On the eve of his recent visit to India, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan made an unsolicited offer on Kashmir ~ “We should not allow more casualties to occur (in Kashmir). By having a multilateral dialogue, we can be involved and we can seek ways to settle the issue once and for all”. Implicit was the message on taking a deliberate ‘position’. The deeply hyphenated Indo-Pak relationship is a conundrum for any visiting dignitary ~ either to Delhi or to Islamabad ~ to take a ‘side’. This invariably gets deciphered by the dignitary by alluding to Kashmir as either a ‘bilateral issue’ (decoded as a pro-India stance, that assumes no third party interference), or alternatively suggesting a potential solution framework of ‘multilateral dialogue’ (tantamount to supporting Pakistan’s singular quest to internationalise Kashmir). Turkey’s stand was certainly unwarranted, diplomatically ungracious and wholly avoidable, given the timing of the visit. It is not new, however.
Turkey has had an indelible imprint on the subcontinent’s psyche ~ from Mahmud of Ghazni, who was a Turkic Mumluk to the Khilafat movement (1919-1922) to save the Ottoman Caliphate. Turkey has held the popular imagination, especially for the ummah, who contextualised the country as a model Islamic state.
Logically, Partition on the basis of religious identity made Pakistan more aligned to the memories of the Ottoman Empire, although the founding father of the modern state of Turkey, Kemal Mustafa Ataturk, tried to firewall religiosity and its Islamist heritage. Since then, the latent Islamic fissures and strategic Cold War alignments (which put both Pakistan and Turkey on the same side as members of the US-led Central Treaty Organization ~ CENTO), as the bulwark states against the threats of the Soviets, ensured a more active Pakistan-Turkey relationship. Even from a regressive sectarian angle, the majority in both countries practise the Sunni Hanafi Islam. Today, Turkey’s swing from avowed secularism towards its more religious moorings, has found a new champion in President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party. This has had an impact on Turkey’s domestic politics, as indeed, its international posturing and visions of a “NeoOttoman” regime.
Erdogan has visited Pakistan as many as seven times. There is a historical connect between the two nations with a shared tryst and sensibilities of military men at the helm of affairs. Unlike Pakistan, however, the military in Turkey has been neutered with Erdogan’s successful Islamisation of governance. Many of Pakistan’s military top brass have been part of the extensive exchange-programmes. General Musharaf spent his impressionable school years in Turkey, can speak fluent Turkish, and is an ardent admirer of Kemal Mustafa Ataturk.
With such an empathetic sense of ‘progressive destiny’ in the global ummah, it is hardly surprising that Turkey routinely backs the Pakistan line in multilateral forums like OIC (on Kashmir), is cleverly part of ‘Uniting for Consensus Group’ that opposes the India-backed idea of an enlarged permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and worse, has supported China in the devious, ‘criteria-based approach’ for non- ’Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’ (NPT) states which unsurprisingly, makes a case to accommodate Pakistan, instead of India, in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This strategic bonhomie is reciprocated by Islamabad which supports Turkey’s stand on the ultra-sensitive issue of Cyprus for the Turks, as also, converging on the battlegrounds of the Middle East turmoil. Turkey, like Pakistan, is part of the 39-nation, ‘Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism’, now led by the former Pakistan army chief, General Raheel Sharif.
However, beyond religious and historical convergences and impulses, both Pakistan and Turkey project themselves as ‘model’ Islamic states. The recent tension with their principal ally ~ the US ~ has made these countries particularly brazen and hawkish in opposing the US. Both countries boast US bases and assets. The Incirlik base in Turkey has tactical nuclear weapons, while Pakistan is nuclear armed and dangerously flirts with China to offend the Americans. This larger geopolitical evolution lends itself to Turkish belligerence and support for Pakistan in the new strategic sweepstakes.
Even tactical irritants like the Afghan civil war, in which both Turkey and Pakistan are supporting opposing groups is conveniently overlooked, and Turkey props the Pakistani line in an ode to Erdogan’s comment about Pakistan being “a home away from home”. Pakistan is pro-Taliban given the Pashtun composition, whereas, Turkey is pro-Northern Alliance with a mélange of Turkic races.
Further, the preceding visit of the President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, just before Erdogan’s visit to Delhi would not have been received very favourably by Ankara, which is hypersensitive to perceived slights on such issues as Northern Cyprus, Kurds or more recently, the Gulen movement. With no major trade, geographical or strategic stake involved with India (as opposed to Pakistan), it makes political sense for Erdogan to champion the Pakistani stand on Kashmir, to further bolster his own Islamic identity and credentials.
In an unwarranted act of diplomatic provocation, the Turkish ambassador to Pakistan, recently spent over a week in Muzaffarabad (in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) to showcase his nation’s sympathy with Pakistan on Kashmir. Clearly, the optics of maintaining a ‘pro-Pakistan’ line is politically beneficial for Erdogan who has to contend with domestic power struggles between the forces of secularism and “alternative-politics”, exemplified by the military, the Kemalist outfits like the Republican People’s Party and from cult leaders like Fethullah Gulen. This has made Erdogan’s government circumspect in the context of US-Russia relations and yet retain his stance on the Islamist construct.
Erdogan is the ‘new sultan’ on the block, his tacit support for the Pakistani line is part of a carefully cultivated image and global aspirations in the larger perspective.
Far from mediating on Kashmir, Ankara has its hands tied in mediating with the European Union, which is opposed to his anti-Zionism and his autocratic streak. To that can be added Turkey’s relations with Russia and the US, the hapless Kurds and Armenians, homegrown Islamist-terror and the Middle East powers. Ankara’s relations with Syria and Iran are far from cordial.
Erdogan’s conduct in Delhi was rather undiplomatic. The ambitious semi-professional footballer-turned-conservativepolitician has his eyes and heart set in visions of ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ that necessitates exploiting any political opportunity, to enhance the relevance and legitimacy of the new-age Pasha from Turkey.
The writer is Lt Gen PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands & Puducherry