Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd)
Former GOC, IPKF, Sri Lanka

There is never good news coming out of Afghanistan. The hype about Russia spearheading Afghanistan-Taliban reconciliation talks and India getting a US waiver on Chabahar Port is misplaced. Still, the third democratic election for the Afghan parliament last month, though at a horrendous cost — nearly 500 killed or wounded in the bloodiest resistance to elections by the Taliban — is a positive. The Americans are fighting their longest war abroad, having invested $1 trillion and losing 2,500 soldiers. Their reputation as the world’s most powerful nation, militarily and economically, is at stake following the British and Soviet retreat from Afghanistan.

According to Bob Woodward’s new book Fear: Trump in the White House, Prime Minister Modi told Trump at their first meeting in June 2017 at the White House that the US has got nothing out of Afghanistan. He told him: ‘Never has a country given so much away for so little in return’. Trump also noted: ‘Pakistan is not helping us. They’re not a real friend (sic) despite $1.3 billion annual aid the US gives them.’ Later he raged: ‘All we’ve got from Pakistan is lies and deceit’. The outburst against Pakistan could have been influenced by Modi’s remarks. Come to think of it, India has invested $2 billion in development and committed another $1 billion in aid. All India has got in return is the goodwill of Afghans and high ratings in popularity charts. India does not exercise any influence in shaping policy like Pakistan does. Not for nothing is it said that the road to peace in Afghanistan runs through Rawalpindi.

Trump teasing Modi?

Woodward also says in his book that Trump asked Modi why India did not put boots on the ground in Afghanistan. He does not indicate Modi’s response. According to the media, at a meeting on the sidelines of ASEAN and East Asia summit in Manila,Trump is supposed to have mimicked Modi, whom he had  called a ‘friend of mine’. Last month, Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman had informed her US counterpart Jim Mattis at an ASEAN plus defence ministers’ meeting that India could not provide troops in Afghanistan despite its vital security interests there. The reason for refusal was not mentioned in the news report. One can assume that India does not wish to antagonise the Taliban which considers New Delhi an important friend, good for Afghanistan’s development. This is a Taliban volte face: both on development and considering India a friend.

The second reason is simply geographical — without a contiguous border, maintenance of a light division of 20,000 troops is difficult. Further, Indian troops in Afghanistan for Pakistan will be like a red rag to a bull. Finally, the US will not want to complicate further the Afghan imbroglio. A Trump adviser said: ‘Trump is only teasing Modi’.Not many troops to spare

India at any time has some 8,000-9,000 troops on UN Peace Keeping operation missions. In addition it holds another 10,000 soldiers as strategic reserve. Given the inflamed situation in Kashmir and a stressed border with China, it can ill afford to commit more than a brigade — 5,000 soldiers — for out-of-area operations, which is anyway too little for effect.

In 2003, the US Defence Department had asked India for an infantry division for Iraq. Then Army Chief Gen Vij argued based on the Sierra Leone fiasco that a self-contained battle group was necessary to combat any unforeseen contingency. This required attaching an armoured brigade to the infantry division to give it more weight and fire power. In order to maintain one division and a brigade on an expeditionary mission, a minimum of two additional brigades would have to be earmarked as backup and relief. With nearly one brigade already deployed in Lebanon, Eritrea and Congo, it was unwise to despatch such a large fighting force in a region where India’s intrinsic national interests were not at stake. But it would serve to demonstrate a BJP-led government’s solidarity with Washington. Vij also mentioned in his written note to the government that the Army had  been deployed for a full 12 months in Operation Parakram which had created turbulence in peace tenures and training cycles.

The Chabahar carveout

Further, the situation in Kashmir was worsening. The question of command and control (Indian troops never served abroad except under the UN flag), cost and logistics were also raised. The lifeline for the task force from Mumbai to Basra would be long and tenuous. A unanimous resolution in Parliament rejected the idea of sending troops to Iraq and took the Army off the hook. The same would certainly happen in case of Afghanistan. For Afghanistan, a carve-out for Chabahar by US sanctions regime on Iran has come.

India has to be proactive. For too long and in too many hot spots, New Delhi has adopted its favourite wait-and-watch mode. Like Karzai earlier, President Ghani was asking in September for additional lethal military hardware in accordance with the Strategic Partnership Treaty of 2010. The list included four armed helicopters which are to come from Belarus and paid for by India. India wants to stick to soft aid which wins you friends but little influence. It is probably time to deploy a full-fledged training team in Tajikistan, backed by a field hospital. The air field at Ainey in Tajikistan that India shares with Russia and is serviced by the Indian Air Force is available for forward deployment.

The ultimate counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism baptism is to be had in Afghanistan. Kashmir is a cakewalk in comparison.