When the Army is called to aid the civil authorities, the operations are extremely sensitive. Patience and deliberation are of utmost importance. Minimum force and minimum collateral at the risk of own casualties is the thumb rule.

A tightrope walk: The Army had to proceed with caution and avoid collateral damage. Foreigners being airlifted from Rohtak, during the Jat agitation. Tribune Photo

The Jat Agitation in Haryana in February and the followup Prakash Singh report has brought to the fore key issues related to deployment of the Army in aid of the civil government. Both have received widespread coverage and discussion in the media, specially on the social media. The issue needs to be placed in perspective. It is necessary to understand the functioning and psyche of the Army in internal security operations; be it to aid civil authorities during natural calamities, rioting and unrest etc. or the more professional task in counter-terrorist operations. The Army always means business and therefore terms these as operations, however by nature these are offensive only while countering armed terrorists/ insurgents. Otherwise they have nothing to do with muscle and firepower. On the contrary, these operations are extremely sensitive, where patience and deliberation rule and there is no scope of instigating the population or getting carried away by any provocation by nefarious elements. The conduct has to be rational, minimum force and minimum collateral at the risk of own casualties is the thumb rule.The Army started its learning process in dealing with populations in a hostile environment in the North-East during the early years of countering insurgency in Nagaland (starting in late 1950s) and later in Mizoram. Lessons were there to learn from similar operations the world over but there were no copy-book solutions. One lesson was clear, that every insurgency had peculiarities and required ingenuity in handling. Strategy and tactics to be adopted also depended on whether operations were conducted in a foreign land against an alien people; or, within your country to handle misguided population. While in the former situation, strong-arm tactics to kill, collateral or imposing disliked measures like grouping of villages to isolate the insurgents were of no concern to the security forces but in the latter, strong-arm tactics are unacceptable and no contentious methods can be undertaken. Thus, over decades of operations in insurgency/terrorist-affected areas the Army evolved the concept of an “iron fist in a velvet glove,” while the iron fist is to counter the terrorists or other anti-national elements but more importantly was the velvet glove to deal with the majority peace-loving population. Collateral is a red herring and has immediate adverse affects; it is exploited by the terrorists/ insurgents/ rioters and their ilk to ignite the people which adversely affects operations. A hostile populace is a sure recipe for unsuccessful operations. Therefore, winning the confidence and goodwill of the local population is a must. Towards this the Army evolved the concept of a velvet glove or “Winning the Hearts and Minds (WHAM)” of people. WHAM is a well-articulated policy that has evolved and matured over years of experience and learning. It drives home the goodwill of the Army, and drives home that for a peaceful environment  is conducive for progress and prosperity. Once the confidence of the majority population is won it becomes that much easier to initially isolate and finally bring back the hostile elements back to the mainstream. WHAM activities by their very nature are carried out in close liaison with the civil administration and the involvement of the population who identify their wants and join hands with the Army. This policy has been successful in gaining the confidence of the locals; from initial small-scale projects like constructing playfields, minor water projects, road building, medical camps, veterinary camps etc. to major commercial, educational and technological spheres under Operation “Samaritan” in the North-East and Operation “Sadhbhavna” in the North. Cultural visits by schoolchildren and elders to places of interest have increased people-to-people contact countrywide, showcasing the progress of the nation and enhancing integration. However, in this entire well-meaning and humanitarian effort, the goodwill gained can be lost in a matter of hours. Collateral damage of any dimension, true or false, is a flashpoint and erupts without warning. It is often is a figment of imagination, created by anti-national elements or rioters etc. to up the ante and place the security forces on the defensive. Despite best efforts and repeatedly taking avoidable casualties to minimise collateral, a spark can always be created. For example, take  the recent alleged molestation case in Handwara, Kashmir, where a mountain was made even where there was no molehill.  It is against this backdrop that the conduct of the Army has to be seen when involved in any internal security action; the last thing that one would want is a hostile population to handle.The Army was called out during the Jat agitation. It was later construed that the presence of the Army had no effect. Did anyone rationalise the options available to the Army columns? Under no circumstance did the Army columns have the option of blasting their way through with tanks; infantry combat vehicles (which by the way are located in large numbers close at hand), heavy fire or even resorting to any violence. Despite incitement from the rioters, there was only one option to adopt a peaceful method and ensure no or minimal collateral and that is exactly what they did. To avoid any clashes or an adverse situation, troops were flown in by helicopters to begin with. As the situation improved, columns on foot moved forward to complete their allotted tasks.The Prakash Singh report mainly concluded a long-known fact that the Army should be used in internal security only as a last resort; and that repeated exposure of the Army in such operations will only reduce its effectiveness in internal security situations. However, the question here is whether or not the deployment of the Army in the agitation was a right step to bring the violent situation under control? Taking that the civil administration, the state police and the Central Police Forces abdicated their respective duties, leading to an “administrative paralysis,” with clear indications of internecine communal riots erupting, calling the Army in was possibly the right decision. This saved the situation from developing into another anti-Sikh mayhem as it happened in Delhi, where the Army arrived only when the damage was done. The report also goes on to add that the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) who evidently was sitting “dormant” at Chandigarh but had no hesitation in saying that the agitators were not daunted by the Army and that it is a matter of concern that the presence of the Army had “limited effect”. Strangely forgotten was the fact that 2,000 men of the Army effectively brought the situation under control where tens of thousands of the police/ CPOs failed.The Prakash Singh report seems to have ruffled some feathers and may finally not achieve its aim as is gradually becoming evident. The bureaucrats named are shouting blue murder, comments on an MP have been withdrawn, the role of the state police / CPOs seems to have been softpedalled, it reeks of an anti-Army bias. But the complete silence on appropriating any blame on the political leadership is indeed jarring. 

The writer is a former Commandant, IMA & ex-Chairman, PPSC.