requisition the trained Infantry battalion located close by at Colaba or for that matter, to drive in infantry troops from Pune. At Pathankot it was a repeat. Again time was lost in flying in the NSG; whereas the immediate call should have been to rush in troops from the large trained force of infantry available close at hand; or, to fly in the crack special troops at Nahan. Forgotten was the fact that all Infantry battalions are well trained and capable of handling varied terrorist-related situations. Even in peace stations, especially in the vicinity of the International Border in sensitive areas like the Pathankot corridor, the vulnerable areas or points are identified, operations planned and rehearsed with quick-reaction teams on standby. An enhanced surveillance grid can be established in a very short time. The AFB, Pathankot, without doubt is an important vulnerable area, so keeping the Army out of the loop made no sense. One-upmanship showed up between ministries too. The Home Ministry was at the forefront, with the Ministry of Defence visibly on the backfoot. While the Defence Minister blows hot, the Home Minister shows a carrot.  Handling of grave situations cannot be done in such a lop-sided way or to prove a point. There is no shortcut to unity in security matters. For comprehensive national security, turf wars and parochialism has to be shed, issues of command and control have to be resolved without delay. A must is NSG must be headed by an Army officer and immediate intelligence sharing with those who have to act on it. Requirements of hi-tech equipment have to be met. For this, the post of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has to be created. We need to move from trust deficit and one-upmanship to mutual trust and unity. The writer is former Commandant, IMA & ex-Chairman, PPSC.

Col Ramesh Davesar (retd)

The country needs more Muslims in armed forces

Let us for a moment set aside the politico-religious aspects and purely focus on the socio-economic aspirations of Muslims. Due to various factors, Muslims are devoid of requisite employment opportunities. This needs to be addressed on priority.

In the backdrop of the socio-political scenario and to counter developments to destabilise the communal equilibrium for myopic interests, one finds that so-called “minority-welfare initiatives” launched are counter-productive. The net result is, let alone improve the socio-economic status of Muslims, it has made them easy prey to politicians and, to some extent, also to the fundamentalists.Explore job opportunities for  approximately the 10 crore Muslim youth not only to enhance their mainstream presence but also keep them away from being exploited by vested lobbies is a crucial issue. I often wonder, while all other employment avenues are discussed, why  are the armed forces, which provide equitable opportunities to all sections, are ignored and  not promoted amongst the Muslim youth by their own leaders? The result is that the representation of Muslims in the armed forces is woefully low. Therefore, we need to discuss the genesis of  poor representation and explore the remedial measures to facilitate their entry into the armed forces. This would assist in mitigating their socio-economic inequalities and incentivise their participation in nation building. Before proceeding further,  it is imperative to understand the recruitment modalities.  After Independence, keeping in mind our multi-ethnic society, and in order to provide equal opportunity to all citizens (particularly the under-represented sections), in 1949, the erstwhile British legacy of “Fixed Class Composition” was replaced with the indigenised policy of “All India All Class Composition,” thus implying that the units would have “mixed class culture”. In order to ensure equality to all, it was further streamlined during the 1970s, whereby the states were allotted the recruitment quota based on their “Recruitable Male Population” (RMP).To sum up, the current procedure provides equal opportunities to all Indian subjects, irrespective of religious affiliations. Thus it makes it all the more incumbent on Muslims to explore a military career.  It is prudent to highlight the contributions of Muslims in the armed forces. A majority of us, including Muslims themselves, are unaware of their sacrifice in defending the nation, which irrespective of numbers, has been on a par with others. Brigadier Usman and his brother Brigadier Gufran, in spite of professional luring from Pakistan, chose to stay back with the Indian Army. The former, known as “Saviour of Jhangar”  laid down his life and was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC). Later, Havaldar Abdul Hamid was awarded the Param Vir Chakra (PVC) in the 1965 war. His martyrdom is an embodiment of a supreme sacrifice for the nation. Contributions in military hierarchy have been equally commendable. So far, we have had one Air Chief, two Army Commanders and a host of two and three-star generals. Brigadier Sharif, known for his administrative skills, was picked up to to set up  the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA),  Mussoorie.They have carved out an indelible niche in academics and defence research. The present Vice Chancellor of Aligarh University is a retired three-star general. A leading defence analyst is also an Army veteran and a retired Lt-General commendably commanded the Corps in the Valley and is a voracious writer on security matters. Iconic sacrifices and services must be utilised by Muslims to motivate their youth to join the armed forces. Why should Muslims, with a 14.3  per cent population share, just account for 2 per cent in the armed forces. In striking contrast, despite mass-scale immigration and attractive employment options, the Sikhs, another minority with a paltry 1.72 per cent population share, have 15 and 20 per cent share in other ranks and officers’ categories, respectively. Similarly, the Christians, with 2.3 per cent population share, have matching representation in the armed forces. Of late, there is welcome increase of Muslims’ intake in the civil services and the IPS by over 3 per cent and is presently pegged at 3.31 and 3.66 per cent, respectively. Similarly, there is a perceptible increase in  the states’ police  and the Central Armed Police Forces. Why has the option for the armed forces been stagnant?Primarily, it is parents, society and academics who play important role in shaping and motivating the youth to select  a career. All Punjabis, (including those in West Punjab) in general and Sikhs in particular, have imbibed family and community support, motivation by the educational and religious institutions to channel youth to opt for a military career. Rightly so, the Punjabis not only enjoy a sizeable presence in India but also dominate the military in Pakistan. As a Punjabi, I vividly recall my formative years and the preaching of elders highlighting the nobility of an Army career during various social,  family and the religious congregations calling upon youth to join the armed forces. With great pain, one finds these aspects are inexplicably missing amongst Muslims. Apart from the national effort, which undoubtedly must speed up, it is the “in-house” initiatives which must provide initial grooming and motivation. First of all, the parents, who, by citing the contributions made by their community both during the pre and post-Independence epoch, must encourage and motivate their wards to choose an Army career. Educational institutions, most importantly the “community-run” institutions must take over to further channel the youth towards a military career. In order to achieve the desired recruitment trajectory, Muslim military veterans must get together to plan long-term strategy and  organise seminars, workshops and conduct lectures as also hold “Defence Exhibitions” to motivate youth at school, college and university levels. Further, to promote “inclusive community participation”, the services of Muslim political as well as religious leaders who are looked up to and heeded with reverence must be solicited. Their influence on the youth must be utilised to shed diffidence and opt for a career in the Army. The writer is a veteran.